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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to present a naturalised 
metaphysics of information, or to naturalise information, by 
way of deploying a scientiﬁc metaphysics according to 
which contingency is privileged and a-priori conceptual 
analysis is excluded (or at least greatly diminished) in 
favour of contingent and defeasible metaphysics. The 
ontology of information is established according to the 
premises and mandate of the scientiﬁc metaphysics by 
inference to the best explanation, and in accordance with 
the idea that the primacy of physics constraint 
accommodates defeasibility of theorising in physics. This 
metaphysical approach is used to establish a ﬁeld ontology 
as a basis for an informational structural realism. This is in 
turn, in combination with information theory and 
speciﬁcally mathematical and algorithmic theories of 
information, becomes the foundation of what will be called 
a source ontology, according to which the world is the 
totality of information sources. Information sources are to 
be understood as causally induced conﬁgurations of 
structure that are, or else reduce to and/or supervene upon, 
bounded (including distributed and non-contiguous) 
regions of the heterogeneous quantum ﬁeld (all quantum 
ﬁelds combined) and ﬂuctuating vacuum, all in accordance 
with the above-mentioned quantum ﬁeld-ontic 
informational structural realism (FOSIR.) Arguments are 
presented for realism, physicalism, and reductionism about 
information on the basis of the stated contingent scientiﬁc 
metaphysics. In terms of philosophical argumentation, 
realism about information is argued for primarily by way  
2of an indispensability argument that defers to the practice of 
scientists and regards concepts of information as just as 
indispensable in their theories as contingent representations 
of structure. Physicalism and reductionism about 
information are adduced by way of the identity thesis that 
identiﬁes the substance of the structure of ontic structural 
realism as identical to selections of structure existing in re to 
combined heterogeneous quantum ﬁelds, and to the total 
heterogeneous quantum ﬁeld comprised of all such ﬁelds. 
Adjunctly, an informational statement of physicalism is 
arrived at, and a theory of semantic information is 
proposed, according to which information is intrinsically 
semantic and alethically neutral.
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Difficulties associated with the newness of the discipline of the philosophy of
information and information theory are well documented by philosophers of in-
formation, scientists, and mathematicians: especially with respect to how broad,
ill-defined, and confused many of its concepts are (Floridi, 2011c; Adami, 2016;
Dretske, 1981; Lombardi, 2004; Timpson, 2013; Griffiths, 2001; Adriaans, 2010;
Floridi, 2009a; Vitanyi, 2000; Lombardi et al., 2016; Ferguson, 2015; Adams
and de Moraes, 2016; Kraemer, 2015; Caticha, 2014.) To make matters more
challenging, in pursuing my project of developing a naturalistic metaphysics of
information, I intend application of - and a limited development of - a compar-
atively new kind of metaphysics (not of my own design): the scientific meta-
physics suggested recently in the work of both ontic and informational structural
realists James Ladyman and Don Ross, with reference also to the work of Steven
French and Paul Humphreys (Ladyman and Ross, 2013; Ladyman, 2011; Ross
et al., 2013; Humphreys, 2013; French, 2014.)
There is significant philosophical value in coherently identifying any central
conception and definition of information that somehow corresponds to some in-
dependently existing thing (or category) in the world (Gillies, 2010, 8; Caticha,
2014, 38.) More straightforwardly, there is a benefit in identifying, if it exists,
whatever the real thing is in the world, and especially the material world, that
satisfies certain intuitive, but, more importantly, scientific, criteria and require-
ments for properties and characteristics that information must have: again, on
scientific grounds. I will specify what these scientific grounds are by way of
establishing a scientific metaphysics specifically for approaching the question of
the nature of information.
Often in physics and molecular bioscience - even when there is a context that
suggests some kind of statistical conception of information - it seems evident
that there is some conception of some thing being transmitted or transferred
from one spatiotemporal location to another: something apart from a reduction
in the objective uncertainty about the next state of a dynamic state of affairs.
The term ‘information’ is used as the basis for many scientific explanations,
to the extent that in philosophy at least it has become something of a ‘weasel
word’ in many applications. Information is often the stipulated arbitrary and
undefined ontic basis for many descriptions and explanations in philosophy and
science.
I have some sympathy for what has come to be known as ‘Canberra Plan’
metaphysics, according to which so called a-priori judgements and conceptual
analysis are necessarily informed by or include upstream contingently acquired
empirical evidence or information ( Braddon-Mitchell and Nola, 2009; Jackson,
1994; Chalmers and Jackson, 2001.) However, I am not interested in analysing
platitudes for epistemic applications, and I am only interested in intuitions when
they belong to scientists making metaphysical judgements while doing science,
and perhaps in the intuition that pluralism about the nature of information is
probably true at higher levels of abstraction, explanation, and/or description.
I have no intention of pursuing a naturalised (reliabilist) epistemology based
based upon a naturalisation of information as leading philosophers of informa-
tion have done (although I think the project will be contingently successful.) I
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am interested in the naturalisation of information only, and on a very specific
basis: that basis being an identity thesis that locates the physical structure
of physicalist ontic structural realism in re to/within heterogeneous bounded
regions of quantum fields comprising together the universal quantum field and
vacuum. I’ll achieve this by combining a field ontology forquantum field theory
(QFT) with an informational adaptation of ontic structural realism, and with
what I will call a source ontology. I am going to do, and refer to, only as much
quantum field theory (I’ll do precious little mathematics) as I have to and am
able to. I will mostly stand on the shoulders of philosophers of physics and pop-
ularising physicists, with some harder material from the philosophy of physics
and science, and scientific realism, ad-mixed.
When it comes to naturalising information, at minimum I agree with David
Papineau’s weaker non-a-priorism about epistemology and metaphysics which
states that the a-priori is meaningful (meaning it is not nonsense and not epis-
temically vacuous) but that it is unimportant and irrelevant to philosophy. More
strongly, and specifically for naturalising information, I don’t reject - as Pa-
pineau does - Michael Devitt’s assertion that there is no a-priori - or more
precisely that there is no such thing as a-priori knowledge about scientific meta-
physical facts, among others (Devitt, 1998; Devitt, 2005; Papineau, 1993.) I
think Devitt’s proposed abduction holds: knowledge about things like mathe-
matical and logical truths that seems a priori is empirical after all and based
on upstream empirical evidence (see also Chalmers and Jackson, 2001), while
explanations for how a priori knowledge about such things could obtain sans
empirical acquisition are unsatisfying. I take it that this approach coheres (ad-
equately) with the ‘viking’ (raider) metaphysics of Steven French, according to
which we can ‘raid’ the store of a-priori metaphysical assertions and hypotheses
about the world to acquire that in it which is apt to be used in a contingent or
scientific metaphysical manner (French, 2014.) Devitt and Papineau’s respective
non-a-priorist (anti-a-priorist in Devitt’s case) epistemologies are a continuation
of the best part of the debate between Rudolph Carnap and W.V.O Quine about
the coherence of metaphysics and its relevance to science and philosophy (Quine,
1951; Alspector-Kelly, 2001; Devitt, 2010.)
1 Metaphilosophy and Methodology - Scientific
Metaphysics
Something very like David Papineau and Michael Devitt’s respective non-a-
priori and anti-a-priori stances are applied in contemporary scientific realism
for metaphysics under the head of what is now called scientific metaphysics, the
proponents of which are usually ontic structural realists of some non-eliminative
(about objects) stripe. There are correspondingly different - stronger and weaker
- versions of scientific metaphysics available. Ladyman and Ross’ and Paul
Humphreys’ versions accommodate something closer to Devitt’s eliminativism
or total epistemic eschewal of a priori conceptual analysis, and thus tends also
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to be friendly to Rudolph Carnap’s dim view of a-priori metaphysical analyses
(Humphreys, 2013; Ladyman and Ross, 2013.) While the interpretation offered
by Steven French retains those analytic a priori conceptual analyses that are apt
to be appropriated to contingent applications (French calls this appropriation
of a priori constructs to contingent metaphysics ‘Viking metaphysics’ French,
2014.) I will favour such a metaphysics (more so the epistemically Devitt-
aligned versions of Ladyman and Ross and Humphreys) and thus largely avoid
a-priori analytic metaphysics and conceptual analysis in favour of deferring to
the ontology identified by most physics.
My chosen ontology of information will be arrived at by exploiting formal
theories of information and quantum field theory to identify what has come to be
known in the literature as a field ontology by way of an unusual identity thesis:
between the structure about which ontic structural realists like both French
and Ladyman and Ross are realist, and selected structure existing in re in the
quantum field (until - in accordance with defeasible science - something else
is discovered to provide a better basis that quantum field theory) (Cao, 1997;
Wayne, 2008; Teller, 2010; Lam and Esfeld, 2012.) So, metametaphysically,
my approach is intended to be neither stipulative, a-priori, nor based upon
conceptual analysis.
There is wide disagreement within philosophy and across the sciences about
the nature of information - enough to lead many theorists to conclude that
eliminativism and anti-realism about information, or something converging up
them, must be true (Levy, 2011; Sommaruga, 2009.) Hence the propensity for
leading theorists like Luciano Floridi to reject any idea of a central or overarch-
ing concept of information, favouring instead non-reductionism and pluralism
(Floridi, 2004a; Floridi, 2011a, 217.) Moreover, there is enough disagreement
among physicists and philosophers of physics about the ontological implications
of both information theory and quantum theory, including (but not limited to)
quantum information theory, such that a metaphysical discussion about both
the nature of the quantum field and of information and how they might be
associated is meaningful in philosophical and in scientific terms (Esfeld, 2014;
Wayne, 2008; Teller, 1995; Fraser, 2004a; Kuhlmann, 2010b; Lyre, 2004; Rickles,
2008c; Everett, 2012; Redhead, 1995.)
It does not follow from the definitional uncertainty and semantic pluralism
in the field that one should deploy either a-priori analytic methods (apart from
logic), or conceptual analysis, for the task of adducing a metaphysics (Rickles,
2008a, 1-2; Ross et al., 2013; Humphreys, 2013.) While I have some sym-
pathies and a predilection for Canberra Plan metaphysics, my methodological
and metaphilosophical approach will involve ontological minimalism approach-
ing nominalism. However, as I will argue at §3.4.1 p117, §1.2 p34, and §4.3.1
p147, nominalism is not an accurate label for the approach, which is information-
theoretic in its motivation, and has a scientific metaphysical - and therefore
largely scientific realist - basis (although, as I will demonstrate in chapters 1, 2
and 5, leading field ontologies and scientific structural realisms differ widely in
their ontological commitments.)
As briefly mentioned above I will identify and establish the scientific criteria
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and requirements for the existence nature of information largely by recourse to
inference to the best explanation (IBE) and a specific kind of indispensability
argument (§2 p23, §3 p28, §4 p29, §2.1 p55.) I take both inference to the best
explanation, induction, and indispensability arguments, all to be befitting of,
and apt for deployment in accordance with, scientific metaphysical premises and
principles of the kind I will present.
The locus classicus (and original) indispensability argument is undoubtedly
the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for realism about mathematical
entities (Putnam, 1979, 323–358; Colyvan, 2001, 10-20.) According to the
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, for what is effectively a form of Pla-
tonist realism about mathematical entities, we should believe in the existence
of Platonic abstract mathematical entities because reference to those entities
is ineliminable in our best scientific theories, implying that realism about such
entities is required for the solutions, explanations, and saving of the phenomena
that those theories include or embody. I will be deploying a different variant
of this indispensability argument in keeping with the premises of the scientific
metaphysics of information I will develop. Like the Quine-Putnam indispens-
ability argument, it makes an inference to the existence of something in the
world that fulfils the role of information, from the comprehensive use of ref-
erences to structure, information, and informational dynamics and concepts in
our best scientific theories.
My overall approach, then, involves identifying, in accordance with scientific
metaphysical premises, the indispensability, in the hard and special sciences,
of realism about information, informational quantities and qualities, and/or
to information dynamics and phenomena, as evidenced by the use of either
information-theoretic terms and principles directly, or else terms and concepts
associated with structural-causal dynamics that form the basis of such things as
encoding, decoding, transfer, compression, translation, processing, programs,
data, data representation, signification, generation, channels, messages, sym-
bols, transmission, and signals. Information theory, in this connexion, is broadly
construed as including classical Shannonian, algorithmic(Andre Kolmogorov
and Ray Solomonov), computational, and hybrid conceptions, and any other
formulations that arise on a defeasible or revisionary basis that are similarly
reducible to the same basis in structure and structural dynamics. The next step
(or, leg or pillar, perhaps) of the approach involves identifying a physicalist and
reductionist (in keeping with the prescribed scientific metaphysics) metaphysical
core conception of information on the basis of inference to the best explanation
in conjunction with the aforementioned scientific metaphysics.
Importantly, I do not need the indispensability argument to directly either
entail or imply, on its own, the specific field-ontological conception of informa-
tion that I will propose according to scientific metaphysics and IBE. Thus:
i. The indispensability type argument (IA) and contingent (a-priori-analysis-
eschewing) scientific metaphysics delivers - or is intended to strongly imply
the truth of - realism about (structurally based) information in the hard and
special sciences (and about such things as natural encoding, transmission,
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and natural decoding, among other dynamics.)
ii. Inference to the best explanation, in conjunction with the aforementioned
scientific metaphysical approach, is, subsequently, intended to deliver, in
the form of a field-ontological informational structural realism (FOSIR), a
best candidate 1 for the basis of the nature of information (§3.1 p81, §3.2
p83, §4.3 p142, §3.5 p133.)
The indispensability argument I deploy (i.) has nothing to do with inferring
either the epistemic value, or the necessity, of realism about Platonic entities,
especially since I will argue, on the basis of the associated scientific metaphysics,
that Platonic entities could not, in-principle, be informational (§1.4 p47.2) In-
stead, it’s indispensability, by way of reference and representation, of what,
according again to our best science, are naturally obtaining information, and
informational dynamics and phenomena - even when these are do not involve
explicit use of the term ‘information’. Importantly, I don’t need to argue directly
for the indispensability of the specific naturalised conception of the nature of
information that I argue for by way inference to the best explanation (ii.) I’ll
attempt to establish that via scientific metaphysics coupled with IBE (Refer
especially to §3.2 p83.)
However, critically, I suggest that if the indispensability argument goes
through for realism about natural I -obtaining information, and then the ar-
gument from scientific metaphysics and IBE goes through for the field onto-
logical conception of information in nature, then I get indispensability of the
field-ontological informational-structuralist account of natural information tran-
sitively, for free, so to speak, with the assistance of the prescribed contingent
scientific metaphysical premises. However, in accordance with the tenets of the
scientific metaphysics I will propose, I get it for free defeasibily. If QFT ends
up bowing to a greater physics, then that physics should serve as the new (con-
tingent) ontic basis for informational structure and information. I doubt that
there will be a need to revise out the concept of structure, and I do not need to
rely on a-priori reasoning for this doubt: I can defer to an empiricist, contingent
scientific metaphysics since structure is as foundational to naturalistic scientific
practice as causation. In other words, on a defeasible, scientific metaphysical,
non-a-priori basis, if field-ontic structural informational realism is the best can-
didate for fulfilling the role of being the ontic basis of information in nature, then
1Something like the best-deserver of Canberra plan metaphysics.
2For the philosopher of mathematics now wondering what mathematical entities are ac-
cording to the metaphysics that I will offer: they are informational but not Platonic, on a basis
not dissimilar to the way that is suggested by Aristotelian in re realism about mathematical
entities, but with a basis in information dynamics and a form of informational ontic structural
realism. I do not have the space to develop this, but it has a basis in the black-box encod-
ing/encoder approach to theory representation that I do herein develop §6.2.1 p212. Other
than that it has to remain a promissory note, with the attached caution that my ontological
conception of information is not mathematical. According to my approach, mathematical ab-
stracta and representations are abstractive encodings of information from structured sources.
Mathematics is not the basis of information, ontologically speaking: only of its measures and
metrics.
18
it (field ontic structural informational realism or FOSIR) is strongly implicated
also on the basis of an indispensability argument for causal and structural infor-
mation in our best scientific theories made on the same scientific metaphysical
basis.
Importantly, the indispensability argument about information that I will de-
velop (ii.) differs from its Quine-Putnam pro-Platonism forebear insofar as it
is arguably stronger. It’s stronger in the sense that (trivially, I suggest) struc-
ture, causal pathways, and causation are indispensable to science more than is
mathematics. In fact, causal pathways, causation and structure, whatever they
actually are, and however they are systematically characterised (and it’s not un-
fair to baldly state that most scientists take both to be physical in some way),
are not just indispensable, but are all foundational, to science and the practice
of saving the phenomena. This makes evident the mutually supporting nature
of the indispensability argument for realism about information (i.) and the in-
ference to the best explanation argument for the nature of information as based
upon informational structure (ii.) The reductive and defeasible conception of
information according to IBE - the CICS or causally-induced configuration of
structure conception - broadens the scope of application of the indispensabil-
ity argument so that it applies not only to informational terms and references
specifically, but to the structural and causal reductive basis thereof. There is
no circularity involved, since i (IA) and ii (IBE) can stand independently of one
another.
It’s also important that there are different ways of interpreting the basis
of the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument (Busch and Morrison, 2016;
Busch, 2012; Colyvan, 2001, 1-12, 40-44.) The three commonly identified premises
are Quinean naturalism, confirmational holism, and inference to the best expla-
nation. Quinean naturalism bids us to regard science only as the sufficient basis
for understanding nature and natural phenomena. Confirmational holism as-
serts that there are only arbitrary distinctions between natural concrete and
abstract mathematical entities in scientific theories, and that realism about the
former should be accompanied by realism about, and belief in, the latter, as
part of the ontology. According to confirmational holism, all of the referents in
a theory are taken together as real:
Adopting confirmational holism ensures that there won’t be any
discrimination between empirical and non-empirical parts of a theory
when it comes to confirmation (Busch, 2012, 5.)
Eliot Sober has used confirmational holism as a foil against Quine-Putnam
indispensability of Platonic math abstracta, since there are non-mathematical
versions of some theories that are as complete in scientific terms as their math-
ematical counterparts (Ibid, 4-6, Sober, 1993.)
Jacob Busch also reminds us of Penelope Maddy’s argument that confirma-
tional holism is flawed due to the fact that scientists often employ useful fictions
that are not intended to pick out any real referent in the ontology (Maddy,
1992.) As such (per a distinction I will draw later that Maddy and other indis-
pensability theorists do not draw) those entities or dynamics might be thought
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of as in the ontology of the theory, but not in what I will call the I-ontology:
the mind, language, computation, and theory independent ontology from which
representing structure in the theory are encoded. (See §1.3 p37.)
My indispensability argument for realism about information (ii. §1 p16)
does not require confirmational holism, and nor does it require the absence
thereof. A salient comparison would be between the ratio of confirming non-
mathematical to mathematical theories, as compared to the ratio of confirming
theories that do not reference dynamical structures, signaling, casual pathways,
or other informational and transmission dynamics, against those that do make
such references. Many theories readily omit reference to informational dynam-
ics using the term ‘information’ itself, but if one includes the entire vocabulary
of information theory, informational dynamics, and dynamical structural, and
causal language that it can be reduced to or that constitute it in other ways (en-
coding, signalling, entropy, compression, data, transmission, transfer, channels,
casual pathways, codes, transduction, sources, and so on), then the number of
non-information-referencing confirming theories is, in-principle and practically,
significantly reduced, along with the relevant ratio. Perhaps more significantly,
the number of leading and important scientific theories in the hard and special
sciences that make no terminological or representational direct or indirect refer-
ence to information dynamics and elements is few overall. This is even more the
case if one includes statistically based theories that make use of convergences,
divergences, and other comparative statistical measures between random vari-
ables such as Fisher and Kullback-Leibler information measures, since I will offer
a way of construing frequentist statistics physicalistically (Ladyman and Ross,
2013 do something similar for their conception of statistics qua physical stochas-
ticity; Kullback, 1959.) Put in a different way - if there is a theory that can be
stated using informational, information theoretic, and information-dynamical
terms and references on the requisite basis, then any confirming theory that
does not overtly deploy such terms and references is likely to be found to be
relying on concepts and terms that reduce in some way to (or at least supervene
upon) informational terms and concepts, or else to provide a reductive basis
for them. It will be as difficult to remove from the confirming theory concepts
of, and references to, structure, causation, and causal pathways, and according
to my argument for my characterisation of the nature of information, informa-
tion reduces to the causally induced configuration of structure. (§3.3 p101.)
My indispensability argument for realism about information (ii.) relies upon
Quinean naturalism, and in-principle upon what Colyvan refers to as Quine’s
“ontological commitment of theories” - as delivered by the ontological commit-
ment of the existentially quantified entities of theories regimented in Quinean
fashion using first-order formal logic. It can also be regarded as involving its
own inference to the best explanation for why there are so often informational
terms and representations in working theories. Thus IBE will play a dual role at
the level of metametaphysics and methodology herein. The first role will be to
point to a specific field-ontological and ontic structural conception of the nature
of information. The second and separate role will be to constitute part of an
indispensability argument for realism about information.
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2 Physicalist, Structuralist Realism about In-
formation
In terms of the metaphysics of (the nature of) information itself, the central
and most radical proposal I will defend is that information only exists physi-
cally. More specifically, that it necessarily existentially depends upon and re-
duces to physical spatiotemporal structures and structures that reduce to such
structures. These structures, as I have mentioned, I take to be or else reduce
(ontologically) to structures that inhere in re in the quantum field. I will refer
to the totality of all quantum fields for all standard model particle realisations
and other non-standard properties as the quantum field and vacuum. I’ll ar-
gue that the structures that ontic structural realists should be realist about
inhere in the quantum field and vacuum thus defined in the sense that they
existentially depend upon it and exist in re in it. More specifically, within
heterogeneous bounded regions of it, including regions that are non-contiguous,
non-continuous, and distributed. 3.2.1. In other words I will be combining what
is called a specific field ontology for quantum field theory with ontic structural
realist ontology on a scientific metaphysical and contingent basis to naturalise
information.
In pursuing this end, issues arise with the scientific ontological status of
fields, quantum systems, spacetime, and their representation in physics. Later
in the thesis I will explain why physicalism about information is not simply
trivial, and not just a restatement of token physicalism (1.1, 7.4.2.) My claim
throughout will be that my scientific metaphysics allows me to defer to discov-
eries and applied mathematical theories in science to discover the nature and
ontological content of information in accordance with the defeasible nature of
science and scientific theorising. This defeasibility of science does a lot of work
in the interpretation of scientific metaphysics that I will deploy (2.2.)
In defining and identifying what they are ontic structural scientific real-
ists about, ontic structural realists Ladyman and Ross stop at non-redundant
statistics - which exists physically and mind and language independently as the
basis of their scientific metaphysics and non eliminative (about objects) ontic
structural realism (NOSR), which is not specifically an informational NOSR.
French’s scientific realist ontology instead stops at modal innateism (French,
2014.) Floridi, whose adaptation of NOSR is informational (informational struc-
tural realism) stops at a transcendentalist conception of data which reduces to
infons and ontologically neutral differences de re (6.2.) I stop at whatever
physics ends up contingently discovering - defeasibly - is the objective ontologi-
cal content (causally induced physical configuration of) of spacetime, and more
specifically heterogeneous bounded regions of the quantum field, as referred to
in our best quantum field theories (Cao, 2003a, 25-7, 29-30.)
To grasp the relevance of my proposed version of physicalism about informa-
tion at the outset, consider the question of dualism about mind versus identity
theory and epiphenomenalism. The debate about mind and the explanatory
gap usually centres upon whether or not the mind reduces in principle and
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practically to the physical neurological processing of information. The physical-
ism about information that I will espouse means my anti-dualist claim is even
stronger: the mind is the physical processing of necessarily physical information.
It’s not just the mind that reduces to and is identical with (in identity theoretic
and epiphenominal terms) physical systems and stochastic and non-stochastic
physical processes (contemporary information theory includes both kinds of in-
formation source), but the information involved is necessarily only physical, as
there is no such thing as non-physical or non-physically-reducing information. I
am not the first person to suggest physicalism about information (Gillies, 2010,
8), but I am not aware of anyone else that has attempted to do so by combining
quantum field theory (QFT) with structural realism and scientific metaphysics,
and without putting information at the bottom of the ontology as Floridi has
done (Bawden and Robinson, 2013; DiVincenzo and Loss, 1998; Landauer, 1999;
Esfeld and Lam, 2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2010; Allo, 2010; Floridi, 2008a.)
This physicalist (and significantly reductionist) move will likely seem wrong
to many, for a number of reasons including - but not limited to - concerns about
obvious pluralist deployment of the term ‘information’ in the sciences, non-
reductive physicalism and emergent phenomena, and the overtly statistical and
algorithmic basis of much of information theory. Not to mention the infamous
difficulties associated with defining the physical itself (7.1.) I do not intend to
argue that pluralism about information in scientific praxis - even within hard
scientific subdisciplines - does not occur. It obviously does, although some the-
orists working at a more mathematical level commonly try to unify algorithmic
information or complexity theory with classical information theory (Chaitin,
1975; Gru¨nwald and Vita´nyi, 2003; Calude, 2009, 86-9.) However, when in-
formation scientists, quantum information theorists, black hole physicists, and
those dealing with the question of quantum entanglement and Bell’s theorems
(and the possibility of superluminal information transmission - see Al-Safi and
Short, 2011, 1-3) all start referring to information as a central element of their
theory, then it looks like more than just intuition that is suggesting a common
referent. At the very least the ontology of their various theories requires - or
is encoding representations and concepts from or reading off - a common con-
ceptual and ontological referent for the term ‘information’. Then, when many
of them start discussing information as entropy and trying to identify the right
alternative between Von Neumann, Boltzmann, and Shannon entropy, or even
trying to reconcile these in the context of - say - thermodynamics: then it looks
like it is not just deference to Shannon’s theory that is the common ontological
and methodological currency (Sagawa and Ueda, 2009; Tribus, 1963; Bennett
et al., 1993.)
This alone does not tend to imply, let alone entail, the truth of physicalism
about information. There are many detractors in the sciences who have con-
cluded that the attempts at synthesis are an inappropriate confusion (and in
some cases this may well be true. See Oppenheim, 2010, 84-5.) However, in
molecular bioscience, numerous geneticists and biophysicists have tried to do
perform exactly the same kinds of unification or synthesis in order to capture
adequate detail and express a more complete theoretical and natural ontology
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- especially where physics and genetics meet in studies of protein folding and
other areas like neuroscience (Galas et al., 2010; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2008;
Zhao et al., 2006.)
These observations must - at this early point in my presentation - be (tem-
porarily) informal. However, consider that in molecular bioscience, biophysics,
quantum information theory, and quantum computing theory, measures of in-
formation are almost comprehensively measures of either entropy, or measures
of specifically structural complexity, or unifications of the two ( Plastino et al.,
1997; 129-30; Dierckx et al., 2008, 1-2, 8-9; Landauer, 1999; Vitanyi and Li,
2009; Adami and Steeg, 2014; Aguirre et al., 2015; Al-Safi and Short, 2011;
Altschul et al., 2009; Bavaud, 2009; Bawden and Robinson, 2013; Artiga, 2014;
Barbieri, 2012; Bekenstein, 2004; Eidhammer et al., 2004; Collier, 2008; Zurek,
1989; Zhao et al., 2006; Wheeler, 1989; Uhlmann, 1970; Frieden and Gatenby,
2013.) Consider also the relationship between complexity and entropy in com-
plexity theory and physics ( Anand et al., 2011; Barnum et al., 2012.)
There are at least two initial challenges in presenting such a metaphysical
conception of information (I deal with them both in Chapters 1 and 4.) Ini-
tial responses often involve a charge of token physicalism, and just as in the
philosophy of mathematics, there is platonism to contend with. The charge of
token physicalism is not a serious threat. It makes a significant difference to
the ontology of scientific theories that information is and reduces to something
physical rather than - say - some kind of Platonic abstracta, or some kind of
subjective epistemic content and/or subjective statistical outcome (elements of
each of which may be taken to involve Platonic entities.) Moreover, there are a
number of non-reductive physicalists who take information to be part of what-
ever exists in the world that cannot be reduced, or even to be additionally or
else alternatively something subjective and/or mind-dependent. In some cases
such physicalists allow that information either does or can exist in some kind
of Platonic abstract space as some kind of Platonic abstracta. In chapter 3
and 4 I move to apply the principles of scientific metaphysics to non eliminative
structural realism (NOSR), thus arriving at what I call ontic structural informa-
tional realism (OSIR) by field ontology (FOSIR.) I distinguish OSIR from the
well known ISR (informational structural realism) of Floridi (Floridi, 2008a.
I leave the work of comparing FOSIR to other non-field ontic informational
structural realisms to 6.4.)
What I am at this point not informally intuiting - but instead observing
commensurate with the tenets of scientific metaphysics (Chapter 1-2) - is that
there appears to be a scientific praxis-driven conceptual convergence, as well
as a set of common conclusions from different hypothetico-deductive inductions
in different fields, towards a physicalist - or at least a scientific realist - under-
standing of the nature of information. As I will also proceed to argue in the
early chapters, however, what is being deployed is not some commitment to a
natural kind (in line with Wiener’s famous dictum Wiener, 1961), but to the
existence of something that scientists consider to be at least as real as struc-
ture - and perhaps more real than physical causation (counterfactual theses and
Hume’s doubts notwithstanding, causation seems to be ineliminable from our
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best scientific theories.) This is the argument from indispensability of struc-
ture and information in scientific theorising that I referred to in the previous
section (§1 p16), and it calls inference to the best explanation (and best can-
didate empirically determined contingent deserver) for ontological explanatory
and existential status (See H3 at 4 below.)
This view will inform my hypothesis that information is the causally-induced
configuration of physical structure (CICS) or of structure that reduces to such
(H1 at 4 below), and that the structure at bottom (as far as our best science
can identify) must be embedded in and realised in the universal quantum field.
This is the ontology that I think really should be taken to be delivered by
a Ladyman and Ross (Ladyman and Ross from now on) style formulation of
scientific metaphysics. A way of stating this view is to say that structure and
causation are real, and information is just as real and is the causally induced
configuration of structure, and can be encoded, processed (computationally and
algorithmically), transmitted, and represented.
The difference between my approach to scientific and physicalist structural
realism and that of Ladyman and Ross is that I will resist their move to a
mathematical or statistical-at-bottom ontology (In this approach I am in agree-
ment with Tian Yu Cao Cao, 2010, 202-203.) I likewise resist the respective
innate modalist and many worlds reductions of Steven French and Michael Es-
feld (French, 2014.) Despite their scientific realism via ontic structural realism,
Ladyman and Ross seem to embrace statistical ontology on the basis of what
seem to be partly instrumentalist intuitions as well as scientific metaphysics
(French and Ladyman, 2003a, and see 7.1.) They may have an out on the basis
of a commitment to statistics as something that exists mind, language, the-
ory, and computation independently in the world as an intrinsic component of
stochasticity in natural systems and processes. I will be identifying such things
as information sources. I’ll identify fields (classical fields and bounded non-
uniform heterogeneous regions of the universal quantum field), not relations, as
the reductive basis of structure in a scientific realist ontology(3.3; 6.6.) As such,
the non-eliminative ontic structural realism that I will adopt is what has come
to be called a field ontology (see Cao, 2003c, pp. 17–19; Esfeld and Lam, 2008.)
Just as NOSR does with respect to structure, I reject subjectivism about in-
formation in all of its currently known forms: information can exist apart from
minds, observers, receivers, and computation (certainly agent centric and artifi-
cial computation, but I reject that there is any need to regard the universe and
nature as a computer, and think that arguments for such are abductive rather
than inductive and break down as a bad analogy.)
In this I am again in agreement with Tian Yu Cao (Cao, 2003a, 25-8; Cao,
2003b; Cao, 2003c.) I will also largely avoid and reject the modal - or modality
centric - approach of philosophers like Micheal Esfeld and Dean Rickles (Esfeld,
2009b; Rickles, 2008a) which is significant in the light of developments in the
metaphysics of information in quantum mechanics and the philosophy thereof,
since the possible worlds model in quantum theory currently enjoys significant
support (Deutsch, 1985b; Wallace, 2012; Wallace and Timpson, 2007; French,
2014.) My approach to a physicalist, scientific realist, scientific metaphysics of
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information also meshes with a reductive and physicalist conception of informa-
tion as endorsed by quantum computation pioneer Rolf Landauer, and analysed
by DiVincenzo and Daniel Loss in relation to quantum systems (Landauer, 1991;
Landauer, 1996, DiVincenzo and Loss, 1998; Vitanyi, 2000. See also Bub, 2005.)
There are related and relevant meta-theoretic and metaphysical questions
in quantum mechanics, field theory (classical and quantum), quantum informa-
tion theory, and black hole physics associated with the nature of mathematical
abstracta, and these questions intersect with the way that the nature of infor-
mation is treated within the theories themselves. The work of pioneer quantum
information theorist Rolf Landauer is one of the earliest and clearest statements
of physicalism about information. Landauer required that information (which is
in a significant sense identical to data representation, according to Landauer) is
in fact physical, and that there can be no data representation without physical
structure - a principle that Floridi has opposed under the rubric of ontological
neutrality (ON) within a Kantian transcendentalist metaphysical framework.
Floridi’s Kantian framework allows that one can in-principle have representa-
tion of data without material implementation (Floridi, 2011b, 90.) As I will
discuss in chapter 5, it is not clear what it means to naturalise data either.
Moreover, the key theories referred to by scientists and philosophers alike - that
of Hartley, Shannon, Kolmogorov, and Fisher - are grounded in physical sciences
and applied mathematics for the physical sciences.
I intend a (scientific metaphysical) conceptual progression in this thesis from
the idea of ontic structural informational realism (OSIR) to field ontic structural
realism about information, or what I am going to call a field ontic structural
informational realism (FOSIR.) My intention is to argue and establish first that
structure inheres in re in the physical ontology about which ontic structural
realist scientific realists are realist: not something in theories but that in the
world which the structure of theories maps to and represents according to ontic
structural realism (and according to some versions of intrumentalism.) Then
the next move is supposed to be to establish an identity thesis in accordance
with the scientific metaphysics I adhere to, and incorporate the quantum field
into the structural realism as the very basis for the substance and realisation
of the structure. However, this identity thesis is so conceptually critical that it
cannot be deferred until after the introduction of an ontic structural realism.
Chapter 3 introduces my own adaptation of non eliminative ontic structural
realism - ontic structural informational realism (OSIR) - and its field onto-
logical extension: Field Ontic Structural Informational Realism (FOSIR.) It
becomes field ontic structural informational realism. It involves proposing a
radical identity between physical structure referred to in theories and (defeasi-
bly) the quantum field itself. The chapter concludes with the presentation of
two revisionary physicalist hypotheses. The first is an informational version of
David Armstrong’s eliatic principle: the idea that the only things that exist are
causally interactive. The other is an informational restatement of physicalism
derived from the definition offered by Frank Jackson, which definition goes that
if one duplicates all the physical stuff in the world, one has therefore duplicated
absolutely everything (Jackson, 1998.)
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3 Semantic Information: It’s the Same Informa-
tion
It is widely thought that there must be a meaningful and valid conception and
theory of semantic information, or that at least one should be contructed (Shan-
non and Weaver, 1949 3.) In the third chapter, I will present an argument that
all information realised by or obtaining due to (existentially depending upon)
causally configured structure is intrinsically semantic. Quantitative theories like
that of Shannon are understood by most theorists to elide any semantic aspect,
although Dretske’s theory links semantic content to both quantity of informa-
tion and Shannon’s measure, and Pieter Adriaans has presented a challenging
argument that Shannon information and associated quantitative measures in-
clude an adequate semantics (Adriaans, 2010.) Theorists who do not agree that
quantitative theories adequately account for the semantic value of information
propose various other semantic conceptions which involve various views of the
alethic value of information: its relationship to truth. Floridi and Dretske as-
sert that information is always true. Mathematician Keith Devlin allows that
information is bivalent (Devlin, 1991, 80-1.) In Chapter 5 I suggest it is neither.
I take the assertion that information can only be true to be an indication that
something is wrong: information is not a truthbearer at all, but instead is a
truthmaker 4.
Christoph Adami has suggested that the philosophy of information has many
conceptual parallels to the philosophy of mathematics, and that the philosophy
of information should be approached on a similar analytic basis (Adami, 2016.)
There exist numerous scientific and applied mathematical approaches to under-
standing and defining the nature of information including algorithmic informa-
tion theory and various logics of information (Sommaruga, 2009 includes several
offerings in the logic of information, and Floridi defers to Devlin’s adaptation of
Barwise and Perry’s situation theory in Devlin, 1991; See also Allo, 2011), not
to mention computational conceptions that are not statistical in nature (Tur-
ing computability for example, and the minimum description length principle.)
Each of them has - or seems to have initially - a different ontology of information
if mathematical constructs of any kind are taken to be the ontic reductive basis
of the nature of information, which is often the case. In Andre Kolmogorov’s al-
gorithmic information theory, information is the structure of data objects which
are physical, while in Shannon’s theory information is seemingly both physical
entropy, a statistical measure of entropy, and a reduction in objective statistical
uncertainty (at minimum. Kolmogorov, 1968, 6-8; Shannon and Weaver, 1949.)
So given that there is often apparently not a lot of scientific consensus about
the nature of information even at what Floridi refers to as lower levels of ab-
straction - or at maximum conceptual and ontic reduction - in formal theories,
then it is not surprising that theorist tend towards pluralism, eliminativism,
or nominalisms (Floridi, 2011c.) If information is something like a reduction
3Refer to the Preface by Warren Weaver
4For further background, refer to (Floridi, 2011c,92-3)
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in objective uncertainty (sometimes a subjectivist interpretation of the prob-
abilities is asserted) based upon a current state of a source or a signal - then
it is not clear how that translates to reductions of uncertainty with respect to
different structures and structured states of affairs (Christopher Timpson, 2013,
26, agrees about the rejection of the subjectivist classical interpretation.) This
is a non-trivial problem that Fred Dretske arguably failed to resolve despite sys-
tematic work inspired by Shannon’s theory and with a naturalising metaphysics
that largely obeyed the scientific metaphysics of Ladyman and Ross in the nat-
uralistic way that it drew upon that theory (Dretske, 1981; Timpson, 2013 10,
38.)
I will not be concerned with naturalised epistemology as Fred Dretske was
(this takes me too far afield into applications which are not my central con-
cern), but his attempts to naturalise epistemology by naturalising information
are enlightening with respect to the metaphysical problems of the nature of
information. Dretske sought to retain naturalisation of information, representa-
tions, doxastic content (or his alternative thereto) and epistemic content, while
regarding information as an objective abstract commodity. Yet he asserted that
information based beliefs and knowledge rely upon a subjectivist element. This
apparent subjectivist element is what Dretske called the k factor. According to
Dretske “A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional prob-
ability of s ’s being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k alone, @ 1)” and “Here
k is a variable that takes into account how what an agent already knows can
determine the information carried (for that agent) by a signal.1” (D’Alfonso,
2016, 307-8.) Technically, k is what the receiver and destination ‘know’ about
the states that can obtain at the source. This is the source alphabet or state
possibility space, or, rather, in subjectivist psychologistic terms, an imperfect
subset thereof. It’s a partial knowledge of the codes required to decode the
source generated signal-borne sequences and messages: or rather in Dretske’s
case single signals. The upshot of this is that while Dretske’s naturalised con-
ception of information is classical (with adaptations for a single signal content
rather than an average across signals, sequences and messages), statistical, and
objectivist, his naturalised conception of semantic information is apparently
necessarily subjectivist and probably psychologistic (although the latter is less
clear, since the term ‘knows’ with respect to what the receiver knows can be
metaphorically interpreted.)
The statistical core of Dretske’s naturalised objectivist conception of infor-
mation is prescient. It anticipates the somewhat later assertion of scientific
metaphysicians and realists James Ladyman and Don Ross that “the world is
the totality of nonredundant statistics”. If statistics exist somehow mind, lan-
guage, theory, and computation independently, then this would seem to provide
a vindication of Dretske’s objectivist conception. My approach will involve ac-
commodating these statisticalist objectivist naturalising moves and views, but
emphasising a more basic and - perhaps - less specific naturalised conception of
causally induced structure, and relying - on a defeasible scientific metaphysical
basis - on another very statistically orientated theory: Quantum Field Theory.
I will not venture at any point to engage on a detailed level with quantum field
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theory, and I will largely stand on the shoulders of those better qualified, cit-
ing their metaphysical observations and explanations. My engagement with the
science will not be completely bereft of detail, however, as is dictated by my
stated predilection for a scientific metaphysics.
4 Key (Scientific-contingent) Metaphysical Ar-
guments: CICS, OSIR, and FOSIR
The metaphysics of information I am arguing for, via scientific metaphysical
premises, is based upon combining ontic structural realism with what has come
to be called a field ontology. This is to support the further ontological idea that
the world is the totality of all information sources, which in turn are, or reduce
to, causally induced configurations of structure. The structure of the informa-
tion sources inheres in re in some n A 0 region(s) of the heterogeneous quantum
field(s) (or the vacuum - to be more general and universal) which permeate(s)
all of spacetime, providing the substrate in which energetic excitations realise
particles and their properties. The region(s) can be bounded, contiguous and
continuous, or, alternatively, they can be distributed: including an arbitrary
(depending upon such things as nomic constraints, system function, or prop-
erties and relations that are somehow significant) set of non-continuous and
non-contiguous sub-structures selected from a larger structure(s) (The latter
might arise with such things as binary systems in astronomy, entangled sys-
tems in quantum mechanics, and assemblies of neurons in the context of neuro-
science.) I propose this contingently in terms of the whole of QFT, since there
is a debate about whether the emergent excitations in standard model fields
are what physicists call particles at all (Kuhlmann, 2015. See 6.1, 6.2 herein.)
I will be claiming that my inclusion of scientific defeasibility of theories and
explanations saves me from having to be very concerned about this, provided
optimistic meta-induction about scientific theories is at least as good as pes-
simistic meta-induction, where good means prospectively correct and accurate
given contingent information.
This thesis requires four significant arguments to sustain the proposed natu-
ralising ontology of information (presented here in order of logical and ontologi-
cal precedence/progression, which does reflect the order of their presentation in
the thesis because of some of the complexities involved in combining OSR and
a stochastic source-process ontology with a field ontology):
H1 The CICS argument: That information is the causally induced configuration
of structure (CICS), and that such configurations of structure are the states
of sources. (Chapters 1 and 6.)
H2 The structure-QFT identity argument: The best ontic candidate for best
deserver for what constitutes the nature and substance of structure referred
to in physicalist scientific realist ontic structural realism in general is and/or
reduces to selections of physical features or structure in re (in) heteroge-
neous quantum fields. (Chapters 3 and 6)
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H3 The Source Ontology or ontic structural informational realism (OSIR) ar-
gument by IBE and indispensability: That natural stochastic processes and
systems are CICS sources (This is consolidated in 4)
H4 The field-ontic structural informational realism (FOSIR) argument: That
the structure of causally configured (CICS) information sources per H3 is
identical to in re selections of features or structure in heterogeneous quan-
tum fields, and/or is identical to physical structures that reduce to such
QFT in re structures. At reductive ontic bottom they are and/or reduce
to bounded regions of heterogeneous quantum fields, or to combinations of
such regions. (This is the work of 3 and 6)
H5 The instrinsic semantics argument: That information per the ontology ar-
gued for in H1-H4 is intrinsically semantic on the basis of indication and
causal pathways, and yet alethically neutral, and is a truthmaker and not
a truthbearer (This argument is presented in its entirety in Chapter 5.)
I have elected to largely (but not completely) support the (now) almost
thoroughgoing statisticalist ontic structural realism of Ladyman and Ross by
reference to Shannon’s theory, other mathematical conceptions of information
(including algorithmic conceptions and those that are hybrid), and quantum
field theory. However, as I will explain at 3.2.2 I do not concur with the idea
that the ontology sought by ontic structural realists should be taken to bottom
out at physical statistics realised as stochasticity in natural phenomena. I’ll
argue that, at best, if statistics are physical in that way, they constitute only
part of the total structure of any natural phenomena or system. I have elected
to avoid the Kantian transcendental commitments of Floridi, because I’ll be
claiming that - contingently and not on the basis of a priori conceptual analysis:
P1. Real information necessarily always is or reduces to the causally induced
configuration of physical structure (I will be referring to this often using the
acronym CICS, and will often use the phrase “CICS information” to indi-
cate I am specifically referring to information according to this conception
and definition.)
P2. A sufficient and necessary condition of its existence is that is transmittable
P3. A necessary condition of that transmissability is physical causal pathways
and specifically physical causation (as a reductive basis for causation at
least), and that
P4. The world is the totality of stochastic CICS information sources that reduce
to structurally heterogeneous bounded regions of the quantum field (this
latter assertion is what I will be referring to as the/my identity thesis about
structure.)
Regarding P1, as mentioned above, I’ll be arguing that in accordance with
scientific metaphysical premises of the kind that Ladyman and Ross endorse,
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and with reference to inference to the best explanation and the primacy of
physics constraint combined with a specific indispensability argument, that our
best defeasible scientific theory (quantum field theory) avails us of a basis for
a physicalist identity thesis (P4) about the ontic structure that ontic structural
realists like Ladyman and Ross are interested in. That basis is the structure
inhering in re in the quantum field and bounded regions thereof: the ontic
structure that is the existential basis for, and a necessary condition for, the
obtaining of CICS information, is literally identical to that physical structure
inhering in re the quantum field and vacuum (including and incorporating - or
being constitutive of - what is often called ‘quantum foam’ Bynum, 2014, 131.)
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Part II
A Scientific Metaphysical
NOSR for Information:
Developing Field-Ontic
Structural Informational
Realism
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Chapter 1
Scientific Metaphysics of
Information
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to set naturalistic metaphysical, metameta-
physical, methodological, and information-theoretic foundations for my investi-
gation of the nature of information. I will continue this project in §2 p55 and
§3 p81, where I will give some support for what I have called my indispensabil-
ity argument (See argument H3 at §4 p27.) Metametaphysically the intended
approach is contingent scientific metaphysics. The methodology thus involves
minimising a-priori analytic approaches and conceptual analysis. My objective is
to present and defend a reductionist, physicalist, and anti-platonist metaphysics
and ontology of information. That is: a scientific metaphysical characterisation
of the nature of what underlies scientific references to information, or a state-
ment of what information is. Or, more precisely, what information reduces to -
and how it exists.
I agree with Ross and Ladyman’s assertion that the only coherent meta-
physics is that which intends to build bridges between and unify elements of
scientific theories regarding as (defeasibly) real only ontologies of the best avail-
able theories in the physical sciences (their principle of natural closure or PNC)
(Ladyman et al., 2007, 28.) Ladyman and Ross ultimately conclude that the
world is the totality of all nonredundant statistics precisely because they favour
a contingent metaphysics, and reject a-priori analysis derived from armchair
speculation (included a-priori conceptual analysis.) They privilege physics as a
source of material facts and knowledge about the nature of reality (the primacy
of physics constraint, or PPC) (Ladyman et al., 2007, 5.)
Ladyman and Ross’s metaphilosophical mandate - that I also adopt - is
that the only good metaphysics is properly scientifically motivated non-a-priori
metaphysics (with reasonable tolerance for scientifically informed hypothetico-
deductive approaches) and that if any conceptual analysis is included it is with
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a view to unifying existing ontic concepts from scientific theories (which is also
somewhat familiar from the Canberra Plan view of prior evidence based con-
ceptual analysis and ontic-cum-explanatory best-deserver nomination.) I also
agree with Humphreys that an a-posteriori/contingent scientific metaphysics is
better because it inherits the methodological and epistemic property of theory
and conclusion defeasibility (Humphreys, 2013, 55; See also Hacking, 2002.)
My first task in this chapter is to develop a reasonably systematic definition
and formulation of my metaphysical approach. This will include an outline of a
significant contribution to the philosophy of information in general - a calculus
and (pre)logic of information dynamics encompassing what is commonly referred
to as information flow - but covering numerous other important dynamics of
information and information processing not covered by any logic of information
offered at this time.
My next task is to begin to bring this scientific metaphysical approach to
bear upon some a-priori reasoning and conceptual analysis (although I will not
be deploying the aforementioned logic of information dynamics for the purpose.
It gets limited use later in the thesis.) My targets will be Platonism about in-
formation (the view that information can exist Platonically) and Kantian tran-
scendental realism about information which allows or requires that information
can be realised in abstract spaces where an abstract space is considered to exit
in that contemporary weak Platonic sense (that is - with no commitment to any
claims about exactly how Platonic structures or entities might exist.) I have
already indicated that the new scientific metaphysics proffered by Ladyman,
Ross, Kincaid, Humphries and (to some extent) Collier has itself got a con-
ceptual heritage in, and is contextual to, the Quine-Carnap debate about the
salience of metaphysics and commitment to the existence of mathematical en-
tities, the subsequent epistemologically orientated discussions of Papineau and
Devitt, and the considerations of contingently informed a-priori conceptual and
intuitive reasoning of the Canberra Planners. However, I will be favouring the
stronger anti-a-priorist metaphysical-to-epistemological views of Devitt and the
aforementioned scientific metaphysicians. This is because I regard that it is hard
to deny that both the Canberra Plan’s contingently informed a-priori concep-
tual analysis and French’s Viking Metaphysics seem to be inherently subsumed
under contingency: the real metaphysical work is being done by scientifically
underwritten contingent-empirical evidence and information (I don’t think that
French opposes this outlook.)
1.2 Physicalism and Structure
One position unpopular with, and doubted by, many contemporary philoso-
phers and philosophers of science is physicalism about information. Still more
unloved is physical reductionism about information (Griffiths, 2001, Floridi,
2004a, Chalmers, 1996), but there are also many philosophers and scientists that
regard it as contingently and/or in-principle true (Refer especially to Jackson,
1982, Landauer, 1991, Landauer, 1996, DiVincenzo and Loss, 1998, Bub, 2005,
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Devlin, 1991, 82-86; Cao, 2003a, 25-8; Papineau, 2010b; Esfeld, 1999.) Other
applied scientists and mathematicians present apparently confused or contradic-
tory viewpoints (Shannon et al., 1993a 1), but with significant commitment to
realism about information as something like physical entropy, physical stochas-
tic system changes, or some kind of physical complexity (Kolmogorov, 1963 2
See also Cover and Thomas, 2006.)
There are conceptions of information that regard that it can exist noetically,
abstractly, and Platonically (Floridi, 2003; Floridi, 2011c, 88-90) or otherwise
transcendentally (Gillies, 2010, 8.) Moreover, there are metaphysical theories
that eliminate information from the ontology completely. Still others regard
that some kind of nominalism about information as true, while other concep-
tions involve the necessary presence of either a conscious receiver-agent or an
unconscious non-cognitive consumer or receiver for there to be any information
(Dretske, 1981, 65 3; Shea, 2007a, Millikan, 2013.)
The reductionism about structure and information that I favour is ontic
rather than epistemological. It is not commonly endorsed, and has serious de-
tractors (Dennett, 1991, Floridi, 2008a 4.) Moreover, even some naturalising
theories of information require cognitive-subjectivist premises about the exis-
tence of information that render epistemic content of some kind as a necessary
condition for the obtaining of information such that they converge on a form of
idealism about information (Deutsch, 2013, 4331, 4343, 4347-8, Dretske, 1981,
58-9; Peacocke, 2010, 256, 265; Deacon, 2010, 146-7.) However, I will seek to
secure credibility using the best science available on its own defeasible terms
(see §2 p55), thus debunking platonist, subjectivist and epistemic conception
of the nature of information as being based upon what are in fact errant and
unfounded a-priori metaphysical assumptions.
Because the expressly physicalist and reductionist non-eliminative ontic struc-
tural realism that I will present is the basis for the scientific metaphysics and de-
feasible characterisation of information that I present, it entails anti-subjectivism
about real information (including semantic information.) There is a bidirec-
tional entailment relationship regarding the ontological status of structure and
1Scientists and applied mathematicians like Shannon often have a coherent materialist
metaphysics, but are less concerned with philosophical discourse and expression than with
problem solving in their domain of application
2As I will discuss in Chapter 3 - Kolmogorov was a very committed physicalist-materialist,
to the point that he was a Brouwer style intuitionist and mathematical constructivist and
a staunch physicalist about the data sequences that his complexity measure was applied
to. Kolmogorov’s stated reason for his anti-realism about infinite sequences was not just
that he was a committed Communist and dialectical materialist, but that he was specifically
physicalistic about data and real mathematical entities. His commitment was not just to
a form of Brouwerian intuitionism, but to physicalism about data in a similar vein to that
asserted later by Rolf Landauer in the context of computer science. Kolmogorov, 1932, 6, 7;
3Dretske’s account here is specifically about his semantic theory of information, but ac-
cording to my approach all information is intrinsically semantic and non-alethic
4Refer to the discussion at 4.2 of Ladyman et al., 2007 for a background in difficulties with
clarity about reductionism in the context of debates about scientific realism and instrumen-
talism and specifically in the context of Daniel Dennett’s commitment to anti-reductionism
and scale relativity in his thesis about real patterns (Dennett, 1991)
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information: the existence of information is a sufficient condition for the ex-
istence of physical structure, and specifically physical structure is a necessary
and sufficient condition for information. If the structure in question could not
transmit information in the classical sense, then it is not, in fact, real. If it can,
then it is real. I suggest that this is also a good - and non circular - definition
of physicality: if a structure is capable of transmission of, or of participating
in transmission of, information, then it is physical (see §4.4 p158.) With this
definition of physicality debates about realism about causality can be deferred.
I do think that transmission of information naturally necessarily requires and
existentially depends upon physical cause and effect, and I will later provide
a brief defeasible characterisation of how I think causation obtains using the
terms of the metaphysics that I will propose 5. The requirements for correct
sufficient conditions for information have ontological implications for how real
structures exist. Such structures are naturally necessarily information bearing,
and the presence of information and/or information transmission (and encoding,
and processing) is a sufficient condition for the obtaining of physical structure
(see §7.3 p252. Refer also to Hayashi, 2017, xxxv.)
I suggest that there are four more important reasons for my physicalist-
NOSR approach (NOSR):
1. (Perhaps most importantly) Physicalist reductionist NOSR accounts for and
accommodates informational interpretations of ontology that preserve struc-
ture as ontologically prior to, and as an ontic existential basis for, information
(I will investigate this in this chapter and Chapter 3.)
2. Physicalist reductionist NOSR provides a superior conceptual and explana-
tory framework for understanding necessary partialness of scientific repre-
sentations due to information loss.
3. Physicalist reductionist NOSR provides a basis for development of a non-
Platonistic (informational Aristotelian or in re) explanation of the nature of
mathematical structures
4. Physicalist reductionist NOSR includes an avenue for explanation and char-
acterisation of objects in the ontology as arbitrarily-bounded structured in-
formation sources.
Importantly, 1. means that information is as ubiquitous in the material
universe as structure is, and this fits with longstanding (in the philosophy of
information anyway) assertions about the ubiquity of information (Chalmers,
1996, 84.) In chapter 2 I will propose the radical identity thesis that it reduces
(defeasibly) to the configuration of the structure(s) of the fluctuating vacuum
field of quantum field theory that literally (according to our best science) exists
everywhere (Cao, 2010, 205; Rugh and Zinkernagel, 2002, 1.) This thesis will
assert that the real ontology of the universe is best represented by physicalist
5My suggestion will be that in accordance with scientific metaphysical methodology, cau-
sation is defeasibly a conveyance of structural change in the quantum field
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reductionist non-eliminative structural realism, and that this best explains the
way in which the universe is informational.
The universe, I will suggest, is the totality of veridical information sources,
and is not informational at ontological bottom in some transcendentalist sense,
but by virtue of being physically structural at bottom, where such structure is
necessarily informational (the existence of such structure is a sufficient condition
for the obtaining of information.) The meaning of ‘necessarily informational’
here is that it necessarily realises information, not that it is existentially based
upon information realised in some other way (mathematically, computationally,
or subjective-ideologically, for example.) This in turn supports my thesis that
information is a truth maker, rather than a truth bearer (See, especially, Chapter
4.)
I do not think that there is a successful challenge from prospective nom-
inalism and eliminativism about information that will undo 1., 3. and 4. I
approach the challenge as follows. Begin with the idea of structure. In struc-
tural realisms the question of what kind of structures are real, and are of interest,
is one of the most salient and prospectively vexing. It serves to delineate the
differences between Worrall’s epistemic structural realism, and eliminative and
non-eliminative ontic structural realisms (and to provide a motivation for a clear
formulation of the latter.)
So at minimum we are dealing with the question of whether information can
exist without physical structures (whatever they are: I say selections of nonuni-
form regions of the quantum field, defeasibly) - or according to the terms of my
approach - physical information sources (which according to the best applied
statistical and complexity orientated scientific theories of information reduce to
physical structures, which according to the best physics require the existence of
fields.) I am claiming that it can’t in principle on the basis of contingent find-
ings, that its existence is established only contingently, and that it is a matter
of natural necessity that it exists under certain circumstances (where necessary
and sufficient conditions are met) which can be described in terms of contin-
gent natural necessity. There may be things (or even non-things or subsistent
things like fictions) to which one can apply common statistical and complex-
ity based information measures and formulae that are not so reducible - but I
contend that they don’t embody real information, but instead what I will call
pseudo-information (§2.3.1 p68 and §5.5 p198.) Moreover, the application of an
information measure does not information make, any more than the application
of any measure or formula to anything makes it what the formula was originally
developed for.
1.3 A Systematic Approach to Defining Ontol-
ogy
I will talk of structures rather than entities even though the ontic structural
realism I endorse is non-eliminative with respect to entities (given the context
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of non-eliminative ontic structural realism this is somewhat trivial.) I will refer
to such phenomena/systems (both unobservable and observable) as realists are
realist about - and their structures - by calling them I-obtaining or I-existing:
an abbreviation for ‘independently informational’. Throughout this chapter
and the entire thesis I will say that such structures I-exist, and this is explicitly
defined as meaning the structures exist/are:
A Mind independently
B Language independently
C Formalism and Theory independently
D Computation independently
E Physical structures or are ontologically reducible to physical structures
F Subject to causal closure or
F.1. ontologically reduce to structures that are subject to causal closure
F.2. existentially depend upon structures that are subject to causal closure
G With causally induced configurations in accordance with
G.1. the (altered) principle of causal closure (and PNC) limited by the pri-
macy of physics constraint (PPC) since contemporary physics doesn’t
require everything to have a cause.
G.2. ineliminability of causal pathways (ICP)
Correspondingly, I will argue on a contingent basis from inference to the
best explanation, induction and with appeal to scientific usage, that information
sources I-exist only, where an information source is a physical stochastic process
or dynamical system (Gray, 2011a, 1, 5-6, 10-11; Gallager, 2008, 5-7; Shannon,
1998, 5.) For the moment the above is partly stipulative, but I will seek to
develop/establish its contingency through the course of the chapter in keeping
with the contingent scientific metaphysical purview.
C. is included because some philosophers have proposed or assumed that
theories and formalisms exist Platonistically (Colyvan, 2001, Balaguer, 2001)
and on similar terms to which Platonists about mathematical constructs take
them to occur: that they just exist and are real in some abstract sense or
Platonistic way and are only discovered - not constructed - by mathematicians
and scientists. Such formalisms and theories can exist in accordance with A.
and B., and can be regarded as the reductive basis of an A + B ontology.
D. is included because some physicists and scientists now take seriously either
informational or computational metaphysics according to which John Wheeler’s
“It from Bit” thesis - or some near alternative to or revision of it is correct:
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It from bit. Otherwise put, every it—every particle, every field
of force, even the space time continuum itself—derives its function,
its meaning, its very existence entirely—even if in some contexts
indirectly—from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes or no ques-
tions, binary choices, bits. (Wheeler, 1989. See also Floridi, 2008a;
Tegmark, 2008; Bostrom, 2009; Fredkin, 1992, 116-17.)
This kind of approach will later be analysed in terms of Steven French’s idea
of mathematical collapse (§7.1 p249) and what I call formalism driven confla-
tion or formalism driven ontological descent (§3.2.2 p87 and §1.4.1 p49.) Such
a metaphysics can accommodate simulation based ontologies like that inspired
by Bostrom’s simulation argument (Bostrom and Kulczycki, 2011.) Neither ‘It
From Bit’ ontologies nor simulation ontologies require the agent-sustainers of
idealism (but nor do they necessarily preclude them), since the former is moti-
vated by instrumentalism and the latter can allow the simulation to be accidental
or natural (i.e. not designed by any sentient or cognitive agent or any kind.)
Moreover, there are panpsychists that might argue that a computational meta-
physics is real in keeping with premises that say that 1. the universe and natu-
ral systems are computational (See readings in Dodig Crnkovic and Giovagnoli,
2013. See also Lloyd, 2010, 96-7; See also Zenil, 2013, 3-5; Vedral, 2010; Brooks,
2012a; Brooks, 2012b; Beavers and Harrison, 2012, 349-51; Chaitin, 2012, 280-1;
Hutter, 2012, 408-12.) and 2. the existence of minds and cognition does not
require the existence of mind-brains or even multiply realised neurology. Under
such circumstances D. is a necessary requirement. It is interesting that from
the perspective of defeasible scientific metaphysics that the addition of C. and
D. has come about or become necessary because of historically relatively recent
metaphysical hypotheses that are contingent upon scientific discovery especially
with regards to indiscernability and qauntum indeterminacy.
G is what I will refer to for brevity as the ICP + PCC constraint. Scientists
have no need of non-physical explananda that do not exist in accordance with
PCC for any known empirical theory, even if statistical analysis and abstract
formal constructs help with theory construction and data analysis. There is a
very large literature and debate about the nature of causality and realism versus
anti-realism about causality, but I will assume, in accordance with a scientific
metaphysics and due to the role of causality in signal pathways in classical
theories of information transmission, that there is no in-principle or ontological
problem with physical causation of the kind countenanced by physicists.
There is of course an immediate potential problem for a conception of in-
formation and information transmission (via signal transmission) that requires
causal inducement or causation, and causal pathways, respectively, as necessary
conditions. John Bell’s theorems in support of the existence of spooky action
at a distance without hidden variables have been experimentally proven and
re-proven, including the no loopholes versions that eliminate, as possible causes
for nonlocal co-ordination, instrument influences and possible problems with
random number generators for some experiments ( Esfeld, 2015; Hensen et al.,
2015; Bell, 2004; Aspect et al., 1981.) It would seem that these Bell-theorem ex-
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periments should perhaps count as a problem for PCC also. They do leave open
the possibility that a non-physical cause is involved, since there is no positive
ontic candidate available to fulfil the functional role of nonlocal causation at a
distance. However, in keeping with inference to the best explanation, the no
miracles argument, and the totality of results in experimental physics: neither
the elimination of physical causes nor the falsity of PCC is entailed by the no-
loophole versions of the Bell theorem experiments (meaningful issues regarding
the nature of the physical itself notwithstanding. For further discussion see §7.3
p252.)
PCC only requires that whatever the reason for the non-locality is, it doesn’t
fall outside of the set of things and events that are causally closed: that require
physical causes operating in accordance with natural nomic constraints. The
cause, causation, and causal pathways of entanglement might be very strange,
but it neither naturally nor logically necessarily follows that they are not physi-
cal and not subject to PCC (See further discussion about causation and quantum
entangelment at §6.3.1 p214 and §6.6 p239.) Even if the causation involved is
somehow not physical causation (a possibility which I take it that most working
physicists would reject) there are counterfactual and dispositional conceptions
of causation that still obey PCC. To assert otherwise without positive evidence
of a substantial (involving some non-physical substance) non-physical causa-
tion would, at minimum, breach the principle of ontic parsimony, and breach it
not just in terms of adding entities to the menu of existents unnecessarily with
respect to explanation, but by adding entire non-natural types or categories
pursuant to the same end. According to the metaphysics of information that I
will formulate, causal pathways do not have to be continuous and contiguous:
only continuous, which allows for the principle of causally induced configura-
tion of structure to be sustained in the case of spooky action at a distance (See
§6.3.1 p214. For further discussion of non-contiguous but continuous causation
supporting transmission, see §3.3 p101, §7.3 p252.) ICP (the ineliminability of
causal pathways) is likewise preserved according to these same considerations.
So the question to be addressed is if and when real information I-obtains
and how, and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions are for its I-
obtaining. This is not simply a word game or a-priori conceptual analysis, since
there are tangible and demonstrable differences between how physically trans-
missible information and real information sources obtain, and the way in which
(pseudo)-information associated with fictional sources obtains (See chapters 3
and 4 and §5.6 p199.)According to the metaphysics I will propose - one can
transmit sequences of symbols with fictional semantic content, but the meaning
of the fictions is not a necessary condition for the underlying transmission of in-
trinsically semantic physical information (Hartley, 1928; Shannon and Weaver,
1949.) One way to introduce this idea is to identify that there is a lot of informa-
tion transmitted incidentally in any given signal (Dretske, 1981) but according
to my thesis (information as the causally induced configuration of structure or
CICS) - this is by way of layered indication (this is the basis of my solution to
the symbol grounding problem.)
This highly specific characterisation of the ontological target of my enter-
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prise is necessary because of the ontological ambiguities that appear in both
the philosophy of information and ontic structural realisms. There is so much
confusion at different points in the OSR literature that, as mentioned above,
Steven French was led to propose that much of the field is troubled by a propen-
sity to mathematical collapse of the ontology (French, 2014; For earlier ideas see
French and Ladyman, 2003a, 41, 45.) This outcome alone places great stress
on scientific realism and undoes the distinction between abstract and concrete
in un unhelpful rather than constructive way. Moreover, it tends to neglect sci-
entifically relevant and proven evidence of the efficacy of reductionism and the
significant albeit problematic support for physicalism. As we will see, even Lady-
man and Ross’s statistical approach to OSR retains the idea that the statistical
Dennettian real patterns in question are generated by I existing stochastic pro-
cesses (the kinds of things that Shannon specifically called information sources)
(see §3.3 p90.)
1.3.1 An Outline of a Logic of Information Dynamics with
Operator Definitions
I am going to make limited use in this thesis ( §7.3.2 p257 §7.4.2 p265 ) of a
semi-formal calculus for a logic of information dynamics. In this section I will
introduce the main concepts, symbols, and operators, with definitions.
Informational logics of the kind that interest philosophers of information
tend to come under the heading of logics of being informed and logics of infor-
mation flow (Floridi, 2011c; D’Alfonso, 2014, 318; Floridi, 2017.) Fred Dretske
and Luciano Floridi are interested in the former since they are interested in
naturalised epistemologies based upon naturalisation of information (although
their conceptions of the nature of information are quite different.) Both make
use of the concept of logical operations such as is informed that or has the in-
formation that obtaining between an agent and a situation or state of affairs,
or the proposition associated with the latter:
Previously, in chapter two, I discussed the problem whether there
might be an information logic (IL), different from epistemic (EL) and
doxastic logic (DL), which formalizes the relation ‘a is informed that
p’ (Iap) satisfactorily. In this chapter, I defend the view that the
axiom schemata of the normal modal logic KTB (also known as B
or Br or Brouwer’s system) are well suited to model the relation of
‘being informed’. After having shown that IL can be constructed
as an informational reading of KTB, four consequences of a KTB-
based IL are explored: information overload; the veridicality thesis
(Iap   p); the relation between IL and EL; and the Kp   Bp prin-
ciple or entailment property, according to which knowledge implies
belief. (Floridi, 2011c, 224.)
Note that Floridi’s conception of veridicality as expressed here is very differ-
ent in its development from my own, especially since it requires that information
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itself (rather than representations of information sources) is alethic and a truth-
bearer. As I will discuss at §5.5 p198 and §5.6 p199, veridicality according to
the CICS conception of information is about the presence or absence of a real
information source, as opposed to a pseudo-source. Floridi’s ‘is informed that’
operators and relations are taken to have a basis in Dretske’s conception of a
signal carrying information - usually stated as the relation ‘carries the infor-
mation that’. The idea of using information theory to naturalise epistemology
involves getting such relations as agent S knows that P to reduce to or be de-
fined in terms of agent S is informed that P, and the latter to be supported by
information dynamical relations like signal r carries the information source s is
in state F .
Simon D’Alfonso has offered a logic of information flow which seeks to pro-
vide a characterisation of of a logical operator for the relation A carries the
information that B in order to provide a basis in a logic of information flow for
naturalised, externalist, reliabilist, informationist epistemology:
After some work he [Dretske] ends up with the following defini-
tion: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional
probability of s’s being F , given r (and k), is 1 (but, given k alone,
`1) . . .K knows that s is F = K’s belief that s is F is caused (or
causally sustained) by the information that s is F . . . . It is now time
to introduce a symbolic vocabulary for speaking about information
flow and list some of the properties which we will consider through-
out our investigation. This vocabulary consists of the following:
 Symbols A; B; C; D; . . . stand for information bearing struc-
tures (events/ situations/facts/signals.)
 The formula A a B stands for ‘A carries the information that
B’. (D’Alfonso, 2014, 318-21;)
The k is what makes Dretske’s semantic conception of information natu-
ralistic and subjectivist, when his conception of information is naturalistic and
objectivist (information is an abstract commodity): it is the knowledge that
the receiving agent has about what states are possible at the source (the receiv-
ing agent’s possession of part of the source alphabet, and possibly some of the
codes used for encoding the signal.) Note that the information that relation
here again indicates that D’Alfonso takes information to be alethic or a truth-
bearer, and as such his approach accommodates Floridi’s veridcality formula
above. Below I will present two informational ‘that’ operators, both of which
are specifically about information based representation as defined according to
my CICS conception of information. They both allow information to be non-
alethic, while information based representations of information are alethic (for
a full development see §5 p175.)
I am not interested in epistemic logics or the naturalisation of epistemology
in this thesis: only in the naturalisation of information and its dynamics. Here
I will present a prefiguration of a logic of source information dynamics which in-
cludes operators for information generation, encapsulation/containment, repre-
sentation (information about other information), in re realisation, transmission,
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emission (natural transmission), encoding (natural and artefactual), decoding
(natural and artefactual), and compression.
Instead of Floridi and D’Alfonso’s predicate notations (which are purposed
for reliabilist informational-epistemic logic) or D’Alfonso’s information flow op-
erator (a) I have elected to employ operator notation based upon earlier work
done by myself for a describing a unified conception of biological information,
which operator and its notation drew upon Paul Humphrey’s physical fusion
operator () for the description of emergent properties (Humphreys, 1997.) I
will employ a somewhat quirky notation which involves placing denotative su-
perscipts and subscripts on this information dynamics operator to indicate its
variations and indexing respectively (more explanation of the latter below.) I
have done this where it might seem more standardising and preferable to use,
adapt, or extend some other operators (such as D’Alfonso’s later a ) because:
1. No other available operators have exactly the same semantics as those I
am trying to capture, and so redeploying them with adaptation is likely to
be confusing (I do not want to impose a fusion type or alternative dynam-
ical adaptions upon D’Alfonso’s more recent flow operator, as D’Alfonso’s
operator is very specific in its definition.)
2. Specifically, most other existing operators (including D’Alfonso’s) involve
a semantics according to which information has alethic value, even if they
are not designed for a semantic theory or conception of information, but
only about - say - Dretske’s objective abstract commodity.
3. Humphrey’s fusion operator is not purposed for information dynamics or
flow (except insofar as the emergence of properties might be regarded
as involving information dynamics - which Humphreys does not discuss)
most readily accommodates the idea of both the fusion and combination
of structures, and of dynamical I-obtaining operations and processes in-
volving CICS type structure.
Regarding the motivation for considering the term ‘about’ to be an kind
of semantic logical predicate (physico-semantic predicate) - consider that the
other terms connected with information retrieval and identification in system are
‘that’, ‘in’, ‘from’, ‘of’ and ‘at’ (which I will denote, respectively, θi ,
ι
i,
φ
i ,
ω
i ,
and αi
6.) I will stipulate - on a contingent scientific metaphysical basis derived
from classical statistical and algorithmic information theory and complexity
theory - formal definitions for the other operators as physico-semantic operators.
By this I mean that their semantic content is determined by reference to specific
physical properties and dynamics of information encoding, representation, and
transmission according to the CICS conception of information and classical and
algorithmic physical theories of information.
6Although I will not make much use of them
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Information-Dynamical Logical Operators
I will not be attempting any axioms, as I do not need nor have the scope for such
development herein. The descriptions of these operators should make apparent
the existence and importance of 1. capturing the variety of semantics of infor-
mation and information source and transmission dynamics, without omission
and 2. capturing the distinctions that arise due to differences between artefac-
tual implementations and natural realisations of almost all process - especially
encoding, decoding, and transmission:

ι
i Information in or in re (inhering in re): within source structural boundary,
including in mathematical representation)

ω
i Information of : Total information of the source - within the source including
its boundary.

α
i Information at : at the source and its immediately causally connected sources
per causal continuity)

ρ
i Information lexically representing or about :
Information in a source or CICS structure that carries causally induced
configuration that’s complex and involves lexical symbols encoded using
artefactual source alphabets and processes of transduction or that reduce
to transduction (or digitally sustained equivalents thereof) that represents
information at, from, or in other sources, where the causal configuring
involved some kind of artefactual encoding process. In other words, this
is information configured such that it also carries or realises a structured
representation of other information. The base information is a truthmaker
only, but the representing structure in the information is a truthbearer:
the truthbearer structure inheres in the truthmaker structure.

ν
i Information naturally representing or about :
Information in a source or CICS structure that carries causally induced
configuration that’s naturally occurring and doesn’t involve non-natural
lexical symbols encoded using artefactual source alphabets and processes
of transduction. The base information is a truthmaker only, but the repre-
senting structure in the induced in the configuration of the CICS informa-
tion is a truthbearer: the truthbearer structure inheres in the truthmaker
structure (and this does not involve artefactual, lexical encoding.)

φ
i Information from: Anything specific CICS structure encoded from the source
into other sources, resulting in either natural representing νi or artefactual
representing ρi .

θ
i Information that, or the indication operator: semantic information encoded
from the source indicating something of its configuration, nature, status,
state, or dynamics/behaviour.
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
σ
i Signal based transmission of information from one source to another:
Sn 
σ
i Sn1 (1.1)
Artefactual causally sustained information transmission: Read not as Sd
carries the information that B where B is some information from, at, of,
or in source Sa but read instead as source of origin Sa transmits CICS
information to destination or destination source Sd. The semantics do
not include any conception of carrying the information that, since the in-
formation that operator σi S
s is separately defined and must be applied
separately. The semantics of σi are limited to information is transmitted
(via signal.) A naturally occurring signal constitutes emission. A tele-
phone network transmits encoded information to a receiver, a celestial
X-Ray source emits (naturally encoded) information which can arrive at
a destination (which stands a receiver.) (For one description of the idea
of natural encoding, see Collier, 2011.)

η
i Signal based emission of information from one source to another:
Sn 
η
i Sn1 (1.2)
Naturally occurring causally-sustained information transmission: Read
not as Sd carries the information that B where B is some information
from, at, of, or in source Sa but read instead as source of origin Sa emits
CICS information to destination or destination source Sd. The semantics
do not include any conception of carrying the information that, since the
information that operator ηi S
s is separately defined and must be applied
separately. The semantics of σi are limited to information is transmitted
(via signal.) A naturally occurring signal constitutes emission. A tele-
phone network transmits encoded information to a receiver, a celestial
X-Ray source emits (naturally encoded) information which can arrive at
a destination (which stands a receiver.) (For one description of the idea
of natural encoding, see Collier, 2011.)
∆
i
: This is a functor ∆
i
to denote the partial information of any source structure.
∆
i
φi S Says “partial information in/of S”. The ∆i
translates to part of
the CICS. The functor plus unary φi function maps from the total set of
the information in the system of sources S to a subset thereof: a subset of
the causally induced configuration of their structure(s) intrinsic semantics
by causal inducement that they embody.
Note that receivers and channels can be regarded as sources in the classical
theory, and sources can be modelled as channels. The subscripts i are included
because I want to retain the ability to enumerate and index all of the opera-
tions in a information dynamic logical expression. The reason for this is that
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in Shannon’s theory, and in contemporary mathematical/statistical information
theory, sources and channels can be chained and combined and regarded as ei-
ther sources or channels. It follows that the ability to perform fusion operations
on operator and functor instances is salient.
The ‘information about’ or lexically encoded information unary operator
function (ρi ) indicates in folk/intuitive terms that information is given to rep-
resent something: the CICS in question is also an encoding representation of
some other CICS. However, this is not a clear definition. When information is
said to be about something the exact meaning of this is often ambiguous. The
intention can be that one is being given some kind of description, explanation,
instructions, or analysis of some entity or fact. It means that a fact is being
described, explained, or stated. I will stipulate (for the sake of being systematic
and clear) that this operator - in formal terms - means that:
P1 a representation of some structure (including complex facts) has been en-
coded from alternative information sources to those comprising the fact(s)
and/or structure(s) being represented.
Information ρi can also be compiled on the basis of alternative sources to
provide an apt representation - a model, description, and/or depiction - for
the source(s)/source complex/fact(s) being represented. This can include ex-
traction of information (CICS) from the structure be represented by encoding
into representation for epistemic consumption - or not. That is the sense of
‘information about’ in the Dill et. al. passage in the previous section, and
yet the ambiguity of English and the context seem to allow that it’s also re-
ferring to information in the folding events and information from and of the
folding events. Happily, these English terms have coherent parallels in contin-
gent formal physico-semantic and mechanistic (meaning of machine mediated
communication systems) information theoretic terms.
Information in (ιi) denotes the information contained within the structure(s)
of a complex source: literally bounded within its structural boundary. Infor-
mation from (φi ) denotes information encoded into a representation (including
signal complexes) from the specific source or source complex (also a source) be-
ing represented. The representation can be naturally encoded (emissions from
a pulsar or quasar) or artificially (sensor or instrument acquired data.) Infor-
mation at (αi ) denotes the CICS information contained within and bounded
by a certain source or complex of sources (which is ιi) plus surrounding di-
rectly causally connected information sources at one degree of signal pathway
separation.
Floridi has isolated an predicate/function associated with ‘information that
[it is the case that S obtains]’ in developing a modal logic for being informed
(Floridi, 2011c, 225-6.) It is an alethic and epistemic function that indicates the
provision of information with a truth value. It is a different class of function. I
take it that the physico-semantic functions listed can all be alternatively applied
as ways in which an epistemic agent can be informed that some proposition is
true, but that they are truthmakers for this kind of proposition.
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1.4 Anti-Platonism about the Nature of Infor-
mation
Established conceptions of information either tend to accommodate or else re-
quire platonism about information. If they do not explicitly require such pla-
tonism about information, they tend to stipulate that information is some kind
of nonspecific abstracta (they do not specify how the abstracta exists) or else
some kind of objective or else a subjective/epistemic probabilistic outcome, or
else a measure of the latter or a value of such. These conceptions of informa-
tion can be equally problematic, especially for physicalists about information.
However, probabilism about information is probably worse for platonists. One
straightforward problem with platonism about information is that it’s broadly
incompatible with the scientific conception of information according to the cen-
tral applied scientific theories of importance, all of which take information to
be generated by and to be existentially dependent upon physical processes and
systems, or to be related to physical parameters in measured systems (that is,
to actual physical magnitudes and quantities.)
Critically - there is a circularity to avoid. If information reduces to platonic
structures or abstracta, or if ‘the information that’ is grounded in such entities,
then it must still be explained how such are informational, or else how they are
information. Importantly, the definition/conception of abstraction and abstract
usually identified with studies of types (universals) and tropes is different to that
involved in physics and in the applied mathematical and engineering applications
of mathematical communication theory and computing. The latter involves
an abstracting-out, abstracting-away, or hiding of detail or surplus structure
and properties (surplus to the explanation or analysis necessary to achieve an
outcome in terms of scientific and functional results) (Hayashi, 2017, xxxvi.)
It is easy to miss the central significance of, and unavoidable motivation for,
anti-platonism about information. The primary problem with platonism about
information is neither one of a failure of ontological parsimony (although I think
this applies) nor of the precedence or order in which mathematical structures
and descriptions and their alleged platonic existent referents are proposed. The
problem is that we are interested here in the information content of platonic
abstracta, and yet more specifically and importantly - the accessibility of the
information. In order to be informational, they must be information sources,
and they cannot possibly be information sources as they cannot participate in
transmission, reception, encoding and transduction, nor be linked to any signal
pathway. Armstrong’s causal argument for anti-realism about platonic abstracta
admits only concrete particulars, and states of affairs that reduce to them, into
the ontology, since according to platonism itself platonic entities can in principle
have no causal properties, thus it is impossible that we could know they exist
since no causal pathway exists with which we can interact with them in any way
(Armstrong, 1978 45-7; Armstrong, 1978, xiii; Armstrong, 1978a, 17-18.) This
argument is thought by many philosophers to have been debunked because it
misconstrues the in-principle nature of platonic abstracta (although I think this
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is premature and question begging.)
The response can be framed thus: that platonic abstracta are not some kind
of ‘ghostly’ platonic forms that exist independently of corresponding concrete
entities or particulars (or trope or bundle based types of various kinds) but
that instead they exist in some thin ontological sense when they are referred
to by formulae, descriptions, and structures in theories. Therefore their causal
accessibility or lack thereof is thus irrelevant, and based on a misconstrual of
their alleged nature (Colyvan, 2001, 39-40.) In other words, Armstrong burned a
strawman because platonists were not making the claim about platonic existents
that he ascribed (I find this to be dubious.) This response is based upon a weaker
kind of platonism - one that at some points is indistinguishable to Aristotelian
in re realism about mathematical entities which posits no platonic existents,
but neither calls fictionalism into service for an explanation or characterisation
of the referents of mathematical statements either.
The abovementioned response cannot work in the case of informational struc-
tures or information sources, and especially not, I suggest, if we adopt a sci-
entific metaphysics of the kind that either Ladyman and Ross, Humphreys, or
French propose. The very real problem for platonism about information sources
- and therefore about information - is that our best scientific theories of com-
munication and information tend to explicitly require either physical stochastic
ergodic or else nonergodic, or even non-stochastic (chaotic systems that are
quasi-deterministic are not readily categorised as random-stochastic), processes
as information sources, ineliminably physical signal transmission for informa-
tion transmission or movement, and physical representation (at minimum) of
some kind for messages and symbols. In the scientific metaphysical sense -
information does not move or exist without physical substrates. Shannon’s ap-
plication of frequentist statistics and his propensity to identify the information
measure with a physico-statistical entropy measure, Kolmogorov’s materialist
constructivist-intuitionism about data sequences, and Landauer’s insistence on
the physical nature of data realisation and representation all tend to indicate
as much. An indirect result of the metaphysics of information I am suggesting
is that the criterion of acceptance for what is real sought by some philosophers
(with respect to both realism about mathematical entities and scientific realism)
is the ability to realise information and to be accessible as an information source
on scientific metaphysical grounds (Colyvan, 2001, 40.)
No information is regarded as obtaining apart from such in our best scientific
theories of information, including theories in physics, which latter generally defer
to classical physicalist signal transmission and encoding based classical theories
of information, and/or physicalist algorithmic or data based statistical and non-
statistical theories. Thus, according to the primacy of physics constraint (PPC)
of Ladyman and Ross, which I retain as necessary to a scientific metaphysics of
information, being causal is a necessary condition for a structure or a phenomena
to be informational (Ladyman et al., 2007, 190-2)
There exists a potential foil to this position from the philosophy of infor-
mation: it is claimed by some philosophers that The Mathematical Theory of
Communication allows that accidentally correlated and co-varying structures
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(and it is unclear how this can come to occur at all in any comprehensive or
sufficient way in all but the most simple of systems) information transmission
can be sustained without intermediate causal pathways constituting the basis of
signal pathways. The only significant exception is the recent re-verification of
what Einstein referred to as spooky action at a distance: nonlocal effects. There
is very recent evidence in the upholding of John Bell’s theorems debunking Ein-
stein’s belief (which results are again subject to defeasibility and optimistic
meta-induction) in the hidden variable theorem (Hensen et al., 2015; Rudolph,
2012.) In other words, quantum non-local effects and entanglement provide a
well proven example of apparent signal transmission without any discernable
causal pathway (although according to one classical interpretation, the signal
transmission in question cannot convey information.) I handle this significant
issue economically by 1. deferring to the defeasibility component of scientific
metaphysics which allows me latitude in the definition and nature of, and realism
about, cause-effect relationships and causality, and 2. deference to the primacy
of physics constraint and the principle of causal closure. The latter suggest, in
conjunction with Later (§5.4.1 p190) I will debunk the argument from accidental
correlations between structures that claims that information transmission can
occur in the absence of physical, causal signal pathways serving as the basis for
channels and the existential basis for co-varying.
Thus the conception of information I propose is anti-platonist. I take it
that information cannot and does not exist in any transcendent platonic space
or structures, nor that it can ever exist apart from spatiotemporal structures,
and that even if it did it would be un-transmittable and thus inaccessible and
unable to be acquired. Metaphysicians will recognise in this a direct parallel to
Armstrong’s causal criticism of platonism. However, this criticism of platonism
about information is not vulnerable to the same rebuttals as have been directed
at that argument, precisely because there is an ineliminable requirement for
information to be transmitted from source to receiver in order for it to be
accessed and used (For further development see §4.4 p158 p125-6.)
1.4.1 No Information in Abstract Spaces
A Shannon source, being a physical stochastic ergodic (and - according to more
contemporary scientific formalisms - non-ergodic) process, is also a structure
that changes over time. This is something that Platonic entities - by definition
- do not do. Shannon’s measure formula delivers a value based upon the proba-
bility that the source will adopt a particular possible structured state given the
previous state. Thus what is measured reduces to change in physical structure
of the source - its state - at points in time and over time. R. A. Fisher’s infor-
mation measure is also one of physically realised information. It is a metric of
the quality of a statistical estimate of a physical parameter in a system given
some data values. Kolmogorov’s statistical measure is one of the complexity or
information in the structure of a physical string of symbols - usually bit symbols
representing states - considered as an object. The same reduction to physical
structure goes for signals, channels, and messages in Shannon’s theory. This has
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not stopped philosophers from regarding some of these components as existing
Platonically.
The premiere presentation of the explanatory gap argument against meta-
physical physicalism is probably the qualia based argument of David Chalmers.
According to Chalmers qualia track phenomenal states, and qualia are evidence
of the veracity of the explanatory gap argument against metaphysical physical-
ism. Phenomenal information is realised in or by spaces of possible phenomenal
states, possible discrete experiences of phenomenal states, and possible qualia
(qualities of experience) intrinsic to and determined by these possible phenome-
nal experiences (Chalmers, 1996, 283-4.) According to what Chalmers calls the
double-aspect principle, phenomenally realised information always supervenes
upon physically realised information:
This treatment of information brings out a crucial link between
the physical and the phenomenal: whenever we find an information
space realised phenomenally, we find the same information space
realised physically (Chalmers, 1996, 284.)
It is implied - required in fact - by Chalmer’s approach that qualia must
track phenomenal states per person (or vice versa.) The double aspect principle
is Chalmers’ supervenience physicalism applied to such information-realising
possibility spaces of phenomenal states or structures: phenomenal information
spaces supervene upon possible physical (neural correlate state) information
spaces. Physical information is realised from or in a space of physical possibilities
- possible physical states (Chalmers, 1996, 280-2.) An information space is
realised by possibilia. This finding is not familiar from applied mathematical
theories of information in science.
Possibility spaces of source states are familiar from Shannon’s statistical
model. However, Shannon’s model requires that physical symbols or structures
are actually physically realised by physical source states in order for information
to be realised, and Shannon’s possibility spaces are derived from frequency data
(Hayashi, 2017.) Chalmers’ construction draws upon the semantic theory of
information outlined by Carnap and Bar Hillel (see chapter 5) in that it regards
possibility spaces as somehow contributing real information. However, in Car-
nap and Bar-Hillel’s case, the possibility space contributes a measure (and only
a measure) of the semantic content of information, rather than the information
itself (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952.) Chalmers asserts that abstract spaces of
possible physical brain states and of possible physically irreducible qualia not
only somehow realise information apart from the existence of any source, but
that a set of possible qualia constitutes information. This is a marked departure
from Shannon’s theory. It is a departure that makes Chalmers’ conception of
information not Platonistic, but possibilistic (probabilistic if one insists that the
possibility space is also a probability distribution.) The double aspect-principle
applied to information spaces is not enough to deliver the realisation of infor-
mation.
As previously mentioned, eliminativism and pluralism about information
are live metaphysical options, but in the context of Shannon’s theory, real in-
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Figure 1.1: If Qualia track phenomenal states, then this has to be realised by
information channels reducing to causal pathways. Accidental covariance does
not constitute the transmission of information, and the statistical likelihood
that the phenomenal space possibilities and quale ‘states’ track the complex
possibilities in the phenomenal space accidentally is diminishingly small.
formation requires real/token source state changes. To avoid platonism about
information, there must be physical sources or at least physically realised source
state structures - not just structured abstract spaces.
Physical and phenomenal possibility spaces are abstract mathematical struc-
tures: spaces of possible physical and phenomenal states respectively. Yet even
mathematical Platonists do not generally concede that possibilities are real, and
so it is not even certain that possibility spaces can be abstract in the requisite
sense. Chalmers also relies on the principle that information is in fact realised
by structure. However, the structure is that of the abstract possibility space:
To find information spaces realised phenomenally, we do not rely
on the causal “difference that makes a difference principle”. . . we
rely on the intrinsic qualities of experiences and the structure among
them-the similarity and difference relations that they bear to each
52 Chapter 1. Scientific Metaphysics of Information
other, and their intrinsic combinatorial structure (1996.)
According to Chalmers, it is the phenomenal information (structured pos-
sibility) space - the space of possible phenomenal states that supervenes upon
the space of possible physical brain states - that results in phenomenally re-
alised information (284-5.) However, there can be no real Shannon information
from any real source or object given just an abstract possibility space informa-
tion space, and nor is there Kolmogorov complexity in the absence of physical
data sequences (Kolmogorov, 1968.) Shannon’s theory requires - and Chalmers’
double-aspect principle implies - that there must be a causal physical source
structure. Even if we grant that information is intrinsic to static physical struc-
ture, and I do, Platonic abstract entities like possibility spaces regarded as
Platonically or otherwise real are taken to be not only unchanging but a-causal
and spatiotemporally unextended.
If we take information to be realised by information spaces as sample spaces
of possible source states visa vi Shannon’s theory, then physical information
source structures are still ineliminable. Moreover, non-reductive supervenience
of one information space upon another is similar to the idea of information
transmission by accidental covariance of structures, which I will rebut at §5.4.1
p190.
Chalmers probably cannot appeal to Kolmogorov complexity of object struc-
ture, since according to that particular structure-centric conception of informa-
tion the object must physically exist. Information is realised by structure as
intrinsic to it. The Kolmogorov information measure is a structural complexity
measure: a measure of the complexity of the structure defined as the compar-
ative length of an encoded description of the structure of the object in some
formal description language. Kolmogorov complexity is not realised by a possi-
bility space.
The pragmatic Platonist about information may charge that this is simply
all just begging the question against platonism. However:
(i) Platonic entities are normatively defined (by Platonists) to be a-causal,
unchanging and non-spatiotemporal.
(ii) The I  i CICS physical realist about information can provide a scientifi-
cally coherent (with respect to the main scientific theories of information)
empirical and contingent story/explanation about why structures that re-
alise information must be causal, able to change, and spatiotemporal.
(iii) The physical realist can provide a scientifically coherent story/explanation
about how such structures can fulfil the functional role of information
bearing and realising mathematical modelling abstracta or abstract entities
by providing a physicalist and I  i CICS realist definition and conception
of how abstracta exist as spatiotemporal causal structures that encode
information from other such structures (See Chapter 4.)
(iv) The Platonist can provide no scientifically coherent story/explanation for
exactly how Platonic information bearing entities (sources) exist, nor for
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how exactly they might realise information, nor how exactly that infor-
mation might be accessible from - or to be able to causally inform - the
causal spatiotemporal structures of the material world (including the neu-
ral correlates of mental/cognitive content.)
Platonists must simply make the brute a-priori assertion that platonic enti-
ties are informational ‘somehow’. Neither (ii) nor (iii) require inflating ontology
beyond a scientific materialist ontology whereas it is hard to see how (iv) does
not require an inflated ontology. Regarding possibility spaces as informational
is arguably even more vacuous from an information theoretic perspective than
platonism about information. The only possible exception might be to consider
past frequency data as physical structures by considering events in terms of
Minkowski spacetime, but Chalmers does not do this.
Another subtle but important complication troubles the possibilist interpre-
tation of information. Shannon’s model for continuous sources is a pragmatically
discretising model: it is an approximation using the discrete source model for
manageability. There is a non-trivial question about how the source coding al-
phabet - the set of possible source states - is determinable or ascertainable in
any stable way. Different categories or ways of assigning possible states or pos-
sibilities would presumably deliver completely different possibility spaces, and
all might be considered as coherent as any other. Even a specific discretising
criteria might deliver varying magnitudes of possibility space for the same cog-
nitive state space and phenomenal state space. Thus it would seem arbitrary
and unjustified to limit the information space and its information to be finite.
Any assertion that (i) is wrong and that Platonic entities are somehow causal
and/or spatiotemporal and/or can change requires scientifically coherent justi-
fication and explanation on a contingent ontic basis. Normally this requirement
would be relaxed, and the Platonist could refer to a-priori Platonic abstract
information or information of Platonic abstracta. This is not adequate when
the ontic question is about information itself. 7.
The question is not being begged against platonism. It is just that I  i
CICS in re physical realism about information is compatible with and accounts
for the scientifically normative minimum necessary and sufficient physical and
causal conditions for the realisation of information sources and thus of trans-
missable and accessible information. platonism about information sources does
not account for these conditions. Possibilism seems even less promising.
1.5 Conclusion
The objective of this Chapter was to establish a metametaphysics and sys-
tematic methodology in accordance with scientific metaphysics. I described a
set of systematic criteria for such a metaphysics, which include defeasibility,
7Some weak versions of platonism do not assert the existence of a transcendent Platonic
realm, but the explanations for how Platonic entities exist begin to converge on theories like
Armstrong’s immanent realist theory of universals and to become very like I  i CICS realism
conceptually and in terms of their ontic commitments
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contingency, minimisation and elimination of a-priori conceptual analysis, and
rejection of the analytic a-priori and the fecund ontology of abstracta to which
such often gives rise (I will develop this further in the context of my metaphysics
of information in §3 p81, §4 p137.) I prefigured an important contribution to
logics of information - important because the calculus attempts to accommodate
and account for information dynamics that are immutable to and ineliminable
from materialist scientific discussions of information.
I then proceeded to attack one of the contemporary metaphysical mainstays
of the philosophy of information: Platonism about information, and the Kan-
tian transcendentalism that accommodates it (I do not think that Platonism
about information is a necessary condition for, say, Floridi’s Kantian Transcen-
dentalism about information, as it the latter can arguably deploy other kinds of
noetic spaces and is not necessarily committed to Platonism.) I made reference
to the explanatory gap argument from cognitive science and the philosophy of
mind, and more specifically David Chalmers’ realism about qualia. Chalmers’
argument from qualia against reductionism and in support of the in-principle
explanatory gap is an interesting example of informationist metaphysics that
arguably necessarily requires transmission of some kind in the absence of causal
pathways (although the debate is complicated by the relationship between su-
pervenience, reductionism, and non-reductive physicalism.)
Chapter 2
Towards a Metaphysics of
the Nature of Information
2.1 Introduction
Humphreys has recommended that the right approach to scientific metaphysics
is to regard the metaphysical postulates and observations of scientists with vary-
ing degrees of epistemic certitude or confidence depending upon the amount of
epistemic and inductive risk involved in any extrapolations from known scientif-
ically determined data (Humphreys, 2013.) In this chapter I begin to apply this
principle to the philosophy of information. The term ‘information’ gets applied
polysemously and pluralistically, and domain contextually, and yet in some im-
portant domains of the physical sciences - which scientific metaphyics suggests
provide the best and most correct ontology available - the question becomes
whether it’s clear that there is nothing to which information refers to in the I-
ontology corresponding to various physical formal scientific theories?”. I suggest
that the answer is no, and moreover that the opposite becomes apparent. This
is one expression of the argument from indispensability for naturalistic realism
about I-obtaining information that I mentioned in the introductory chapter .
The main motivation for considering a physical reductionist and scientific re-
alist conception of information (where information is taken to be real in a similar
way to physical structure in physical systems, rather than like fundamental par-
ticles or DNA) is that scientific metaphysics motivates a consideration of the
apparent almost unfaltering realism about information exhibited by scientists
and engineers. Scientists are notably often not capable philosophers and meta-
physicians (with notable exceptions) (Humphreys, 2013, 65; Ladyman and Ross,
2013, 114-15.) Sometimes, however, special scientists are both reductionists and
astute philosophers of science: see Sarkar, 2005, 236-40. Nonetheless, the scien-
tism that motivates the kind of scientific metaphysics that I am seeking to apply
to understanding the nature of what information reduces to in empirical the-
ories arises from both the demonstrable efficacy of science for solving complex
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material problems, and the propensity for such theories to refer to information
in what is clearly a scientific realist sense. My argument thus combines inference
to the best explanation, induction, and an indispensability argument.
Regarding information, it turns out that, unsurprisingly, scientists - and
especially physicists and molecular bioscientists - have always been interested
in the metaphysics of information (In fact some of the most important and
formative work in the discipline with respect to both classical, computational,
algorithmic, and hybrid measures, and conceptions, of information.) Their dis-
cussions usually begin with opinions about, and/or semi-formal attempts to
determine, whether different referents of physical theories that talk about en-
tropy and information are identical, and/or what exactly is being measured
when information is measured and how. In this chapter I continue the project
of establishing the scientific metaphysical mandate, and I move towards refer-
ring to science - and especially physics in accordance with the primacy of physics
constraint - to begin to establish the argument from inference to the best ex-
planation for the nature of information in conjunction to what I have referred
to as my indispensability argument for realism about information (§4 p27 H2.)
In this chapter I will also establish justification and relevance of the some
of the tenets of scientific metaphysics, most prominently, defeasibility of the-
ories and models in physics and the special sciences in accordance with the
primacy of physics constraint (§2.2 p56.) I then defend my reductionist stance
with reference to the dynamics of information itself, with the idea being that
scientific metaphysics, especially that which respects what are understood to be
physically sustained information dynamics, will tend to vindicate a stronger re-
ductionism than has been fashionable in the philosophy of science. I will then go
on to introduce the important concepts of natural encoding and the distinction
between transmission and emission, and between artefactual and natural sources
and source state alphabets (possibility spaces.) These concepts are important
because they help progress the overall argument I am presenting in support of
scientific metaphysical support for physicalist realism about information on the
basis of indispensability and inference to the best explanation.
I finish the Chapter with an important set of examples from physics and
molecular bioscience, making reference mostly to the discourse and theory terms
of practitioners in these sciences, while introducing my own terms of reference
as discussed above.
2.2 Defeasibility of Scientific Theorising
I have already introduced the idea that the defeasible nature of physics and the
sciences fits with both the primacy of physics constraint and the imperatives
of scientific metaphysics as I am deploying it. Adoption and incorporation
(into the scientific metaphysics) of a defeasibility orientated contingent scientific
metaphysics indicates that it is also not my aim to attempt anything like first
philosophy. If defeasibility and revisablity in scientific theory is the norm, then
a scientific metaphysics should seek to reflect this - not assume to override it or
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to be able to provide some logico-ontological glue or foundation of some kind
that supersedes or transcends it. Defeasibility and revisability is very much the
norm in QFT, for example:
The result was, as Schwinger, among many others, argued con-
vincingly that the concept of a fluctuating vacuum seemed to be
a viable one if it was combined with the renormalization scheme
developed in the late 1940s. More positively, the Casimir effect dis-
covered in 1948 suggested that the fluctuating vacuum even had an
observable effect. Only then, that is only at the end of 1940s, a firm
ontological commitment to the fluctuating vacuum field was made,
which signaled the maturity of the discipline. More than six decades
have passed since quantum field theory matured, but as far as its
ontological commitment to the vacuum field is concerned, nothing
has changed (Cao, 2010, 203-8; Refer also to the discussion about
the cosmological constant in Rugh and Zinkernagel, 2002, 665.) 1
The fluctuating vacuum is of course another way of referring to what I am
calling the (combined) quantum field and its corresponding vacuum. The pro-
cess of maturing referred to above has included enormous changes in ontological
commitments, and the quotation makes it clear that a change in commitment
to the idea of the fluctuating vacuum was never beyond consideration. The
minimal commitments of a scientific metaphysics for my purposes are:
M1 Defeasibility of premises and claims in keeping with the defea-
sibility of formal sciences and their theories (Humphreys, 2013,
55-6; Cao, 2003b, 61)
M2 Contingency or a-posteriority for premises and claims (Humphreys,
2013, 60; Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 114; Ladyman et al., 2007,
129-30, 131)
M3 Rejection of a-priori analysis (especially ontological existence
claims), including conceptual analysis (Humphreys, 2013; La-
dyman and Ross, 2013 2)
M4 Retaining of formal logic and the various mathematical calculi
indispensable to science in keeping with M1-M3 with respect
to scientific ontology.
There’s an important difference between Humphrey’s view of defeasibility
and my own. Humphreys, understandably, states that “in the absence of specific
1The Casimir effect is a small attractive force between uncharged conductive plates (or
in other descriptions of the experiment - mirrors) that has been demonstrated to be caused
by quantum field vacuum fluctuations Rugh and Zinkernagel, 2002, 6-7; Zeidler and Service,
2009, 822-3
2The treatment of the hybrid approach of the ‘Canberra Plan’ is not something that I will
attempt to address in this paper.
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evidence that is directly relevant to a particular scientific claim which suggests
that the claim is false and the presence of specific evidence that it is true, the
rational epistemic action is to accept the claim as true.” (Ibid. 56.) I will
qualify this with a rather significant adjustment: we should accept such claims
to be defeasibly true if they encode sufficient veridical information, where the
encoding of information from nature and from physical systems is performed by
scientists and scientific apparatus and methods performing the role and function
of a special kind of ‘black box’ encoder of information.
However, I agree with Humphreys that a more a-priori-like metaphysics -
with its numerous tools including thought experiment and constrained extrapo-
lation from established facts - sometimes unavoidably arises from open questions
at the frontiers of the sciences (Humphreys, 2013, 65.) Ontological questions
in the sciences are frequently posed by scientists themselves, and yet, just as
a-priori ontology and metaphysics that denies or omits to acknowledge the pri-
macy of a-posteriori science is ill-founded, it is not clear that scientific discipline
without trained philosophical discipline (or at least acumen) is alone enough to
do contingent a-posteriori metaphysics.
In addition to its contingent and a-posteriori character, I agree with Humphreys’
assessment that scientific metaphysics is realist about the objects of scientific
investigation, and that it involves a meta-inductive observation:
It is that the methods of the physical sciences have been suc-
cessful in discovering the existence and properties of a number of
generally accepted entities in the physical sciences. These proce-
dures include empirical, mathematical, and computational methods.
( Humphreys, 2013, 54)
Ladyman and Ross also regard that there is little to be gained from estab-
lishing metaphysical frameworks that are not in keeping with the best scientific
practice (Ladyman et al., 2007, 1.)
While there are many places that one could start, a good view of the sci-
entific metaphysical problem domain with respect to information is available in
cosmology. Humphreys reveals eloquently how the overlap between scientific
information theory and metaphysics is salient to philosophical investigation:
How can all of the relevant information needed to fix future states
of the universe be encoded into a single instantaneous state? This
puzzle becomes more pressing when we consider the state at the
first instant of the universe. How can everything needed to guide
the development of the universe for evermore be right there in a
single time slice which has no history and no law-like regularities
to guide its subsequent development? This is a serious difficulty for
any view that insists that there can be no causal properties without
an associated law, and that regularities are a necessary condition
of having a law. (Humphreys, 2013, 66; Refer also to Rugh and
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Zinkernagel, 2002, 664-6, 671.) 3;
Humphreys is here discussing the problem of the apparent explosion of in-
formation in the expansion of the material universe (visible within our light
cone and based upon data accessible to human astronomy) in the context of do-
ing metaphysics about nomic constraints, and determinism. This is relevant to
questions about the validity of digital and informational ontology - ‘it from bit’
and what we might fairly call ‘it from information’ respectively. It is certainly
salient to the enterprise of producing an informationist scientific metaphysics, as
well as a scientific metaphysics of information. It is my position that I-existing
physical structures and causality come first and are the reductive basis of infor-
mation, rather than the inverse, the aforementioned it from information (and
the closely related idea of it as information), as some contemporary philosophers
have argued (Floridi, 2008a; Tegmark, 2008.)
In the above quoted passage, Humphreys uses the term ‘encoded’ to refer to
the containment of information in the original finite point state of the physical
universe. This is coherent according to the concept of natural encoding that I
have introduced 4. Then there is the idea that the information in the early state
of the universe either might or must have somehow guided the development of
the universe. This coheres with the concept of causally induced configuration of
(signals as) sources. Yet I suggest that such ideas imply a number of assumptions
about information, not all of which are contingent. They include that:
i. Information is somehow programmatic, where the property of being pro-
grammatic includes a kind of rule based or nomically constraining causality
(I do not think Humphrey’s requires teleology as a necessary component.)
ii. Information either existentially precedes physical structures and spatiotem-
porally structured processes, or else is somehow intrinsic to or else neces-
sarily incidental to them (it from information, and it as information)
iii. There is some fixed and-or traceable relationship between information in
the initial state and that in subsequent states
iv. Information has some kind of causal power (although it is not clear how
this might work, except on the apparent terms of theories in physics about
the early state of the universe. See also Pitalu´a-Garc´ıa, 2013 and Al-Safi
and Short, 2011)
I take it that i. - iii. are both coherent in contingent terms and align with
mathematical information theory, and that iv. involves the same scepticism and
uncertainty about causality and causal powers as is usually prevalent in meta-
physics, with the caveat that physicists generally don’t - and cannot - dispense
3For some research by scientists that focus on unifying information theories and the in-
formation of the expanding universe see Frieden and Petri, 2012, Ubriaco, 2009, and Frieden
et al., 2011. For discussions of information in cosmology see Short and Wehner, 2010
4Although I confess that the causally upstream sources are what I take to be a mystery to
not only myself - but all physicists
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with causation. There may also be included in the above the assumption of
the metaphysical doctrine of universal causality or the ontological version of the
principle of sufficient reason, which has been called into question in the light
of various scientific findings (Humphreys, 2013 , 55.) However, this is not clear
due to the oft-noted indispensability of causation in physics.
I think that physics and mathematical information theory both allow that
structure, and thus information, can be as emergent as whatever the best physics
(my current chosen physics being QFT) contingently finds that they are, but
with the caveat that it looks like there is no contingent or empirical evidence
that physical I-obtaining structure has to be somehow conserved in the same
way as natural kind energy according to the law of conservation of energy (Cao,
2010, 205-9; Swanson, 2017, 3-4.) As I have already suggested, these possibilities
are not mutually exclusive with pluralism about information at different levels
of explanation and abstraction.
Information might reduce to the natural equivalent of lexical sequences (and
there is then a question about whether such are abstract-Platonic or always
physical and how any semantic content attaches to them - i.e. the SGP), or to
physical entropy (whatever that is exactly 5), but without some kind of ontic
overlap between the two it is hard to see how it could reduce to or involve both.
The appeal of a nominal pluralism about the nature of information thus becomes
apparent. My view is that there is an ontic overlap and moreover that there is a
common ontic ground or basis for the obtaining of both sequences and entropy
considered to be the basis of information. It occurs at a very basic level in the
ontology, but is not so basic as to be trivial or irrelevant. There have been
numerous attempts - many of them coherent and serviceable - to unify algo-
rithmic and entropic conceptions of information (Chaitin, 1975; Zurek, 1990a;
Zurek, 1990b; Zurek, 1989; Galas et al., 2010; Gru¨nwald and Vita´nyi, 2003;
Gru¨nwald and Vita´nyi, 2003; Calude, 2009, 86-9.) Andre Kolmogorov was a
rigid materialist who regarded that all data sequences were physical - a position
that closely resembles the often derided brute physicalism about information
(data representation) of Rolf Landauer (Landauer, 1996, Kolmogorov, 1963, Vi-
tanyi and Li, 2009, Gru¨nwald and Vita´nyi, 2003, DiVincenzo and Loss, 1998.)
Kolmogorov’s work is relevant because of his materialist constructivism and be-
cause he sought to develop a statistics not based upon probabilities, and yet his
probability axioms are core to contemporary statistics and probability theory.
Those axioms were formulated measure-theoretically by Kolmogorov and can
be applied to non-probabilistic mathematics (Kolmogorov and Bharucha-Reid,
1956; Kolmogorov, 1963; Porter, 2014; Nualart, 2004, 607-8; Ha´jek, 2012; Shafer
et al., 2001, 40-2.) The metaphysical significance of this is that, although mea-
sure theory is generally applicable to many problem domains, Kolmogorov chose
it because it allowed him to restrict his theory to countable infinities only, and
because the measure theoretic approach was apt to apply for physical events
in a probability space considered in the context of material (empirical) random
experiences (where random experience is a technical term in the theory for an
5Refer to the discussion below at the second quotation in §2.4 p72
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empirical outcome.) Kolmogorov’s notable materialist and empiricist interpre-
tation of probabilities and mathematical entities included rejecting the existence
of infinite series.
Thus, the probabilist assertion that information reduces to statistics, or else
non-reductively just is statistical and/or probabilistic in nature, is on shaky
ground (and I include Ladyman and Ross’s statisticalist metaphysics combined
with Floridi’s ISR in this) if for no other reason than according to Kolmogorov
- and to Ladyman and Ross themselves - there is a physical basis for algo-
rithmically and statistically obtaining information respectively (Kolmogorov,
1932.) The probabilist about information can arguably permit contingent facts
about the nature of probabilities and statistics without confusion. As I have al-
ready mentioned, however, if probabilities turn out to be something like physical
propensities and therefore to supervene upon or to be existentially dependent
upon stochastic processes and systems and information is statistical only, then
information transitively existentially depends upon such systems also (I develop
this idea to be the definition of the basis of my formulation of ontic structural
informational realism OSIR at §6.2 p208.)
Under such circumstances it is doubtful that a-priori approaches - even
Floridi’s transcendentalist approach (Floridi, 2004b 6) - can succeed in deter-
mining a workable metaphysics of information if for no other reason than -
platonism about information not withstanding - the terms of the ontological
discussion and the problem domain are largely set by physico-mathematical sci-
ences (A transcendentalist quantum adaptation of Floridi’s ISR is proposed in
Bynum, 2014, 131-36.)
This physicalist and empiricist standpoint, and the rejection of the tran-
scendentalist conception, is often denied for various reasons associated with
pluralism and non-reductivism about information, using such devices as ontic
neutrality - Floridi’s aforementioned statement of a kind of non-physicalist mul-
tiple realisability principle for the realisation of information designed to counter
the information physicalism of Rolf Landauer ( Floridi, 2004a.) Yet at best it
is not clear that information is not physical as Landauer asserted. More than
that, there are problems with ontic neutrality, according to which information
reduces to relations, where the relations are of any kind and in any kind of
space (including noetic, abstract spaces conceived of numerously, and mathe-
matical spaces) (Floridi, 2011c, 90.) At minimum, this does not seem to be
easily reconcilable with classical probabilism about the nature of information:
Shannon deploys Kolmogorov’s axioms in Kolmogorov’s empiricist and materi-
alist spirit, which is underpinned by the important fact that Shannon’s classical
statistical theory of information regards only physical stochastic processes as
real information sources (Shannon and Weaver, 1949.)
Perhaps, then, this discussion does point to the merits of both pluralism
and eliminativism-nominalism about information. Maybe it is simply errant
to attempt to attach the natural language term-label ‘information’ to any one
thing - or type of thing - at certain levels of explanation or abstraction. Claude
6This is a continuation of Floridi’s effort to establish a theory of semantic information)
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Shannon certainly thought so:
The word ‘information’ has been given different meanings by var-
ious writers in the general field of information theory. It is likely that
at least a number of these will prove sufficiently useful in certain ap-
plications to deserve further study and permanent recognition. It
is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would
satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this
general field. Shannon et al., 1993a
Notice that Shannon is here talking only about information theory (although,
how broadly he takes that to be defined is not clear), and so this omits the mul-
tifarious attributions that had already arisen in the rest of the sciences (and
the social sciences) by the 1990s. However, putting aside which term is used to
label it - cosmologists, biologists, applied mathematicians and physicists alike
frequently use the term to refer to something in their empirical theories: some-
thing that is associated with entropy, signaling and transmission of messages
and/or signals, and with natural laws and ‘instructions’.
The nature of information itself cannot be explained in terms of information,
for obvious reasons, but it does not follow that it does not exist. One can only
talk about it in terms of what the best scientific theories say about it (or about
I-existing system dynamics taken to be information-theoretic or informational)
contingently, and defer to their discussion of dynamical systems and phenomena
in information-theoretic terms, and identify what in the I ontology - regardless
of labelling - is thought of as information and the dynamics associated with
it: the best deserver for information, to use Canberra Plan metaphysics terms.
I suggest that if structure uncontroversially I-exists in the I ontology, then
information does still more surely, since information can reduce to structure, but
it is hard to determine what structure reduces to (although I will be proposing
the radical identity thesis that it is defeasibly identical to non-uniform regions
of the quantum field.)
2.3 Reductive Physicalism About Information
and Informational non-eliminative ontic struc-
tural realism
Physicalism-materialism about information itself is rejected by Luciano Floridi
and is largely precluded by most probabilist-subjectivist metaphysics of infor-
mation. Philosophers like Fred Dretske seek naturalising formulations of the
nature of information, but stop short of asserting physicalism about informa-
tion itself. Mathematician Keith Devlin has a naturalising approach but doesn’t
foreground (and may assume but not require) physicalism-materialism (Dretske,
1981; Devlin, 1991, 84.) This is an intuitive consequence of a number of facts and
conceptions, including the usefulness of theoretic and mathematical abstracta as
explanatory and therefore apparently informative or information bearing (Lyon
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and Colyvan, 2008) and the probabilistic and popular subjectivist characteri-
sations of semi-formal notions of information as being associated with a prob-
abilistic surprise or surprisal value, or a subjective or epistemic reduction in
uncertainty (it’s telling that theorists often don’t distinguish between subjec-
tive and objective probabilistic uncertainty, and often refer to the former when
it is not necessary or supported.)
In recent history, the main framework that has been taken up by metaphysi-
cians seeking a sound basis for scientific realism about natural systems and
phenomena is ontic structural realism. Ontic structural realism originated with
Worrall’s epistemic variety (Worrall, 1989) and Dennett’s acknowledgement of
the differences in realisms about abstract entities like centers of gravity (Den-
nett, 1991, 29-30.) Most ontic structural realists are naturalistic philosophers
- embracing what Dennett following Arthur Fine called the natural ontological
attitude or NOA. Differences in naturalistic standpoint will affect the choice of
ontology for ontic structural realism.
Floridi, in seeking (despite stated pluralism about the nature of informa-
tion) to establish the reductive ontic basis of information for the purposes of
both informational structural realism (ISR) and a theory of strongly semantic
information (Floridi, 2003; Floridi, 2008a; Floridi, 2005a; Floridi, 2004b), has
proposed that it obeys what he calls ontological neutrality in keeping with a
rejection of Landauer’s physicalism about data representation (Floridi, 2009b,
21.) Floridi’s informational structural realism (ISR) is an ontologically non-
committal or neutral structural realism designed to accommodate the disparity
between scientific/ontic and mathematical structural realisms since both can
provide a basis for information depending upon which metaphysics is favoured
by a particular information theorist or scientist. Landauer argued in terms of
data representation necessarily requiring physical structure, which depending
on the terms, principles and concepts deployed (about the nature of represen-
tation, for example) may be very different from information requiring physical
structure.
The metaphysics of information that I suggest is an non-eliminative ontic
structural realism that requires that both information sources and formal struc-
tures that represent them embody information on the same basis, which basis
is the causally induced configuration of I-existing structure (CICS.) Moreover,
representation can and does occur naturally and all CICS are instrinsically se-
mantic and representational at different levels (see §7.1 p249 especially Chapter
3 7.) Any higher level rule based or lexical semantics associated with messages
still reduce to CICS - albeit on the basis of a complex of heterogeneous sources
used in encoding the messages (this is my solution to the symbol grounding
problem or SGP (Floridi and Taddeo, 2005 and Floridi, 2011c), which I also
expand upon in chapter 3.)
However, I am also proposing a revision to non-eliminative ontic structural
realism. It will involve emphasising structure as existentially prior to relations,
and rendering relations (otherwise the core of most non-eliminative ontic struc-
7Refer also to Long, 2014
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tural realism) as just elements to be picked out of structure, as opposed to
determining ground or existential basis of structure (See §3.3 p90, §6.6 p242
and refer to Cao, 2010, 211-14 and French, 2006 for contextually relevant dis-
cussions.) The motivation for this inversion (which I will cover further below)
in the context of scientific metaphysics is that, although our best sciences deal
with what are referred to as mathematical relations, including statistical and
probabilistic ones:
 Not all mathematical structures are based upon relations
 Not all science, especially hypothetico deductive motivated science, has
structure that starts with relations (See again Cao, 2010, 211-12.) Often
it comes from representations of natural phemonena, for example (these
representations can be expressed in terms of relations, but need not be.)
 There is nothing in principle or practice wrong with asserting that relations
are not the basis for structure, but just features of it or a selection of some
features of it in line with the idea of partial representation.
The best support I can offer at this point for this is a visual-cum-modeling
analogy. Think of the wireframe representation of a structure as a computer
visualised model, or a physical wireframe for an artist’s sculpture or a scientific
prototype. In these cases it is at least as reasonable to state that the wire-
frame is regarded as an approximation of, or part of, the modelled structure
only (let’s assume they are all trying to model a subject or external entity to
represent it, for the sake of argument to eliminate concerns about constructive
elements.) The engineer, scientist, or artist has a full structure to approximate.
The wireframe is an approximation by partial representation. It is a partial
representation of an entire structure (see also §3.3 p101-§3.3 p109 and §4.3.1
p147.) There are relations between the different nodes (relata, components, ex-
istents, objects) in the web, but there are infinite possible spatial configurations
for the web (and there is a parallel case - arguably even more so - for any ab-
stract web like model or structure in a representation or theory.) Each of those
configurations is only an approximation or partial representation of the entire
structure. As the number of nodes approaches infinity, so the model approaches
a full representation of the structure of that modelled. A mathematical model of
the structure might be bootstrapped or start with a description of relations, but
which parts or features of a partial representation one starts with would seem to
have little real connection with what the objective existential basis of the struc-
ture is (See also French’s reference to Murray’s coverage of the Lotka-Volterra
model of butterfly wings French, 2014, 102-3, 332.)
So, as I will re-affirm at §3.3 p101 and §4.3.1 p147, whilst Cao, in summaris-
ing the tenets of non-eliminative ontic structural realism, mentions that “if we
take a structure as a stable system of relations among a set of relata”, I don’t
do so, and yet my claim is that I am still pursuing an OSR of an informational
variety (Cao, 2010, 212.) Moreover, I suspect it’s true that “the nature of an
entity cannot be exhausted by its structural relations because an entity always
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possesses its natures whether or not it is, at any given moment, engaged in all
relations it is capable of, which is a contingent matter” (Chakravartty, 2004)
(Ibid.)
One can also approach this issue from the perspective of the mathematical
fictionalist, keeping in mind that caution is required in the context of physico-
mathematical QM and QFT where observables, operators, and even uncertain-
ties are often taken to be physical or directly representative of such things as
physical properties (spin etc.), physical entropy, or even physical interactions
(operations.) If numbers are only fictions, then it follows that the relations
described by such fictions are also fictions that are able to be deployed in a
modelling setting to partially represent structure in systems. If the claim is
that it is the relations being represented, then I suggest that this ontic priority
is confused, since such relations in a system might be used to define a model of
it, but with respect to the I-existing system, they seem to be very much only
picking out a part of or a feature of the overall structure of the system, or else
they may very well be relations only between constructed mathematical appara-
tus that emerges in the formal model during construction on a pragmatic basis
or due to the deployment of a mathematical system of rules and axioms: an
effective turning of the handle on the mathematical/computational machinery.
This latter posit seems to be supported by the idea that more than one set of
relations can be used to approximate the structure, and that any given set of
relations does not fully describe the structure of a system in its totality.
I not a fictionalist, Platonist, or in re realist about mathematical entities
and structures. I am an informationist about mathematical entities. I take this
to be a new category in the philosophy of mathematics. It is more closely allied
to Aristotelian in re or immanent realism about mathematical entities, but can
accomodate the idea that mathematical abstract entities (and other entities)
are only what I have called pseudo-sources. It is not my primary concern in
this thesis, but informationist mathematical realism of the kind I have devised
is underpinned by the scientific metaphysics of information that is my primary
concern, and its defining features are:
 Mathematical abstracta cannot exist platonically (due to what is essen-
tially the eliatic principle taken in conjunction with principle of natural
closure and the primacy of physics constraint)
 Mathematical entities, when not fictions, are sources
 Mathematical entities that are objectively not reducible to CICS struc-
tures are pseudo-sources (§5.6 p199; §2.3.1 p68)
This analysis accommodates and makes available two possible interpretations
of the nature of mathematical points: they can be source structures (physical),
or pseudo-source structures (fictions.)
Most theorists take the idea that more than one set of relations can ap-
proximate, realise, or identify a structure to mean that constructive empiricist
anti-realism has merit in that the I-existing ontology is ultimately inscrutable.
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I suspect that this is a non-sequitur, and it is simply that infinite or near infinite
selections of information can be taken from a total structure and encoded into
a representation of the structure, and that noise and error in transmission and
encoding is impossible to avoid. This is the very principle of abstraction (the
abstracting out of surplus or bulk structure from the actual or posited structure
of the I-obtaining natural phenomena or systems) that makes mathematics ef-
fective and useful. Ladyman and Ross make an indirect statement of this when,
in analysing David Deutsch’s metaphysics, they affirm that “Deutsch argues for
the first claim just as [we] do, by invoking the fact that in scientific practice,
explanations of macroscale phenomena in microphysical terms are almost never
available.” (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 120.) That sometimes constructive in-
terpolation and or extrapolation is used - including that called into service by
physical posits and hypothesis like those associated with Pauli’s neutrino, Ein-
stein’s gravity waves, and myriad other posits in physics including the QFT
vacuum itself 8 - does not change the outcome: the model or representation so
adduced or constructed is still one of many possible encodings of information
selected from the I structure. It’s my view that an approach according to which
structure is a primitive (as opposed to structure that is based upon relations)
with a physical existential reductive basis, solves several problems for the exis-
tence of properties and the distinction between I-existing and formal structure.
It also helps to properly locate and situate information - or the reductive basis
or ground of what scientists 9 are broadly referring to as information - when
they talk about both I-ontology and formal theory ontology.
My informational non-eliminative ontic structural realism revision is obedi-
ent to Humphrey’s and Ladyman and Ross’s criteria for doing good naturalis-
tic metaphysics. It minimises and even eliminates a-priori conceptual analyses
(Humphreys (2013).) It is not anti-reductionist nor non-reductionist like the
statistical-structuralist approach which Ladyman and Ross ultimately adopt
for the basis of the nature of information and for their informational ontology
(Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 612-4. See §4.3 p142; See also French’s observa-
tions at French, 2014, 231, 325.) Ladyman and Ross’s non-eliminative ontic
structural realism becomes a kind of instrumentalism-approximating (in that
science’s connection with nature is limited to a statistical data based view of its
structures) quasi-reductionism: they do not see statistics as reductionist espe-
cially when applied to real patterns at higher levels of abstraction, but regard
that the statistics and the structure do I-obtain in the I-world.
According to Ladyman and French’s earlier non-eliminative ontic structural
realism (Ladyman et al., 2007) the reductive base of scientific ontology is struc-
ture that is partially isomorphic with mathematical relations in formal models,
although they still defend their position regarding the nature of structure as
physicalist against the similar observations to those I have just outlined but
made by Cao (French and Ladyman, 2003a, 37, 40-2; Cao, 2003b, 58.) This is a
similar ontological move (reduction to relational data or relations) to the alter-
8Neutrinos (1932-52), Schwarzchild black holes, gravity waves, frame dragging (1918, 2004-
2015), heliocentrism, stomach ulcer bacteria (Helicobacter pylori), Higgs boson (1962-2012))
9See the previous footnote regarding the use of the term ‘ground’.
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native transcendentalist (Adriaans, 2010) view about information itself that has
been proposed by Luciano Floridi which is central to his informational structural
realism (ISR: Floridi, 2008a) and his semantic theory of information respectively.
According to Floridi information reduces to ontologically neutral nonuniformi-
ties including abstract relations, and they are at in fact at the bottom of the
material ontology - see §6.4 p225. It’s also an ontologically similar move to the
mathematical reductionism proposed by physicists such as Max Tegmark, which
has been identified as mathematical collapse by French (Tegmark, 2008; French,
2014, 193-4.)
Importantly, as already mentioned, the revision of non-eliminative ontic
structural realism that I propose (called OSIR or ontic structural informational
realism - see §6.2 p208) is itself intended to be defeasible on the scientific real-
ist basis suggested separately by Humphreys and Cao (Humphreys, 2013, 55-6;
Cao, 2003b, 61; See also French, 2014, 324.) Ladyman and Ross emphasise the
statistical and probabilistic nature of reality. This is in keeping with the un-
derstanding that statistical mechanics and statistics in general does most of the
effective work in contemporary science, and forms the core - along with linear
algebra - of quantum mechanics:
The deep structure of the world is arguably not mathematical
but statistical, and there is no such thing as ‘purely formal statis-
tics’. The principles of statistics are generalizations of recurrent
patterns found in data; and such structuring of data is the core
business of both science and its metaphysical unification. Contrary
to Deutsch’s claims, enlightenment optimism about the capacity for
limitless expansion of knowledge is compatible with the hypothesis
that the world is irreducibly and fundamentally stochastic. Among
great philosophers, C.S. Peirce anticipated this hypothesis (Lady-
man and Ross, 2013.)
French has also presented what is very much a naturalistic ontic structural
realist scientific realist metaphysics with statistical content, but he favours the
modalism that is often associated with possibility spaces in quantum systems.
Guided by his aversion to the kind of ontological fecundity that arises from the
many worlds interpretations of QM due to Hugh Everett and David Deutsch,
which I also reject as ontologically inflationary and unjustified even in the light
of the demonstrated mathematical elegance of Everett’s model, French restrains
his approach to the content of the structure of non-eliminative ontic structural
realism (French (2014), 263-6) to incorporate innate modal realism (the in-
nateness avoids concrete many worlds commitments.) Whereas Ladyman and
Ross rely upon a physical mind, language, theory, and computation indepen-
dent naturalised conception of statistics - statistics existing as the stochasicity
of stochastic sources in nature - French instead relies upon modality as being
an intrinsic mind, language, theory, and computation independent element of
natural processes and systems:
My central claim will be that we should take laws and symme-
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tries—and hence the structure of which these are features—as inher-
ently, or primitively, modal. . . . I will assume that modality is ‘in’
the world, in the sense that the structure of the world is modal, and
the issue will be . . . how to spell that out. (French, 2014, 231.)
According to my view of representing structures in formal theories, they
are CICS source structures produced by a complex of encoding operation(s)
which reduce to physical processes of various (and sometimes practically inde-
terminate kinds) being performed on information existing in external sources of
various kinds in order to encode representations of the information, and that the
physical encoding operations (which reduce to transduction) are performed by
human agents and appropriate tools. More specifically, that the posits and mod-
els demonstrably encode veridical information from known information sources
(more of this in chapters 3-5.) I suggest this is borne out by both meta-induction
and inference to the best explanation with respect to the unusual success of phys-
ical posits in physico-mathematical theories historically, as well as the unusual
operational effectiveness of such theories as QM and QFT. (For similar appli-
cations of the encoding concept from classical information theory, or a concept
similar to it, to formal representation in physics see Ladyman et al., 2007, 208,
212-16; Rickles, 2008a , 4, 11; Rickles, 2008d, 136-8; Esfeld and Lam, 2009, 8;
Ladyman and Ross (2013); Chakravartty (2004), 155; Redhead et al. (2001);
Cao (2003c), 60.)
2.3.1 Brief Introduction to Naturalised Encoding and Rep-
resentation, Pseudo Sources, and Pseudo Informa-
tion
I will make reference to pseudo-information in this chapter (although not in
any depth), and so a brief introduction to the concept (to be developed at §5.6
p199) is as follows. A real information source (existing on the physicalist and
structuralist bases that I have already introduced) is the necessary existential
basis of real information. A representation of such a source or sources can
arise naturally by causal inducement of configuration of another structure or
structures by that source. So at this point we have natural information sources
and naturalised representations thereof. Such representations of the source or
sources would then be veridical on a causal indicative basis: the information in
the source is a truthmaker, and is not alethic, whereas the representation of the
information is alethic and a potential truth bearer. Now, such representations
can also be caused with an encoding step: there can be various kinds of trans-
duction or conversion of energy involved in producing the causally downstream
representation(s) from the original source(s), and such can happen according to
a naturally occurring (according to natural nomic constraints) source alphabet
- or set of possible source states - and an effective set of natural codes.
Astronomy is a good place to look for examples of natural sources and natural
encoding of representations in their emissions as the transmission medium (the
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electromagnetic spectrum - and gravity waves - through the vacuum of space 10)
and the sources (spinning stars or pairs of stars respectively) have easily iden-
tifiable and isolatable macroscopic properties (Mahmoodifar and Strohmayer,
2013; Bejger, 2015; Patruno et al., 2012; Corsi and Me´sza´ros, 2009; Corsi and
Me´sza´ros, 2009; Alford and Schwenzer, 2015 11. Celestial X-Ray and gravity
wave sources have certain naturally constrained property limits. There are cer-
tain limits on the size and age of stars that can be pulsars, and there are certain
limits - related to natural nomic constraints - upon there minimum and maxi-
mum spin rates, energy output, frequencies, and other properties all relative to
their mass and density, among other things. There are limits or bounds on the
amount of energy that a given size, mass and age of pulsar can emit in particle
beams, for example. What these natural limits and constraints correspond to
is a natural alphabet for the source: there is a finite set of allowable states that
the sources can be in, and a finite set of sources configurations. To understand
the latter, consider that a pulsar has dual beams/or jets which are aligned with
or ‘funnelled’ out along its magnetic poles. This also limits the set of angles for
beams relative to the axis of rotation. In pulsars where the beams are aligned
with the spin axis, there is no ‘lighthouse’ or pulsed effect where the beam emis-
sions intersect earth. The set of possible properties of signals/emissions from
pulsars is constrained by both physical laws and geometry.
This short development of these concepts of natural encoding and represen-
tation also avails us of a glimpse at our scientific metaphysics in action. It is not
known with 100% certainty what all of the limits and ratios are. Astronomers
are constantly discovering errors and new data that causes them to revise the
limits that they are aware of in epistemic terms:
The new discovery, called PSR J1748-2446ad, is interesting be-
cause it spins faster than 700 Hz, which astronomers had considered
a stellar speed limit. Although most pulsars should have enough
self-gravity to spin as fast as 3000 times per second before they split
apart, all of the previously discovered millisecond pulsars, of which
there are 150 or so, spin slower than 700 Hz. That led researchers
to believe that they were emitting gravitational waves – theoretical
ripples in space-time – that kept their spins in check. Massive, fast-
spinning objects that are not perfectly symmetrical are predicted to
radiate away energy in these waves, with faster objects unleashing
much more energy than slower ones. Bryan Jacoby, a pulsar expert
at the National Research Council in Washington DC, US, and not
part of the discovery team, says this “brick wall” effect is thought to
be very effective at limiting spin rates. “If you make it spin just a
little bit faster, you’re emitting a lot more very strong gravitational
waves,” he told New Scientist. “So, the existence of this pulsar sug-
gests the numbers [for this speed limit] aren’t quite right, or that
10Here I simply mean outer space, rather than specifically Einstein’s spacetime
11The Chandrasekhar limit on white dwarf mass: electron degeneracy cannot support a
white dwarf heavier than 1.4 solar masses.
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something is wrong with this idea.” The authors agree, saying that
slowing from gravitational wave emission must become significant at
spin rates higher than 700 Hz or that theorists should revise their
models of neutron star crusts, which were used to arrive at the 700
Hz limit. (Hessels et al., 2006)
Although these researchers know that their data is incomplete and their
predictive theories and models are partial representations and incomplete, and
affected by noise and error (including signal loss that persistently obscures some
data), they are also working under the assumption - valid according to the
primacy of physics constraint - that they are aiming at a relatively fixed target
in terms of the objectively obtaining total set of limits and properties of such
X-Ray and gravity wave sources. Universal natural physical constraints - laws
of physics - guarantee that such limits and properties exist even if they are not
epistemically accessible to us. Scientists work with imperfect knowledge of the
set of possible source configurations and states: the alphabet at the source and
the set of codes for the natural encoding of emissions (transmitted messages)
from the sources (Boucheron et al., 2009; Orlitsky et al., 2004.)
So the signals received by Earth based telescopes are a natural representa-
tion of the information at pulsar sources 12. Most telescopes have transducers
(which in many cases now are based on digital technology with very high sam-
pling rates), and they encode new messages (and are themselves both elements
in information channels as well as themselves sources.) These signals inter-
nal to the telescope involve human artefacts, but are also governed by natural
constraints. When they are encoded from naturally occurring emissions from
celestial signal sources, these also carry representations of original sources infor-
mation. Now consider what happens if an astronomer generates a test sequence
using the software in the telescope. The sequence is not based upon any real
captured signal from any actual celestial signal source, but she could easily
present it to her colleagues as such without their being suspicious (until fur-
ther investigation of the claim.) Her deception involves using a non-natural
representation (which nonetheless is constrained on a naturalistic basis by the
physics of the equipment) the causally induced configuration of which is not due
to any celestial signal source. It’s essentially a fictional representation, and the
relations that represents are also fictional, and the putative source which it rep-
resents is a pseudo-source. The information represented is pseudo-information.
Correspondingly it’s a pseudo-representation. As I will explain at §5.6 p199, the
source that is implied to exist by the pseudo-representation is a pseudo-source,
and the representation itself a virtual source.
As I will discuss later (§4.3.2 p153) with reference to black hole physics
and quantum gravity - scientists are understood to make some ontological as-
sumptions in keeping with physicalist premises and particularly the principles
of causal closure and of ontological parsimony (Ladyman and Ross make ref-
12Rickles also refers to representations encoded from the mind, language, and theory inde-
pendent ontology (Rickles, 2008a, 4.) Esfeld and Lam use this terminology non-trivially at
(Esfeld and Lam, 2009, 8.)
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erence to the principle of natural closure - principle of natural closure - in the
same context Ladyman et al., 2007, 208, 306-8.) These assumptions can be
regarded as contingent because of the principle of ontological parsimony (POP
in this chapter) and in keeping with the Putnam no miracles argument, both
of which were of course concerns of Worrall when he developed his original
epistemic structural realism to combat pessimistic meta-induction and sustain
scientific realism. That is to say - even though there are some problems with
existing statements of physicalism, there is contingently no justification for be-
ing committed to the existence of informational or information bearing entities
in empirical theories that are not physical: no evidence for the causally effi-
cacious existence of non-physical or else physically irredicible information has
been discovered. Abstracta in formal theories do not non-physically reducing
informational entities in the ontology make.
2.3.2 Summary
In this section I have restated the need for a scientific metaphysics of infor-
mation and made some minimal commitments to the doctrine (which I take to
be defeasible itself), emphasising the centrality of defeasibility. I’ve admitted
that even physicists participate in apparent a-priori speculation when they have
pushed their science to the limits of discovery and detection, but that it does
not follow from this that what they do is uninformed by their science: the sci-
entific metaphysical mandate is retained. I’ve defended physicalist reductionist
structuralism as a basis for the metaphysics of information, and restated the
identification of quantum field theory as picking out the best defeasible existen-
tial basis of structure (I will pursue this further throughout the thesis §3.3 p90.)
I have introduced the idea of pseudo-information and pseudo-sources, and given
a brief outline of how the schema is associated with the philosophy of mathemat-
ics: I mentioned and briefly outlined informationism (of a very specific kind)
about mathematical entities and structures. I contrasted my view of structure
as an ontic primitive with the structural realist views of Ladyman and Ross (who
hold a physico-statisticalist position according to which structures are relations)
and French (whose position is one of realism about modality as the ontic ground
of the relations constituting structure) and provided a naturalised conception
of representations. We now have at least a fairly comprehensive prefiguring and
statement of the specific kind of ontic structural realism that I propose should
be combined defeasibly with quantum field theory using scientific metaphysical
premises in order to identify - using inference to the best explanation and a spe-
cific kind of indispensability argument - the nature of information. That project
will be pursued extensively in the remainder of the thesis (especially chapters
3, 4, 6, and 7.) Next however, and to close this chapter, we will refer - and
defer - to some insights from physics and the special sciences that are intended
to support my proposed arguments from indispensability and inference to the
best explanation in the context of scientific metaphysics.
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2.4 Initial Insights from Physics and Molecular
Bioscience
My approach is to achieve a scientific metaphysics of information by inference to
the best explanation, induction and meta-induction (induction from outcomes of
induction), and by establishing an indispensability argument. We must account
for references in scientific theories to dynamics such as the causal generation
and transfer or transmission (often functional or critical to system properties)
of signals and representations and structures between systems that I-obtain in
nature, and also between those systems and representing structures in theories
(Ladyman et al., 2007, 208-14, 307-12.) Something moves around which seems
to involve structure but is not limited to structure, and which can be measured
variously statistically and as entropy or as sequences, and it seems to be present
in all sciences (refer for examples to chapter 4 and §4.3.2 p153.) Information
transmission or similar dynamics (signal transmission and emission, structural
transfer and replication) are the constant feature of much of science. Information
theory provides ample analyses of such dynamics, and source coding theory also
provides some explanatory and ontological support.
Theories of black hole physics frequently become preoccupied with discus-
sions about, and scientific realist references to, information transmission, radi-
ation pulses and bursts, oscillation emissions, signals and encoding, and data-
compression dynamics: within quantum systems, between cosmological and ce-
lestial entities, and across event horizons (Frolov, 2014; Bra´dler and Adami,
2014; Hawking, 2014; Barbo´n, 2009; Page, 1993; Brustein and Medved, 2015;
Almheiri et al., 2013; Hawking, 2005; Hawking, 1975.) Surprising findings re-
garding entanglement and non-locality in quantum mechanics are expressed in
terms of prospective instantaneous information transmission as an outcome in-
trinsic to and inseparable from spooky action at a distance, although to date
an interpretation due to classical information theory has led to the assertion
that superluminal transmission by nonlocal effects or quantum entanglement is
not possible (Walleczek and Gro¨ssing, 2016; Esfeld, 2013, 21, 23, 25; Rudolph,
2012.) However, that the idea of instantaneous and/or superluminal trans-
mission is considered as surprising on the basis of perceived physicality of the
medium and the information transmission - if not the information itself - is, I
suggest, significant.
More relevantly, perhaps, quantum information theory commonly makes ref-
erence to entanglement using informational terms (which perpetuates the phys-
icalist conception of information as existing inherent to quantum systems as
discussed by DiVincenzo and loss DiVincenzo and Loss, 1998; Clifton, 2002;
Bokulich and Jaeger, 2010; Bennett (2004); Norton (2005); Bennett and Di-
Vincenzo (2000), 247. 13) At minimum, the contingent nature of quantum
information is intrinsically tied to the contingent nature of quantum probabil-
ities, quantum statistics (especially in the context of an ontology according to
13Bennett and DiVincenzo directly refer to/characterise I-obtaining quantum entanglement
as a quantifiable kind of information.
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which the world is the nonredundant statistics as with Ladyman and Ross’s
OSR), and entropy 14. Thus I suggest that information is not just some kind of
poly-semantic abstractum in physics, but that it’s something that is explanatory
precisely because it exists as intrinsic to I-obtaining structure in the I ontology
(see §4.3.2 p153.) When quantum mechanical and quantum physical theories
become dependent upon formal theories of information and information mea-
sures of different kinds as explanatory in a causal and reductionist sense, then I
suggest what’s evidenced in scientific practice is not just scientific realist intu-
ition limited by instrumentalist parameters, but a dependence of theory as an
epistemic tool on correct representation of a real dynamical structural existent
in the natural systems.
There is an information transmission concept familiar from the philoso-
phy genetics and molecular biology due to Susan Oyama and Paul Griffiths
- the parity thesis - that also reveals the way in which traditional signals and
transmission channels involve more information transmission than the classi-
cal encoding-channel view of machine mediated communications requires (Shea,
2007a, Griffiths and Gray, 1994, Griffiths and Gray, 1997.) The idea is that
if one inverts the relationship between channel contraints and the transmitted
signal according to classical transmission theory (Shannon theory) then there’s
another channel and different signals. This and other adaptations of classical
and complexity based information measures and theory tend to indicate that
there are demonstrable common reductive bases for them, or at least that there
are lower level facts about information realisation that reveal the existential
basis thereof, and the basis of information realism in scientific theories.
Not only are scientists often clearly scientific realists when it comes to infor-
mation, but physicists especially regard it as something physical, and assume a
statement of the nature of information:
However, much of the interest in the connection between infor-
mation, i.e. “bits”, and physical objects, i.e. “its”, stems from the
discovery that black holes have characteristics of thermodynamic
systems having entropies and temperatures. This insight led to the
information loss problem – what happens to the “bits” when the
black hole has evaporated away due to the energy loss from Hawk-
ing radiation? [W]e speculate on a radical answer to this question
using the assumption of self-similarity of quantum correction to the
gravitational action and the requirement that the quantum corrected
entropy be well behaved in the limit when the black hole mass goes
to zero. (Singleton et al., 2014, 0-1) (See also Rovelli, 2016, 1; Esfeld
and Lam, 2010, 1; Cao, 2003a, 26, 29; Mu¨ller et al., 2012, 2, 3-4, 5-6
and especially 6, 12, 15, 16; Timpson, 2005, 327-8, 329, 330.4, 331
4.1 - counter claim; Maudlin, 2013)
Here, Singleton et. al. seem to require:
14the real nature of which none other than Von Neumann famously said was not understood
by anyone
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A. Rejection of Wheeler’s digital ontological thesis of ‘it from bit’, according
to which material reality is the sum of responses to binary ‘yes-no’ queries
made of it by scientific methods, theories, and instruments (see §1.3 p37)
B. Assumption that Shannon’s classical theory is consistent with the rejection
of Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’ thesis.
According to the above passage, the bits are regarded as in re constituents
of the black hole system, rather than being realised by the use of apparatus
or instruments. An ontic structural scientific realism is implied as the correct
accompanying structural realism, rather than a theory-centric epistemic struc-
tural realism. According to Shannon’s theory, a bit is a unit of measure where
the measure is:
I   Qplogp (2.1)
and p is the probability of the next state of the source given the current state
using Markov-chain analysis (in which the probability of the current source state
is conditional upon the prior source state only.) In Shannon’s classical statistical
formulation, the choice of bits is driven not by a metaphysical assumption or by
theory-centric premises, but by mathematical elegance (suitability, simplicity)
and convenience (of base 2 logarithms) in the problem domain, and by intuition
about the most appropriate measure per an intuitive concept of proportional
information:
The logarithmic measure is more convenient for various reasons:
1. It is practically more useful. Parameters of engineer-
ing importance such as time, bandwidth, number of relays,
etc., tend to vary linearly with the logarithm of the number
of possibilities. For example, adding one relay to a group doubles
the number of possible states of the relays. It adds 1 to the base
2 logarithm of this number. Doubling the time roughly squares the
number of possible messages, or doubles the logarithm, etc. 2. It
is nearer to our intuitive feeling as to the proper measure.
This is closely related to (1) since we intuitively measures entities
by linear comparison with common standards. One feels, for exam-
ple, that two punched cards should have twice the capacity of one
for information storage, and two identical channels twice the capac-
ity of one for transmitting information. 3. It is mathematically
more suitable. Many of the limiting operations are simple
in terms of the logarithm but would require clumsy restatement in
terms of the number of possibilities....The choice of a logarith-
mic base corresponds to the choice of a unit for measuring
information. If the base 2 is used the resulting units may
be called binary digits, or more briefly bits, a word suggested by
J. W. Tukey. A device with two stable positions, such as a relay or
a flip-flop circuit, can store one bit of information. (Shannon and
Weaver, 1949, 3-4. My emphasis.)
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Thus according to the classical formalism from The Mathematical Theory of
Communication, the assignation of bits is derived from the construction of the
measure according to applied mathematical and intuitive premises, rather than
the idea that instruments will make binary queries of natural systems. In other
words, the bit very much comes from the it. Singleton et. al. above take this
more seriously still - identifying the bit with the it - but not in such a way as
they mathematise the ontology: the bit is a physical quantity associated with a
physical structural feature in transmission.
A preliminary observation from a survey of literature on the topic of what in-
formation is in science and communications theory - and what if anything it has
to do with thermodynamics and entropy - reveals that although engineers and
scientists both struggle with the issues, scientists (physicists, anyway) are per-
haps more concerned with metaphysical clarity than are engineers and applied
mathematicians like Shannon. Although Shannon was very preoccupied with
the correct designation for his measures, and with the connection with physics
and statistical mechanics, he was more focused on producing a superior applied
mathematical engineering solution, and this is reflected in the ambiguities - or
at least dualities - in the contingent metaphysics of The Mathematical Theory
of Communication. That said, I restate that at no point did he countenance
real information being associated with anything other than physical stochastic
processes.
Another place where the need for a scientific metaphysics of information
becomes apparent is the probabilistic conception of information as a reduction
in uncertainty ascribed to and derived from Claude Shannon’s The Mathematical
Theory of Communication, which is often referred to as the classical conception
or classical formulation/notion of information. The assertion that this is the
correct conception of information is faced with the problem that Shannon had
some difficulty determining what he himself was referring to:
Shannon replied: ‘My greatest concern was what to call it. I
thought of calling it ‘information’, but the word was overly used, so
I decided to call it ‘uncertainty’ . . . John von Neumann, he had a
better idea. Von Neumann told me, “You should call it entropy, for
two reasons. In the first place your uncertainty function has been
used in statistical mechanics under that name. In the second place,
and more importantly, no one knows what entropy really is, so in a
debate you will always have the advantage.” (McIrvine and Tribus,
1971 See also Tribus, 1988)
Moreover, although Shannon was famously pluralist about the term ‘infor-
mation’, or at least he acknowledged its plural application in information theory,
he also sought the physical basis of the nature of information:
The formula for the amount of information is identical in form
with equations representing entropy in statistical mechanics, and
suggest that there may be deep-lying connections between thermo-
dynamics and information theory. Some scientists believe that a
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proper statement of the second law of thermodynamics requires a
term related to information. These connections with physics, how-
ever, do not have to be considered in the engineering and other fields.
(Shannon et al., 1993b.)
So perhaps there is a common basis for realism about information between,
say, physics and biology? (For the same question considered for ontic structural
realism see French, 2014, 324-334.) Markedly successful efforts to unify statis-
tical information entropy measures and mathematical representations thereof
with complexity oriented representations and measures in both physics and the
molecular biosciences suggest that an attempt to identify a reductive basis for
both entropic and statistical-complexity conceptions of information measures
and models is (See Adriaans, 2010, 45; Frieden, 2004) not without merit. This
is partly an intuitive assertion, but it fits the suggested scientific metaphysical
outlook.
In science successful unification of different approaches to modelling a sys-
tem are often expected to verify that the same or common phenonema and mi-
crostructural dynamics are being alternatively represented (French, 2014, 333-6;
Hacking, 1983; Timpson, 2005, 319, 330-1.) This assumption lies at the root of
the philosophical discussion about gauge symmetries and whether all symme-
tries putatively represented in such theories are in fact I real (Rickles, 2008c;
Healey, 2007.) Pieter Adriaans indicates just some of the possible and actual
aspirations of unifiers of mathematical information theories and mathematical
information measures:
Possible results of such a unified theory of entropy, computation,
and information could be:
 A general theory about the interaction between information
and computation
 A general theory of induction
 A general frame work to study human cognition and method-
ology of science
 A theory of non-equilibrium entropy
(Adriaans, 2010, 45)
In contrast to philosophers such as Fred Dretske and Luciano Floridi, who
each actively seek to ground epistemology using a semantic conception of infor-
mation involving (in Floridi’s case at least) significant reference to a-priori ana-
lytic and logico-mathematical constructs (which in Floridi’s case are intended to
defer to Kantian transcendentalism to a significant degree), Adriaans separates
the objectives and program of the philosophy of information and information
theory from the philosophical discipline of epistemology on the grounds that
“The ambition to develop such a unified theory defines a philosophical research
program that is orthogonal to the classical research program of epistemology”
(Adriaans, 2010, 45.) He then provides one of many definitions/statements of
(the task of) the philosophy of information:
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It offers various mathematical techniques to select the right model
given a set of observations. Philosophy of information studies model
selection and probability. (Adriaans, 2010, 45)
Whether or not one agrees with Adriaans, his mathematicalist outlook is
arguably far more in keeping with a scientific metaphysics. He stays close to
the best established physico-mathematical science in his quest for a metaphysics
and semantic theory of information and a characterisation of its nature.
When it comes to an a-posteriori scientific metaphysics of information, one
cannot disregard the causal-realist and physicalist expectations and outlook
of scientific researchers active in the field of mathematical/computational biol-
ogy/molecular bioscience carrying out research into unified physico-mathematical
and statistical conceptions of information for the molecular biosciences pursuant
to deployment field’s like oncology:
Living systems are distinguished in nature by their ability to
maintain stable, ordered states far from equilibrium. This is despite
constant buffeting by thermodynamic forces that, if unopposed, will
inevitably increase disorder. Cells maintain a steep transmembrane
entropy gradient by continuous application of information that per-
mits cellular components to carry out highly specific tasks that im-
port energy and export entropy. Thus, the study of information
storage, flow and utilization is critical for understanding first princi-
ples that govern the dynamics of life. Initial biological applications of
information theory (IT) used Shannon’s methods to measure the in-
formation content in strings of monomers such as genes, RNA, and
proteins. Recent work has used bioinformatic and dynamical sys-
tems to provide remarkable insights into the topology and dynamics
of intracellular information networks. Novel applications of Fisher-
, Shannon-, and Kullback–Leibler informations are promoting in-
creased understanding of the mechanisms by which genetic informa-
tion is converted to work and order. Insights into evolution may be
gained by analysis of the the fitness contributions from specific seg-
ments of genetic information as well as the optimization process in
which the fitness are constrained by the substrate cost for its storage
and utilization. Recent IT applications have recognized the possible
role of nontraditional information storage structures including lipids
and ion gradients as well as information transmission by molecu-
lar flux across cell membranes. Many fascinating challenges remain,
including defining the intercellular information dynamics of multi-
cellular organisms and the role of disordered information storage and
flow in disease. ( Gatenby and Frieden, 2007, 635)
Practically efficacious scientifically coherent references to transmission and
transduction (information/entropy conversion) cannot be ignored here, even if
Frieden is a known proponent of information-theoretic unifying and information-
realist approaches. Regardless of the information measures referenced, and al-
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though it is arguably the case that, due to a lack of training in the field, as
Humphreys has observed “[f]or the most part, when scientists try to do phi-
losophy, they do it as amateurs, with noticeably poor results” (Humphreys,
2013, 65; For similar expressed views see Rickles, 2008a, Ladyman and Ross,
2013, 110) - and even though information as a concept has been treated on an
eliminative ontological basis by several insightful philosophers (Levy, 2011) - a
serious Canberra planner, for example, should attempt to explain “mechanisms
by which genetic information is converted to work and order” in terms of a
best deserver with contingent content (causal inducement of configuration per a
kind of transduction?) In fact - they should more correctly be using this kind of
scientific reference to fulfil the role of best deserver since the formal statements
seem to be very much making scientific realist references.
Molecular bioscientists commonly deploy references to information trans-
mission and transduction, particularly in association with energy exchange and
conversion, and conceptions of statistically modeled physical entropy:
The mutual information of thermodynamic coupling is incorpo-
rated into the generalized fluctuation theorem by using information
theory and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Thermodynamically
coupled dissipative structures in living systems are capable of de-
grading more energy, and processing complex information through
developmental and environmental constraints. The generalized fluc-
tuation theorem can quantify the hysteresis observed in the amount
of the irreversible work in nonequilibrium regimes in the presence of
information and thermodynamic coupling. (Demirel, 2014, p. 1931.)
Mutual information measures associated with physical entropy are a ba-
sis of Shannon’s classical theory. There are numerous other measures of this
kind and related kinds that link statistical measures and random variables with
physical outcomes (measures such as Fisher Information and Kullback-Leibler
divergence) in such a way that vindicates Ladyman and Ross’s metaphysical
conviction that the world is ‘the totality of non-redundant statistics’, which I-
existing statistics are irreducibly stochastic on the basis that “there is no such
thing as ‘purely formal statistics’ ”. Demirel goes on to employ standard classical
formulations (together with more recent unifying adaptations) to characterise
information in the context of their research matter. In so doing they retain
a physicalist outlook that meshes with the kind of statisticalist-cum-physcialist
view of Ladyman and Ross, but also introduce an independent abstract observer
into the formal ontology:
Information may be defined as the capacity to reduce statistical
uncertainty in the communication of messages between a sender
and a receiver . . . Consider the number of ways W in which N dis-
tinguishable entities can be assigned to M distinguishable states
such that there are ni entities in state i...In Shannon’s theory, en-
tropy represents the amount of uncertainty one particular ob-
server has about the state of the system [3,5]. For a variable X
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with the x1, x2, . . . , xN of its N possible states, the probability of
finding X in state xi would be pi and Shannon’s entropy H of X is
Pi pi lnpi (Demirel, 2014, 1932-3)
The independent observer is not a necessary postulate. It’s just explanatory
metaphor. The stochastic system can simply be regarded as exhibiting an objec-
tive reduction in frequentist statistical uncertainty. The posited and obviously
fictional observer is a wholly unnecessary explananda that lends weight to the
impression of probabilism and platonism about information.
Demirel et. al. are applying the classical formalism to fluctuation theory to
ascertain the information associated with the movement of one system/quantity
in a fluid influenced by a heat bath. This is a reasonable and logical approach
since such a system is representable by the Langevin equation, which represents
a stochastic system by virtue of including a noise input which is a stochastic
component:
An over damped motion xτ of a system in contact with a heat
bath and a single continuous degree of freedom can be described
by the Langevin equation x˙   µF x,λ  ζ. The systematic force
F x,λ can arise from a conservative potential and/or be applied to
the system directly as a nonconservative force, while ζ is the stochas-
tic force, which is not affected by a time-dependent force, and µ is
a positive constant. The Langevin dynamics generates trajectories
xτ starting at x0. For an arbitrary number of degrees of freedom,
x and F become vectors. The Langevin equation is the generic
equation of motion for a single fluctuating thermodynamic quantity
such as the concentrations of the chemical species in the vicinity of
equilibrium . . . For a system in contact with a heat bath, symmetry
of the probability distribution of entropy production in the steady
state is known as the fluctuation theorem. Crook’s fluctuation theo-
rem compares probability distributions for the work required in the
original process with that of the timereversed process. The proba-
bilistic approach has gained broader appeal due to the advances in
experimental techniques, such as atomic force microscopes and op-
tical tweezers, for tracking and manipulation of single particles and
molecules . . . .
So what in fact is being compared in Crook’s fluctuation theorem is two
casually induced spatiotemporal structures to which objective frequentist prob-
ability distributions are attached. Both the physical nature of the subsystem
corresponding to the ζ term and the events associated with the frequentist dis-
tributions are physical structures with casually induced configurations.
What I hope the reader is finding to be at least plausible and a serious
explanatory option, if not correct, from the exploration in this section, is that
my arguments from indispensability and inference to the best explanation in
support of a physicalist and structural realist naturalisation of information and
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representations of information are both salient and supported on a scientific
metaphysical basis.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I worked to further establish the scientific metaphysical ap-
proach that I am endorsing and developing, and to then segue conceptually and
explanatorily into exemplars in science. I argued that although some scientific
theories in physics and biology do not use the term ‘information’ itself, there
is still ample evidence to suggest that there are core ontological concepts being
deferred to in the formalisms of scientific theories. When these theories make
indispensable the deployment of concepts of transmission, encoding, and pro-
cessing of signals and signal borne messages or structured causal content that
is functionally or otherwise efficacious and analysable, then the underlying in-
eleminable features of the natural systems being modelled are causal pathways
and the causally induced configuration of structures.
The implication (which I am trying to move as close to an entailment as
possible) of my proposed metaphysics is that the information and information-
dynamics referred to in these theories (using various terms) exists externally
in the world as what Floridi calls environmental information (Floridi, 2011c,
380-5.) That is: there is something in nature which constitutes a best deserver
on a contingent basis - and terminology is not settled or is less important. This
is just the kind of consideration that leads theorists to propose mathematical
definitions of information. I am seeking a physicalist and reductionist character-
isation of the same. Put otherwise, we should not proceed by looking for when
scientists use the term ‘information’ as an indicator of the ontic status thereof
(although we should no ignore that usage either.) We should instead identify
ineliminable non-negotiable, broadly scientifically ratified (by formal scientific
information theory) ontic identifiers of information systems.
Chapter 3
Introducing Field Ontic
Structural Realism
(FOSIR)
3.1 Introduction
I am committed to a very specific, comprehensively, and explicitly physicalist
non-eliminative ontic structural realism, and think that this is the right ontology
for situating and explaining the metaphysics of information in nature. Those
familiar with various interpretations of ontic structural realism will be aware
that the degree to which structure is regarded as both physical and causal, and
in what ways, are both pertinent and often present difficulties for those seeking
to formulate and articulate ontic structural realist ontologies and informational
variations thereof (Saunders, 2003, 17; French and Ladyman, 2003b, 75-7; Esfeld
and Lam, 2008, 613; French, 2014. See especially Adriaans, 2010; Floridi, 2008a
and Floridi, 2011c, 347-57, 140-50., and Gillies, 2010.) Overall I am seeking
to solve a host of these problems by way of the identity thesis/argument I am
presenting (H2 §4 p27 and §6 p207): the structure about which ontic structural
realists want to be realist is best characterised as, or recognised to be, selections
of structure in re quantum fields and the quantum vacuum.
In this chapter I will begin to introduce one of the core arguments in my
thesis: the idea of identifying structure as in re (to) the combined heterogeneous
spacetime-permeating quantum fields of QFT - the set of all of which fields
is regarded as a combined or compound heterogeneous quantum field - with
the existential basis for what I will call ontic structural informational realism
(OSIR), thus producing a field-ontic structural informational realism (FOSIR.)
It will involve proposing an alternative scientifically inspired reductive and,
importantly, defeasible basis (see §2 p55) for characterisation of the nature of
structure: nonuniform, heterogeneous physical fields (accommodating classical
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fields by reduction the quantum field(s) and vacuum - see Esfeld, 1999; Esfeld
and Lam, 2008, 614; Lancaster and Blundell, 2014, 1; Ladyman and Ross, 2013,
137; See also Swanson, 2017, 2-3 and §6.5 p229 p182.)
It is important to introduce this key part of my thesis here to provide a
context for arguments and later discussions of other views. However, the main
work of establishing the identity thesis about ontic structure inhering in re in
bounded regions of the universal quantum field (H3) is deferred to Chapter §6
p207. A result of this approach, which is part of my central objective in deter-
mining a contingent scientific metaphysical view of the nature of information, is
that I will have introduced a new proposal for the ontology of the quantum field
that does not rely upon the usual posits. That proposal involves the entire com-
bined quantum field being comprised of CICS information sources, existing as
bounded regions of heterogeneous quantum fields that are themselves (dynamic
CICS) sources. The boundaries could be those of a particular field excitation for
a standard model particle, or some combination of different fields for different
particles and/or properties.
In other words, I am introducing the identity thesis proposition/hypothesis
H2 (§4 p27) to provide a field ontology for information via ontic structural real-
ism, and as an upshot I will also have introduced a new proposal for the ontology
of the universal quantum field-vacuum itself (as a set of dynamical fluctuating
CICS sources), the development of which I will not pursue herein. As I move
towards deploying a specific quantum field ontology ontic structural realism for
the purposes of providing a basis for a field-ontic structural realism about infor-
mation to provide an existential and reductive basis for CICS sources, I’ll begin
to regularly refer for support to the work of physicists who regard information
as explicitly physical or conceive of it in physicalist terms and in whose theories
and hypotheses information is at least as indispensable as structure 1
In the introductory chapter I introduced the idea of an indispensability argu-
ment for the I-existence of information (§1 p16.) The indispensability argument
that I am deploying works the same way as the Quine-Putnam argument in the
sense that based upon scientific praxis and the encoding of representations in
scientific theories. Their argument is intended to support realism about Pla-
tonic entities. My argument, however, is intended to support realism about
information in nature. This based upon references to information and to infor-
mational phenomena and dynamics that are able to be modelled using one or
more of the scientific information theories including, but not limited to, such
things as information, signalling, signification, encoding, transmission, compu-
tation, computability, data, data representation, data transfer, patterns and
pattern manipulation, programmability. In this chapter I am also going to de-
velop an argument from inference to the best explanation intended to support
the above-mentioned identity thesis H2 (4), and this argument strengthens the
indispensability argument.
In chapter §1.1 p33 I dealt with the issue of Platonism and Kantian tran-
1Hawking, 2005, Muneyuki et al., 2010, Sagawa and Ueda, 2009, Denning and Bell, 2012,
Devin, 2014, Alesci and Modesto, 2014
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scendentalism about the nature of information with reference to the explanatory
gap argument in cognitive science and Chalmers’ argument from non-reductive
realism about qualia. In this chapter (§3.4 p117) I move to deal with the propo-
sition that nominalism about information is the best that scientific realists and
information naturalisers can do - based on inference to the best explanation -
to account for apparent and actual pluralism about the nature of information.
This is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, because nominalism is, in
many ways, a coherent position to adopt to make sense of informationist sci-
entific discourse while being eliminativist about information as some element
of the furniture of the universe. Secondly, nominalism is a preliminary basis
for reasoning about existing trope bundle field ontologies for QFT, and so it
threatens to impinge upon my naturalisation at the level of QFT field ontology
too. I will end with specific statements of ontic structural informational realism
(OSIR) and field-ontic structural informational realism (FOSIR.)
3.2 A QFT Field Ontology as the basis of OSIR
The existential indispensability argument I am developing, as I have mentioned
in the introduction to this chapter and the introduction to the thesis, is intended
to establish realism about natural I-existing information. It’s supported by an
ontic argument about the nature of said information. That ontic argument,
which I will now pursue, is based upon inference to the best explanation and in-
duction as constrained by the scientific metaphysical premises established earlier
(§1.3 p38 and §2 p55.) It’s intended to establish the best candidate for fulfilling
the role of the ontic basis of I-obtaining information. The support it provides
for the existential indispensability argument comes by way of the reductive con-
ception of information so established. This conception allows information to
be construed using ontic structural and dynamical terms in accordance with
the CICS conception (introduced at §2.3 p62) combined with a field ontology.
This broadens the vocabulary recognisable as informational and information-
dynamical in the sciences and strengthens the indispensability argument for
realism about naturally I-obtaining information. There is no circularity, as
each argument also stands alone. In this section, through §3.3 p109 I pursue
that argument, the main argument of the chapter: that the previously intro-
duced identity between ontic structure and quantum field in re structure forms
the basis of the most ontologically parsimonious ontology for naturalised infor-
mation, most in keeping with the primacy of physics constraint and scientific
metaphysics (identity thesis H2 4.)
Importantly, the inter-supporting nature of the existential indispensability
argument for realism about natural I-obtaining information and the ontic ar-
gument from inference to the best explanation about the best candidate for
the ontic content and nature of information is appropriately constrained. Only
certain concepts are permitted to be classified as foundational or a reductive ba-
sis for information according to the ontic IBE argument. We cannot just keep
claiming scientific terms arbitrarily and calling them informational, else the en-
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deavour is rendered pointless and ineffectual. Scientific metaphysical premises
constrain us to dynamics, structures, and phenomena in science that are able
to be deemed informational on the basis of the terms of scientific information
theory broadly construed as including statistical, algorithmic, computational
(including concepts of computability), and entropic theories, and theories syn-
thesised from these, and any reasonable reductive basis of information in these
theories as adduced on the same scientific metaphysical basis. (This could be
partly characterised according to Ladyman and Ross’ principle of natural clo-
sure, but this is not necessary.)
There are various field ontologies that have been proposed for quantum field
theory, where ‘field ontology’ refers to an ontology of quantum fields or other
fields in physics (Laudisa, 2012; Kuhlmann, 2015; Kuhlmann, 2010a; Kuhlmann,
2010b.) These include process, particle, field, and trope bundle ontologies. I
am using the term ‘field ontology’ subtly differently - to refer to a way of having
an ontic structural realist ontology that is sustained by or existentially depends
upon a field ontology in the first sense. This, I am arguing, is best done by way
of an identity thesis (H2 at §4 p27.)
The metaphysics I propose for understanding the nature of information and
the necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence is what has come to be
called a field ontology (Cao, 2003c, Esfeld, 2004.) In my metaphysics of infor-
mation, physicalism about structure based upon nonuniformity is retained as a
necessary condition for the obtaining of the reductive basis of real information,
and the medium required for real informational non-uniformities is I-obtaining
fields. Such fields might be classical or the quantum field (the former reduce
to the latter.) The point is that the metaphysical bottom of information as
construed according to a scientific metaphysical outlook is whatever physical
structure reduces to at bottom according to physics, and that currently and
defeasibly (where defeasibility refers to revisability of scientific theories and
knowledge based upon new information) that is fields (both classical and quan-
tum.) Like Ladyman and Ross, my affinity for contingent scientific metaphysics
includes defeasibility and statistical weight instead of impossible certainty or
Cartesian and Kantian epistemic apodicticity (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 123.)
I will not be presenting very much physics and mathematical physics: only
very limited material that is enough to support the scientific metaphysical con-
clusions and hypotheses. In many cases I will be relying upon the expertise of
philosophers of physics who are interested in non-eliminative ontic structural
realism and especially classical and quantum field ontologies. A benefit of a
field ontology is that in addition to structural non-uniformity, we can intro-
duce ontic heterogeneity of I-content - or the natural kind of the field - as part
of I structure and intrinsic to the realisation of information. As I will argue
below, in agreement with French, when speaking of I structure of a physical
system or phenomenon, the distinction between content and structure is not
one of concrete versus abstract as it is between I-structure and formal abstract
structure.
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3.2.1 The Heterogeneous Quantum Field as The Set of All
Quantum Fields
It is hardly surprising that physics, even according to a-priorist metaphysics
(Wayne, 2008), is the new metaphysical discipline par excellence. Its historical
development from, and epistemic and conceptual basis in, natural philosophy
and mathematics, makes it the natural seat and arbiter of contemporary meta-
physics. Certainly according to scientific metaphysics, metaphysical claims can
only be countenanced if contingent in keeping with the primacy of physics con-
straint (PPC.) Nonetheless, QFT (like quantum mechanics) is one of the most
notoriously difficult disciplines in physics, not only because of the usual degree
of demandingness and complexity associated with its various mathematics and
their calculi and algebras 2 - but precisely because there are so many of them and
they are so widely interpreted with respect to their ontological commitments.
There are at least two basic problems with physics and Quantum Field The-
ory from the perspective of physicalism and scientific realism. One is that
there are serious debates about the ontological status of the various quantum
fields supporting standard model particle realisation (Esfeld, 1999; Esfeld and
Lam, 2009; Redhead, 1982; Redhead, 1994; Wayne, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2010b;
Kuhlmann, 2010a.) The other is that physico-mathematical operators are com-
mon in quantum physics, and they are often either identified or conflated (defini-
tionally, conceptually, and/or ontologically) with the entities that they are being
used to model and/or track (Weinberg, 1995c; Henning et al., 2016; Smolyakov
and Volobuev, 2015; Willenbrock and Zhang, 2014; Smilga, 2017.) This is cer-
tainly the case with QFT since the realisation of each instance of a fundamental
particle is taken to be modelled by various mathematical representations of the
dynamics of variously mathematically represented fields. This lends itself heav-
ily to both instrumentalist interpretations, and tends to result in what I have
labelled formalism driven ontological descent, according to which the mathe-
matical model and machinery becomes what is considered to be all there is to
be realist about, or more severely - the actual substance of the fields and their
emergent-as-low-energetic-excitation particles.
Yet it remains that matter is measured and manipulated in the laboratory,
and fields are understood to be the real I-obtaining basis (somehow) of particles
and matter throughout spacetime:
This concept of a field, an unseen entity which pervades
space and time, can be traced back to the study of gravity due to
Kepler and ultimately Newton, though neither used the term and the
idea of action-at-a-distance between two gravitationally attracting
bodies seemed successful but nevertheless utterly mysterious. Eu-
ler’s fluid dynamics got closer to the matter by considering what we
2Theoretical and applied physicists deploy varieties of both: consider the bra-ket notation
of Paul Dirac and Richard Feynman’s Feynman Diagrams for the calculi case, and consider that
in QFT several different Lie algebras and techniques involving Lagrangians, Hopf algebras,
Zeidler, 2006
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would now think of as a velocity field which modelled the movement
of fluid at every point in space and hence its capacity to do work
on a test particle imagined at some particular location. Faraday,
despite (or perhaps because of) an absence of mathematical school-
ing, grasped intuitively the idea of an electric or magnetic field that
permeates all space and time, and although he first considered this
a convenient mental picture he began to become increasingly con-
vinced that his lines of force had an independent physical existence.
Maxwell codified Faraday’s idea and the electromagnetic field, to-
gether with all the paraphernalia of field theory, was born. Thus in
classical physics we understand that gravity is a field, electromag-
netism is a field, and each can be described by a set of equations
which governs their behaviour. The field can oscillate in space and
time and thus wave-like excitations of the field can be found (elec-
tromagnetic waves are well-known, but gravity waves are still to be
observed.) The advent of quantum mechanics removed the distinc-
tion between what had been thought of as wave-like objects and
particle-like objects. Therefore even matter itself is an exci-
tation of a quantum field and quantum fields become the
fundamental objects which describe reality. (Lancaster and
Blundell, 2014, Overture.)
In the rest of this thesis, I will frequently refer to ‘the (universal) quantum
field’. By this I mean the total set of all different existent quantum fields that
are the basis of the emergence of all standard-particles by way of excitations
of energy in the fields, along with any classified as part of the vacuum. The
different kinds of quantum fields for different standard model particles are all
modelled with a wide range of different algebraic mathematical apparatus. Thus
they are heterogeneous in terms of their mathematical descriptions and nature
(See further development at §6.3 p213.)
According to QFT, spacetime is permeated by heterogeneous standard model
particle-sustaining fields, in the sense that all of the I-instances of particles that
are known in the standard model come into being as energetic excitations of their
respective field type instances:
The Universe is filled with Matter. There are many different
types of matter. Sometimes, physicists call these types fields and
sometimes particles, the latter being elementary excitations (quanta)
of the former. (Smilga, 2017)
According to QFT, these different standard model fields (identified by what
is know as effective field theory, which deals with energy levels conducive to
modelling excitations in fields that are manageable for particle emergence and
experimental observation) all co-exist in and inhere in a universal complex of
fields which are taken to have some common foundation. It is this totality
of quantum fields sustaining the emerge of all standard model particles and
quantum field including all quantum fields that are in vacuum or ground states,
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since the latter always involves the presence of energy that at any time can
produce an excitation.
A standard vacuum isn’t empty because no standard-model quantum field
vacuum, which latter are really ground state fields, is ‘empty’. Importantly,
where there are no particles, there is still the (combined) quantum field (the
combined various heterogeneous natural kind quantum fields) in vacuum state,
because there are still quantum fields that can produce material particles (Red-
head, 1994; Riek et al., 2015; Bynum, 2014, 131):
Is empty space really empty? In the quantum field theories
(QFT’s) which underlie modern particle physics, the notion of empty
space has been replaced with that of a vacuum state, defined to be
the ground (lowest energy density) state of a collection of quantum
fields. (Rugh and Zinkernagel, 2002, 1, 3-4;)
I am not asserting that there is a compound quantum field that is comprised
of all other fields at all times (although I don’t need to deny this either), only
that the vacuum ground state of all of the standard model fields and fields for
other observables, actions, and outcomes (beyond the fields for the standard
model particles) can produce excitations and thus particles anywhere at any
time.
3.2.2 Against Probabilism and Formalism-Driven Onto-
logical Descent
My approach to emphasising physical structure as ontic best deserver for a basis
for the naturalisation of information brings the obvious charge of neglect the
central non-apodictic explanatory role of statistics in science itself. Moreover,
many theories - including empirical theories - ascribe apparent informational
content to apparently irreducible systems, which concept is certainly familiar
from Daniel Dennett’s real patterns. A reduction in statistical uncertainty - one
important probabilistic conception of information - does not seem to necessarily
reduce to I-obtaining structures. However, as I will explain later, this is the
basis of a measure of information, and is therefore not a good candidate for the
nature of information itself.
If statistics does somehow reduce to in re structure (and I think there are
ways in which frequentist probabilities can be so reduced, and also propensi-
ties) then it seems statistics could be the ontic ground or basis of information
- which positive thesis is what Ladyman and Ross conclude (§6.6 p234; §4.3
p142; Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 146-7.) However, Ladyman and Ross have an
I physicalist and realist conception of statistics. Moreover, there are stochastic
processes to be accounted for in their ontology below the non-redundant statis-
tics: I think they have succumbed to what French calls mathematical collapse
(French, 2014, 192-3) in statistical terms, with the exception that they have pos-
sible wiggle room if probabilities are just physical existents, which ontic wiggle
room they do claim on what I take to be the basis of ontological parsimony. The
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principle of charity suggests allowing the move, but my worry is that stochas-
ticity of a natural system or process is not its ontic ground or existential basis.
Stochasticity seems to inhere in and/or be intrinsic to such processes and dif-
ferent aspects of their structure, but it necessarily does not seem to account
for all of the structure and its content and substance, and I don’t think it fol-
lows that such in re statistics are all that we can be scientific realists about
in a natural stochastic system/process/phenomenon. My own view is that our
informational and causal access is not limited to statistical structure only, and
that there would still be no real information on the terms of Shannon’s theory
without I-obtaining physical sources, about which we can be both realist and
structural realist. Shannon’s theory does require that also.
Especially in physics it is apparent that fields as phenomena suffer somewhat
from the same dual physico-mathematical plus mathematical characterisation
as do other modeled phenomena and structures, thus again threatening to in-
stantiate French’s mathematical collapse if they are deployed in the context of
NOSR as associated with structure (my project in chapters three and four.) The
modelling and characterisation of fields in physics is so mathematically intensive
that sometimes the term ‘field’ apparently refers to a mathematical construct
and/or structure, sometimes it apparently primarily refers to an external physi-
cal entity or structure. It is assumed (especially by scientists who are physicalist
and realist in their metaphysics) that the former presupposes the latter except
where the the latter ontologically overdetermines the former as in the case of
gauge symmetries (Mathur, 2009b, 7; Healey, 2007; Rickles, 2008c) 3.
French’s (ontological) mathematical collapse occurs when overdetermining
gauge symmetric representations push back on the I ontology and tend to pro-
duce mathematical and mathematico-informational (information reducing to
mathematical abstracta and data) ontologies like that of Tegmark. I will refer
to this as formalism driven ontological descent : the process whereby the for-
mal representing mathematical structures become elements of the I-obtaining
modelled world. French’s collapse is the wholesale version of this - according
to which the mathematical abstracta become themselves the entire basis of the
I ontology (as with Tegmark’s MUH) or else the only epistemically accessible
reality, supplanting the various posited or else data derived I physical natural
systems’ structures.
One common definition of information derived from Shannon’s theory is that
it is the reduction in statistical uncertainty about the state of a source given a
message from the source or else given the prior state of the source (the source
could be a human speaker/utterer, and the consecutive states voicings of dif-
ferent phonemes or words.) To provide an idea of the scope of problem solving
involved in identifying the objective nature of information (and if in fact such
even exists), it is often not even clear which kind of probability is being relied
upon. Shannon’s theory directly suggests that if it is a reduction in uncertainty
3Although not infrequently physicists and philosophers of physics regard the universe as
reducing to something mathematical at bottom, with varying ambiguity and clarity about
what -if any - ontological commitments are being endorsed. See Tegmark, 2008, Ross et al.,
2013, Ladyman et al., 2007, Floridi, 2008a
3.2 A QFT Field Ontology as the basis of OSIR 89
that constitutes information, then it would be a reduction in objective statistical
uncertainty (corresponding to an increase in probability score) since Shannon
uses frequentist probability interpretations almost exclusively (with some refer-
ence to classical probability.) However, some theorists have attributed a kind of
epistemic subjective probability to Shannon by deriving semantic theories of in-
formation from Shannon’s quantitative theory in which the information received
by an agent is partly determined by information previously acquired from the
source about the (set of) possible states that can obtain there (Dretske, 1981.)
reject that information necessarily has or involves either or both of a statisti-
cal or a subjective component. I can still significantly support the statisticalist
ontic structural realism of Ladyman and Ross, according to which (in its latest
version or revision) the world is the totality of nonredundant statistics. I am
only interested in rejecting that information is either identical to or reduces
to probabilities, likelihoods, subjective uncertainties, objective (frequentist) un-
certainties, and/or what information theorists have called surprisal value. Most
Shannon-inspired theories of information involve some kind of statistical mea-
sure applied to dynamic systems or processes, and/or some kind of physico-
statistical outcome in such systems, as a critical or essential part of the nature
of information, or else even as identical to or constituting information. Chapters
one and two both include an important clarification of the conception of Claude
Shannon as a physicalist, objectivist and reductive conception. The more com-
mon standard interpretation of Shannon’s conception is that it is statistical or
at least physico-statistical (in keeping with Shannon’s reference to Boltzmann
theory of entropy in a volume of gas as being the physical probabilities associ-
ated with the microstates of the system) and that Shannon takes information
to be some kind of objective physico-statistical outcome or that he takes it to
be identical to the value of a statistical measure of change in a dynamic process.
I take this conception to be a misreading of Shannon’s intent that favours an
epistemic conception of information that Shannon simply does not have, or that
at the very least is not a requirement for his applied mathematical theory.
Ladyman and Ross make what I think is the strongest case for a statistical
ontology as the correct scientific realist scientific metaphysics, and in so do-
ing avoid the modal innatist commitments of French’s NOSR. They do so on
the basis that the main challenge to their approach - necessary reducibility of
stochastic laws - undermines the idea that statistics are the ontological base:
On some conceptions of ‘laws of nature’, the idea of an irreducibly
stochastic law is self-contradictory. As an analytic dogma, however,
this can have no persuasive force for a naturalist. (Ross et al., 2013)
I do not require any deference to French’s reification of modality via sym-
metry (or perhaps to be more generous, situation of inherent modality with
symmetry laws French, 2014, 264-5.) As I have already mentioned under the
head of formalism driven ontological descent, the pervasive confusion and often
conflation of representing abstracta in formal theories with that which is taken
to I-obtain in the world as being represented gives rise to unclarity about the
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exact ontic locus of what Ladyman and Ross call stochastic systems (French
mentions that Suppes noticed this tendency - or something like it - in 1960
French, 2014, 334.) It is the same problem exactly, which is brought out still
more clearly by the fact that Shannon’s sources are both physical stochastic
processes and the representation of stochastic processes. Ladyman and Ross
are making no reference to Shannon or his communications systems model in
this connexion, but the comparison is still prescient:
A physical system, or a mathematical model of a system which
produces such a sequence of symbols governed by a set of probabil-
ities, is known as a stochastic process. (Shannon, 1998 5.)
It is not laws that are at issue, but information. Natural laws are certainly
central to science, but that they are necessarily reducible is - as Ladyman and
Ross have suggested - analytic dogmatism not in keeping with defeasible science.
However, it is not clear that the appropriate scientific metaphysical move is then
to reject reduction. Laws may reduce to information, but I suggest that although
laws are informational, nomic constraints associated with them also participate
in encoding and configuring of structures and thus of sources and their signals.
My contingently and scientifically derived metaphysical contention is that
information does not - certainly not obviously - reduce to statistics (although
it may reduce to dynamical structures that are intrinsically and even possibly
physically statistical.) In fact I have rejected probabilism about information
with the primary justification that in theories such as Shannon’s - the statistical
components are measures and where they are not Shannon defers to talk of
entropy in terms of disorder in a physical source, which is the stochastic physical
process that he says the statistics are used to model in the formal representation
(although he certainly has a statistical mechanical conception of entropy.) I
suggest that it’s sources - stochastic (and in some cases non-stochastic: chaotic
or deterministic) processes and dynamical natural systems at the bottom of the
ontology. It’s I obtaining stochastic sources that are the necessary condition
for the obtaining of I stochasticity.
3.3 Ontic Structural Realism by Fields
Quantum field theory (QFT) is applied to quantum systems in special high
energy relativistic circumstances where different inertial frames of reference
become important and particles can annihilate and split into particle/anti-
particle pairs. Correspondingly, non-relativistic quantum mechanics does not
reconcile easily with the relativistic variety that gives rise to QFT. The highly
utilised Schrodinger equation for describing the time evolution of a single par-
ticle quantum system in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is not suitable for
modelling quantum systems in high energy relativistic settings. For one thing,
the Schrodinger wave equation cannot model or capture the physical dynamics
of particle annihilation and creation (Zee, 2010, 3-4; Weinberg, 1995b.)
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Field theories are arguably the most important and foundational in physics.
In quantum physics, quantum field theory is recognised as the best available
approach to understanding and modelling multiple particle systems and espe-
cially for the study of relativistic quantum systems. There are at least three
chief difficulties facing my ambition to produce a scientific physicalist reduction-
ist ontic structural realist metaphysics of information based upon what I have
called heterogeneous fields:
A. QFT, like quantum mechanics, involves the use of a lot of mathematical
constructs that represent and model physical dynamics and constraints in
ways that are not always straightforward in terms of the mapping from the
I-system to the representation (actions, The Lagrangian, operators, and
paths of evolution of a system, to name just a few. See Kuhlmann, 2010b;
Swanson, 2017.)
B. A Field in classical field theory (standard electrodynamics) is often defined
in terms of a quantity or magnitude that is evenly distributed, where the
quantity is a measure or amount of something apparently undefined.
C. The relationship between QFT and classical field theory is complex, even
if it is taken that quantum field theory can be extended to both different
kinds of particles but also thus to explain fields at higher magnitudes and
quantum systems are the basis of macroscopic systems.
In this thesis, I will refer to all of the component fields of the standard model
as the quantum field or the quantum field and vacuum, which is thus heteroge-
neous because it is comprised of different component field types, including all of
those in vacuum or ground states. Each different type of fundamental particle
is an emergent unit excitation of its own field. Each standard model particle
has its own field type.
QFT involves many different competing mathematical interpretations (Wein-
berg, 1995c; Weinberg, 1995d; Lancaster and Blundell, 2014;.) However, in its
popular algebraic expressions the particles of the standard model are all taken to
emerge as excitations in specific types of field. Fermions emerge as excitations of
fermionic fields, likewise for bosons (bosionic), and gluons (gauge fields.) There
are fields for modelling the emergence and/or obtaining of specific properties of
quantum systems. Fermionic fields, bosionic fields, spinor fields, the Higgs field,
tensor fields: all highlight the apparently intimate connection between maths
and the material measured phenomena (For an approach involving the combina-
tion of a Lagrangian with combined derivative see Henning et al., 2016, 18-21,
40-3, 51.) However, it does not follow, from the fact that the mathematical
machinations for each particle in the standard model are wrought differently,
that these heterogeneous type fields are not able to provide an overall scientific
realist and physicalist ontology in keeping with the primacy of physics constraint
and with scientific metaphysics with an emphasis on the defeasibility of theories
and models.They’re the ontic basis of all classical electrodynamic fields in the
electromagnetic spectrum and all matter.
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I think that there is good reason to suggest that the variety tends to confirm
a Hacking style corroboration argument: the various apparatus work because all
of them are differently encoded and configured as representations and models by
a fixed ontological target (albeit one that is complex.) To assume that the vari-
ety of workable representing algebraic and statistical apparatus means that the
I-system is somehow ontologically completely obscure is not only unintuitive,
but begins to commit the error of formalism driven ontological descent. M The-
ory (Membrane string theory) may well be very elegant and mathematically well
suited to model otherwise apparently impenetrable problems, but it is not clear
that this elegance indicates a better and more accurate representation of the
I-ontology. It may well be the result of re-encoding from existing artefectual
abstract mathematical artefacts rather than being like a Pauli-neutrino-posit
kind of predictive outcome. Pauli’s prediction involved one particle only: both
the Everett Many World’s interpretation of QM and string theory posit com-
paratively enormous ontological inflation. These quantum system and particle
sustaining fields in which the excitations of energy occur in such specific ways as
to produce specific outcomes which result in the existence of matter (Lancaster
and Blundell, 2014, 239.)
To show why these difficulties are not fatal to my approach, it’s best to point
out some positive support from physics. Quantum field theory was devised to
handle some of the more difficult problems with particle orientated quantum
mechanics, and to solve problems with ‘action at a distance’. The old laws of
Coulomb and Newton involve “action at a distance”. This means that the force
felt by an electron (or planet) changes immediately if a distant proton (or star)
moves. This situation is philosophically unsatisfactory. More importantly, it
is also experimentally wrong. Beginning with classical field theory, the field
theories of Maxwell and Einstein remedy the situation, with all interactions
mediated in a local fashion by the field. (Tong, 2007,1-2):
From the quantization of the electromagnetic field one is nat-
urally led to the quantization of any classical field, the quanta of
the field being particles with well-defined properties. The interac-
tions between these particles are brought about by other fields whose
quanta are other particles. For example, we can think of the inter-
action between electrically charged particles, such as electrons and
positrons, as being brought about by the electromagnetic field or as
due to an exchange of photons. The electrons and positrons them-
selves can be thought of as the quanta of an electron–positron field.
An important reason for quantising such particle fields is to allow
for the possibility that the number of particles changes as, for exam-
ple, in the creation or annihilation of electron-positron pairs. These
and other processes of course only occur through the interactions of
fields. The solution of the equations of the quantized interacting
fields is extremely difficult. (Mandl and Shaw, 2013, 16-17; Refer
also to Tong, 2007, 4.)
At least since Dirac’s 1927 paper The Quantum Theory of the Emission and
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Absorption of Radiation the practice in physics is to see fields as fundamental
and particles as derived concepts appearing only after quantisation of the fields.
QFT provides support for the idea that if structure reduces to the quantum
field and classical fields that reduce to it, then non-uniformity and heterogene-
ity of field natural kind(s) are intrinsic to the structure and constitute what
ontic structural realists struggle to identify as content or substance of the struc-
ture about which they are realist (leading to such solutions as the statistical-
physical-realist approach of Ladyman and Ross and the innate/intrinsic modal-
ity approaches of Steven French, Dean Rickles, and Michael Esfeld and Vincent
Lam):
[T]he field is primary and particles are derived concepts, ap-
pearing only after quantization. We will show how photons arise
from the quantization of the electromagnetic field and how massive,
charged particles such as electrons arise from the quantization of
matter fields. We will learn that in order to describe the fundamen-
tal laws of Nature, we must not only introduce electron fields, but
also quark fields, neutrino fields, gluon fields, W and Z-boson fields,
Higgs fields and a whole slew of others. There is a field associated
to each type of fundamental particle that appears in Nature. (Tong,
2007, 4.)
Ontological predictions wrought by physics and its physico-mathematical
posits are surprisingly accurate. It is likely that they correspondingly have high
surprisal value in the sense that this term has been used in the philosophy of
information: an outcome at a source that is unlikely corresponding to a high
degree of statistical uncertainty gives a greater quantitative measure of infor-
mation using classical Shannon measures. Hx   Pni 1 pxi log pxi is the
measure. The sources state, sequence, message, symbol, or signal content cor-
responding with (Markov-conditional) probability pxi. When there is a low
pxi then Hx increases. In Dretske, 1981 Dretske adapts the Shannon mea-
sure for the information content of a single isolated discrete signal or source
state. This supports the inference to the best explanation component of a de-
feasible metaphysics of information like OSIR that requires physical structure to
I-obtain apart from and as partially represented by models encoded (in various
ways) from the information in it. The successful prediction of black holes, grav-
ity waves, frame dragging, the Higgs Boson, and the neutrino alone (§2.3 p62 p.
47) are enough to make such posits more strange than even the unusual effec-
tiveness of mathematics in normal statistical modelling, number theory (which
is surprisingly effective when coupled with digital computers) and engineering.
Combine these outcomes with Hilary Putnam’s no miracles argument (NMA),
according to which scientific realism is a necessary condition for avoiding ex-
planatory recourse to entities and phenomena prospectively outside of nature
and natural categories:
‘[scientific realism] is the only philosophy that does not make [the
predictive success of] science a miracle’. (Putnam, 1979, 59-80. See
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also Floridi, 2011c, 345. See also salient discussions at Psillos, 2009,
311-12.)
Add also the primacy of physics constraint (PPC). Together with the NMA
and PPC the above outcomes suggest that there is a simple answer which is el-
egant - exemplified by the kind of formalism driven ontological descent adduced
by Tegmark and Everett, and then there is the complex answer suggested by the
idea that physics boils down to the complex (multi-rule and multi-transducer)
based encoding of information from natural I phenomena (sometimes very in-
directly.) I think that the complex answer is the right answer. Physicists’ talk
of information and information-like dynamics bottoms out in something onto-
logically real and regular, but it is not physical structure or causality alone.
Quantum field theory was developed in order to model quantum systems
whilst taking into account special relativity: for quantum systems in high energy
settings. The significance of this for the purposes of this thesis is that it provides
a strong motivation for:
i) Physicalist reductionism for ontic structural realism (Cao, 2003b; Cao,
2003c; Ladyman, 2011; French and Ladyman, 2003b.)
ii) Commitment to in-principle possible non-terminating physical reduction of
structures (contingent upon findings in physics.)
iii) The emphasis on nonuniform type heterogeneous fields as the basis of struc-
ture (for physicalist ontic structural realism) rather than relations, whilst
retaining both relations and objects in the ontology.
QFT is the best available theory in physics for describing nature at a funda-
mental level using a reductionist approach. In physics the terms and elements in
the models and theories and their corresponding concepts reduce because physi-
cists take it to be the case that these explanatory, descriptive, theoretic, and
conceptual reductions correspond to physical reduction in the material systems
under investigation. As I have discussed above - non-eliminative ontic structural
realism preserves objects in the ontology but in most versions of it objects are
reduced to structures which are in turn existentially dependent upon relations.
This often taken to somehow account for the move from the structures of the
physical sciences to the (putatively abstract in Platonic terms) structures of
mathematics.
Regarding i: It’s physical fields that are taken to be the most fundamental
of physical entities in the universe by our best physics. If I can justify - on
a defeasible basis - identifying the ontic basis of structure of ontic structural
realism with selections of structure from heterogeneous regions of the quan-
tum field, then it is the I-existing quantum field that defeasibly becomes the
ontologically prior primitive, with relations inhering in it in re. The putative
scientific metaphysician’s licence for regarding relations as the best candidate
for the basis of structure is not then diminished. It’s certainly not vacuous,
and it arises from the history of the development of ontic structuralist sci-
entific realism. Ontic structural realism does emphasise physicalist I-realism
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rather than theory-centric and/or percept-centric realism. Yet it is still influ-
enced by John Worrall’s theory-structure orientated epistemic structural real-
ism, Bertrand Russell’s sense-data and percept-centric indirect epistemic struc-
tural realism (where the structure is relations between percepts in the head
isomorphically mapping to relations between distal and proximal causes of the
percepts), and Rudolph Carnap’s adoption of Ramsey sentence re-expression of
logical restatements of models and equations in theories as the basis for structure
(See Frigg and Votsis, 2011, 229-32.)
Relations are chosen by epistemic structural realists and ontic structural
realists alike as the primary manipulable features or representations of the phe-
nomena in theories, theory models, and in most mathematically furnished repre-
sentations. However, to retain relations as the best candidate basis of structure
for ontic structural realism tends towards what I will call mathematical formal-
ism driven ontological descent (see the full development at §3.2.2 p87.) Relations
are regarded as primitive in I-existing ontology because there is a representation
of them in a theory or theory model, and the relation is not distinguished from
the representation. Despite appearances, this ontic descent (similar to French’s
mathematical collapse) is a mistake due to misidentification of the location of
the I-existing represented structures (which in the next chapter I identify with
sources of information), and due to subjectivist and psychologistic projection.
There is one obvious other indirect support for this assertion: Max Tegmark
and Hugh Everett’s explanations are completely ontologically different and mu-
tually logically and ontologically exclusive, and even different versions of the
many worlds interpretation of QM are significantly ontologically different. And
this is apart from the fact that there is not even consensus between such theorists
about what mathematical abstracta are and if they are even real.
QFT itself, the primacy of physics constraint, the no miracles principle,
and the contingent success of physico-mathematical predictive posits in physics
demonstrates why FOSIR is a good scientific metaphysics, and why favouring
fields over relations as the primitive basis of structure is pertinent. If in OSR
relations are between relata, and the relata are objects, and the objects are
structures and therefore existentially dependent upon relations, and (according
to Floridi, for example) the relations are also structure: then relation reducing
non-eliminative ontic structural realism has more than one problem, and one of
them seems very much to be circularity. In QFT there is available a support
for my argument:
Quantum field theory arose out of our need to describe the ephemeral
nature of life...quantum field theory is needed when we confront si-
multaneously the two great physics innovations of the last century
of the previous millenium: special relativity and quantum mechan-
ics. It is in the peculiar confluence of special relativity and quantum
mechanics that a new set of phenomena arises: Particles can be born
and particles can die. (Zee, 2010, 3; See also Tong, 2007, 2)
So per the first quote in this section and the above - according to our best
physics the most fundamental of objects in the material universe are not only
96 Chapter 3. Introducing Field Ontic Structural Realism (FOSIR)
really excitations in physical fields modelled using quantisations of fields, but
they are correspondingly ephemeral. Certainly physicists use mathematical ex-
pressions of relations between quantities to model many of the properties and
dynamics of such fleeting material existents: but nowhere does it seem that
the relations are the basis of the fields in terms of some kind of existential de-
pendence. The relations are picked out from the total physical information in
order for physicsts to be able to model and gain a cognitive representational
grasp on what might be happening, but it simply does not coherently follow
that physicists regard them as the ontic reductive basis of fields and therefore
of particles.
If my identity thesis (ontic structure is defeasibly identical to selections of
I-existing structure inhering in the heterogeneous quantum field) holds then
an ontic reduction of structure becomes available across the ontological board:
representations in theories are encodings of information from I-existing struc-
tures, but are also themselves sustained by the in re structure of the quantum
field. This is essentially Rolf Landauer’s position extended to include a defeasi-
ble ontological bottom substrate for the implementation of representations: i
(physical reduction of ontic structure) is supported by QFT, since according
to QFT, the universal quantum field and vacuum are the physical substrate
in which all fleeting and persistent elementary particles in the standard model
exist as emergent excitations. Regarding iii: What does the defeasibility mean
in practical terms? Simply that if it contingently turns out that string field the-
orists and string theorists are instead right about how fundamental particles of
the standard model exist, then string field theory would become the new ontic
basis of structure for ontic structural realism (and I could still call it field-ontic
structural informational realism.)
This defeasibility in the hard science, and the ability to regard ontologically
different candidates for the physical substrates of material structures, might
seem at odds with my whole enterprise. Doesn’t all of this - especially the
defeasibility component - entail that an identity thesis of the kind I am proposing
is a mistake? This is only entailed if the structure of either the quantum field or
its contenders (of which the string field is one) for fulfilling the best deserver role
for the basis of physical ontic structure (which most proponents of OSR really
want) in the ontology is asserted by physicists to be contingently (based upon
the best empirical findings) non-physical. However, this is an unlikely outcome
in physics-deferring scientific metaphysical terms (I’ve offered a succinct but
important informational definition of physicality §7.3 p252 4) Short of such an
outcome - I can have the physical in re selection from the total structure of
heterogeneous regions of a universal quantum field for my ontic structure, or I
can have the same thing from a string field.
Either way I have my causally configurable information source structure in
accordance with the primacy of physics constraint, the no miracles argument,
4I have not developed this notion overmuch, as it brings in an entire other metaphysical
(and certainly) debate. However, it’s by no means a trivial offering, and my statement of it
is rather well supported by my discussion in this thesis of field ontic structural informational
realism.
3.3 Ontic Structural Realism by Fields 97
and the principle of causal closure. Ladyman and Ross’ principle of natural clo-
sure is also arguably obeyed, since there is an inter-theoretic epistemic bridging
outcome according to which these hypotheses about in re structure and infor-
mation transmission (such as that information sources are stochastic bounded
regions of the heterogeneous quantum field) as a necessary condition for the ob-
taining of real structure and information arguably add explanatory power to the
hypotheses in the field theories or information theory (or the structural realism)
taken alone.
Now, regarding ii, I, like Simon Saunders, can therefore rely upon the real
possibility that it’s real, physical structures of the field in re kind I have been
identifying - reductively all the way down (Saunders, 2003, 129.) There are lots
of spooky-stuff type contingent outcomes - according to which the structure of
OSR is exists in re in non physical spooky stuff - that could bring this undone.
Although as I argue at §7.3.2 p257 , if spooky stuff of some kind is real, then
according to our best science and a not unreasonable assertion of the eliatic
principle in the context of the principle of causal closure and the primacy of
physics constraint - such spooky stuff in re structure would arguably have to
be causal and transmission-sustaining too, or else we’d never be able to get any
information about it, and nor could it induce changes in any configuration in
physical structures according to any physics we have. A less radical contingent
ontological outcome that could arguably bring undone the idea of bottomless
reduction to physical in re structures is the discrete universe hypothesis of
Einstein. This is not because there would be no in re structure, but because if
the underlying structure of the quantum field and spacetime manifold really is
discretised somehow at Planck length (or some other naturally necessary interval
of some kind), then it looks like something like Floridi’s differences de re put
relations back as ontologically prior: that is if one thinks that differences de re
(remembering that Floridi’s transcendentalist informational structural realism
does not require physical relations as a necessary condition and/or reductive
basis for the obtaining of real structure) are in fact relations of the right kind
for a formulation of ontic structural realism (Floridi, 2008a, 235-7.)
However, mathematical relations are still indispensable in theories and proofs.
Yet, just as there is more than one kind of abstraction, there is more than one
kind of relation. Natural language terms automatically fail because they are dis-
cretising - semantically. The term ‘abstract’ can mean subtly different things.
Something can be abstract in the sense that other details are abstracted out
of or away from it, or else it can be abstract in the sense that it is abstracted
from something (picked out of or isolated.) Similarly, something can be a re-
lation between two field regions, or it can be a relation - somehow - between
Batman’s utility belt and the first quark ever to exist. The first seems to be
more like Floridi’s difference de re, perhaps inhering in re in a form (archaic
philosophical term) or in a field (scientific ontic term of reference to a natural
kind and/or phenomenon.) The latter relation is very different ontologically
an semantically, and one that I analyse (§2.3.1 p68 and §5.6 p199) as being
mostly pseudo-informational and fictional. My answer to how it obtains is an
immanent/Aristotelian realist, reductionist, not-simple, and arguably very on-
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tologically inelegant answer (which may or may not fail to be adequately prag-
matic depending on one’s conception of pragmatism, but it’s as pragmatic as
physics defeasibly and contingently allows it to be.) I have already characterised
naturalistic codes and encoded representations (§2.3.1 p68) as themselves be-
ing causally induced configurations, where the causal inducement is done by
causally upstream structures - or more specifically: source structures. Causally
induced configurations of this kind are representations of the configurations
- and real patterns - of the sources inducing their configurations: structures
are imposed from the upstream source to the representing source. This is the
common sense of understanding of naturalised representation on the basis of in-
dication, but with emphasis on the pattern or structure that is induced. There
is an undeniable element here of something like French’s Viking metaphysics,
since talk of the forms and en-forming (giving form to) is Aristotelian. In the
case of causally induced configuration of (source) structures, we are deploy-
ing such characterisations as apt in the context of the Mathematical Theory
of Communication. Remember that in Shannon’s theory signals and channels
can be regarded themselves as sources, and sources can be regarded as parts
of a channel depending upon what is taken to be the receiver and destination
of the signal and message(s.) It is the former fact that Fred Dretske deploys
in identifying - in his informational naturalisation of epistemology - the source
of perceptual knowledge with proximal stimuli and their resulting perceptual
internal structures. It is also this set of inter-mutabilities of roles of sources and
channels that avails Susan Oyama and Paul Griffiths of the now famous parity
thesis, which reduces to the notion of regarding channel conditions as the signal
content, and the signal and noise as the channel conditions. This interchange-
able nature of the components of information transmission systems is a strong
scientific metaphysical support for the idea of information transmission as the
causally induced configuration of structure.
Now, I claim it to be contingent according to scientific metaphysics that
relations should be taken to inhere in structures and are not the necessary -
but only a sufficient - condition for the obtaining of structures. That is to
say they are not the ontic existential basis of structures and not ontologically
prior to them (see further development at §3.3 p101 and §6.6 p242.) If so then
relations that inhere in re in either intra-source or inter-source configurations
(remembering that, according to this view, sources are configured structures)
are imposed by modelling and/or picked out of the total structure of the source
by abstraction. The reader may well have developed the concern at this point
that I have lapsed into a-priori armchair metaphysics despite my aspirations to
scientific metaphysics and contingency. However, the objective of this chapter
is to give a specific ontic basis to structure: that which is either identical to
and/or reduces to that structure inhering in re in the quantum field. That
is, unless the best candidate theory (with associated calculii) - in accordance
with the defeasibility of scientific practice - reveals contingently that it’s not
the quantum field but the string field that is the substrate and substance of
all structure per ontic structural realism. In which case the specific ontic basis
of the substance of structure will be the structure inhering in re the material
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string field. Critically, it does not follow from this that there is some indpendent
(independent of the quantum field) abstract structure existent in the I-obtaining
ontology. There’s no mediating abstracta, and there’s no platonic abstracta or
nominalist universal required (although the latter could reasonably be stipulated
as a kind of variable reducing to a set of all field-ontic CICS structure)
This writing and my imagining is probably the first time the Batman-utility-
belt-to-first-ever-quark relationship has ever been constructively picked out (this
alone is prospectively philosophically interesting.) Information theoretically, it
is not impossible, but extremely unlikely not to be the first time based upon
the size of the available dictionary of semantic and lexical possibilities: every
fictional and physical thing in the universe that natural language users who
have heard of Batman’s utility belt and physics have ever heard of. I am not
going to engage the constructivist/objectivist debate here. Even if we take the
constructivist position - the alphabet of possible source states for the fiction
(possible knowings about batman’s belt by possible cognitive agents) and the
physics (possible first quark ideas) are enormous (depending upon whether one
asks an Everettian many worlds enthusiast - the first quark could present a
sizeable alphabet of its own. Transfinite perhaps?) In any case - the inelegant
immanent realist FOSIR answer to how this relation obtains is that it is picked
out from a very complex set of interacting CICS source structures which include
those which are realised by and reduce to the physical information processing
in my brain, those in the brain of whoever first imagined batman’s utility belt,
all of the physical and lexical encoding between that physically realised imag-
ining and my own (textual transmission, if you like), and all of the sources
in the network of sources from the who and whatever verified the existence of
quarks. So it’s enormous, unwieldy, and (except perhaps with a good quantum
computer) probably practically impossible to catalogue, so there is arguably
(obviously) an epistemic access problem. However, it does not follow from the
epistemic access problem that there are not necessarily (natural necessity and
logical necessity) physical causal transmission-capable channels that reduce to
physical causal transduction and signal pathways on the basis of QFT (defeasi-
bly), mathematical communication theory, and therefore FOSIR.
In other words, yes - I am saying that the relationship between Batman’s
utility belt and the first ever quark is sustained by a vast complex of CICS
reducing pathways comprised of CICS sources that reduce to interacting het-
erogeneous regions of the quantum field, and that any abstracta are ‘abstracted
out’ from this. I am aware of the conceptual heritage which I am calling into
service - from Kripke’s causal reference chains to informational semantics and
epistemology. However, the interpretation of abstraction and my deployment of
FOSIR as aspiring scientific metaphysics make my approach different.
There is admittedly no unquestioning broad consensus in physics about what
it is that constitutes the foundational or fundamental stuff of the material uni-
verse, and certainly no consensus that it is necessarily fields:
In fact, lately there has been a reaction against looking at quan-
tum field theory as fundamental.The underlying theory might not
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be a theory of fields or particles, but perhaps of something quite
different, like strings (Weinberg, 1995b, 1-2.)
I am not denying the basis of pessimistic metainduction - contingently false
theories - but I regard that 1. it’s implications have been significantly cur-
tailed by non-eliminative ontic structural realism and 2. more significantly,
the unreasonable contingent effectiveness of predictive posits in physics makes
it completely moot. It is hard to see how the menagerie of successes already
multiply cited - neutrinos, black holes, frame dragging, and gravity waves alone
should not be regarded as having independently rendered PM moot by inference
to the best explanation and induction. I defeasibly retain fields as identical to
I structure here because of Weinberg’s ‘might’. Fields might not be structure,
but they’re the best candidate so far. Yet defeasibility must be retained. The
true nature of the wave function itself has long been in question: is it a rep-
resentation of underlying dynamical I structures, or something stranger (Ney
and Albert, 2013, 2; Allori, 2013, 58.) However, there is an understanding in
physics that although there might be other very distinctly different foundational
entities, field theories nevertheless capture the material ontology at a very low
level:
We have learned in recent years to think of our successful quan-
tum field theories, including quantum electrodynamics, as ‘effective
field theories,’ low energy approximations to a deeper theory that
may not even be a field theory, but something different like a string
theory. (Weinberg, 1995b)
It is at this point it seems possible that something in the ‘turtles all the
way down’ in-principle non-terminating structural reduction hypothesis of ontic
structural realists could be true (Saunders, 2003; Frigg and Votsis, 2011; Esfeld,
2009b, 179-80.) However, what has emerged in physics is the idea that at the
very least - not all of the turtles are of the same natural kinds, and so it’s
differently realised ontic contentful or substantial structure inhering in re in
quantum fields all the way down. This claim about ontologically heterogeneous
structure ‘turtles’ is based upon the current success of predictions and theories
in physics. For example, according to our best current experimentally verifiable
physics, the fundamental particles are excitations in the quantum field, electrons
are nevertheless stubbornly spherical, and photons have a wave-particle dual
nature. Thus if it is turtles all the way down, and if structure is considered to
be somehow contentful and not just a mathematical projection onto the natural
phenomenon: scale variability tells us that the structural turtles are most likely
of different natural kinds with respect to structure itself. Furthermore, and again
in accordance with the scientific metaphysical prohibition on scale invariance
for both dynamics and structure: there does not seem to be a great deal of
agreement about the possible specific alternative kinds of structures at different
scales, and some of the structures are strange to even geometric and spatial
intuitions of physicists: fields, quantised regions of fields, strings in up to 11
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dimensions. If any experimental evidence for string theory appears, then that
analysis will be just as relevant.
As Ladyman and Ross have observed, debates about the nature of material
reality are very ancient and general metaphysical terms of reference have long
since failed:
When it comes to debates about the nature of matter in con-
temporary metaphysics it tends to be assumed that there are two
possibilities: either there are atoms in the sense of partless particles,
or there is ‘gunk’ in the sense of matter whose every part has proper
parts (infinitely divisible matter.) This debate is essentially being
conducted in the same terms as it was by the pre-Socratic philoso-
phers among whom the atomists were represented by Democritus
and the gunkists by Anaxagoras . . . Boyle, Locke, and Gassendi lined
up for atomism against gunkists Descartes and Leibniz. It is pre-
posterous that . . . contemporary metaphysicians blithely continue to
suppose that the dichotomy between atoms and gunk remains rele-
vant, and that it can be addressed a priori. Precisely what physics
has taught us is that matter in the sense of extended stuff is an emer-
gent phenomenon that has no counterpart in fundamental ontology.
(Ladyman et al., 2007)
Arguably, however, in their debates about the nature and reducibility of
structure and relations, ontic structural realists may be guilty of the same error
but with vaguely different terms and concepts. An ontology of structure that re-
duces to structure can become tantamount to effective than gunkism (Ladyman
et al., 2007, 44) if we do not follow the rules of scientific metaphysical conduct
set for us: 1. Keep physics very close and 2. Avoid a-priori stipulation and
conceptual analysis. At this point I offer the following two suggestions as scien-
tifically ratified, or at the very least as fitting with the mandate of true scientific
metaphysics. Firstly, structure is a concept that has currency in an explanatory
and ontological sense, and physicists do mention the term reasonably frequently.
Above I answer the question of potentially infinite reduction of structures -
which has been investigated by Simon Saunders - with a cautionary and non-
committal stance (Saunders, 2003.) It does not matter so much for my purposes
with the exception of determining the total information in a system. However,
the idea that structure reduces to structure without any terminus in principle
is an important step (scientifically supported) in establishing a scientific meta-
phyics of information. Heterogeneous fields are able to be the basis of intrinsic
properties according to this approach. That seems to be something that is
scientifically coherent and very valuable (Tong, 2007, 4.)
Not Relations, But Field Structure/CICS
My approach to ascertaining an OSR for the basis of naturalising information
and information transmission will involve these steps:
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i. Eliminating structure as some kind of abstracta or existent over and above
the physical I-system or I-phenomena in which it inheres in re
ii. Identifying structure with/as the structure that inheres in re in whatever
defeasible scientific theorising contingently adduces is the basis of material
I-existing reality (currently the best contender, although one not without
problems, is quantum field theory.)
iii. Taking the structure in ii) to be ontologically prior to, and not existentially
dependent upon, relations and instead, regarding:
a. Relations as selections of or features of information inhering in that struc-
ture
b. Relations as a sufficient condition for the obtaining of structure, not a
necessary condition
c. Structure thus conceived of as a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of relations
d. Structure thus conceived of as a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of information.
e. Per b. and d., relations are a sufficient condition for information, but
not a necessary condition.
ii. is what I am calling the identity thesis in this thesis. I will pursue its
development in earnest in §6 p207.
iii.c. and iii.d. do not imply or entail that relations are the ontic basis of,
or identical to, information. Information is the casually induced configuration
of structure as conceived of in i. - iii. In other words, iii.e.
Esfeld has proposed a relation based ontology for quantum entanglement
(Esfeld and Lam, 2008) and “notably quantum entanglement—poses a challenge
to Lewis’ Humean supervenience . . . quantum physics can be taken to suggest
replacing a metaphysics of intrinsic properties with a metaphysics of relations”:
A metaphysics of relations is often dismissed out of hand, for
it seems to be paradoxical. It seems that (a) relations require re-
lata, that is, things which stand in the relations, and that (b) these
things have to be something in themselves, that is, must have in-
trinsic properties over and above the relations in which they stand.
However, a metaphysics of relations merely has to reject the second
part of this claim: one can maintain that (a) relations require relata,
that is, things which stand in the relations, but that (not b) these
things do not have any intrinsic properties that underlie the rela-
tions in which they stand. (Esfeld and Lam, 2008, 31; Esfeld and
Lam, 2009, 243-4.)
The significance of Esfeld’s approach is that he defers to actual (based upon
the predictive power of quantum mechanics and its experimental verifiability)
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I-obtaining quantum systems as a basis for formulating ontic structural realist
metaphysical premises. i. - iii. above (which I will spend this and the next
chapter developing, as well as chapter 6.) constitute a similar but broader and
stronger move to make the I world the locus of ontic structural realism, but less
elegantly (more brutely 5) and without any dependence upon supervenience
principles.
I am proposing an non-eliminative ontic structural realism according to
which - not just laws and symmetries - but relations and relata are both fea-
tures of structure, and not its basis. This is also suggested by holism about the
quantum world:
Quantum entanglement [according to which spatiotemporally sep-
arated systems have interdependent properties], by contrast, sug-
gests a sort of holism: instead of the intrinsic properties of the parts
fixing the relations among them and thus the state of the whole, only
the state of the whole fixes the relations among the parts (Esfeld and
Lam, 2009, 246.)
In fact Esfeld has an instrumentalist view about the quantum field, and is
not an I-realist or scientific realist about it exiting in a physical sense somehow
(See §6.3 p213.) Ladyman and Ross attack (rightly) Theodore Sider’s a-priori
approach to metaphyics as not naturalised visa vi scientific motivation:
Certainly, it seems that any satisfactory ontology will have to
include self-individuating elements, the only question being which
entities have this status-space-time points, bare particulars, tropes,
and individual substances all being among the possible candidates’
(93.) Certainly? None of these ‘obvious’ elements of reality (includ-
ing pseudoscientific ‘space-time points’) are known to either every-
day intuition or science. (Ladyman et al., 2007, 14-15.)
However, do webs of relations and relata and nodes fair any better in terms
of realism about the scientific image? I think that there is good reason to think
that they do not, including some of the moves made by ontic structural realists
to explain them and/or situate them in the ontology. Admittedly Ladyman and
Ross end up endorsing what I call statisticalist-probabilism about reality. This
both informs and is motivated by their conception of the nature of information,
which is broadly statistical and not structural. However, this in turn seems to
create problems for non-eliminative ontic structural realism as they formulate it.
One adjunct note, however, is that Ladyman and Ross’s view of the I universe
reducing to the totality of non-redundant statistics and/or irreducible stochas-
ticity seems to negate the need for any talk about relations as ontologically
fundamental.
I reject that relations are the locus and source of the identity conditions
of what ontic structural realists refer to as intrinsic identity of entities in the
ontology. Here are my starting points for the idea of heterogeneity:
5In my defence, Everrett’s possible worlds QM is supremely mathematically elegant, but,
ontologically, strikingly inflationary §3.4.3 p126
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I. I reject the binary conception of non-uniformity, and suggest that differ-
entiae de re are necessarily multi dimensional - like fields.
II. In accordance with 1., binary relations associated with differentiae de re
are idealisations and abstractions away from reality, rather than any viable
basis for real concrete (especially spatiotemporal causal) structure.
III. Structures are nonuniform bounded regions of natural kind heterogeneous
fields, in which differentiae de re intrinsically inher.
IV. Fields contain discrete differentiae de re, but the differentiae de re are not
ontologically prior.
The reason for (IV) is contingent: there have never been detected physical
differentiae de re in physics in isolation, only those embedded in fields. It is
the quantum field that is (defeasibly) contingently existentially prior. The on-
tological move being made here is not really the opposite of formalism driven
ontological descent. It’s not ontological ascent according to which we arbitrar-
ily supplant apparently abstract and constructed elements of the model in the
scientific theory with concreta. What I am instead suggesting is that we stop
regarding these as an epistemic or representing level of ontology versus a repre-
sented I-ontology and instead approach the former as representations encoded
from information abstracted out from the I structure using encoding mecha-
nisms that include indirect approaches which call constructive encoding into
service. This is where successful physico-mathematical predictive posits come
from, and why they succeed 6.
At minimum it is not clear that relations are ontologically prior to structures
where there is content heterogeneity (as contingently indicated by QFT particle
physics.) I think it more likely that structure does not reduce to relations, and
nor are they ontologically mutually supporting. So relata/objects are structures
or else exist only by virtue of being picked out by relations, which are structures
(Esfeld and Lam, 2010; Ladyman, 2014, Chapter 5.) But Esfeld and Lam (and
Floridi) say structures are relations:
According to this position [moderate ontic structural realism],
neither objects nor relations (structure) have an ontological priority
with respect to the physical world: it makes no sense to assign an
ontological priority to objects, because instead of having fundamen-
tal intrinsic properties that constitute their identity, there are only
the relations in which they stand. In other words, an object as such
is nothing but that what bears the relations. As regards the rela-
tions, it makes no sense to attribute an ontological priority to them,
for at least insofar as they exist in the physical world, they exist
as relations between objects. We can therefore say that the rela-
tions (structures) are the ways (modes) in which the objects exist...
(Esfeld and Lam, 2008, 4-5.)
6I believe the solution to the symbol grounding problem and to the nature of mathematical
structures is to be found in this direction, and I start an analysis in chapter 3
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This is close to my position as ontological priority is not given to relations.
Yet something is wrong, even granted the disputes between where formal repre-
senting structure ends and the I-ontology begins, and even if statistical structure
is situated between the theory ontology and the I-ontology. If objects are struc-
tures and structures are relations then objects are relations. An alternative is
that “[i]f there are objects at all, these are derived from the structures as being
nodes of structures, instead of structures presupposing objects” (Ladyman 1998,
French & Ladyman 2003, French 2006; but see also the more balanced position
in Ladyman & Ross 2007, chapters 2 to 5.) The attempt to fit structures with
relations and relata in the ontology - whilst maybe eliminating objects yet keep-
ing them as nodes of structures and as structures - is clearly strained logically
and ontologically. The problems with reconciling the elements are what lead
Esfeld and Lam to propose intermediate structural realism.
Moreover, putting concrete physical fields first (defeasibly) means that we
avoid the effective formalism driven ontological descent and mathematical of
non-eliminative ontic structural realism as it is broadly supported:
fundamental physical features can with good reason be taken
to suggest all the same conclusion, namely that the fundamental
physical objects – whatever they are according to the theory under
consideration – are parts (relata) of a physical structure in the sense
of a network of concrete physical relations. These objects do not have
any existence – and in particular not any identity – independently
of the structure they are part of (that is, the relations they bear
to each other). . . French and Ladyman (2003) – consider OSR to be
supported by a fundamental underdetermination about individuality
in QM and about quantum fields in QFT. Ladyman and Ross (Esfeld
and Lam, 2011, 143-4)
I am proposing instead using a field ontology that includes an identity the-
sis about structure that says structure and its content just are the defeasible,
contingent best ineliminable candidate: M qua the quantum field and vacuum.
This allows us to avoid commitment to the idea that things such as particles as
emergent excitations in the quantum field have no content other than relations
in which they stand to other emergent features of the field, which brings with it
the stress of calling the relations involved physical. Instead, according to FOSIR
they are an information sources that are realised as a causally induced configu-
ration of a heterogeneous (in terms of feature structure and properties) bounded
(arbitrarily and/or else by structural features) regions of the quantum field. This
alleviates an overriding problem with non-eliminative ontic structural realism:
it’s effective anti-Aristotelian elimination of natural content. This elimination
happens on a pragmatic basis - the Peircian scientific variety of pragmatism -
and as such ends up approximating the kind of epistemic viewpoint that OSR
is supposed to provide an alternative to. A field ontology with a bite-the-bullet
defeasible identity between structure and the nonuniformities de re of the het-
erogeneous quantum field itself provides an acceptable (in terms of scientific
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metaphysics) and useful middle ground between Arisotelian mysterious intrin-
sic properties and the elimination of all but bare content-less structure that is
the hallmark of most non-eliminative ontic structural realism.
Moreover, continuous heterogeneous or nonuniform field structures seem -
brutely and contingently - to be real things according to other assertions by La-
dyman and Ross and F&L, and other OSR supporters beside. Their existence
also seems to complicate if not negate the idea that structures require or arise
out of discrete relations between discrete entities of some kind. I have claimed
the scientific metametaphysical commitments of Humphreys and Ladyman and
Ross as my own, and so I must find in physics a precedent for my claim about
heterogeneous fields as prior to relations, and as the basis of structure. Accord-
ing to the physicalist reductive non-eliminative ontic structural realism that I
am proposing, relata and relations are discretisations from existing structures.
They are bounded substructures (and therefore as I will argue below information
sources) that may stand in relations to other bonded substructures - selections
of structural features with properties bound to them or realised by them. This is
not unlike Ross and Ladyman’s position according to which objects are derived
from structures as the nodes of structures. However, the term node is abstrac-
tive as well: nodes are abstract representations of structured entities in network
diagrams and directed graphs and other mathematical nets and meshes.
I think that the recognition of relations as having ontological priority is an
unwanted left over from Worrall’s ESR and was never properly dealt with in the
proposal and formulation of OSR. We don’t need this to defeat PM: we can kill it
in other ways. It’s the unreasonable effectiveness of physico-mathematical posits
in physics that matters - not the truth or falsehood of statements in natural
or theoretic language according to some referential context. It’s the optimistic
meta-induction that Floridi mentions (Floridi, 2008a) that is the right response:
the theories keep working and making astonishingly accurate predictions despite
the logical falsehood of some of the epistemic statements encoded into them. The
best explanation for this in information theoretic terms - including statistical
terms relating to uncertainty - is that there is an external I-obtaining set of
structures and information sources that constrain the results and predictions of
the theory, and that these deliver effectiveness and correctness despite linguistic-
epistemic error. The whole system seems to involve a tolerance for inaccuracy
as noise in the very real sense of a signal to noise ratio.
The heterogeneous information source-structural realism I am proposing is
FOSIR: (quantum) field ontic informational structural realism. Here are its
primary features and points of difference from other versions of OSR:
1. All structure is spatiotemporal causal structure or structure that reduces
to such structure compositionally (although the component strutures or el-
ements of them may be distributed in space and time) and this includes
mathematical structures in what is close to an immanent realist sense.
2. It is not salient, nor fatal, that structure might defeasibly reduce to structure
all the way down with no in principle terminus (contingent on the findings
of physics.)
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3. Structure is realised by nonuniformity and natural kind heterogeneity in mul-
tidimensional quantum and classical fields: not by idealised or abstract (or
abstracted) point to point or node to node relations or by data structures,
but -
i. Relations are retained in the ontology as selections of structure and
associated properties from the structure or substructures. There is no
need to define them as determined by discrete relata, but they can be
thus defined.
ii. Entities are retained in the ontology as substructures which are arbi-
trarily bound multidimensional heterogeneous fields. Such bounded sub-
structures in the heterogeneous multidimensional spatiotemporal causal
field provide the ontic basis of or are information sources.
4. Properties are distributed across the nonuniform bounded quantum field
regions either homogeneously and evenly or heterogeneously, and thus across
the structures. Any discrete selection of substructure including at a physical
non zero-dimensional location of an idealised point can have empirical causal
properties (realised due to the structure and the structures that it reduces
to and the nomic constraints that operate upon and within them and the
interactions between the substructure and other substructures that may or
may not overlap or intersect with it.)
I will call 3. the no abstract wireframe principle (see my earlier multi-
ple/partial wireframe argument §2.3 p62), and I will label the principle from
OSR that it negates, which I will refer to as the abstract wireframe principle:
Structure always consists in certain specific, concrete relations,
these relations being as determinate as intrinsic properties are sup-
posed to be (Esfeld, 2009a, 5.)
The no abstract wireframe principle is the expression of the hypothesis that
structure does not reduce to nor ontologically depend upon relations between
relata like some kind of mesh made up of nodes connected by concrete relations
(the abstract wireframe principle), but instead is realised in I terms as a con-
tinguous and continous heterogeneous spatiotemporal (and multidimensional)
field comprised of similar fields - all the way down (defeasibly and if necessary)
in reductive terms. The mesh is just a substructure - a selection of specific fea-
tures from the total structure. It does not determine the I nature of the entire
structure to which properties are being imputed/ascribed.
Ladyman and Ross approach this in their explication of non-eliminative ontic
structural realism by referring to the conclusion of Michael Redhead:
[R]ealism about what? Is it the entities, the abstract structural
relations, the fundamental laws or what? My own view is that the
best candidate for what is ‘true’ about a physical theory is the ab-
stract structural aspect. (1995, 2) (Ladyman et al., 2007, 139)
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My suggestion is that a sound justification for the application of the no-
miracles argument which Ladyman and Ross endorse as part of the primacy
of physics constraint is that the abstract structure redhead speaks of - the
structure in the model and theory arising from the web of relations described
by it - is in fact an abstracting out of part of the information from the I-existing
structure of the phenomena being investigated, and that the relations that form
that representing ‘abstracted-out’ structure are an encoding of partial structural
CICS information from the phenomena in question. Cao observes:
But then one may ask, what ontologically constitute structures?
The question is essentially the same question as to which, a struc-
ture or its parts, should be taken to be ontologically prior over the
other. The answer depends on specific situation. A structure, char-
acterized only by its invariants, may be ontologically prior over its
constituents (relata in the relational structure, either as unstruc-
tured raw stuff or as place-holders.) But if a structure is formed
by its constituents through a structuring agent and characterized by
structuring laws, which govern the behavior of the constituents and
hold them together to be a structure, then the constituents certainly
enjoy ontological priority over the structure as a whole. (Cao, 2010,
212)
I suggest that Cao’s second option above (the constructivist situation - see
Ibid 213) is instead still reducible to - or else collapses into - something like
the first option: the agents and structuring, and the constituents, are identified
as (albeit causal) elements emergent from the quantum field such that “the
existence and characteristics of the constituents are derived from the structure.”
Cao asserts that the second option consists of:
causally effective properties of the constituents (such as the charges
of the electron and proton) that make it possible for a structure (the
atomic structure of hydrogen) to be formed through the causal in-
teractions of the constituents content...(Ibid)
He does so because the basis of his distinction is causal powers. However, I
do not need this hypothesis - nor causal powers - to sustain FOSIR, and I don’t
think Cao needs this either. I have no dog in the race with respect to causal
inducement except the idea that fields transmit structural change by continuity
(including the non-contiguous variety required for entanglement - defeasibly.)
I suggest that the realist about the scientific image is a realist about the
I heterogeneous field (the fluctuating vacuum of QFT) as well as about the
selection of relations and entities (configured substructure information sources)
and other substructures selected and encoded from or out of it. Another way of
putting this - in informational terms - is that if information existentially depends
upon structures realised as bounded multidimensional regions of hetergeneous
fields (which all reduce to the quantum field one way or another), then the
realist about the scientific image is a realist about the information in the field
I-existing.
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Info-structural Properties and Relations
Just as I reject trope bundles for fields and M , and objective grounding, I
reject the need for such metaphysical posits as quiddities for the realisation
of properties and haecceities for the distinguishing of individuals, as well as
clusters of dispositions for the realisation of properties. According to both ESR
and OSR the problem with objects is that any intrinsic properties that they
are supposed to have are wholly unverifiable. Properties are only identifiable
by the external relations in which entities stand to each other and the effects
between entities that those relations capture for measurement and (Esfeld and
Lam, 2008, 3-4; Lewis, 1999, 114.) Properties according to OSIR reduce to the
nomic interactive causal propensities of field CICS.
Now, Ladyman and Ross have to find a way to retain objects and the prop-
erties that supposedly inhere in them. Esfeld and Lam suggest that they are
limited in terms of options, with which assertion I agree:
As mentioned above, insofar as the radical ontic structural re-
alism ofF&L admits objects at all, it has to reconstruct them as
something like bundles of relations (more precisely, nodes of rela-
tions) (Esfeld, 2009a, 6.)
Esfeld decides to deal with properties by redefining relations such that in-
trinsic properties are eliminated:
[A] metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quan-
tum entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding en-
tanglement as a sort of holism. By contrast to a radical metaphysics
of relations, the position...recognizes things that stand in the rela-
tions, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there
is no need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties
underlying the relations. This position thus opposes a metaphysics
of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties...
(Esfeld, 2004, 601.)
This is fairly motivated by “the rationale behind a metaphysics of relations is
to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics.” However, notice again
that now the objective is to avoid the premise that intrinsic properties underly
the relations, whereas in the afforementioned cases relations reveal the intrinsic
properties, which are otherwise inaccessible.
My suggestion is that objects or nodes are substructures (the use of the
term ‘nodes’ implies an ambiguity with points) and information sources, and
that their properties come from two sources:
1. The nomic constraints acting via causal pathways upon the structure and its
substructures (all realised by fields.)
2. The configuration or arrangement of the bounded substructures and (the
interactive characteristics of) the heterogeneous fields that realise them.
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The apparently intrinsic properties of any given bounded (sub)structure (in-
formation source) or bounded region (not necessarily continuous) or a multidi-
mensional heterogeneous field (the heterogeneity is the ontic basis of the config-
uration of the structure inside the boundary of the source) are realised by the
properties of the structures and thus the sources to which the source/structure
reduces and of which it is comprised, and these are realised by causal impetii
governed by nomic constraints and the different types of field. Presumably
we should allow different types of heterogeneous field. This is in keeping with
physics, according to which difference particles are associated with quantisation
of different fields (Tong, 2007.) The heterogeneity is all that is required to de-
liver the structure, but for properties something more is needed. I take it that
a field type is indicated by the way in which it interacts with causally effected
nomic constraints, and that differences in the interaction result in differences in
properties from one part of a field to another.
This approach may seem close to a return to Lewis’ Humean supervenience
thesis according to which “at the basic level of the world, there are only local
qualities in the sense of intrinsic properties instantiated by space–time points or
point-sized particles or field sources” (602.) However according to my approach,
it is not the case that “everything there is in a world like ours supervenes on the
distribution of basic intrinsic properties over all space–time points”. Instead,
the subtle but very relevant difference is that properties are heterogeneously
distributed across intersecting fields. I-obtaining fields are mathematically de-
scribed in terms of a quantity of something being distributed through spacetime
(Tong, 2007, 5; Zeidler and Service, 2009; Lancaster and Blundell, 2014.) What
that something is depends upon the nature of the field such that different fields
are distributions of quantities of different natural kinds, or one natural kind out
of which different natural kind particles are somehow produced by excitation
(energy input.) Properties emerge from the natural nomic constraints acting
upon fields (themselves fields) and from the quantisation of the any multidi-
mensional field. Another way of putting this is that both spacetime points and
relations are just selections or the picking out of information from the existing
field (Rickles, 2012, 143.) Choose any two so called points in a field, and there
are an infinite number of spacetime points between them.
Here is how my approach differs from Lewisian Humean supervenience:
1. The fields are real, but the points themselves are just positions within the
field. The properties emerge from the operation of physical nomic constraints
upon the fields, and their empirical interactive effects on other fields, and are
distributed not across points but heterogeneously through fields.
2. Fields are real, points are abstractions of information from fields, particles
are features in fields and are not points in the either a mathematical or semi
abstract sense.
Relations may be said to exist between points (although it is not clear how
relations could actually physically exist as concreta in the way that arbitrary
positions in the field which could be called quantised point sources can.) If we are
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following our mandates to put scientific metaphysics first, then it is significant
that particles can be identified as points according to Lewis’ metaphysics, Our
best physics suggests that it very much looks like fields (which may or may ot
be something like strings) come before particles. Particles are quantisations of
a field that can be located by a point in the field. No quantisation at a point -
no particle. The photon was the first particle to be described first in terms of a
quantisation of fields, and physicists progressively discovered field-quantisation
based physical explanations for numerous other particle types (Weinberg, 1995b,
3, 15.)
One type of heterogeneous field (a region of the quantum field excited in
a certain way to produce one type or another of particles) will respond to the
causally induced effects of nomic constraints differently than another. For ex-
ample - different heterogeneous fields of matter and energy sitting in the same
gravitational field - modelled by different effective field theories - are operated
upon causally somehow by that gravitational field regarded as a causally ac-
tive nomic constraint, and various kinds of energy field interact with different
physical structures differently.
None of this in any way means that information is somehow matter, although
defeasibly there is a chance that it may contingently turn out to be or reduce
to the latter or configurations of the latter, since energy is so central to field in
definitional and ontological terms.
Information pioneer Wiener would have disapproved:
“Information is information, not matter or energy” (Wiener,
1961, 132.)
I have referred in this section to casual nomic constraints and to causal inter-
active propensities. I now owe some discussion about what scientific metaphysics
with a quantum field ontology allows me to say about causation.
3.3.1 Causality as Continuous Transmitted Field Fluctu-
ations
Philosophers and ontic structural realists have long since identified causality as
a problem for scientific realism and structural realism. According to Ladyman
and Ross, and Esfeld and Lam, it is not clear what it means to regard structure
as causal - even if there is a strong intuition that the correct kind of conception
of structure is that it is physical (Ladyman, 2014, 71.) The ontic structural
realist whose position is closest to my own is French. He deals with causality
by rendering it intrinsic to relations that comprise a structure:
However, although being a realist about structures and an anti-
realist about causality does not seem to be an incoherent combi-
nation, this is not the only alternative. Again, I’m not convinced
that the claim that causality has some ‘active’ component requires
a metaphysics of objects and properties.Thus consider the question:
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where might this active principle be located? With the object or the
properties? If the former then we obviously need to press a little fur-
ther and ask for an account of objecthood which could accommodate
such activity . . . Obviously the idea of objects as ultimately bare sub-
strata can’t do the job; and equally obviously the view of objects as
bundles of either properties or tropes forces us to look closer at the
latter as the source of this activity. There are then further options:
either each property that is causally active has some causal principle
particular to that property, or kind of property, that is involved in
the conferral of causal power on the possessors of that property; or
there is some generic causal activity which together with the other
features of properties confers such powers. (French, 2014, 216-7.)
I have not only dispensed with bundles, ground, and tropes as I-necessary
existents or explanatory, I have also included relations in this - against most
existing OSR and probably against the scientific metaphysical intuitions of pro-
ponents of the same. Causality, however, is not so eliminable on a contingent
basis (Ney, 2009; Handfield et al., 2008; Maudlin, 2007; Dowe, 2004; Kutach,
2013; Glynn, 2013. For my non-modal characterisation of causation, refer to
§3.3.1 p113 .)
Determining a place for causality in OSR is difficult to do on an a-priori
basis. I suggest, however, that when regarded contingently causality is less
impenetrable. There is a mythologised ‘microbanging’ conception of causality
that I, like Ladyman and Ross, reject as dispensible and as just wrong (Ladyman
et al., 2007, 3-4.) As Cao has observed, historically physics saw the move from
considering force as an entity, to viewing it in field-theoretic and ontological
terms:
[T]he change from the mechanical perspective to field-theoretical
perspective in looking at physical interactions was accompanied by
or resulted from the replacement of a commitment in which force
was taken to be an independent entity, . . . Of course, the view in
which interactions are conceptualized as the processes of emission
and absorption of quanta by interacting entities through exciting the
general background of the vacuum signals is still another conceptual
revolution. (Cao, 2010, 208)
The conception of causality and statement of physicalism that I endorse are
also governed by the primacy of physics constraint (the primacy of physics con-
straint) and PSR about information transmission at the level of I-ontology: I
am not interested in trying to defend PSR in epistemic or semantic terms - only
for I-ontology. PSR is understood to be an analytic basis of reductionist ap-
proaches to understanding quantum systems and quantum field theory (Rickles,
2008c, 187, 173-4.) Scientific metaphysics of the kind we are pursuing here only
permits of such if there is contingent support for it. I do not have space for
a full defence of a metaphysics of physical causality, but my approach involves
the scientific contingent sustaining of the following assertions:
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a. Information transfer and transmission is ineliminable from both I-obtaining
natural systems and from the investigation of such (even scientific instrumen-
talism requires that information goes from the instruments to the theory)
b. According to the best (all, in fact) science, and maintaining the no miracles
argument, physical signal pathways are a necessary condition for information
transmission (Hawking, 2014)
c. Causal pathways just are or reduce to signal pathways, necessarily (every
causal pathway is a signal pathway)
d. Accidental correlation between a source and a destination structure sans
signal pathways does not constitute information transmission (unless there
is an observer to add additional encoding signal pathways 7)
FOSIR Causation My characterisation of physical causation is consequently
that it is identical to casual inducement of configuration of I-obtaining
structures and structures that reduce to I structures (nonuniform regions
of quantum fields), and that physical causation is a necessary and sufficient
condition for information transmission.
There is an entire philosophical literature stemming from Humean scepti-
cism (Hume, 1748) and from counterfactual analyses like that offered by David
Lewis about causality that regards considering causality in realist terms as reify-
ing an unecessary metaphysical glue in the same way as I refer to trope bundles,
property bundles, and even relations of certain kinds in §3.2 p83. (Fair, 1979,
223; Woodward, 2010; Lewis, 2000; Lewis, 1979; Menzies, 2004; Kutach, 2013;
Maudlin, 2007; Dowe, 2000.) I have elected the realist physicalist conception of
causation on a defeasible basis, in agreement with Ladyman and Ross, French,
Cao, Alyssa Ney, and a much earlier David Fair - all of whom have differ-
ently nuanced interpretations of physical causation and causation as physical
(Berenstain and Ladyman, 2012, 158; Fair, 1979 220; Ney, 2009, 740-1. See also
Braddon-Mitchell, 1993.)
The conception of causality that I recommend is realist about causal path-
ways, and regards them as functionally and ontologically ineliminable from the
physics of signal transmission (which is also in keeping with PSR.) Signal trans-
mission is something that I will argue is a strong indication that something like
a ‘banging together’ type of causality - based on fields as structures rather than
objects - is real. Put brutely: there is stuff that bangs together, and that stuff is
or reduces to physical (by the definition presented below) fields, and it isn’t ex-
actly ‘banging together’: more like ‘continuous pulling and pushing’ or ‘pulling
and pushing in a continuous medium’: a kind of transmitted flux. For those
that think this latter statement hopelessly inadequate, I present a continuous
conception of the same, the idea of which is that proximate fields and parts of
fields are continuous with other bounded fields, and are necessarily affected by
7See §5.4.1 p190
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fluctuations in those neighboring fields. So the banging together of fields is a
transmission of energy through field boundaries (something like this has been
presented by Fair, 1979, 228-230, 233.) This is in fact based upon what are now
fairly familiar observations in QFT:
An important development was brought out in 1932–33 by Heisen-
berg in his work on the compound model of neutron, in which he
developed the idea that the nuclear force consisted in the exchange
of pseudo electrons. The idea was taken over and further developed
by Ettore Majorana. Then a crucial step was taken by Enrico Fermi
in his work on the beta decay of 1933, in which interactions were
conceptualized, not in terms of the exchange of existing particles,
but in terms of the couplings of fields, or the creation and annihi-
lation of the relevant quanta at the interacting point. The tacitly
assumed conceptual foundation of Fermi’s theory was the vacuum
fluctuations, which under certain constraints result in the creations
and annihilation of real and virtual quanta. A crucial step in laying
down this foundation was taken by Niels Bohr and Leon Rosenfeld
in 1933 when they investigated the measurability of the field, which
brought the idea of field fluctuations into the physics community.
This, combined with Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, paved the
way for the idea of local fluctuations of the field, whether it is in the
vacuum state or in excited states. (Cao, 2010, 206.)
Put yet another way: snooker balls don’t seem to be connected in terms of
occupying each other’s space when they collide, but according to contemporary
physics they’re really made up of fields, and the constituent fields are over-
lapping and interacting at impact (Deutsch and Hayden, with whom I disagree
about Everett’s interpretation of QM, have expressed a similar requirement they
call contiguity (Timpson, 2005, 320.) Put still another way, Hume’s statement
that we don’t know what the nature of the (physical) relation of causality is
between snooker balls is arguably answered by field theories in physics. Par-
ticle interactions in quantum systems are well described not only because all
fundamental particle tokens are identical to each other for each particle type,
but because their interactions are field based.
According to my approach, the ineliminable objective basis of signal path-
ways is physical causal pathways, and their characterisation as physical is rooted
in contingency, measurement, and empiricism, rather than any a-priori meta-
physical dogma.
Causal Configuring and Configurations
A statement of the idea of causal pathway based inducement of configuration
of a structure and its salience to physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural
realism is approximated (in loose contingent metaphysical terms) by Ladyman
and Ross:
3.3 Ontic Structural Realism by Fields 115
However, understood in terms of claims such as ‘The Kreb cy-
cle is an unobservable structure that underlies cellular metabolism’,
or ‘Mobile telephones work because microwaves propagate between
them and telecommunication masts and satellites’, where ‘microwaves’
describes recurrent structure for propagating a certain class of influ-
ences, then we do have knowledge of the unobservable. (Ladyman
and Ross, 2013, 127.)
The phrase “propagation of a certain class of influences” approximates the
idea of transmission of information by causal inducement of configuration of
structure. Like Cao and Ladyman and Ross I regard that scientific realism at
minimum requires the inclusion of causation in the I-ontology (Ladyman and
Ross, 2013, 144-5; Cao, 2003b, 59; Esfeld and Lam, 2010, 156.) I suggest that
furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, representation requires information
transmission which is not possible without signal pathways, and signal pathways
are ineliminably causal in nature.
Cao, Dennett, and Ladyman and Ross make extensive use of the concept of
configuration (Cao, 2003b, 59-64; Dennett, 1991; .) This is hardly surprising as
it is an intrinsic part of phase spaces and other mathematical representations
of physical systems, and is familiar in physics from the configuration spaces of
gauge theories. Crucially, despite the non-reductive and ant-reductive overtures
of Ladyman and Ross and Dennett, the concept of configuration is common
between them and underdetermines my own. Real patterns in empirical theories
are still determined by the causal inducement of arrangement/configuration of
the representing structures. According to my approach, the configuration of a
representation in phase space is still causally induced and encoded according to
the mechanisms so far discussed: complexes of encoding apparatus and rules for
achieving partial representations.
Reference to configuration has a long history in science and the philosophy of
science. According to FOSIR and the CICS conception of information, partial
representation is representation of part of the information of a system: of part of
the configuration of its spatiotemporal structure (refer also to the final chapter.)
The British emergentists - particularly C.D. Broad - had an early conception
of the configuration of a system. It concurred with ideas in classical mechan-
ics in that it was basically the idea of the arrangement of a system’s particles.
However, for the emergentists, the arrangement of the microconstituents of a
physical system resulted in causal powers exerted as what Brian P. McLaugh-
lin has termed ‘configurational’ forces. The emergentists thought that “some
special science kinds from each special science can be wholly composed of types
of structures of material particles that endow the kinds in question with fun-
damental causal powers” such that “the powers in question ‘emerge’ from the
types of structures in question” ( Bedau and Humphreys, 2008 20-21, 34.) The
concept of special configurative forces is of course largely defunct. However,
causal relations have remained indispensable for scientific explanation.
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Ubiquity of Information and The Quantum Field
Information exists in and essentially is the causally induced spatiotemporal con-
figuration of the system (refer to §3.3.1 p114 for more detailed argument.) Con-
figuration here is the arrangement of the physical data in the structure. Physical
Structure is the real ontic basis of information in both Shannon’s theory and
Dretske’s conceptions of information, since sources and source states are phys-
ical structures. The same is true on a similar basis for Floridi (by structural
realism), Devlin (situations) and Chalmers (the double-aspect principle.) All
mathematical structures and rules used to represent necessarily require physical
structure to be inscribed or otherwise realised. All cognitive structures em-
ployed in doing mathematics or any other simple or complex cognitive function
require physical realisation as physical structures.
Any meaning of the data is due to its status as intrinsic semantic information:
what the spatiotemporal configuration indicates about the physical structure
and properties of the physical structure(s) that caused it. A structure naturally
indicates something of the cause of its configuration. If unnecessary subjectivist
and absolute idealist kinds of confusions are not permitted to muddy the waters,
then this is all but undeniable: neither subjective propensities to bet, epistemic
probabilities, nor abstract observers are a necessary requirement for the exis-
tence of causal pathways. The configuration (intensity, energy levels, intervals
and frequency) of gamma rays or x rays form a celestial x-ray source indicate
something about the structure of the celestial source (the frequency at which it
is spinning, for example.) These assertions are broadly defensible on intuitive,
empirical and scientific grounds. According to this ontology, information is –
like physical structure – ubiquitous.
David Chalmers may have been the first philosopher to propose that the
ubiquity of information is objectively true and intuitively obvious. The best
way to quickly grasp this idea is by a kind of loose intuitive reductio: try to
think of somewhere that information does not exist. According to subjectivism
about information, it can only exist where there is a sentient epistemic agent:
that information is some kind of agent phenomenal or cognitive content, or some
resource that gives rise to the same. However, this kind of assumption just seems
wrong when one asks whether neurons, non-sentient organisms - and especially
DNA and RNA - would contain information even in the absence of an epistemic
agent (Hutter, 2012, 408-12.) It seems hard to deny that objectively they would
contain, generate, consume, process and pass information even if no epistemic
agent of any kind ever existed to perceive them (and they did so for millions of
years.) An ontology which considers the “fluctuating vacuum field as its basic
entity” - that of QFT - supports this notion in conjunction with a causal I CICS
conception of information. The random element of the posited nature of the
vacuum field may trouble ontic-physicalist PSR if the argument that randomness
is uncaused can go through (Cao, 2010, 204-5; Kuhlmann, 2010a, 1630; Swanson,
2017, 4-5.) This does not seem to be a significant problem for my approach:
according to physics the vacuum state or zero-point quantum field regions are
never empty of structure: especially in Minkowskian four dimensionalist terms.
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A putatively more secure agent-centric conception requires only that the
agent be an organism of some kind: that information is only something that
is definable with respect to an organism with component subsystems that con-
sumes it or produces it. However, again we are then required to deny that no
information objectively exists in suns, pulsars, molecules, proteins, electromag-
netic radiation, in quasi-periodic oscillations from celestial x-ray sources, and so
on, in the absence of any consuming organisms or perceiving agents. We would
have to say that no information is emitted from the configuration of a pulsar
(its frequency of rotation, mass, beam energy levels etc. Zeidler and Service,
2009, X, 25; der Klis, 1988) in the absence of organisms (cognitive or otherwise)
which can somehow register or sense the emission. So strong is this intuition
that information is agent-centric that it leads Chalmers to feel able to propose
the unintuitive thesis that information and experience are inseparable: wherever
there is information, there must be an informational entity or system realising
experience along with it (Chalmers, 1996, 282-6.)
I suggest that - according to science and especially according to ontic struc-
tural realism - information is indeed ubiquitous. Trivially and defeasibily, physi-
cal structure - and structures abstracted from but necessarily supervening upon
and reducible to physical structure - are ubiquitous because they reduce to
classical fields and all classical fields reduce to (regions of) the quantum field
and vacuum. According to FOSIR, information is therefore ubiquitous. Were
information existentially dependent upon a subjective agent, then Chalmers’
assertion of ubiquity would be necessarily false in the absence of - say - an
appropriate version of objectively real idealism.
3.4 Other Field Ontological Alternatives
3.4.1 Why not Nominalism about Information?
Although I find it to be initially intuitively appealing, I reject that eliminativism
and/or some kind of nominalism about information is true (Levy, 2011; Griffiths,
2001.) My intuition favours naturalistic liberal pluralism at higher levels of
abstraction - at the level of information measures, of formal logical, logico-
mathematical, and physico-statistical theories of information 8. I find the latter
to be the most convincing alternatives (Floridi, 2009b 13-15.) I will endorse
8I refer to the technical conception of levels of abstraction in computer science and software
engineering, which meshes with the conception of abstracting out or removal of data and
structural details irrelevent to the specific modelling, explanatory, or computational task at
hand at a given level of focus and explanation. Many philosophers of science refer to the same
technique under the rubric of levels of abstraction, explanatory levels, and/or scale variability
(Woodward, 2010; Mitchell, 2009, 28, 109, 114; Wimsatt, 2006; Bermudez, 1995; Neuroscience:
Owens, 1989; Physics: Wilson, 2010.)
I regard that an understanding of abstraction in terms of the discarding of noise or irrelevant
information and/or the black-boxing of details is a given for scientists and engineers, and that
philosophers should not have any trouble with it as a technical term. For a development of
the terminology refer to Floridi, 2008a; Van Leeuwen, 2014, Floridi, 2008b; Computer Science:
Ratti, 2015; Ganascia, 2015.
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pluralism at higher levels of formal theorising and modelling. However, I will
argue that thoroughgoing eliminativism and nominalism do not hold up under
scientific metaphysical scrutiny with respect to both realism about information
and the nature of information and a metaphysics thereof. I will be arguing
that realism about information is implied by its indispensability to science,
along with inference to the best explanation. Anti-realism about information
does not survive these either intuitively at first blush or upon more careful
scrutiny. Asserting or adducing the nature of information is not nearly so trivial
a challenge.
The approach I am taking involves an identity thesis between the I-existing
ontic structure that ontic structural realist scientific realists endeavour to be
realist about, and physical selections of structure in re the universal quantum
field (all fields combined) and vacuum (where fields are in ground states) across
all of spacetime. Approaches to how the fields of quantum field theory ex-
ist often involve process interpretations, nominalism, trope bundles, particle
interpretations, and field interpretations. I am interested only in the latter:
field interpretations. According to my informational ontology, fields are at the
bottom of the ontology of the world, but they constitute stochastic dynami-
cal (embodying fleeting excitations and fluctuating states) CICS information
sources.
My approach is to establish the aforementioned ontic identity to help provide
a basis for the nature of information, but there is also support for the idea of
nominalism about information in the philosophy of physics. For example, taking
his lead from Fred Dretske’s definition of information as an abstract commodity,
Christopher Timpson refers to the term ‘information’ as an abstract noun only:
The puzzle that seems to be posed by the examples of telepor-
tation and the like is over the question ‘How does the information
get from A to B?’. This is a perfectly legitimate question if it is
understood as a question about what the causal processes involved
in the transmission of the information are, but note that it would
be a mistake to take it as a question concerning how information,
construed as a particular, or as some pseudo-substance, travels. ‘In-
formation’ is an abstract noun and doesn’t serve to refer to an entity
or substance. Thus when considering an information transmission
process, one that involves entanglement or otherwise, we should not
feel it incumbent upon ourselves to provide a story about how some
thing, denoted by ‘the information’, travels from A to B; nor, a
fortiori, worry about whether this supposed thing took a spatio-
temporally continuous path or not. By contrast, we might very well
be interested in the behaviour of the physical systems involved in
the transmission process and which may or may not usefully be said
to be information carriers during the process. (Timpson, 2005, 331)
I do not think, and nor am I arguing, that information exists in the on-
tology as some natural kind. The identity thesis I have proposed between the
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I-structure about which ontic structural realists are realist and selected in re
I-obtaining quantum field structure does not involve taking information to be
the same natural kind as I-obtaining fields and/or their in re structure. I am in
agreement with Timpson here. My argument is that a way in which structures
are I-configured and exist in the system constitute its functionally effective in-
formation (and intrinsically semantic - see §5 p175.) To paraphrase Timpson,
the information gets from A to B by way of causal processes and structures -
the causal inducement of configurations in structures comprising a signal path-
way in transmission media. I am referring to such causal processes and their
structures as linked information sources and their causally induced structures
as information. The classical model and its contemporary adaptations allow for
this - a channel can be treated as a source and any stochastic process is a source.
Moreover, the causally induced downstream configurations of structure are all
natural representations of those upstream causal structures that induced them.
Spatio-temporal continuity is too strong a requirement, from a scientific
metaphysical perspective, to place upon the transmission or information. This
is mostly due to quantum non-local effects and the Bell theorems. Note that it
does not follow from this that structures that co-incidentally co-vary are realising
information transmission or transfer (Not independent of any observer, anyway.
See §5.4.1 p190.) I require only causal continuity (see §7.3.1 p252.) Note also
that it is not clear that QFT cannot in principle provide an explanation for the
results of the Bell theorems and the apparent failure of hidden variable posits,
but none is apparent yet.
According to the classical theory, message transmission reduces to signal
transmission from a source through a channel that involves transducer based
encoding, which I will later argue can occur naturally. Transducers by defini-
tion generally involve energy transduction. The terms ‘code’ and ‘ encoding’
have been cited as having metaphorical and/or nominalist use in molecular bio-
science (Godfrey-Smith, 2000.) It looks like further support for pluralism and
nominalism that the term code also gets used for the physical interactions that
effect protein folding. Returning to Dill et. al.:
Prior to the mid-1980s, the protein folding code was seen as a
sum of many different small interactions—such as hydrogen bonds,
ion pairs, van der Waals attractions, and watermediated hydropho-
bic interactions. A key idea was that the primary sequence en-
coded secondary structures, which then encoded tertiary struc-
tures. However, through statistical mechanical modeling, a different
view emerged in the 1980s, namely, that there is a dominant compo-
nent to the folding code, that it is the hydrophobic interaction, that
the folding code is distributed both locally and nonlocally in
the sequence, and that a protein’s secondary structure is as much
a consequence of the tertiary structure as a cause of it...Similarly,
tight packing in proteins implies that van der Waals interactions
are important (28.) However, the question of the folding code is
whether there is a dominant factor that explains why any two pro-
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teins, for example, lysozyme and ribonuclease, have different native
structures. This code must be written in the side chains, not in the
backbone hydrogen bonding, because it is through the side chains
that one protein differs from another...Sequences that are jumbled
and retain only their correct hydrophobic and polar patterning fold
to their expected native states. . . in the absence of efforts to design
packing, charges, or hydrogen bonding. Hydrophobic and polar pat-
terning also appears to be a key to encoding of amyloid-like fibril
structures (236) (Dill et al., 2008a, 291. Emphasis added.)
Notice the ontologically non-inert reference to ‘patterning’, and that the
way that amyloid-like fibril structures are generated is by being causally ‘coded’
- the inference being that they get their functional dynamical conformation-
configuration from a natural encoding process. The process can be said to have
an alphabet of possible ‘codes’ - conformations and associated properties with
evolved teleological rules for where and how they fit with other conformations.
Thus the application of ‘encoded’ and ‘code’ is not heretical to the I natu-
ral system as a number of philosophers have suggested (Godfrey-Smith, 2007.)
Scientists like Dill et. al. know more than enough about classical theory and
that of Fisher and Kolmogorov (and the derivatives of those theories - MDL,
Solomonov, Kullback-Leibler.) It seems coherent to claim that protein folding
codes and the genetic code have non-trivially similar causal-structural compo-
nents and that both involve - ineliminably - the causally induced configuration
of structures, and subsequent transmission of causally induced representations
(existing on the same basis) as well as inducing of functional structures (Grif-
fiths and Stotz, 2013.) At the core of all of this is the transmission of intrinsic
structure-reducible representations of causally upstream systems acting as in-
formation sources (sometimes very large complexes of them.) There is little
reference to information using the word ‘information’, but if classical and algo-
rithmic information measures were applied I suggest naturally encoded CICS
would be the bottom of what got measured. In another recent paper Dill et.
al. refer to information using a Shannon-like interpretation and other measures
based upon energy ratios as indirectly informative giving secondary information
about certain structures and their properties.
By definition, φ values are fundamentally energetic quantities,
related to changes in the protein’s stability and folding rate. Do φ
values also give information about the structures that describe the
kinetic “bottleneck” or transition-state? (Weikl and Dill, 2007)
There exist both general metaphysical nominalisms regarding the nature of
such things as abstracta and particulars, and mathematical nominalisms about
numbers and mathematical structures. Metaphysical nominalisms tend to be
about I ontologies, and mathematical nominalisms about formal representations
thereof. There is more than one kind of metaphysical nominalism (Kuhlmann,
2010a, 137-40; Armstrong, 1978.) General metaphysical nominalisms are differ-
entiated primarily by different accounts of abstract entities including that they
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are universals, trope bundles, and property bundles - among other options (Arm-
strong, 1997; Armstrong, 1978; Simons, 2014; Armstrong, 2010;.) Mathemati-
cal nominalism (fictionalist and non-fictionalist.) Mathematical nominalism is
relevant to an investigation of the existence and nature of information since
some philosophers have regarded information as being reducible to or otherwise
related to mathematical constructs and/or structures (especially probabilistic
constructs and principles.) General metaphysical nominalism is relevant since
information is often associated with Platonic abstracta of one kind or another
(platonism about information.) The relevant question is whether or not the
existence and/or nature of information should be viewed nominalistically.
It is apparent that a fictionalist nominalism like that familiar from the phi-
losophy of mathematics is not appropriate for addressing the question of the
nature of information. The greatest difficulty, and primary premise for this
claim, is that - unlike mathematical entities - it does not seem like information
can be regarded as a fiction or as not real by science and in scientific theories
without harm to the empirical theories. It looks like expunging references to
mathematical entities might leave the empirical theory in tact according to fic-
tionalist nominalism about mathematical entities (Field, 1980), but expunging
references to information (or to information theoretic dynamics) will do harm
to both the semantics and implications of most scientific theories. Field himself
pointed out the difference between mathematical terms/entities and theoretical
terms/entities (intended to identify real phenomena in nature):
To put it a bit vaguely...if you take any body of nominalistically
stated assertionsN , and supplement it with a theory S, you don’t get
any nominalistically-statable conclusions that you wouldn’t get from
N alone. The analogue for theories postulating subatomic particles
is of course not true: if T is a theory that involves subatomic particles
and is at all interesting, then there are going to be lots of cases of
bodies P of wholly macroscopic assertions which in conjunction with
T yield macroscopic conclusions that they don’t yield in the absence
of T ; if this were not so, theories about subatomic particles would
never be tested (Field, 1980, 9.)
It’s evidently not true for references to physical structure and information
or informational dynamics either.
3.4.2 The Analytic A-priori: Fields as Trope Bundles and
the Spacetime Manifold
Andrew Wayne discusses the historical role of the ether as the substantial sub-
strate in which properties and fields were embedded in various scientific theories
of the 18th and 19th centuries (Wayne, 2008, Dieks, 2002 ,1-4.) Science pro-
gressed from this conception and ontology to one in which Einstein’s spacetime
manifold M replaced the ether as the medium in which fields and their proper-
ties are embedded. Wayne notes that M is unlike the original mechanical ether
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and more like “H.A. Lorentz’s theory in which the electromagnetic field con-
sists of a collection of properties of an immaterial ether” since M , like Lorentz’s
non-mechanical version of the ether, was immaterial (Ibid 2-3.)
Wayne notes that “Field theories with a material ether ontology are the
quintessential scientific articulation of a substance-attribute metaphysics” ac-
cording to which the material and mechanical (causal) ether can exist without
the field, but the field is existentially dependent upon the ether. Points exist or
are picked out in the substance of the ether. Those points together with their
attributes make up fields. Sustaining points with attributes comprising fields
that have to be physical in Lorentz’s nonmaterial ether - and in M - presents
difficulties:
It appears that such an ether could play no useful role in the
ontology of physical field theory. For these reasons we may be in-
clined to augment Lorentz’s immaterial ether with certain geomet-
rical properties,such as topological, differential and metrical proper-
ties, so that it can fulfill the role of indexer and individuator of field
properties. This appears to be a promising strategy and it is...the
direction taken by the ontology of 20th century field theories. That
fields are the properties of a substantial substratum remains the
received view to the present day. (Wayne, 2008, 4.)
Importantly, and not without sound deference to scientific metaphysical prin-
ciples, there are similar problems with getting physical fields to existentially de-
pend upon M as the apparently non-material successor to Lorentz’s immaterial
ether:
We ought to question, however, whether the spacetime manifold,
an immaterial ether with geometrical properties, can fulfil its role
as the substantial substratum for classical field theories. . . Fields in
contemporary physics are material objects; they contain mass-energy
and interact causally with other material objects. (Ibid., 5)
However, I suggest that apart from the fact that Wayne is probably wrong
that contemporary physics does not regard fields as basic (he does not mention
the vacuum), it is also a confusion to regard that physicists think that fields
reduce to a non-material M . Nevertheless, this is again the problem of dual
ontological commitments in physico-mathematical empirical theories giving rise
to mathematical collapse. It is understandable from an instrumentalist and
constructivist perspective - and from the perspective of practical science - that in
the computational machinations of a theory there are no commitments to parts
of the ontology expressed as mathematical concepts existing mind, language,
and computation independently. M is formulated and characterised as a kind
of mathematical stratum in which to embed classical physical fields, but there
is no commitment to its I existence:
When relativity theory banished the ether, the spacetime mani-
fold M began to function as a kind of dematerialized ether needed to
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support the field . . . [I]n postrelativity theory it seems that the elec-
tromagnetic field, and indeed all physical fields, must be construed
as states of M . In a modern, pure field theoretic physics, M func-
tions as the basic substance, that is, the basic object of predication
(Wayne, 2008 Wayne quoting Earman, 1989, 155)
Wayne regards that a metaphysical solution is called for pursuant to scientific
realism, if not physicalism. It is at this point that Wayne’s deference to more
traditional 20th century metaphysics and metametaphysics becomes apparent,
as he presents an a-priori metaphysical solution in terms of fields being regarded
as bundles of tropes, and thus as universals in the a-priori analytic sense. I’ve
neither space nor motive to investigate this approach in depth as I have already
rejected its basis in deference to Ladyman and Ross style scientific metaphysics.
I have sympathy for Federico Laudisa’s reception of Meinard Kuhlman’ simi-
lar trope bundle attempt at a metaphysics for quantum field theory, since Laud-
isa’s doubts emphasise - in effect - what I have called scientific metaphysics, and
rejects the soundness of instantiating or stipulating metaphysical frameworks,
entities, and posits with the intention of somehow completing the ontology of
QFT:
As to the relation between physics and metaphysics, I strongly
suspect that a widespread attitude towards the significance and role
of metaphysics in the foundations of physics is wrong-headed. One
has the impression that some try to solve the open foundational
problems in physics by inserting a sufficiently exotic metaphysical
theory on top of it, hoping that the obscure (physics) and the weird
(metaphysics) will happily match giving rise to some sort of physico-
metaphysical. (Laudisa, 2012, 623.) magic.
I don’t just strongly suspect this: I think that the tenets of scientific con-
tingent metaphysics that respects the primacy of physics constraint demands
it. Kuhlman’s trope bundle account requires realism about properties as part
of the furniture of the universe.
The reader might well have detected at this point that there seems to be some
very close metametphysical and methodological agreement between the identity
thesis approach to OSIR (introduced as H2 at §4 p27 and developed at §1.2 p36,
the end of §2 p55.) I have said that Kuhlman’s trope bundle approach is similar
to Wayne’s, but Kuhlman’s dispositional trope bundle ontology for fundamental
physics is more ontologically modest and less inflationary (Kuhlmann, 2015.)
It’s specifically a trope ontology, but retains this identity better than Wayne’s
could because of the inclusion in it of different kinds of metaphysical bindings or
‘glue’. Kuhlman is committed to a careful observation of Ockham’s Razor as a
guiding tenet of what is very close to a scientific metaphysics, but trope ontolo-
gies commit him to tropes existing as additional particulars that are elements
of the furniture of the universe (Kuhlmann, 2010a, 135.)
However, trope bundles are combinations of such property tropes taken as
particulars or as being realised by particulars. This is inescapably based upon
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a-priorism about properties as ontologically prior, and as such it is inferior
to my identity theoretic plus defeasible science based approach because it is
inappropriately ontologically inflationary and in invites - relies upon - formalism
driven ontic descent. In addition, were it to be deployed as a basis for an
ontology of information as I am trying to do with ontic structural realism, then
it would not be clear how either causality, transmission, or even source states
would obtain on the basis of trope bundles and still retain naturally necessary
and logically necessary information dynamical. I think it’s better to constrain
even French’s Viking metaphysics by requiring that only those conceptual a-
priori posits that can be used to model or represent contingently determined
structures that obey information dynamical necessary conditions.
I take myself to be in significant agreement with French regarding essential-
ism about dispositions in the context of both properties and structures:
More acutely, perhaps, on the view that symmetry principles and
conservation laws play a constraining role with regard to the stan-
dard or regular laws, such principles and laws raise an obvious prob-
lem for the dispositional essentialist. Put bluntly, she cannot accept
such constraints, since she holds that the laws being constrained owe
their necessity to the dispositional properties that ground them and
theoretical representations . . . Given the significance of symmetries
(and conservation laws) in modern physics, some might take this
conclusion as a form of reductio of the whole dispositional essential-
ist enterprise. (French, 2014, 250, 239.)
I think that it does constitute such a reductio on from a scientific meta-
physical perspective. Descending ontological abstract glue and posits into the
ontology from some a-priori standpoint is flawed, and I take it to be simply
wrong. French wants to eliminate dispositions as a going metaphysical consid-
eration for physics, and I think that the same should apply to trope bundles
and prior properties, and to abstract binding relationships between tropes.
Arguably (obviously) something other than contingent scientific realism has
been applied when one begins to speak of fields as bundles of tropes and field
theories as requiring, as Wayne does, some kind of real relation to exist in the
ontology to bind tropes together (the compresence relation), or as Kuhlman does
- properties to exist as prior, or at least independently, in the ontology (Wayne,
2008, 6-7.) Neither could easily be characterised, according to the rights terms,
as information sources. Additionally in Wayne’s case, one could then ask what
binds the identified relation to the trope, then what binds that to both, and so
on in a regress of existential dependence based not upon material structure but
upon a-priori posited abstract placeholders. It seems the ontological bottom or
end of such posits can only be arbitrary. That doesn’t just disobey Ockham’s
Razor as a guide to de rigeur and disciplined theorising, but simply seems to
contradict the principle insensibly. Perhaps a general theory of grounding can
help, but there is serious question about the status of grounding as a metaphys-
ical posit. The debate about whether grounding has grounding or is grounded
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is just one indicator of this (Bennett, 2011; Chakravartty, 2013.) I do not see
the point in referring to grounding, and think that existential dependence (i.e.
reductive basis) is the only admissable reductive base term to include in a sci-
entific metaphysics. As previously mentioned with regard to the normalisation
proofs in QFT: mathematical machinery inflates the apparent ontology in the
theory, but the terms are often cancelled out or treated as dispensible when the
reference to I-ontology is considered. To retain the mathematically adduced in-
terim and utility abstracta as I-existing or referring to I structures or dynamics
is precisely what I have called formalism driven ontological descent.
A valid complaint on the basis of a scientific metaphysics is anticipated with
respect to M . If we are to defer to the best physics, then it looks like M should
be called real, or at least that there is adequate scientific metaphysical reason
to consider it as real per scientific realism. M is understood to be indispensable
to the theory of relativity, and to classical field theories and QFT. The scientific
metaphysics I am proposing as correct includes deference to the defeasibility
of scientific theorising, including in empirical theories. Pauli was prepared to
exclude the Neutrino from the I-ontology pending experimental verification,
and Barbour has argued that time does not belong in - or at least is eliminable
from - Einstein’s theory of relativity (Barbour, 1994.)
Rickles has summarised the purpose of theory interpretation as being about
correspondence based representation in formalisms including constructed em-
pirical theories:
An essential part of interpretation is choosing which parts of a
formalism are taken to represent something. Then one has to give an
account of what they represent, i.e. one has to provide an account
of the ontology. (Rickles, 2008a; See also French, 2014, 266, 268)
My overall project is to argue that when formalisms include references to
information itself - and perhaps more importantly to signal transmission and
encoding - there is a physically reducible structure with specific identifiable
features (causally induced physically reducible configuration that is intrinsically
semantic but alethically neutral §3.3.1 p114) being referred to. If there are any
relations in the I system, and if any information is realised by relations, then it
is because they are incidental to and defeasibly reduce to the physical structure
of bounded regions of fields. Relations in the representing theory formalism are
an encoding of information from the physical system. Information in formal
theories is that which is explanatory with respect to the I phenomena, and this
can only be on the basis of multiply encoded information from I sources.
Structures that don’t reduce to the physical or aren’t physical and causal
are not information bearing: they do not involve real information. This is not
a-priori stipulation, but as I will investigate in the next chapter - evident from
applied mathematical information theory and a necessary requirement for the
realisation of any information generation by sources and for any transmission
by signals over channels.
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3.4.3 Modal Innatism in the Quantum World as the basis
of Ontic Structural Realism
FOSIR does not require many worlds realism about quantum mechanics to be
true, and nor does it require any kind of concrete modal innatism (meaning that
modality is innate to physical systems) about quantum states or their fields to
be true. Steven French has proposed that the quantum world is innately modal
- exhibits innate modality - due to the model nature of the formalisms and phys-
ical operators involved in QM. This not unreasonable assertion is what French
points to as the existential basis for and substance of structure in ontic structural
realism. French does not offer a field ontology, and does not agree with Lady-
man and Ross that the universe is the totality of non-redundant statistics which
constitute physical structure (although modality and frequentist outcomes do
sensibly align in explantory and epistemic terms.) French does not assert a field
ontology, but like Ladyman and Ross nonredundant in re physical statistics by
stochasticity, the truth of such would arguably affect the way in which infor-
mation is realised as selections of structure from the quantum vacuum/foam or
totality of all quantum fields. FOSIR can in fact accommodate either proposal
as the basis for field/vacuum structure - due to the defeasibility of science feature
of scientific metaphysics and according to the primacy of physics constraint.
However, FOSIR cannot tolerate the substance of a structure, in accordance
a field theory, being either non-physical (debates about the definition of physical
- which I have in fact made an attempt to deal with at §1.2 p34 and §7.3 p252
) or not in re. I have argued that probabilism about information conflates the
measure with that which is measured: a certain category error and equivocation
even in extreme cases of physico-mathematical operators. This is another out-
come of formalism driven ontic descent: the measure becomes identified with
the measured (§1.3 p37, §3.2.2 p87, and §1.4.1 p49.) The only way for this to
be a reasonable conflation is if statistics are literally physical in the way that
Ladyman and Ross assert (and it is not clear exactly how that obtains even
with natural stochasticity in play), and I think that would require all features
of formal physics to thus subsist. However, it is not clear exactly how that could
be true beyond in re existence due to stochasticity in physical phenomena - dy-
namic physical processes as sources. Even if a physical realist interpretation of
probabilities is true, then the old arguments about physical propensity interpre-
tations of probabilities (among others) arguably arise (Jackson and Pargetter,
1982.)
Michael Everett and David Deutsch are proponents of the version of the
many worlds interpretation of QM that is sometimes called the relative state or
Everett interpretation (Barrett, 2011, 7.) According to this version, all of the
possible histories that could have obtained in the universe - corresponding to all
of the past possible superposition states of all of the quantum sytems in history
- did in fact obtain in other entire universes. There is a different version due to
DeWitt et al., 1973 that has it that a new universe is ‘branched’ or split off when
decoherence or collapse of a superposition state in a quantum system occurs. In
both cases the outcome is that there are perhaps infinite universes that all exist
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simultaneously, and none is a locus or more real than any of the others. The
details of the history and variations of the many worlds interpretation involve
numerous different re-interpretations and a number of different attempts to use
the interpretation to prove the Born rule in quantum mechanics (Papineau,
2010a; Saunders, 2010; Deutsch, 2010; Vedral, 2010; Vaidman, 2016.)
Steven French notes that to say that the ontology of Everett and Deutsch’s
many worlds interpretation is “ontologically inflationary would be an under-
statement” (French, 2014, 194.) Yet French proposes a modalist NOSR accord-
ing to which structure is irreducibly modal. He apparently does not require,
like Deutsch, that the I-ontology - not just the ontology of theories in quan-
tum physics and other physics of quantum scale involving statistical mechanical
modelling - includes all of the possible ways the world could be (Ibid, 265; all
of the possibilities) as actual and concrete (and presumably physical, although
a physicalist commitment is not foregrounded or not clear.) Yet he thinks
that symmetries in the physico-mathematical apparatus of QFT and quantum
statistics including permutation invariance - reducing to global Hamiltonian
symmetry - are inherently modal in a realist sense (Ibid, 264.)
French proceeds carefully to identify where in the representing mathemat-
ics of the formalism the innate modality exists that can be ascribed to the
I-obtaining system (and French is interested in what in the world exists com-
putation independently just as I am, but he does not state it in those terms.)
He isolates permutation invariance (PI) as critical:
Now, it is too quick to say that the kind structure of the actual
world and the ‘space’ of physical possibilities is given simply by PI.
We need both the group representations and the dynamics. The
former underlie the division of Hilbert space into the relevant sub-
spaces. (French, 2014, 266-7)
Understandably, the approach is somewhat baroque (since the mathematical
and statistical apparatus of group theory and quantum probabilities are com-
plex.) However, I think that in the determined effort to identify modality as
both innate to - and ontologically prior in - the I world, and as correspondingly
represented in the requisite parts of the physico-mathematical formal model
and apparatus, has at least two problems. Firstly, although the mathematical
formalisms are powerful, reliable, and well developed, they are still defeasible
with respect to further contingent insights and improvements: if the reducibil-
ity of different elements of the formalism and its components changes then the
locus of the modality might change or even dissipate (Ibid., 273-4; Although
without radical findings - most of the Hamiltonian model is unlikely to change
much.) Thus support for innate modality may not be available in revisable
partial representations.
However, I’ve a Hacking-like commitment to scientific realism and represen-
tation. Ian Hacking’s scientific realism is what I will call ‘spray-stuff’ experimen-
talist realism. Hacking shifts focus from theory to experimentation and deploys
a kind of intuitive-cum-practical approach to realism that strongly implies both
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a kind of IBE and another form of experimentally centric indispensability argu-
ment:
[W]e spray [a ball of niobium] it with positrons to increase the
charge or with electrons to decrease the charge.’ From that day
forth I’ve been a scientific realist. So far as I’m concerned, if you
can spray them then they are real. (Hacking, 1983, 22-3.)
This approach deploys IBE from experimentation, and because of the nature
of much experimentation, induction also comes into play. Why it is a form of
indispensability argument is perhaps less clear. In the case of the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument for realism about mathematical entities, it’s reference
in theories that is taken to constitute a sufficient condition for realism about
them. In the case of Hacking’s approach - it’s interaction with the entities in
experimental settings that constitutes a sufficient condition for realism about
them.
This commitment brings me to agree with French: the physico-mathematical
formalisms can be read off from our best scientific theories in this case, because
they are encodings of I-information from the sources that constitute the natural
phenomena. So because French presumably endorses scientific metaphysics and
thus may allow for defeasibility, this first worry is not knock down. However,
the second worry is more salient.
Postulating innate modality due to PI and other physico-mathematical con-
structs is one thing. Asserting it as being identical to the structure in the I-
system is something else: if it is not regarded as defeasible. I think that French
risks his own mathematical collapse - or my formalism driven ontic descent - by
making the modality he identifies in the symmetries in the formalism descend
into the I-ontology. French sorts through the paraphernalia of the formalism
- focussing on symmetries - to pinpoint the location of the representational el-
ements that correspond to what I have called I existent system-sources in the
phenomena being modelled. He focusses on symmetries because the associated
mathematical machinery captures sets of possible states for each system sym-
metry, and identifies actual states when terms are resolved or eliminated (a
similar outcome to the cancellation of terms in renormalisation, but with differ-
ent machinations.) The intensity of this worry varies to the extent that French
demands specificity in the kind of modality involved.
French wrangles with the problem of symmetry breaking where it conflicts
with OSR, pursuant to determining “. . . the grounds for attributing lawhood
qua modally informed property?”:
Furthermore, PI can be considered to be inherently modal by
virtue of encoding these possibilities represented by the varieties
of quantum statistics, including parastatistics . . . So, any symmetry
corresponds to a unitary or anti-unitary operator in Hilbert space
. . . the non-negative energy irreducible unitary representations of the
Poincare´ group that have sharp mass eigenvalues. These correspond
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to the possible elementary states of particles . . . Various classes can
then be obtained: those representations for which the mass is real;
those for which it is imaginary; those for which it is zero; and those
for which the momentum is zero. The last do not correspond to
physical objects . . . The massless representations cover objects that
exist on the light cone, such as photons and gravitons and also
the vacuum state. Those corresponding to imaginary mass cover
tachyons, which travel faster than the speed of light and thus enter
into ‘non-standard’ causal relationships . . . the concern is that if
a symmetry is broken, then it cannot be invested with the
significance that the structural realist wishes to attach to it,
since the symmetry is not manifested in the relevant domain. How-
ever, instead of thinking of the symmetry as somehow ‘lost’, the
situation is better understood as one where the relevant
phenomena is characterized by a symmetry that is ‘lower’
than the unbroken symmetry . . . What are the grounds for at-
tributing lawhood qua modally informed property? Answering this
takes us to the second stage and here the grounds must be broadly
metaphysical, having to do with (non-Humean) reasons for taking
modality to be ‘in’ the world rather than a feature of our theories
and models, say. (Ibid., 270, 271-2, 273-4, 275)
This is where - at the last sentence - I take it that the formalism driven ontic
descent is most obvious. The second bold highlight (mine) indicates an almost
undeniable commitment to both ontic and explanatory reduction, but it is clear
that physicalist ontic structural realism must countenance such. The idea is
that “one way we can understand this idea of structure as being inherently
modal—namely via the models the theory presents (cf. Brading 2011)— . . . the
shift of modality from those models to the world.”
French must proceed to cherry-pick a particular model by way of cherry-
picking a conception of model that suits his purpose. The cherry-picking is
informed and coherent, but the effort is so contrived that I think this is itself an
instance of French’s own mathematical collapse, by way of an extended version
of the same kind of conflation of I structure with theory dependent represen-
tation. Modalism in the mathematics has pushed back onto the I-ontology in
a way that it seems that French should very much reject on the basis of his
idea of mathematical collapse since statistics and statistical mechanics cannot
be extrapolated to such I ontological extravagance if Ockham’s Razor is to be
respected. Ockham’s Razor need not be respected in mathematical formal the-
ories and in fact fecundity of posited pseudo-structures is a powerful tool in
mathematics. However, Ockham’s Razor is contingent for the scientific realist
and for the instrumentalist since although nature is often surprising in it’s struc-
ture and complexity - getting its elements wrong is demonstrably conducive to
failure of scientific solutions and investigations: curing a fatal disease does not
involve identifying fictional elements in the I-ontology unless those fictions have
their role fulfilled by concreta that perform the natural function required - in
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which case only the latter are contingently real.
Ultimately, French has to get from modality as “a feature of a collection of
[theory] models, deriving from their shared structure” to “our theories represent
the [inherent] modal properties of the world” (Ibid., 277.) I think it is too quick
to inflate the ontology with modal properties in this way, and that it is likely
impossible without what looks very much like formalism driven ontological de-
scent. He approaches the problem by claiming that the representing model that
corresponds to the real I system is one of a range or set of possible representing
models, and that the other models are all implicated as co-representing reality
partially (by partial isomorphism between possible models and the represented
structure) by the model that is in fact deployed to represent the actual system.
This is similar to the conception of a measure of semantic information that was
developed by Rudolph Carnap and Yeheshua Bar-Hilel according to which the
semantic information content of a source state just is all the possible states (in
the source alphabet or state space) (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952.) This in turn
is derived from Shannon’s quantitative measure, which incorporates the log of
the probability of the source state calculated frequency-wise using the source
alphabet probability space.
The problem, I suggest, is that this identification of modality in these other
possible representing models is a brute ontic assertion inspired by mathematical
contstructs, and is thus mathematical collapse - or perhaps more specifically -
what I have called formalism driven ontological descent. Barrett (and Stephen
Hawking) have said similar things about the many worlds interpretation of QM
(which is not what French is centrally concerned with, but which would be
innate modality par excellence according to his approach):
To begin, since purely mathematical postulates entail only purely
mathematical theorems, one cannot deduce any metaphysical com-
mitments whatsoever regarding the physical world from the mathe-
matical formalism of pure wave mechanics alone. The formalism of
pure wave mechanics might entail the sort of metaphysical commit-
ments that DeWitt and others have envisioned only if supplemented
with sufficiently strong metaphysical assumptions, strong enough to
determine a metaphysical interpretation for the theory. Concerning
the claim that pure wave mechanics interprets itself by way of a
metatheorem that Everett proved, on even a broad understanding
of what might count as such a metatheorem, there is nothing an-
swering to DeWitt’s description in either the long or short versions
of Everett’s thesis. (Barrett, 2011)
French’s collapse involves the mathematics becoming the basis of the ontol-
ogy: the mathematical abstracta become the furniture of the universe in that
system. My conception of formalism driven ontological descent involves different
abstracta being located in the I-ontology due to the efficacy of the formalism,
when in fact they do not really justifiably belong there. If French’s realism
about inherent modalism is not his own mathematical collapse - it looks very
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close. One way of stating the problem with formalism driven ontological col-
lapse of this kind is that it begins to converge conceptually and metaphysically
upon platonism about information.
In producing their measure of semantic information content, Carnap and Bar
Hillel were interested in answering the pressing problem of the apparent absence
of any semantics in Shannon’s quantitative theory: it is by design a quantitative
theory that did not treat semantic content of messages conveyed using signals
as relevant, in keeping with the work of Hartley who also proceeded with the
premise “[i]t is desireable therefore to eliminate the psychological factors in-
volved and to establish a measure of information in terms of purely physical
quantities” (Hartley, 1928, 536.) However, what they unwittingly embarked
upon was a conception of the nature of information that predicted numerous
elements of both Saul Kripke and David Lewis’ modal logic and Lewis’ modal
realism. Kripke published “A Completeness Theorem for Modal Logic” in 1959,
while Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s important “An Outline of a Semantic Theory of
Information” was published in 1953. David Lewis’ modal logic with counterpart
theory followed Kripke’s work in 1968.
3.4.4 Many Worlds Interpretation of QM
The impact of possible worlds modalism and many worlds or multiverse theory
upon quantum theory is marked, with numerous physicists and philosophers of
physics deferring to possible worlds conceptions and characterisations of quan-
tum systems and quantum mechanics, and of the information in quantum sys-
tems (Rickles, 2008c, 174.) Rickles regards representation in physics thus:
I take this latter aspect [choosing what in a theory represents
something] to be tantamount to the presentation of a set of physically
possible worlds that make the theory true — for example, a set of
individuals over which properties and relations are defined in such
a way so as to make the statements and laws of the theory true.
(Rickles, 2008a, 4)
Michael Everett and David Deutsch both suggest that each possible super-
position state of a quantum system is real in an actual material universe based
upon a model where each selection is a branch of bifurcation in the multi-
verse (Esfeld, 2009b; Steane, 2003.) The ontological fecundity of such a model
is extreme, and I suggest that such a model cannot be accommodated by or
reconciled with any pancomputational simulation model of reality because the
computing power required - regardless of the computing mechanism and es-
pecially if constrained by known logics - since the computational power and
required would be in the order of Oª (using O notation.) The idea is supposed
to be that the mathematical aptness and elegance of Everett’s many worlds in-
terpretation of the superposition states and decoherence of quantum systems is
supposed to imply or even entail that there are many actual possible physical
universes - each corresponding to a possible state of a quantum system under
measurement (Deutsch, 1998; Rickles et al., 2006; Everett, 2012; Esfeld, 2009b.)
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Lending weight to our defeasible approach to a metaphysics of information
via OSIR (see OSIR.1 at §4.3 p142), however, there are other physicists and
philosophers of physics that reject such assertions. Physicist Andrew Steane has
asserted that scientific realism about other/alternative universes as motivated by
Everettian interpretations of QM applied to quantum computation and alleged
Q-Bit capabilities are not just premature, but simply a mistake:
Quantum superposition does not permit quantum computers to
“perform many computations simultaneously” except in a highly
qualified and to some extent misleading sense. Quantum computa-
tion is therefore not well described by interpretations of quantum
mechanics which invoke the concept of vast numbers of parallel uni-
verses . . . quantum computers are not wedded to “many worlds” in-
terpretations, not only in terms of the prediction of the results of
experiments, but also in terms of insight into what is going on within
the quantum computational process (Steane, 2003, 469-70.)
Since there are dissenting voices in the scientific community about the on-
tological ramifications of statistical QM, a scientific metaphysics that observes
the principle of ontic parsimony in a defeasible manner should tend to err on
the side of ontological minimalism. Since I am proposing a minimalist scien-
tific realist field ontology in which fields are defeasibly I-obtaining and reduce
defeasibly to the I-obtaining quantum field, then I have to deal with the idea
(corresponding to the Everett QM interpretation) of the states of sources com-
prised of parts of such fields as being defined according to the configurations
that do not obtain within them. The Everettian many worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics involves just such a stipulation, which makes it the same
in principle and formally very close to Carnap’s theory of semantic information,
according to which a measure of the semantic information at a source is a sta-
tistical function of the set of states that do not obtain: the configurations which
don’t obtain. In the Bar-Hillel Carnap model, of course, there is no stipulation
of I-obtaining possible universes as actual corresponding to each possible state
of a source (which source does not of course have to be a quantum system.)
My approach is to defeasibly reject the Everettian approach in accordance
with the tenets of the proposed scientific metaphysics - including causal clo-
sure - as involving a-priori analytic imputation. Quantum theory is one of the
few scientific theories - perhaps the only one - in which such large a-priori (al-
beit mathematical) posits are countenanced (string theory is another example.)
Rickles and other theorists have made the same observation in regards to sym-
metry and gauge theories (Rickles, 2008c; Healey, 2007.) Just as those theories
that can be reduced are thought to contain variables that do not represent what
I have called I-obtaining entities or phenomena, I suggest that the possible
system states of many worlds theories represent (negatively or as alternatively
encoded representations, or part of a total alternative negative representation)
only the actual system structure - and not that of any real material alternative.
There is no empirical verifiable evidence for the latter, and every suggestion that
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it is associated with subjective modelling practices. The problem is not that the
many worlds interpretation of QM involves any requirement for Platonism or
even Aristotelian immanent realism about structure or information: reduction-
ist physicalism can still be the ontological naturalistic basis of all worlds. The
problem is that the ontology of the statistical mechanical representing model
(a collection of encoded representations) which has been encoded as a represen-
tation of the I quantum sources (structured stochastic quantum systems) has
descended back into the I-ontology inflating it against Ockham’s Razor. (I have
called this formalism driven ontological descent.) The representation exists in
the I world as a structured CICS based representation only.
I reject the definition of information content as being only a measure and
not necessary for determining the information of a system and its structures.
The latter requires CICS information only according to my approach - which I
charge is closer to physics than the many world measure and characterisation
of quantum information. One way to put this is that one can posit any number
of possible non-obtaining configurations for any physical system as part of the
representing formalism, and that one can even regard such as real on a con-
structivist basis: yet the actual structure and configuration do not existentially
depend upon these other possibilities, and nor does its information. Another
salient point is that, from a pragmatic and scientific realist perspective, if one
was asked to give the information in a system and could chose between pro-
viding a representation of the actual system state or else all of the possible
but unobtaining states, one should chose the former in order to best represent
scientific practice and Ockham’s Razor on a contingent basis.
3.5 Establishing OSIR and FOSIR - Some prin-
ciples
In the above section I rejected both field ontologies for QFT that have significant
a-priori conceptual elements and that introduce additional furniture to the on-
tology - usually in the form of properties as trope bundles and different kinds of
logical-cum-ontological bindings between properties and bundles (among other
things.) I moved to identify such ontic moves as tantamount to - or at least
tending towards - formalism driven ontic descent.
The positive position I want to promote involves regarding that, contin-
gently, acquisition and encoding of data from natural systems into representa-
tions in scientific research involves the physical extraction of information that
is or reduces to physical configurations of physical structures: the physical in-
formation in/of the physical structures of the material world. There may be
relations involved in encoding the information into representations, and there
may be relations in the objective spatiotemporal causal structures themselves,
but the structures are continuous in temporal and spatial dimensions as far as
science can determine. Any entities identified for the purposes of modelling and
representation are also heterogeneous structures. According to my naturalis-
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tic physicalist I-existence criteria and conception, these structures all reduce
to physical causal spatiotemporal structures (CICS) and existentially depend
upon and are identical to selections from heterogeneous quantum fields and or
the vacuum, or else reduce to such structures. A general statement of the idea
is that no representation of an I-obtaining natural structure can exist without
the causally induced configuration of other natural structure(s), amounting to
the encoding of information from the former in the latter.
Quantitative communication and transmission theories generally deal with
physical information generation, encoding, transmission, decoding, reception,
and processing. Quantitative algorithmic theories of information generally present
measures of information in terms of numbers of structural units or the length of
formal descriptions and/or atomic string objects. According to FOSIR, causally
induced configurations of spatiotemporal causal structure (CICS) is both a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of information. In this chapter
I moved from a general statement of this to a specific, defeasible, contingent
scientific-metaphysical statement of it, which I can now summarise thus:
IS1: Information is (reduces to and is identical to) the causally in-
duced configuration/arrangement of any I-obtaining physical struc-
ture, the configuration or arrangement of which has been caused
or causally induced (via causal pathways) by some other causal spa-
tiotemporal I structure(s), or to structure(s) that reduce, or at mini-
mum supervene upon, to such structure(s) (CICS information here-
after.)
IS2: I structure(s) reduce(s), on a defeasible basis, to nonuniform
heterogeneous regions of the I-obtaining quantum field.
(* The conception of supervenience that I endorse is epistemic, meaning that
in-principle the supervenience base is a reductive base, but that in practice it
is epistemically unavailable or inaccessible. The sources of the base are infor-
mational according to the definition herein, but out of causal or configurative
reach in terms of encoding of representations thereof.)
IS1 is essentially a statement of OSIR. IS2 is a statement of FOSIR, and
embodies the identity between I-obtaining physical structure and nonuniform
regions of the heterogeneous quantum field, defeasibly.
3.6 Conclusion
Nature is the totality of dynamic causally configured structured information
sources that can in relevant cases be taken to be the objects that are retained
in non-eliminative ontic structural realism.
In this chapter I have developed ontic structural informational realism (OSIR),
which is ontic structural realism as the basis for realism abut information via
the CICS conception, along the lines of field-ontic structural realism (FOSIR.)
I sought to stay close to my scientific metaphysical imperatives and premises
in identifying the heterogeneous quantum field (the totality or bounded regions
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of heterogeneous quantum field instances and the vacuum) as the basis for the
structure of ontic structural realism. This was the establishment of the identity
thesis or argument.
I have argued that scientific realism about structure in nature should regard
it as reducing to heterogeneous continuous fields, and that relations do not have
to be - and should not be - considered to be somehow prior to structure in this
context. With this approach the structural realist ontology finds support for
scientific realist acceptance in classical and quantum field theories. There is no
need to demand of physics and physicists that the ontic basis for structure is
based upon something that they identify and use broadly in theorising: relations.
Instead we can just agree with (many) physicists that fields are real and other
entities and relations are embedded in them in re, are quantised from them, and
exist as part of the total structure in which they inhere and which stands as
either their existential basis.
I then addressed the difficult issue of the nature of causation and causality,
arguing that the best deserver for providing a realist basis for the first ‘C’
in CICS can prospectively be realised at bottom in physical natural systems
(including all of those underlying brain-mind processes and cognition) can be
identified as transmissable fluctuations in the quantum field per the chosen field
ontology.
I then attempted to deal with some common alternatives to ontologies for
QFT and information, rejecting trope bundle ontologies as ontologically and
metametaphysically misguided and inappropriately a-priorist, and as being con-
ducive to inflation of the ontology and formalism driven ontological descent. At
this stage the reader should find as (at least somewhat) original the move to
eliminate relations as ontologically prior to structure (with a perhaps surpris-
ing open question about whether we can be eliminativist about them), and the
ontology-reducing consequences (in keeping with Ockham’s razor) of the pro-
posed identity thesis about ontic structure and its substance as existing in re
the quantum field and vacuum.
In the next chapter I will merge this QFT field ontology based conception
of information realising structure with a source-centric (I-obtaining stochas-
tic CICS system centric) scientific metaphysics of information that emphasises
that the world is the totality of information sources, where information sources
are defined according to FOSIR as causally induced configurations of bounded
regions of the combined heterogeneous quantum field and vacuum.
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Chapter 4
The World is the Totality of
Heterogeneous Information
Sources
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I introduced my positive arguments for the (contin-
gently defeasible) ontic structure to in re quantum field structure identity the-
sis/argument and the corresponding field ontology as informational field on-
tology (FOSIR.) In this chapter I will proceed to further associate the idea of
a source ontology with FOSIR. I will step back a little (but not completely)
from the emphasis on QFT and field ontology, and focus more upon a scientific
metaphysical conception of information sources.
In this Chapter I’ll argue by reference to scientific theories and their use of
information concepts that are contingent and not stipulative, that the world is
the sum of all stochastic information sources, where an information source is
conceived of contingently and defeasibly as a dynamic causally induced configu-
ration of bounded region of heterogeneous quantum fields. In following sections
I will attempt to marry this source based conception of ontology with NOSR
based upon classical and quantum field theory. Initially, however, I want to
introduce broader metaphysical terms. I will be endeavouring to do scientific
metaphysics in both steps, but initially I will be relying upon the best applied
mathematical and scientific theories of information - or at least the best avail-
able applied mathematical and scientific theories that posit information and
information measures - but without reference to field theories.
I’ll close the chapter by discussing the deployment of contingent informa-
tion concepts as indispensable in black hole physics, and then revise David
Armstrong’s analytic eliatic principle as a contingent principle: the eliatic in-
formation principle (IE. See §4.4 p158.)
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4.2 Natural Systems are Information Sources
Ladyman and Ross see the material world as reducing to the statistical because
of the enormous prevalence of probabilistic modelling and representation in
quantum mechanics and information theory. However, this brings with it the
problems of the nature of possibilities, of probabilities, and of mathematical
abstracta (and this is true of QFT also.) If one is interested in a structural
ontology and scientific metaphysics, then how these are related to information
in ontic terms is something that I suggest should be addressed first. Statistics
is not the only mathematised basis for reality that has been suggested: I will
discuss Wheeler’s “It From Bit” thesis, Tegmarks’ mathematical universe, Zuse-
Fredkin digital ontology, and pancomputationalism at §7.4.2 p265. I concur with
a number of physcists (and claim as a simultaneous or else prior posit of my own)
that the basis of the world that is the object of scientific research is configured
information sources. Ladyman and Ross position that the world is the totality
of non-redundant statistics is very close to this posit, since the non-redundant
statistics they assert I-exist do so because they are realised by or inhere in
stochastic processes. Shannon may have produced statistical models and an
abstract conception of a source - but it has never followed that he thought
that real sources and real information are abstracta. I doubt physicists are any
different based upon the evidence of their practices and assertions about what
it is that they are doing.
Natural systems are information sources. According to the definition pro-
vided by Claude E. Shannon, an information source is any stochastic physical
process: anything that can exhibit either discrete or continuous changing states
over time (Shannon, 1998, 1-5, 7.) Shannon (and following him, philosopher
Fred Dretske) model such sources statistically, and base their conception of in-
formation largely upon statistical measures of such physical processes. However,
statistical modelling of such entities in reference to information is optional, and
not necessary – nor even appropriate - for a foundational conception of infor-
mation. More fundamentally in metaphysical and physical terms, a source is
any entity (including any natural system) which has spatiotemporal structure
or structure that can change over time, and which can causally interact with
other physical structures in the environment (Barbour, 2015, 5-6.) This is the
basic reductive conception of an information source according to CICS.
Some philosophers, notably Jaegwon Kim, have suggested that comprehen-
sive descriptions of physical systems are in principle available qua ontological
reduction (Kim, 1999, 129-30.) This is the assumption that a continuous natural
system is ideally comprehensively reducible in terms of its physical structure to
constituent information bearing subsystems, mechanisms, processes and other
constituents and microconstituents. Sandra Mitchell argues that Kim’s thesis
against irreducibility and emergence relies upon the use of a “privileged level
of description in which all levels of complex structure and behaviour can be
restated and thus reduced.” (Mitchell, 2009.)
It is not clear whether Kim thinks that objective descriptions exist in the
world prior to the measurement and observation of physical systems, or if the
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assertion that there are universal descriptions is just a statement about all
systems being ideally contingently describable. If the former is the case, then
Mitchell’s complaint is well founded, since such information-bearing descriptions
would have to exist somehow as real abstract entities prior to being encoded
as such from the information in the physical system(s.) As an a-posteriori in
re realism that is not ascriptivist – does not see descriptions as information
but as encodings of information – CICS precludes this ontological a-prioricity
of descriptions.
The scientific metaphysics of information that I am presenting calls into
question whether any kind of description or formal representation - lexical and
constructed or else somehow platonic - can ever be complete, even if it the non-
platonic option involves simulations and diagrams, with programmatic/algorithmic
elements, and not just linguistically expressed or logically regimented descrip-
tions. I suggest that a truly comprehensive representation of a continuous sys-
tem is practically impossible if comprehensive means all of the information in the
system where information is regarded as realised by the spatiotemporal struc-
ture of the system (Gillies, 2010 1-2, 7-9, 17.) This still holds if physics does in
fact (defeasibly) bottom out at the quantum field and its vacuum state(s.)
4.2.1 Configurations and Sources
According to Julian Barbour, a configuration – which can in many cases be
represented mathematically as a point value in a mathematical configuration
space associated with the physical system - is a valid information source. It
is essentially “any structured thing”, and information is the distribution or ar-
rangement of physical parameters and attributes such as “colours and shapes”
that can be observed in such structures (Barbour, 2015, 4.) Barbour’s concep-
tion of configuration is very specific to the idea of time capsules as expounded
in his 1999 The End of Time. It very closely resembles Dretske’s indicator se-
mantics conception of nested information in the configuration of the rings of a
tree (Dretske, 1981; Dretske, 1999, 108,121.), and this concept is essentially that
put forward by Dennis Stampe and Fred Dretske in their attempts to provide
a causal-indicative theory of semantics and an naturalised informational episte-
mology respectively (Stampe, 1977, 48-51; Stampe, 1986, 128-32; Dretske, 1981;
Dretske, 1988a; Dretske, 1995; ) This conception of semantic content via signal
as an indication of past states of systems - causally transmitted - has origins
also in H.P. Grice’s conception of natural meaning (smokes indicates/means fire)
and Saul Kripke’s concept of a causal chain of reference (Grice, 1957.) Leibniz
provides for Barbour his “central idea” of a configuration as an a-temporal in-
stant : a ‘snapshot’ of the total material arrangement and state of the universe
(Barbour, 1994, 16.) It is associated with “the general notion of an instant ,
which is identified with a possible configuration of the universe” (Barbour, 1994,
2854.) The configuration – the structural arrangement of the instant – carries
semantic information from the conditions and nomic constraints that produced
it:
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I claim that the configuration carries intrinsic semantic informa-
tion in the sense that different intelligent beings can in principle de-
duce the law or process that explains the observed structure . . . and
intrinsic semantic information, which distinguishes a random mes-
sage, or configuration, from one that carries meaning and to some
extent explains its very genesis (Barbour, 4,5,9.)
For Barbour, the universe is not the only configured time capsule. Other
examples are complex physical systems – subsystems in the universe - like human
brains and the earth itself (Barbour, 1994, 33.)
Barbour’s conception of intrinsic semantic information coheres with Dretske’s
adaptation of H. P. Grice’s natural meaning for the intentionality of information
content (Dretske, 1981.) Dretske defines the intentionality or intentional content
of the information content of a specific signal transmitted from a transmitter
physically connected to an information source (using Shannon’s conception of a
source as a stochastic physical process) as being the physical source that caused
the signal. This is the physical entity or system that is causally linked to the
signal. Say there were two sources – A and B - which were perfectly internally
identical in terms of their spatiotemporal configuration, and each causes a sep-
arate signal – C and D respectively - that were likewise perfectly isomorphic
in terms of spatiotemporal configuration. The intentionality of the information
content of the spatiotemporal structure of signal C can only be the source that
actually caused it: source A (Dretske, 1981, 75-76.) Grice’s natural meaning is
often illustrated with the example of smoke and fire: smoke means fire because
fire causes smoke according to nomic natural constraints and conditions. There-
fore, smoke carries an indication in its configuration of the nature and structure
– the configuration - of its cause.
The semantic content of information realised by spatiotemporal configura-
tions is very similar in its realisation to the meaning of what C.S. Peirce called
a reagent sign (Peirce, 1895-7, 17.) Peirce used the example of a weather cock
such that the physical position of the weather cock with respect to its possible
positions gave an indication of – and thus information about – the nature and
properties of the causal physical structures causally acting upon it. The seman-
tic content of some information according to CICS is what it indicates about
the dynamic spatiotemporal structures that realised it and that influence or
configure it. No conception of reduction in subjective or objective uncertainty
or enumeration of non-obtaining or counterfactual possibilities is required.
In the molecular biosciences, the idea of casually induced spatiotemporal
configurations of molecules in protein folding is regarded as constituting part
of the information of the system in at least two ways. Firstly there is the
functional-causal (teleosemantic/infotel semantic) information of the molecule
structure as transmitted from causally upstream RNA and DNA - very much a
CICS-source compatible conception:
Melkikh (2013) discussed the issue of complexity with regard to
biologically important molecules. If we consider replication as a cat-
alytic chemical reaction, in which the complexity of biomolecules
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plays a critical role, this process can be divided into two stages:
folding the molecules into the native configurations and recogniz-
ing the molecules when making copies. Most biologically important
molecules (primarily proteins and RNA) have only a small num-
ber (typically one) of configurations in which these entities function.
What, for example, will a copy of an RNA molecule look like? Gen-
erally speaking, this molecule can fold into a variety of potential
spatial configurations. If these configurations are different from the
original configuration of the RNA, they are no longer copies; RNA in
another configuration represents another material with completely
different characteristics . . . A large number of reactions between two
interacting molecules are possible. Many chemical reactions (includ-
ing those associated with the transfer of information) involve a “key
and lock”. . . mechanism, under which the shape of one molecule must
precisely correspond to the form of another to permit enzymatic re-
actions... Currently, these mechanisms are considered as modular
blocks when existing genetic units are used again for the new en-
coding species; however, this algorithm implicitly assumes that the
genetic system contains a priori information about optimal combi-
nations of nucleotides. This information should be mathematically
included in evolutionary theory via partial-information games. The
storage of such large amounts of additional information might be
explained using quantum mechanics. In principle, qubits store an
exponentially large amount of information, although only for pure
quantum states, and the question arises of how to avoid decoherence
in this system. (Melkikh, 2014, 34. See also Sarkar, 2005, locations
182-186.)
Then, after transcription and translation from DNA via RNA and ribo-
somes, there is the set of possible functional configurations of protein molecules
(causally induced with the assistance of chaperone molecules and more ribo-
somes.) There are many possible denatured states of a protein (non-functional
disordered states) and a much smaller number of functional native states. Then
there is the abstractive, encoded representing configuration of the phase space
that is used to represent and map/track the evolution of the protein folding
process and system (itself a dynamical source). Then there’s the abstractive
encoded representation of the energy landscape that is used to model the rela-
tionship between the energy of each conformational configuration of a molecule
and its free energy (or the energy required to get it to a fully folded state) in
protein folding (Wolynes, 2008; Onuchic and Wolynes, 2004, 70-3; Fang, 2015;
Sasai and Itoh, 2009, 2-3; Dill et al., 2007, 344; Dill et al., 2008a, 292, 296; Biro,
2013; WEISS et al., 2000; O Ldziej et al., 2012.)
Melkikh’s work is an excellent example of scientists doing contingent meta-
physics of information using a conception very much like CICS hybridised with
classical information theoretic notions and Sarkar-style conformational-structural
information components (Sarkar, 2005; Melkikh, 2014, 4.2.1, 42.) It includes
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defeasible speculative considerations based upon actual scientific practice with,
and corresponding findings about, protein folding dynamics. I suggest that pro-
tein folding studies in molecular bioscience (see especially the references cited
in the previous paragraph) provide strong support for my indispensability ar-
gument (Intro. §1 p16 and Intro. §3 p28) based upon references to information,
structure, and configuration of structure in the special sciences.
4.3 Stochastic Sources Have Ontic Priority Be-
fore Statistics
Like Ladyman and Ross, I am seeking an NOSR that accommodates scien-
tific realism on a structural realist basis, such that realism about I-obtaining
structure is preserved along with tolerance for defeasibility about the content
or essential nature of the structure(s) assumed to be the target and subject of
representation in empirical and formal scientific theories:
Metaphysical commitment that we think structural realism ought
to entail . . . is that there are mind independent modal relations be-
tween phenomena (both possible and actual), but these relations are
not supervenient on the properties of unobservable objects and the
external relations between them, rather this structure is ontologi-
cally basic. This is enough to make structural realism distinct from
standard realism but also from constructive empiricism. From this
metaphysical thesis there follow plenty of realist methodological and
epistemic implications but, we hope, no unsustainable beliefs in the
specific ontologies that are employed to help us grasp the structure
of the world according to particular theories. (French and Ladyman,
2003b, 42.)
I am rejecting modal realisms about structure as part of the analysis in
OSR, and in so doing forestalling moving from the classical model of informa-
tion theory with its alphabet of possible source states, via statistical mechanics
in QM with its sets of representations, to an uncalled for realism about the possi-
ble states and representations that contravenes POP and constitutes formalism
driven ontological descent. Alleged innate modalities of the kind endorsed by
French and of the related but different kinds endorsed by Deutsch and Everett
don’t make into FOSIR. The CICS of FOSIR is not modal (although since in-
formation sources are stochastic processes - it is statistical in the sense of being
stochastic.) Models representing it may be, but it does not follow that we must
allow it to descend from the representations of the model into the I-ontology.
My further revision is the elimination of relations as the necessary foundation
of structure. Structure as a ontic basic of which relations are a feature and not
the basis. This kind of revision is not foreign to discussions of OSR. For example
Floridi - in developing his object retaining ISR - establishes that some relata
are not prior to some relations, and regards relations themselves as structures:
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Relations (structures) require relata (structured/able objects),
which therefore cannot be further identified as relations (structures)
without some vicious circularity or infinite regress. Yet this is pre-
cisely what OSR appears to be forced to argue (Floridi, 2011c, 353)
According to my approach, the defeasible and contingent ontological basis
of structure is just I-obtaining fields. In fact, structure is intrinsic to fields at
bottom as physical patterns or within the fields, and all other non Ii structure
reduces to and derives from such. Relations are picked out of such fields on the
basis of mathematical encoding of features from I-structure (see also Rickles,
2008b.) Relations are instrinsic to structure according to this approach, but
structure does not existentially depend upon relations.
Ladyman and Ross have gone on to further develop a probabilistic NOSR
according to which statistical and/or statistically inferred structure is at the
ground floor of the ontology:
We build our rhetorical bridge by beginning with a famous philo-
sophical slogan of Wittgenstein’s that many scientists will know. . . ‘The
world is the totality of facts, not of things.’ . . . We here adopt the
form of address . . . to state our metaphysical thesis: the world is the
totality of non-redundant statistics (not of things.) (Ladyman and
Ross, 2013, 146-7.)
According to their approach a scientific metaphysics points to statistics as
the effective bottom of the ontology. I do not even agree with this being the best
choice defeasibly, let alone that it is entailed somehow by IBE or induction. It
is in fact non-contingently metaphysically loaded (albeit it very subtly) by dint
of being an example of formalism driven ontological descent - and that’s with
the understanding that Ladyman and Rosss conception of probabilities is phys-
icalist and that they I-obtain, and that there is nothing inherently problematic
about that finding according to their scientific metaphysical approach. FOSIR
also allows and in fact requires it. However - returning to the metaphysics of
information - I identify what I suggest is a more satisfying ontology: the world is
not the totality of non-redundant statistics, but the total set of both stochastic
(Gray, 2011b) CICS information sources (or physical dynamical systems.)
My conception of ontic structural realism is best described as non eliminative
physicalist ontic structural informational realism (Ontic structural informational
realism.) Objects are retained as structured entities and these are information
sources, which are arbitrarily bounded field regions or regions of the quantum
field. They include stochastic and non-stochastic processes and dynamical sys-
tems. This component of the ontology is influenced by the applied scientific
and applied mathematical quantitative and algorithmic theories of information
of R.V.L Hartley, Claude E. Shannon, Andre Kolmogorov, and Alan Turing
(Zurek, 1990a, 2-4; Ehrenfeucht et al., 2012, .) Moreover, quantum information
scientists and physicists regard information as something that is only realised
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by physical structure (Landauer, 1999, 63-7; Floridi, 2003) 1.
My own ontic structural informational realism Ontic structural informational
realism (to be distinguished from Floridi’s ISR) has a different ontological basis
to that of French, and to that of Ladyman and Ross:
Ontic structural informational realism.1: The world (the
set of real things/stuff) is the set of all stochastic CICS information
sources.
Ladyman and Ross have - despite best intentions - produced an (albeit
physicalist-realist) instance of mathematical collapse. This is not because their
claim that statistics I-obtains in stochastic systems is vacuous. Especially in the
case of frequentist data sets and in all dynamic physical systems. It’s instead
because they decide to establish stochasticity - presumably undefeasibly - as the
in-principle stopping point for scientific metaphysics. This seems to contravene
their own stated goals.
Technically - embracing the distinction between mathematical and statistical
as Ladyman and Ross recommend - their posited ontology involves not math-
ematical collapse so much as statistical collapse in that the arbitrary stopping
point for ontology has become stochasticity (aptness for statistical modelling,
and exhibiting statistically analysable patterns) and is perhaps even computa-
tional. It very much appears to be physico-statistical or physico-computational,
but there does not seem to be any scientifically motivated reason for not offering
an explanation of this (a reference to frequentism and/or physical entropy for ex-
ample) beyond the obervation that quantum systems are apt to be statistically
modelled because of their stochastic nature.
If it is the stochastic nature itself that is being referred to as the non-
redundant statistics, then it would seem redundant to mention statistics at
all, and it would seem that I-stochastiticy is all that is being picked out. This
is much closer to my view than the idea that nonredundant statistics is the
content of structure. However, given debates in QM about how and in what
way quantum systems exist probabilistically - what the ontological import and
entailment is - it is not clear that stopping at stochasticity can be any more
than a defeasible approach, or even consistent.
Ladyman and Ross’s justification is also what is supposed to avoid French’s
“mathematical collapse”. Statistics is distinguishable from mathematics as be-
ing part of the I-obtaining world and its I-ontology:
This is indeed the impasse that some of our critics (e.g. Dorr,
201 0) allege us to be stuck in. Structural realism, they say, in
principle lacks resources for being able to distinguish pure formal
structure from empirical reality, and turns into Pythagorean ideal-
ism. Mysticism is clearly not what most naturalists would regard as
a happy final refuge. However, there is a more plausible alternative
1Also (Barbour, 2015, 1, 3-4); (Di Vincenzo, D. P., & Loss, D., 1998); (Bennett & Landauer,
1991, 1985, 48, 51.);
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that doesn’t lead in this direction. The fundamental empirical struc-
ture of the world is not (p.148) mathematical but statistical. And
there is no such thing as purely formal statistics. The ‘principles’ of
statistics are simply whatever dynamics emerge from our collective
exploration of, and discovery of patterns in, data. (Ladyman and
Ross, 2013, 147-8.)
It’s pretty clear that - even putting subjectivist and Bayesian interpreta-
tions aside - the principles of statistics come from other places also. I agree
that nature is intrinsically stochastic in the sense that the changes in states of
dynamical processes can be treated statistically and are thus stochastic. I also
agree that stochasticity is not dependent upon mathematics - not mathematical
abstracta anyway. However, there is arguably a distinction to be had between
what is stochastic and the statistical, or statistics. The former is I-obtaining
according to Ladyman and Ross, the latter is probably computation and mind
dependent, unless the implication is that the I-system is apt for modelling by
formal statistical constructs. Ladyman and Ross, however, regard the origin
of these constructs from a constructivist perspective. Put otherwise they are
encoded representations of patterns in I-frequency data. Otherwise the mathe-
matical structure has descended into the I-ontology illicitly.
The structural realism Ladyman and Ross develop is scientific realist, but
in a different way completely to that endorsed by most reductionist physical-
ist scientific realists, which approach fits with the rejection of a certain kind
of reductionism. The problem seems to arise, however, that they regard the
physical I-ontology as real on the one hand, but on the other hand as not just
only defeasibly accessible but apparently effectively eliminable:
However, as d’Espagnat (2006) points out, nobody has proved a
version of Bell’s theorem using only locality and not some form of
realism, or counterfactual definiteness about unperformed measure-
ment results. D’Espagnat himself is sympathetic to a Bohrian or
neo-Kantian version of structural realism. He argues that quantum
physics undermines not metaphysical realism, but any confidence
that we are able to grasp the ultimate ‘ground of things’ (see espe-
cially 2006, Chapter 1 9); we would strengthen this by denying that
there is a convincing basis for believing there is any such ground.
(Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 136.)
Their later assertions seems to revise this, since irreducible stochasticity and
the totality of nonredundant statistics seem to necessarily be what they propose
as the I-obtaining ground of nature. However, Ladyman and Ross are claiming
that a reductive bottom of the ontology is not as significant as supervening
Dennettian real patterns, and that these are identified by statistical constructs,
with which high degrees of predictive success are associated in such disciplines
as QFT. Moreover:
However, the Everett interpretation, while not revisionary physics,
is (naturalistic) metaphysics, in that it unifies theories indispensi-
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ble for predictive success, but contributes no novel predictions it-
self. Our point is only that an alternative unifying metaphysics is
available. This involves denying that there is any real causal pro-
cess corresponding to wave function collapse, and hypothesizing that
the statistics directly identify the relevant real pattern––that is to
say, a basis for prediction that supports all relevant counterfactu-
als and is non-redundant in the specific sense that no ‘deeper’ pat-
tern––Everettian or otherwise––supplants it. (Ladyman and Ross,
2013, 137-8.)
The implication is that the physical I-ontology does not exist and only sta-
tistical structure is to be had: there is no reductionist bottom, except stochas-
ticity, with no apparent need to countenance the I-existence of what it is that
is stochastic. This latter possibility does not fit with Ladyman and Ross’s other
statements of realism about I-physical structure.
However, Ladyman and Ross clarify that they are scientific realists about I-
ontology and elements of the formal theoretic representation thereof, as secured
by statistical modelling, but regard that the ontological details are out of reach
and that all that is in reach is statistically adduced patterns:
In the framework of dichotomous opposition between standard
realism and standard instrumentalism, wave functions and utility
functions––along with countless multitudes of similar devices used
across the sciences––are liable to be regarded as ‘pure formalism’.
But this fails to do justice to the ways in which they are embedded
in theoretical and experimental contexts that are rich in ontologi-
cally robust structure. Even in the most abstract reaches of formal
science, where the only objects of manipulation are representations
of functions or elements of topology or high-dimensional sets, there
is always ontological commitment to the data and their statistical
structures. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 139.)
So although the world is the totality of non-redundant statistics: those statis-
tics are realised by I-structures. This seems to be very much an explanatory
reduction with ontic commitments (i.e. An ontic-content reduction.) I agree
with Ladyman and Ross in avoiding admitting modality into the ontology in
the manner that either French or Deutsch do. However I also think that their
ontology is confused in the sense that they propose a conception of a ground
of nonredundant statistics that is non-reductive (irreducible stochasticity) yet
involves admission of ontological commitment to data and statistical structures
that are taken to be innate to the I-existing system as a kind of content. I
simply bite the bullet on the ontic content being supplied (defeasibly - but
accordingly fairly and increasingly reliably) by the quantum field and random
vacuum, and dynamical regions thereof regarded as information sources. As La-
dyman and Ross say, “the world is stochastically structured”, but it is not clear
that pushing statistics down into the I-existing ontology - even as dispositions
or natural frequencies (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 145) is not a kind of formalism
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driven ontological descent that makes statistics the bottom of the ontology when
perhaps stochasticity should instead be regarded as an ineliminable feature of
all natural I-obtaining information sources. Shannon’s information sources are
literally physical stochastic processes, but they’re stochastic processes, not pro-
cessural stochastics: the stochasticity is a (probably ineliminable) feature of the
structure. It’s concrete physical information sources realised defeasibly as het-
erogeneous structures reducing (defeasibly) to the heterogeneous quantum field
that constitute the world in its totality. Not just bare structure somehow, and
not just statistics in terms of irreducible stochasticity, but information sources.
4.3.1 Quantum Field Theory and Bounded Field Regions
as Information Sources
According to this approach bounded regions of heterogeneous nonuniformity in
the universal quantum field. The main point of difference with existing physi-
calist field ontologies is that I question the nature of relations and see them as
existentially dependent upon nonuniformities in the microsphysical structure of
the quantum field, rather than the basis of that structure.
A standing debate among ontic structural realists has been the relationship
between relations and objects as relata (Esfeld, 2004, 602; Chakravartty, 2004,
152; Cao, 2003c, 3; Rickles, 2008b, 20.) Mauro Dorato has observed of relations
in OSR that “I daresay that no ontic structural realist should be falling into the
trap of accepting the view that “relations can exist without relata”” (Rickles,
2008b, 21.) I agree, but I have eliminated relations as an ontological ground for
structure, and instead regard relations as partial information that can be picked
out in an I structure:
A. Objects/entities as relata can and have been regarded as reducing to (mi-
cro)structure(s), and
B. Accordingly, (micro)physical structure(s) reduce(s) to other (micro)physical
structure(s), and
C. Instead of assuming that B. means that A. must be incorrect somehow, we
should instead accept that
D. Not only do (micro)physical (micro)structures not reduce to relata, but ad-
ditionally
E. (Micro)physical (Micro)structures do not reduce to relations, but physical
relations are simply features of physical structures
F. Structures in microphysical systems reduce to classical fields and then quan-
tum field regions.
Otherwise, I suggest, we are inviting mathematical collapse and ontological
descent from the start by making features of structure picked out for formal and
epistemic reasons (in line with instrumentalism) the ontic necessary condition
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and ground for the I structure being modelled in the first place. I suggest that
if one wants to be a scientific realist, then that is not the way to go about it. So
the overall strategy is to eliminate objects and relations both from the ontology
as existential grounds or the reductive basis for physical I-obtaining structure
(see my comments about something being wrong with the existing picture: §3.3
p101.) My adjunct ontological move is to assume that there are three kinds of
relations in the broad ontology of the empirical theory:
1. Real physical relations that exist in microphysical structures, not as the
existential basis of those structures, but only as incidental and intrinsic to
them
2. Applied mathematical relations that encode part of the information from
such structures in mathematical structures.
3. Pure mathematical relations that can map to applied mathematical relations
and do not have to have any correlate in the physical world
The primary distinction between (2) and (3) is that (2) is contingent and
a-posteriori, whereas (3) is arguably only a-priori (although that is open to
debate on mathematical intuitionist grounds, and according to the tenets of The
Canberra plan which regards theories, models, and hypotheses as contingently
informed.) There is no a-priori or a-posteriori knock down argument that (3) are
the ontological basis of (1) and (2) or prior to (1.) In fact (1) seem to be possible
without any reference to (3.) That is, in keeping with the theme of avoiding the
problems of the ambiguity that arises from dual definitions of phenomena and
entities in empirical theories, which I discussed in previous sections, I separate
out the ontology of the theory and its mathematical expression from the I
ontology. This move is not unusual (French, 2014; Rickles et al., 2006; Cao,
2003c.) The three together are what I have called the broad ontology of the
empirical theory.
(1) simply means that neither relata regarded as objects nor relations are
the existential basis of structure, but that structure is the ontological primitive
and entities/relata are in fact arbitrarily bounded substructures and relations
between them are incidental to picking such structures out - albeit based upon
their remarkable natural kind features. Functional or physically causally non-
inert relations reduce to structure or the configuration thereof and so called
intrinsic properties reduce to the configuration and constitution of the structure.
Cao provides a good summary statement of the standard non-eliminative
ontic structural realism idea that relata emerge because of relations that form
the basis of structure:
It was further argued by some structuralists that in terms of
human access no intrinsic properties of an entity can be shown to
exist at the fundamental level. ...physical properties can only be
identified through the relations they are involved in; but identity of
relations does not imply identity of intrinsic properties. So we can
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never know the properties of physical entities in so far as they are
intrinsic. Here we are getting closer to a pure relation ontology, in a
sense that the relata exist but they are constituted by the relational
structure in which they are embedded, which in turn provides a
ground for structuralism. (Cao, 2010, 210)
I am instead rejecting a pure relation non-eliminative ontic structural realism
ontology, with the intuition that hard science, and specifically QFT, defeasibly
point to a different ontological reality: relations are selections of informational
structure from a total structure. The structure is ontologically prior in the
strong sense that if you ignore any ‘picked out’ relations the structure still
exists, and if relations are instrinsically part of the total continuous structure
and its information (see my earlier multiple/partial wireframe argument §2.3
p62) then they are just that - only part of it.
This is a very significant difference in my approach to ontology with scien-
tific metaphysics. Causal intrinsic properties reduce to and existentially depend
upon the composition (heterogeneity) and configuration (nonuniformity) of the
structures which existentially depends upon and reduces to the nature and con-
figuration of I fields. It is the causally induced configuration which constitutes
the information. Contrary to the common approach to abstract metaphysics
and modelling - I am brute asserting the following identity: bounded (includ-
ing distributed complex) regions of I-obtaining fields are identical to structures
I-obtaining in the system. Any non I-obtaining structures in the formal repre-
senting empirical theory - which I take to be constructed on an intuitionist basis
and an a-posteriori construct of the formal representing theory - exist only as
an encoding of the information of the I structures 2.
Another way of putting this is to say that intrinsic relations are abstract fea-
tures of - by way of being I-obtaining information selected from - substructure(s)
of non-uniform structure(s) that are identical to nonuniformly configured het-
erogeneously comprised I-obtaining fields. Relations in the theory that are not
I-obtaining in the system being modelled still reduce to I-obtaining structures,
but there are complexes of many different sources and encodings therefrom:
brain based information processing and encoded formal lexical descriptions, for
example. Configuration of trajectories in phase spaces representing the evo-
lution of dynamical physical systems are also intrinsically informational, but
they encode information from the physical systems they represent. Redun-
dant or overdetermining extended phase spaces in quantum physics may still
be regarded thus as encodings, but the encoding processes are arguably more
complex.
The relations in (2) could be taken to be the existential basis of math-
ematical structures which they apparently specify, define, or participate in -
although I do not see why this should be a necessary condition for the existence
of mathematical structures. Even if it is, I reject that existential reduction
2I agree with Rickles on this point, except for his subscription to modal many worlds
interpretation of QM which I take to invite formalism driven ontological descent Rickles,
2008b, 4
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to and dependence upon relations is a necessary condition for the existence of
(micro)physical structures.
That is - relations in formal theory structures are largely mathematical pro-
jections onto physical structures (including the physical relations in them) that
help scientists pick out relevant features of such structures in order to analyse
and model them. Pure mathematicians and theoretical physicists can happily
do mathematical work with mathematical relations as a way of modeling ab-
stract structures. Applied mathematicians and physicists can do this too, but I
suggest that it does not follow that the structures of the physical world that are
modelled using relations actually reduce to relations.
Another way of saying this is to subscribe to the defeasible structure-field
bite-the-bullet identity thesis that I have proposed: that structures are just are
and/or reduce to nonuniform physical fields - or in the case of the microphysical-
ist reductive approach nonuniform/nonuniform regions of the universal quantum
field. This seems like pedantry from a pragmatist perspective. However, I have
already demonstrated why physicalism about information is not token physi-
calism, and not nominalism. When it comes to information we are beholden
to different ontological standards with respect to reduction and explanation be-
cause a metaphysics of information is self-reflexive and metametaphysical: we
cannot use notional terms or abstractive handwaving, nor supervenience, to
explain information in terms of information (as we might explain explanation,
knowledge, or meaning in terms of information.)
The reductionist physicalist approach to the nature of information means
that intrinsically representational/semantic CICS information reduces to micro-
physical structures in all cases. Our starting point for a non circular explanation
of the nature of information is something like that given by Esfeld’s statement
of physicalism as reducing conceptually and theoretically to microphysicalism:
Ontologically speaking, we assume that macroscopic systems are
composed of microphysical ones. It therefore makes sense to char-
acterize physicalism in such a way that it is microphysics on which
we should focus. The claim then is that everything that exists is
something microphysical – in the sense that everything is realized as
some sort of a microphysical arrangement. No one maintains that
our current microphysics “is the measure of all things, of what is
that it is, and of what is not that it is not.” But the idea in physical-
ism is that our current microphysics is on the right track to discover
the truth of the matter. (Esfeld, 1999, 319-20)
I think that the natural move for a structural realist physicalist scientific
metaphysics has been indicated correctly by Ladyman and French:
The kind of structuralist moves we have outlined here have also
been powered by the development of field theory. Cassirer, again,
argues that the metaphysical view of the ‘material point’ as an in-
dividual object cannot be sustained once we make the transition to
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field theory (op. cit., 178.) He offers a structuralist conception of
the field: The field is not a “thing”; it is a system of effects (Wirkun-
gen), and from this system no individual element can be isolated and
retained as permanent, as being “identical with itself” through the
course of time. The individual electron no longer has any substan-
tiality in the sense that it per se est et per se concipitur; it “exists”
only in its relation to the field, as a “singular location” in it. (ibid.)
(French and Ladyman, 2003b, 46-7)
Although I am not a physicist, I am fairly certain that “singular location”
is not a very apt description here. I suspect that descriptions like “structured
region” or “structured feature”, or perhaps “emergent substructure” or “emer-
gent configuration” of a substructure, would all be better characterisations.
Otherwise I think that this view provides solid support for FOSIR including
its defeasible structure-is-quantum-field-regions identity. Michael Esfeld and
Vincent Lam have articulated a nice summary of French and Ladyman’s 2003
position regarding the utility of a physicalist field ontology:
However, there are in fact strong reasons in favour of a field
ontology on the basis of quantum field theory: the notion of a quan-
tum particle, with all its physical content, can be derived from the
primary notion of a quantum field and is actually not always well-
defined (see Cao, 2003c, pp. 17–19) Esfeld and Lam, 2008)
In a survey of work on field theory as a basis for structural realism by Cao,
F&L identify a defeasible and ontologically parsimonious and/or minimalist
non-eliminative ontic structural realism as that which will work with fields in
mind as the ontic reductive basis of the world:
Furthermore, and crucially, given the rejection of particles as the
basic ontology in QFT, it seems to us that the sort of developments
Cao very nicely charts provide powerful support for the metaphysical
SR programme. In particular, he asks about the reality of quantum
fields and responds that the concept of a field is used to generate
the field equations which describe the structural aspects of “these
hypothetical entities” and to ‘extract’ the concept of particle which
are the ‘observable manifestations’ of the same hypothetical entity.
But then . . . what is this ‘hypothetical entity’, over and above the
structural aspects? What is it, metaphysically? Here, again, we
face . . . metaphysical underdetermination . . . Now, as we have said,
the constructive empiricist responds to this by waving good-bye to
metaphysics but what is the realist going to do? Again, its an ersatz
form of realism that can’t answer - in these terms - the question,
what is the field? SR has an answer - the field is the structure,
the whole structure and nothing but the structure. (French and
Ladyman, 2003b, 48)
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My view - my answer to the metaphysical underdetermination of the type
or natural content of ontic structure in OSR and field theory - is that the
structure reduces to heterogeneous bounded (including distributed) regions of
the (quantum) field. To look for any other substance or intermediary is to
start instantiating anti-POP ‘glues’ and abstracta that are not real, or else
real only as encodings of information from sets of I sources. I bite the bullet,
reject formalism driven ontological descent, and just declare that not only is the
structure physical as F&L declared (French and Ladyman, 2003b), but that it
just is the heterogeneous quantum field. It is partly in agreement with F&L’s
stated view in so far as it supports OSR. However, it is the inverse or antithesis
to the view in that it privileges I fields as the ontic basis of - identical to
- structure and ontologically prior to it but not determined by mathematical
relations and models. The nonuniform heterogeneous quantum field comes first,
and it is intrinsically structured. The structure does not somehow come first
as an ontological basis for the existence of the field, a position closer to that
of Cao and French’s later 2014 view. Ladyman and Ross instead embrace a
statisticalist view in deference to instrumentalist themes.
My approach allows for partial representation on the basis of information
access problems, but bites the bullet on the physical I universe being the origin
of structure in physical information processing, and thus in brains, and thus in
mind and thought. The cognitive science or philosophy of mind that accom-
panies this can be simply stated: the mind is identical - not to the brain and
its states - but to the physical processing of physical CICS information in the
neurology regarded as a CICS information source (For similar if not support-
ing views see Deutsch and Ladyman and Ross Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 120.)
Brain based representations naturally necessarily can’t exist without brains,
and brains naturally necessarily can’t exist without I-obtaining physical infor-
mation processing and signal pathways. The signal pathways must necessarily
exist prior to the information transmission. Signal pathways must necessarily be
causal. Encoding is supported by rules, but reduces otherwise to transduction
of various kind (a significant proportion of which is electro-chemical.)
There is no reason to assume that there would exist any mathematical and
formal structures without brains and the physical information processing based
cognition that they support. Perhaps we might concede that probabilities are
natural and I-exist as Ladyman and Ross require, or that lines and surfaces do.
However, it would not be uncontroversial to refuse to admit the latter, given
the well known debate about physical points, and geometrical primitives and
ratios are one thing, but complex mathematical structures involving such things
as complex numbers with imaginary components, or entire proofs or formulae,
do not seem to be something easily admissible to the I ontolgy as prior at all
(Malament, 1982, 528.) Thus it is ontologically unparsimonious - contravenes
POP and possibly causal closure - to assume that mathematical structures are
existentially transcendental. They may be apparently or virtually transcen-
dental because nomic and logical constraints such that if aliens discovered them
somewhere else independently of humans they would end up similar (the mathe-
matical constructivist view.) However, it does not materially or logically follow,
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and it is against POP, to assume causal I a-priori existence of mathematical
structures: certainly to give them an a-priori causal role. Nomic constraints
related to logical/analytic truths do not constitute sufficient conditions for a-
priori existence of such either. Statistical mechanics as we know it might be
universally applicable to modelling the I structures of quantum systems, but so
are several other mathematical systems that we know of, and so might be many
others of which we are not aware. In the face of such overdetermination, claims
of mathematical structure as a causal existential basis for I structures of finite
physical systems seems ontologically unparsimonious at best, and moreover,
contradictory. FOSIR gives a place to Kolmogorov’s materialist constructionist
view - although perhaps not in its strict Brouwerian intuitionist format. I do
not have to secure either here.
4.3.2 The View from Black Hole Physics
Especially in cosmology and broader physics, conceptions and characterisations
of what is usually called information are closely related to and associated with
physical and physico-mathematical concepts like entropy and complexity, each
of which also seems to be inherently concerned with physical processes and
their structures. And apart from such things as mathematical overdetermina-
tion in gauge symmetry and intermediate mixed states of quanta in QM, in
physics these theoretical concepts are intended/taken to correspond to physical
existents: they are scientific realist assertions about information. Moreover, in
physics - the foundational hard science - the term information is closely con-
ceptually bound to various concepts of physical structure(s) and the movement
thereof. One example is the attempt to solve the problem of what has come
to be called the information paradox in relation to the science of black hole
cosmology:
Black holes are, however, plagued by fundamental paradoxes that
remain unresolved to this day. First, the black hole event horizon
is teleological in nature [6], which means that we need to know the
entire future space-time of the universe to determine the current
location of the horizon. This is essentially impossible. Second,
any information carried by infalling matter is lost once the
material falls through the event horizon. Even though the
black hole may later evaporate by emitting Hawking radiation [7],
the lost information does not reappear, which has the rather serious
and disturbing consequence that quantum unitarity is violated [8].
(Joshi and Narayan, 2014)
My argument is that in such theories 1. references to information are just as
indispensable as references to structure and 2. references to information carry
the same physical content as references to physical dynamical structures and
are often associated with them.
Hawking’s revision of the classical model of black holes to accomodate radi-
ated heat and emitted information relies on the nature of what was previoulsy
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thought to be a perfectly smooth event horizon boundary now being understood
as irregular and ‘fuzzy’ (or ‘hairy’.) Black hole physics is replete with informa-
tional language which directly associates ideas of the distribution and structure
(especially complexity) of matter and energy inside the black hole and across
the actual or else apparent event horizon with the distribution of information:
The black hole information paradox is probably the most impor-
tant issue for fundamental physics today. If we cannot understand
its resolution, then we cannot understand how quantum theory and
gravity work together . . . I formulate the paradox as a ‘theorem’: if
quantum gravity effects are confined to within the planck length and
the vacuum is unique, then there will be information loss. I conclude
with a brief outline of how the paradox is resolved in string theory:
quantum gravity effects are not confined to a bounded length (due to
an effect termed ‘fractionation’), and the information of the hole is
spread throughout its interior, creating a ‘fuzzball’. (Mathur, 2009b)
The term ‘fuzzball’ comes from string theory, and its relevance here comes
from the fact that string theory is one possible candidate to save the phenomena
with respect to the black hole information paradox. The paradox arises from
the fact that coupled mix state quantum systems get divided across the event
horizon of a black hole, with one quanta going into the hole and another escaping
as radiation (Hawking, 2005; Denning and Bell, 2012; Mathur, 2009a; Brustein
and Medved, 2015.) There are at least two problems with this. Firstly, the
escaped quanta are still in a mixed quantum state according to standard QM,
and yet are now not entangled with the quanta in the BH. That’s the information
loss: loss of half of the physical structure of the coupled quantum system is loss of
half of its information. This is not accounted for by the expressions of standard
QM. Secondly, the escape of the quanta on the outside of the event horizon
should constitute radiation accompanied by perturbations on the surface of the
black hole.
The problem is that classical (pre-Hawking) black hole physics does not allow
for any irregularities or non-uniformities on the BH surface, and so no radiation
could be emerging from it causing nonuniformities in structure (entropy, per-
turbations.) This is called the ‘no hair theorem’ because there can be no ‘hairy’
irregular or nonuniform physical structure on the surface of the BH. The area
outside it has to be a perfect vacuum:
The no hair theorem implied that all information about the col-
lapsing body was lost from the outside region apart from three con-
served quantities: the mass, the angular momentum, and the electric
charge. This loss of information was not a problem in the classical
theory. A classical black hole would last forever and the information
could be thought of as preserved inside it but just not very accessi-
ble. However, the situation changed when I discovered that quantum
effects would cause a black hole to radiate at a steady rate [3]. At
least in the approximation I was using the radiation from the black
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hole would be completely thermal and would carry no information
[4]. So what would happen to all that information locked inside a
black hole that evaporated away and disappeared completely? It
seemed the only way the information could come out would be if
the radiation was not exactly thermal but had subtle correlations.
(Hawking, 2005, 084013-1.)
Note that although this is theoretical physics (a point I will return to in
a moment) structure - and particularly the structure associated with physical
entropy - is here very much married with information as ineliminable. The con-
cepts are being used interchangeably. Certainly elements of classical statistical
measures can be and are applied, but the information itself is regarded on a sci-
entific realist basis as something that can evaporate, that is carried by physical
structures, and not just to be transmitted by way of a causal pathway through
a medium but to enter and ‘come out’ of the BH as physical structure. I sug-
gest that this is a vindication of Ladyman and Rosss scientific metaphysics and
non-eliminative ontic structural realism, to the extent that I-existing statistics
are intrinsic to the physical system as natural content. However, I reassert my
conviction that, defeasibly, what are being referred to are stochastic ergodic
and nonergodic information sources, and that these are what carry or realise
the ineliminable (nonredundant) statistics. Nonredundant statistics reduce to
stochastic sources and their dynamics, but sources do not reduce to nonredun-
dant statistics, and at best I-obtaining statistics are a feature of sources. I can
allow that they are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the obtaining
of a source. Remember that according to Shannon - a source is identical to a
stochastic ergodic physical process (a dynamical non-deterministic but parame-
terised physical system.) Information is essentially equated with or taken to be
identical to - or at least intrinsic to - the structures of interest. The structures of
interest in the passage above are taken to be either excitations of the quantum
field, or defeasibly possibly the physical alternative string theoretic substrate
(which allows metrics smaller than the Planck length.)
String theory is supposed to offer relief and save the (yet to be experimen-
tally verified) phenomena here because it allows entropy or perturbations to be
accounted for on the surface of the BH. According to string theory - the cor-
rectness of which is still challenged by many physicists - the information of the
black hole is distributed through its volume and across its surface as entropy
in the form of transverse wave based perturbations, which are of course a valid
candidate to take the label nonuniformities (Mathur, 2009b 42-4.) This is the
‘fuzzball’. If the surface of the BH is a fuzzball, then the no-radiation problem
is solved. Moreover, with regard to information loss:
Now there is no information problem: any matter falling onto
the fuzzball gets absorbed by the fuzz and is eventually re-radiated
with all its information, which is just how any other body would
behave. The crucial point is that we do not have a horizon whose
vicinity is ‘empty space’. The matter making the hole, instead of
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sitting at r = 0, spreads all the way to the horizon. So it can send
its information out with the radiation, just like a piece of coal would
do (Mathur, 2009b, 44.)
What is important for the purposes of formulating FOSIR based informa-
tional metaphysics, however, is that according to both the standard QM picture
and the string theoretic hypotheses physical structure is very much information
for both quantum physics and high energy BH physics. We know that particles
are excitations in the quantum field according to quantum field theory, and so
the structure lost is field theory structure: nonuniform heterogeneously com-
prised quantum field regions constitute the information lost when one quanta
disappears into the BH. From the standpoint of a defeasible scientific meta-
physics of information, quantum fields are the current best candidate for being
exactly what the real structure of OSR actually is at bottom. Defeasibility in
the scientific metaphysical character of FOSIR means we can drop the quantum
field in favour of strings if we so desire. Developments in black hole physics
associated with the information paradox and the so called ‘firewall’ increasingly
make reference to M-Theory (the most mature unified version of string theory)
and so provide a potential illustration of how one natural kind - the quantum
field and vacuum background - might come to be reduced to or supplanted by
(probably the latter - with some overlap) another natural kind - strings and
the string field (although the string field is highly speculative and not well un-
derstood at this time.) In each case physical structure would be retained, and
my argument is that information sources as stochastic dynamical ergodic and
non-ergodic structures would - and do - also remain an ineliminable component
of the I ontology.
There are other ways in which information theoretic terms and concepts are
deployed in BH physics 3:
In classical gravity, a BH is the definitive prison. Nothing can
escape from it. Thus, when matter disappears into a BH, the infor-
mation encoded is considered as preserved inside it, although inac-
cessible to outside observers. The situation radically changed when
Hawking discovered that quantum effects cause the BH to emit ra-
diation. (Corda, 2015)
Now the discussion centers upon the idea that the information in the inte-
rior of the black hole is encoded. This natural I encoding is accounted for by
the metaphysics I am proposing, and is in keeping with the idea of encoding
as energy transduction in Shannon’s theory. The energy-transduction based
encoding reduces to transmission of influences in the quantum field between
excitation regions and these are causally induced configurations of structure.
Consider the following paper abstract which refers to information in the
context of physical entropy of the black hole, and to the information being
encoded going in and decoded when the black hole gives off (Hawking) radiation:
3For another example, see Verlinde, 2011, 24-5.
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We show that, in order to preserve the equivalence principle until
late times in unitarily evaporating black holes, the thermodynamic
entropy of a black hole must be primarily entropy of entanglement
across the event horizon. For such black holes, we show that the
information entering a black hole becomes encoded in correlations
within a tripartite quantum state, the quantum analogue of a one-
time pad, and is only decoded into the outgoing radiation very late
in the evaporation. This behavior generically describes the unitary
evaporation of highly entangled black holes and requires no specially
designed evolution. Our work suggests the existence of a matter-field
sum rule for any fundamental theory. Braunstein et al., 2013
This idea of the distribution of information across the inside of a black hole
and within other kinds of physical systems in both cosmology and quantum
physics often relies upon an apparent association between structural realism
and structural complexity (and this in turn is often associated with statistically
modeled physical entropy of one kind or another.) Importantly, in both applied
mathematics the term ‘structure’ is often applied to mathematical constructs
that are used in modeling physical systems including dynamic stochastic sys-
tems. Especially in quantum mechanics - with its competing interpretations -
there is a strong tendency to regard the probabilities and statistical distribu-
tions on very much a realist basis as existing in the system (this also includes
amplitudes and operators.) QM is heavily dependent upon the idea that many
of its mathematical elements - operators for example - map directly to physical
correlates.
This kind of approach to the nature of information points to something like
CICS information and that:
1. It is realist about information as an existing part of the ontology
2. It does not just denote a measure of something (information is not the
measure, but that which is measured (Bub, 2005, 543), and statistics
underdetermines its nature.)
3. Where there are statistical components (especially for quantum mechan-
ics) in the conception and definition of information (especially quantum
information in black hole physics as well as in qubit theory and quantum
mechanics), at best the distinction between these and physical existents
is not clear, and more often than not both physical phenomena such as
entropy and quantum states associated with them are regarded as phys-
ical (This is accomodated by Ladyman and Rosss statisticalist ontology
- according to which statistics I exists intrinsic to dynamical physical
structures.)
As I mentioned above, it is important that black hole physics is theoretical
physics. An obvious objection to the science as a support for the CICS and
FOSIR metaphysics is that, in accordance with Pauli’s doubts about realism
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about the neutrino, and Einstein’s doubts about spooky action at a distance,
one should not make scientific metaphysical assertions on the basis of theoretic
posits. However, there are some concessions to be made in terms of defeasibility
and representation/model-reliabilism.
In the context of physics - theoretic physics and applied physics feed into each
other epistemically and ontologically in terms of posits and findings. Theoretic
physics is often a precursor to discoveries in applied physics 4 and theoretical
physics frequently gives rise to posits about dynamics as yet considered out of
experimental reach.
I suggest Physicists can make defeasible claims with a much higher confidence
in the reliability of their posits due to 1. the manner in which formal physical
theoretical knowledge is encoded from natural systems and (I discuss this more
fully in chapter 4) 2. the close marriage of mathematics and physics. The
manner of encoding is very rigorous and the mathematical encoding rules are
repeatable and invariant. This probably has a lot to do with why mathematical
constructs in physics - especially QM - deliver such astonishingly accurate and
reliable results.
4.4 Armstrong’s Eleatic Principle and Informa-
tion
In I FOSIR, just as in Aristotelian mathematical realism, structure is consid-
ered not to be ontologically prior so “one can be an Aristotelian in re realist,
holding that structures exist, but insisting that they are ontologically posterior
to the systems that instantiate them” (Shapiro, 1996.) In the context of CICS-
FOSIR I’ve argued that information exists intrinsically to physical structures
(nonuniform heterogeneous quantum field regions) only, or those that objectively
physically reduce to physical structures (which, according to the physicalism I
endorse, includes all real structures) (2003, 75-6.)
The ontic element I identify as that which realises information - the causally
induced configuration or arrangement of spatiotemporal causal structure - un-
derdetermines the constructed conceptual and theoretic content of all quantita-
tive and semantic theories of information. Yet I have argued that it is immutably
part of the ontology of what is modelled by all relevant theories.
The central anti-Platonist assertion supporting the I CICS of information is
thus that:
1. Platonism about information is wrong because all information is naturally
necessarily physically realised by and ontologically reduces to configurations
of physical structures. This entails that Platonism about information con-
tradicts physicalism. Platonists about information have selectively neglected
4The marked success of Pauli’s neutrino posit, Einstein’s frame dragging effect (recently
reverified using NASA gravity probe) as well as Hensen et al., 2015’s recent confirmation
of Bell’s theorems/posit regarding nonlocal effects, and even more recently the experimental
demonstration/detection of gravity waves
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the scientific conception of an information source as a physical process with
structured states and the scientific conception of data as physically realised.
2. All physically realised information is intrinsically semantic on a causal in-
dicative basis, and there can be no information about a source entity without
either information from that entity acquired through physical causal path-
ways or else by way of causally sustained structural covariance (Long, 2014
and see §5 p175.)
The causal indicative nature of all information per 2. is what Julian Bar-
bour has called intrinsic semantic information (Refer to earlier formulations from
Stampe, Dretske, and Grice §3.3.1 p114.) Frank Jackson has referred to such
indication in terms of the entailment of semantic properties from the structure
of physical entities. 2. leads to an informational justification for Armstrong’s
eleatic principle against Platonism that avoids problems with two primary ar-
guments for the principle: the inductive argument and the epistemic argument
from causally sustained knowledge.
The rejection of ON.1 is impossible without committing to strong Platonism
- of the kind criticised by Armstrong - about information. It requires abstract
entities to be causally interactive with and to be ontologically prior to the phys-
ical world for the purposes of information transmission and acquisition. Infor-
mation objectively exists wherever and only where physical structure exists, and
physical structure cannot exist without objectively realising information. Infor-
mation is essentially physically real according to the I CICS in re conception
because it is realised only and always by the configuration of physical structure.
This requirement for the existence of information is very similar in form and
consequence to what Armstrong has called the eleatic principle. Anti-Platonist
David Armstrong formulated the eleatic principle (EP):
An entity is to be counted as real if and only if it is capable of
participating in causal processes. (Colyvan, 2001)
According to Mark Colyvan, EP has fallen out of favour due to difficulties
with its two primary supporting arguments: the inductive and epistemic argu-
ments. The inductive argument proceeds in two stages. First, all of the things
which we intuitively take to be “uncontroversially real” are all causally interac-
tive (not a-causal) and spatiotemporally located, and things that are neither are
not generally regarded as real(Colyvan, 1998, 121.) Thus real things must all be
causally active and spatiotemporally located (Armstrong, 1978 45-7.) This ap-
parently descriptive inductive assertion is then combined with an assumption of
naturalism “of almost any variety” to arrive at a normative inductive argument
for the causally active status of all real things. The difficulty for this approach
arises when we realise that there are some entities - like space time points -
which are regarded as real by anti-Platonists and which are not easily assigned
either causal efficacy or spatiotemporal location (Malament, 1982, 528.)
For example, mathematical nominalist and anti-Platonist Hartry Field main-
tains that spacetime points are real, which claim led David Malament to com-
plain that not everything in Field’s ontology was trivially non-abstract (Ibid.)
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In other words, Field requires spatio-temporally located space-time points to
be real for his anti-Platonist ontology, but they do not seem to be causally ac-
tive, nor even to have spatiotemporal location in any straightforward sense. If
spatiotemporal location without causal efficacy is enough for an entity to be
regarded as real, then this is contradicts the eleatic principle if spatiotempo-
rally located things are invariably causally active. The problem then becomes
one of deciding what the objective criteria are for determination of what is
non-controversially real, which destabilises the eleatic principle(Colyvan, 2001,
41-2.)
The epistemic argument for the eliatic principle is that if an entity is not
causal, it cannot possibly causally interact with us, or us with it, and so therefore
we could never know of its existence. The rebuttal is that there are presumably
lots of causal entities (outside our light cone, for example) that we can have
no causal interaction with and therefore cannot know by interaction. Thus the
epistemic criteria is stripped back to the causal-access inductive argument.
I suggest that physicalist naturalism should require that for space-time
points to be real, they must be or have a structure that realises information
according to reductionist I CICS physicalism about information. I suggest that
the criteria for the inductive argument for identifying uncontroversially real
entities according to Armstrong’s eleatic principle should be that they must
somehow be or reduce to concrete information-realising physical structure(s)
like spatio-temporal non-uniformities. I am making the same kind of strong re-
ductionist and physicalist proposal as Kolmogorov did of data, and Landauer of
the representation thereof: that no real information of any kind exists in the ab-
sence of causal (under causal closure PCC) physical structure (according to the
quantum field-reducing ontic structural realist metaphysics proposed above.) I
have already argued at length for this position, but a basic statement involves
existential dependence upon and anti-Platonism about I structure: if there was
no physical CICS and thus sources, there would be no information at all. To
get us to our defeasible FOSIR - no structure, including mathematical repre-
sentations, cognitive structures, linguistic structures, conceptual structures, or
computational structures would exist without the quantum field. Clearly this
underdetermines such things as measures of information and semantic encoding
of information (lexical and non-lexical), yet it is still both a necessary condition
for the obtaining of information, and as I have argued - not trivial physicalism.
Thus a spacetime point in a formal model in a theory can (but might not) rep-
resent a selection or picking out of a feature or location in the I structure being
modelled.
Thus I suggest:
Contingent Principle SIE (Structural-Informational eleatic prin-
ciple): Structures are to be counted as real if and only if they realise
(CICS) information.
Spacetime points are generally regarded to be dimensionless and a-causal,
and are not realised as any kind of structure or non-uniformity. According to
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I CICS realism about information then, space-time points are arguably not
real because no information is realised by them. The physical space inside an
absolute physical vacuum would contain no concrete structure whatsoever and
would also contain no information whatsoever.
The epistemic argument for the eleatic principle is that we could not possibly
get any knowledge about entities which are causally inert or idle. If there can
be no causal pathway (direct or indirect) from an entity or situation as a distal
stimulus to the percipient because the entity is a-causal, then the observer can
learn nothing of the distal stimulus. I have made a similar argument about
accessibility of information from Platonic entities.
Mark Colyvan asserts that “the eleatic principle motivated by epistemic con-
cerns seems to suffer all the same worries that causal theory of knowledge does.”
(2001, 42.) Scientists should not stop giving credence to such real entities as
unobservable planets existing outside of our light cone just because we cannot
have any physical causal (electromagnetic or other radiation-mediated) causal
interaction with them (44.) It doesn’t follow from there being no causal pathway
between an entity and some/any percipient that the entity does not exist (Gold-
man, 1976, 771.) Colyvan is apparently conflating lack of causal pathway based
epistemic access with objective non-existence and exclusion from in-principle
causal closure. As a Platonist Colyvan wants platonic entities (which are by
definition not causal) to exist without causal access as a confirmation, but Pla-
tonic entities are non causal in-principle, whereas particulars subject to the
eliatic principle are causal. This appears to stop the attack getting started with
a category error.
Armstrong does not mean for causal epistemic access to an entity to be what
establishes its objective existence. Armstrong refers to the “causal efficacy”
of entities that “act and are acted on. . . solely in virtue of their nature” and
asserts that “things have the causal powers that they have in virtue of their
properties” where properties are realised by concrete particulars (1978b, 131-2;
1978a, 46.) In other words, particular entities are capable of participating in
causal processes because they are objectively by their nature intrinsically causal
and could participate in a physical causal pathway, not because there exists a
specific causal pathway between them and a percipient.
Regarding the rebuttal of the inductive argument: for entities outside our
light cone I suggest a causal covariance approach which sees universe-wide nomic
physical constraints as being realised by the structure of physical sources. The
gravity throughout the universe is a physical structure. Such sources thus con-
strain and determine the information inside and outside of the observer light
cone. On this approach a direct causal pathway from a specific out-of-lightcone
unobservable source (planets, stars, pulsars etc.) to an observer is not required
for acquiring some of its information. Alvin Goldman speaks similarly of “re-
lations between the object and perceiver, plus conditions of the environment”
such that a causally acquired “percept is affected by the current state of the en-
vironment” (1976, 780-1.) Environmental conditions causally constrain physical
structures. Environmental conditions existentially reduce to and depend upon
the environment as an encapsulating complex information source, comprised of
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sub sources.
There exist nomic constraints that are known on the basis of causal evidence
- causally acquired information - to be universal. This is based on such things
as reference to cosmic background radiation and induction from all observed
instances of celestial bodies and radiation. The physical universe (or multiverse,
depending on contemporary cosmological theory) in its entirety is a valid causal
information source: it is a spatio-temporal complex of causal structured physical
structured sub-systems.
Barbour has proposed that the entire physical universe is a configured infor-
mation source, and Armstrong holds that “the world is nothing but a single spa-
tiotemporal system” which is a good definition of an information source (1976a,
126.) Thus we can inductively make scientifically reliable judgements about the
general configuration of the universe source outside of our light cone based on
what we know of constants and constraints (including no go constraints) for
which we have evidence or causally acquired information from inside our light
cone. Examples of such constraints include that the speed of light in all direc-
tions must be the same in all inertial frames of reference inside and outside of
our light cone, and whatever it is about gravity that makes the inverse squared
law apply to measuring it.
It would be physically impossible for these constraints not to apply just
outside of the visible universe as they do inside of it, provided the laws of nature
hold consistently across the entire information source. This kind of inference is
stronger than induction from empirical outcomes, and Ladyman and Ross have
noted its prevelance in science:
[It’s] wrong to dismiss the idea that scientific knowledge is some-
times based on the mere generalization of an observed regularity.
While it is certainly true that not all science is like this, there are
cases that do conform to the simple instrumentalist view of what
theories are. For example, it was surely known that Aspirin cures
headaches before anyone had any account of the mechanism by which
they do so or indeed any account of what Aspirin’s molecular struc-
ture is. Similarly, much knowledge in science is generated purely by
pattern recognition or regression analysis of large amounts of data,
and indeed this is increasingly the case. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013,
131)
Thus I propose that FOSIR combined with §4.4 p158 delivers the following
hypothesis:
EI (eleatic Information Principal or no Pseudo-information prin-
ciple): Information is to be counted as real if and only if it is realised
by causally active physical spatiotemporal structures (regions of the
quantum field) in accordance with FOSIR.
This is of course defeasible. Correspondingly, the existence of either infor-
mation generation or transmission is a sufficient condition for the existence of
physical structure.
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EI and SIE partly answer the problem with the epistemic argument for the
eleatic principle by allowing indirect causal pathways, causal pathways from
common sources, and physical structural nomically constrained or constraining
part-whole encapsulation all to sustain covariance between physical structures
thus sustaining information transfer and representation. We can say something
about the structure of real planets and suns outside the light cone because of
causal co-variance between the inside and outside of the light cone sustained
by “laws or processes” as Barbour puts it - that apply to the configuration of
both. They both reside within the configuration of a larger information source
structure: the nomically constrained universe.
Figure 4.1: Nomic constraints distributed in SU causally induce the configura-
tion of both SA and SB . i.e. There is transmission of common signals from SU
to both SA and SB
I don’t need a version of the epistemic argument for information, since I have
suggested that the sufficient and necessary existential criteria for information is
the existence of causally induced configuration of structure that supports signal
transmission/emission and encoding by transduction (reducing to transmitted
continuous quantum field fluctuations, defeasibly.) That’s where the conditions
begin and end.
Physicalism is therefore supported by I CICS in re physical realism (I CICS
realism) about information because there is ample support from science for the
assertion that information can only be realised by, causally acquired from and
transmitted through physical structures or structures that reduce to physical
structures. SIE coupled with EI delivers the result that only structures that
realise information are real. Since only physical structures realise and carry
information, only physical structures are real. This fits with out intuition that,
objectively, all real things have information associated with them, even if it is
only basic information associated with their structure:
1. ¦xIx (Premise: All existing structures realise (and can and do carry)
information)
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2. ¦xIx   Px (Scientifically supported Hypothesis: Hyp): Only physical
structures can realise and carry information
3. ¦xPx(1,2 MP: Only physical structures and structures that reduce to
physical structures are real.)
It’s important to realise that stipulating that Platonic entities somehow track
or map to real world representations in - say - mathematical proofs and scientific
theories is different to asserting that Platonic entities are information bearing
or realise information (and the somehow doesn’t matter to strong Platonists,
although it might matter to an Aristotelian in re realist.) OSIR, IS.1, and IE re-
quire something more like physicalist Aristotelian in re realism about structure
and information. FOSIR delivers a very specific defeasible physicalist character-
isation. There does not have to be a causal pathway or causal access to Platonic
entities for them to exist in the strong or weak Platonist sense. However, there
does have to be such if you want them to realise information, or if you want
them to be an information source. A Platonic entity could not be an informa-
tion source. A spacetime point in a formal theory representation of spacetime is
information bearing as a representation, because the representation is a struc-
tured source (lexical or diagrammatic, for example.) The information that it
encodes as a representation or representing structure(s) is a location picked out
of an I physical structure, such that it encodes information from the structure.
There necessarily will be a complex of upstream causal transmission channels,
reducing to signal pathways, reducing to causal physical pathways (it will be
‘messy’: neurological sources, linguistic encodings, textual encodings, diagram-
matic encodings, instrument channels and so on) that sustain the covariance
and what French (following empiricist Van Fraasen) calls a partial isomorphism
(for a detailed development of this, see §5.4 p189. For a discussion of physical
isomorphism see Szudzik, 2010, 502-5.) Thus another statement of the anti-
Platonism of OSIR-FOSIR is flatly eliminative: there is nothing informational
for Platonic entities to do between the I structure and the formal representations
that encode information from it on a (albeit complicated) causal basis.
4.5 The Question of Infinite Information
The way in which one regards information to exist affects, as far as I can ad-
duce, the answer to the critical question of whether systems contain infinite
information. Some key classical statistical and probabilistic conceptions of in-
formation in physics are taken to non trivially entail that there is a finite amount
of information in the universe. I intuit (for I’ve not the space to argue it) that
this might be retained by some theorists in an attempt to ward off the much
debated ontological consequences (inflationary fecundity) of considering that
the Everett many worlds interpretation of quantum theory, or some derivative
thereof, is true. I do not support the many worlds interpretation, but at the
same time my aspiringly contingent ontology of information does not make it a
hill I (or my contingent metaphysics) have to die upon.
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Some theorists and philosophers have stipulated that there is only a finite
amount of information in any given physical system (including the observable
universe.) Scientific findings are often cited for this assertion (Davies, 2010, 76-
8, 80-1.) Apart from an a-priori stipulation of a finite possibility space (and/or
finite source coding alphabet) with classical probabilism about information, it
is hard to see how this is justifiable as a broad claim unless perhaps informa-
tion instead reduces to physical structure, ontic structural realism is true, and
Einstein ends up being vindicated in his opinion that the physical universe is
discrete at the Planck length, which is in fact a current assumption of quantum
mechanics according to many physicists, although the picture for QFT is not so
clear.
We are eschewing discussions of a-priorist ontological concepts such as that
of gunk. However:
s1. In Shannon’s theory the continuous case (continuous or analogue sources)
is handled by an approximation to the discrete case. This allows the base
2 logarithmic measure of entropy to be easily applied. Without discreti-
sation, there is no manageable source alphabet or possibility space at the
source. Quantification of information per Shannon requires a discretised
source probability space and state space
s2. In ontic structural realism, the question of if structure reduces to structure
all the way ‘down’ ontologically (put otherwise - if a recursive constituent-
structure-finding function can be applied perpetually.)
However, if structure is the basis of information in the way that I have
thus far suggested, and if FOSIR permits structure to be “turtles all the way
down” as Simon Saunders’ metaphor for recursive reduction of ontic structure
has it, then it looks like if there is a potentially infinite structure, it would follow
that there is potentially infinite information. I don’t think a statistical-realist
view like that of Ladyman, Ross, and Kincaid necessarily undoes this. Using
the dynamical logic introduced in §1.3.1 p44, my worry is that if it is really
contingently structure all the way down, then:
TιSU T  ª
Where SU is the universe, and, more potentially at odds with
Bekenstein:
¦xSx  SιxS  ª
(For all x, if x is an information source, then the total information
in x is infinite.)
The immediately important observation to make is that the Bekenstein
bound requires a system to have not only finite volume or to occupy finite
spacetime, but to involve or encapsulate finite energy (Casini, 2008; Bekenstein,
2003.) With this energy constraint removed, presumably included because Ja-
cob Bekenstein integrated a physicalist conception of entropy into his consid-
erations, then we have only structural and volume considerations. In this case
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structure all the way down probably delivers infinite information despite the
Bekenstein bound. In other words, at the level of measures of physical infor-
mation - which should not themselves be taken to be the information, there is
evidently pluralism about the nature of information.
Moreover, with regard to assertions of finite information, I suspect that what
has happened in physics is that the classical Shannon inspired probabilistic
entropy-orientated model - which requires an approximation of the continuous
case by the discrete case for source alphabets and transmission optimisation -
has resulted in the assertion of a necessary finitude of information in continuous
natural stochastic processes and systems modelled as sources (Shannon, 1998.)
This is due, I suspect, such things as the well-regarded Bekenstein bound on
the amount of information in finite systems. On the one hand I am vexed by
not having the expertise to argue this in terms of the physics to which I wish
to defer for authority - certainly not in comparison to the expertise of theo-
rists like Stephen Hawking, Jacob Bekenstein, and Paul Davies (Davies, 2010;
Hawking, 2014; Bekenstein, 2003; See also Lee et al., 2013, 1097 which asso-
ciates this bound with a limit on the number of quantum fields in the universe.)
So although I am worried about whether this might stand as a roadblock to
my entire FOSIR schema, I am also worried that the turtles all the way down
outcome is at the very least an open question, and therefore it doesn’t look like
it is so straightforward to ward off infinite information in a physical information
source.
I will run for the cover of 1. scientific defeasibility in physics and 2. the fact
that leading physicists disagree about such things as the many worlds interpre-
tation and the salience and applicability of string theory - both of which seem
to affect standard contingent assumptions about how information is realised,
how it relates to physical entropy, and what happens in situations like the event
horizon and boundaries of black holes (see the discussion about fuzzballs at
§4.3.2 p153 below.) For some more detailed treatments including some possi-
ble challenges to the finitude of the information in the universe on the basis of
what I am referring to as defeasibility that respects the primacy of physics con-
straints, refer to (I am omitting many worlds interpretations) Bostrom, 2003
245 (including footnote 2); Adami and Steeg, 2014, 13-14; Bekenstein, 2003,
64-5.
Apart from the possibilities presented by continuous quantum field theory
models, it’s relevant that a current Planck length based discretised maximum
information bound of 10122 bits of information for the current universe (one
proposal due to Lloyd (Ibid.)) defers to a discrete information formula with
the possibility space of bits bounded by Planck’s constant. Shannon’s discrete
formula was applied to continuous systems as a mathematical convenience, but
this application of the discrete system or model to the continuous case, was,
as Shannon himself said, an approximation. In other words, Shannon regarded
the measure of information/entropy of continuous sources as a discrete idealisa-
tion. This involves information loss. Moreover, in quantum terms the decision
to equate bits with particles seems arbitrary at best given that QFT says that
particles are emergent non-binary features of the quantum field (Floridi, 2009a,
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158-9.) Then there is the problem that rejecting digital ontology and Wheeler’s
it from bit thesis involves rejecting (in most cases) the idea that yes-no ques-
tions/answers are the necessary basis for determining information content. If
something like qubits are more appropriate at the quantum scale: this does not
involve yes-no questions/answers again. Simply stated, qubits as based upon
quantum systems are not binary - and for good reason. The non-binariness is
due to the strange stochastic nature of quantum systems.
The entire physical universe - considered as infinite - may or may not have
a finite amount of information, according to various conceptions and formu-
lations of information. This is apart from defeasibility, and again apart from
existing serious proposals (no including many worlds hypotheses) that although
the observable universe is finite, the universe is in fact infinite, and may be
unbounded in both temporal directions (Hawking, 1993; Wiltshire, 2000; Page,
2007; Kuhfittig and Gladney, 2015.) Then we must consider the information
content of the entire physical universe considered as somehow finite across the
same criteria. Then we must apply the same question to finite bounded phys-
ical systems, including quantum systems. The same question can be applied
to the idea of a multiverse considered as finite versus as infinite, but according
to my approach the Deutsch-Everett approach is speculative and contravenes
POP, and probably causal closure, so I will not attempt to address that. The
question of interest here is the information content of a finite physical system
according to the CICS-FOSIR conception of information.
Even if Einstein’s Planck size discretisation turns out to be contingently con-
firmed broadly for QFT or whatever alternative theory turns out contingently
to be correct, the amount of information in the universe may be infinite. Can-
tor’s transfinite infinities arguably provide a justification for considering that
an infinite universe - and certainly a multiverse - which is largely empty of any
physical structure, may still have an infinite amount of information: part of an
infinity is still an infinity, quantitatively. The same applies to finite, bounded
physical subsystems in the universe.
Conceptions of information that render the information content of systems
finite are generally expressed in terms of digital ontology and/or pancomputa-
tional views, and/or associated algorithmic conceptions:
It is argued that underlying the Church-Turing hypothesis there
is an implicit physical assertion . . . a physical principle: ‘every finitely
realisable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal
model computing Turing machine. Classical physics and the univer-
sal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter
discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above’.
A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalisa-
tion of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that
quantum theory and the ‘universal quantum computer’ are compat-
ible with the principle . . . the physical version of the Church–Turing
principle: ‘Every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly
simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by
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finite means.’ This formulation is both better defined and more
physical than Turing’s own way of expressing it. (Deutsch, 1985a,
97-99)
Turing machines are a useful algorithmic fiction with mathematical rule
based ‘operations’ and limits. Deutsch seeks to produce a quantum physically
implementable version thereof that is compatible with the constraints of quan-
tum systems because he believes that the physics required for quantum com-
putation entails the I existence of multiple worlds. This is the view opposed
by Steane, 2003 (see the quotation at §3.4.3 p126 above.) With respect to the
question of whether physical systems contain finite information or infinite in-
formation - this implies that finite physical systems that can be so represented
or simulated have finite information. But this seems to be too quick, even for
a metaphysics that regards algorithmic definitions of the nature of information
to be compatible with classical statistical and entropy based conceptions.
One way to approach this question of whether a finite physical continu-
ous/analogue information sources (natural dynamical systems and phenomena,
for example) necessarily have only finite information is by referring directly to
FOSIR. In fact non-eliminative ontic structural realism, and also Floridi’s hy-
bridising ISR adaptation - with its information as nonuniformities - will do.
According to my view - and also according to Floridi’s ISR - information re-
duces to structure. I have already mentioned the question of reducibility of
physical systems and mentioned the views of Ladyman and Ross, Cao, and
Simon Saunders regarding the reducibility regress for structure. Even if we
specify an arbitrary - or otherwise stipulated stopping point for the existential
ontological reduction of structure to other structure, it seems unavoidable that
even physical structure in a finite physical system is likely to be infinite. This
is even more the case if one thinks that relations are identical to, and/or the
ontological ground or necessary condition for structure (and I do not) and that
relations are physical. Even if mathematical points are not physical, one can
put a mathematical surface or line on a physical surface. It is easy to prove
geometrically that there are infinite points on a line segment (Galileo’s para-
dox.) In line with the no abstract wireframe principle I have presented: even if
we avoid conflating mathematical and physical structure in the wrong way by
inducing mathematical collapse and formalism driven ontological descent, there
are infinite possible wireframes that can be picked out of a physical system to
represent it. That’s just geometric relations, and leaves aside the question of
an arbitrary limit to relations that can be identified between features of a phys-
ical system based upon their interaction with each other or other properties.
Put basically, even if structure in a physical system does not reduce to other
structure without terminus, it looks like there must still be infinite relations and
infinite structure in an information source. Remember that the assignment of
an alphabet for source coding against the states or possible configurations of
a source is a discretisation - and thus an abstracting out of or away from the
structure - of the source in the continuous case.
Another challenge to the claim of finite information from a discrete and/or
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digital universe comes from the existence of various continuous physical symme-
tries in physics (Rickles, 2008c, 180; Martin, 2003, 50-2.) Moreover, how does
physics support the idea of finite information in physical systems when some
systems are effectively regarded as having infinite dimensions in some sense?
This does not require deference to Everettian ontological inflation, but only
reference to such things as the infinite proliferation of physical particles (nat-
ural kind emergent features of the quantum field) in discussions of black hole
radiation (Hawking, 1975, 215-16.)
Some infinities in theories of physics are regarded as aberrative artefacts of
the mathematics:
The Euclidean geometry can be regarded as a black hole moving
on a closed loop, as one would expect. However, the corresponding
Lorentzian geometry, represents two black holes that come in from
infinity in the infinite past, and accelerate away from each other for
ever. The moral of this is that one should not take the Lorentzian
analytic continuation of a Euclidean geometry literally as a guide
to what an observer would see. . . . The probability of observing a
small black hole, at a given time, is given by the difference between
the actions. A similar discussion of correlation functions on the
boundary shows that the topologically trivial metrics make black
hole formation and evaporation unitary and information preserving.
(Hawking, 2005, 72)
Yet, there are different physical parts of the system where infinite physical
information - associated with physical dynamical structure(s) - is realised:
My work with Hartle [9] showed the radiation could be thought
of as tunnelling out from inside the black hole . . . it could carry
information out of the black hole. This explains how a black hole
can form and then give out the information about what is inside it
. . . The information remains firmly in our universe . . . If you jump
into a black hole, your mass energy will be returned to our universe
but in a mangled form which contains the information about what
you were like but in a state where it can not be easily recognized. It
is like burning an encyclopedia. Information is not lost, if one keeps
the smoke and the ashes. But it is difficult to read. (Ibid)
This is an example of what I have called natural encoding. Hawking’s de-
ployment of the statistical classical concepts of information do not undermine
the fact that there is also a physical conception of information here, and that this
is not a case of formalism driven ontological descent or mathematical collapse
(see also Hawking, 1975, 217-18.)
Shannon’s measure is often said to be a measure of the reduction in objec-
tive statistical uncertainty about a source state given the state of a signal from
that source, and of the next source state given the previous source state. Many
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theorists have taken this as a definition of information: the reduction in sta-
tistical uncertainty. This conception, although popular, has been numerously
noted to be problematic, and I will not enumerate the various difficulties here
(Cole, 1993, 204-11; Timpson, 2013, 26; Barbour, 2015, 6-8.) There is a related
conception of information that defines information and information content as
that which is indicated not to exist (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952.) In fact, as
physicist Julian Barbour has indicated, the ontic basis of what is measured by
Shannon’s measure is the structure of - and changes in the structure of – (physi-
cal) things (Barbour, 2015, 5-6, 8.) Structured source states are spatiotemporal
structures. That is, changes in spatiotemporal structure over time or changes
in configuration, which latter can be encoded in many cases by changes in con-
figuration space in phase space representations of dynamical systems (Lyon and
Colyvan, 2008.) Thus it reduces to a measure of spatiotemporal structure and
changes in physical structures.
It follows from FOSIR and CICS that a complex natural system is in fact
a composite information source: a structured complex of finite physical sub-
sources (which can be modelled as a set of sources) corresponding to finite
physical sub-systems and other constituents whose internal spatiotemporal con-
figurations and overall inter-source arrangement embody information. We can
take the ontic boundaries (determined more or less arbitrarily) of a natural
system information source to simply correspond to the objective boundaries of
the natural system itself as an entity. According to CICS/OSIR information is
not descriptions (which are encodings of information), but an ontic simple re-
alised by structure. Natural systems realise information in their spatiotemporal
structures. Information is intrinsic to the structure of physical systems, and
according to the CICS conception of intrinsic semantic information, all such in-
formation can be taken to be semantic in a natural sense (Barbour et al., 2014;
Long, 2014.)
It then follows that, with the exception of quantum systems that disobey
in-principle the identity of indiscernables, no two physical information sources
are informationally identical at some level of reduction (This argument has been
applied before to physical events by Hajek in his (Ha´jek, 1996, 75.)) Information
in different sources differs as dramatically as the spatiotemporal configurations
of those sources: the structures in which it exists as intrinsic. Information
is not a Platonic abstract universal. The total difference in spatiotemporal
configuration of a specific zebra and some specific clay is the total difference
in the information of each as a natural information source. Concrete specific
instances of water, zebras, molecules, flocks of birds, iron ore, gamma rays
and stars are all instances of information sources. Such entities all naturally
necessarily realise some specific information as instrinsic to their individual and
unique specific spatiotemporal structures: their configurations. Although at the
quantum level symmetry dictates that the evolution of a system is predictable
in some cases within certain limits, at both quantum and macro-level there are
strong reasons associated with algorithmic complexity and information depth
(in terms of the computability of physical structures Deutsch, 1985a, 114) and
nonlinear dynamics to doubt that an entity or spatiotemporal structure could
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be perfectly duplicated based upon entropy in natural systems and the laws of
thermodynamics.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I attempted to argue, largely via inference to the best explana-
tion combined with my indispensability of information argument, for a contin-
gent and defeasible basis for OSIR in QFT. More specifically, that basis is the
quantum field and vacuum background. I also further developed the argument
from the previous chapter that the assertion that relations are structures and
therefore relations are the basis of the I ontology is a mistake. The overriding
consideration is that the tendency to see relations as primary or as the ontic
ground of structure - or as the necessary condition for structure - comes formal-
ism driven ontological descent, or else from French’s mathematical collapse.
Acquisition of data from natural systems in scientific research involves the
physical extraction of information that is or reduces to physical configurations
of physical structures: the physical information in/of the physical structures of
the material world. There may be relations involved in encoding the information
into representations, and there may be relations in the objective spatiotemporal
causal structures themselves, but the structures are continuous in temporal and
spatial dimensions as far as science can determine. Any entities identified for
the purposes of modelling and representation are also heterogeneous structures.
According to the naturalistic physicalist I conception, these structures all reduce
to physical causal spatiotemporal structures. A general statement of the idea
is that no representation of an I-obtaining natural structure can exist without
the causally induced configuration of other natural structure(s), amounting to
the encoding of information from the former in the latter.
I went on to provide a defeasible, contingent, reductionist characterisation
of the ontology that is the subject of scientific study, providing a metaphysical
basis for the idea that the world, rather than being the totality of nonredundant
statistics, is instead the totality of stochastic ergodic and nonergodic information
sources. I argued that although such information sources (dynamical natural
systems with dynamical structures) are intrinsically statistical by dint of being
stochastic: it is the stochasticity that existentially depends upon and is a nec-
essary, but underdetermining condition for, the existence of information sources
thus defined.
In the previous chapter I presented a new informational statement of phys-
icalism, which is intended to strengthen the best existing conception of phys-
icalism. In this chapter I revised David Armstrong’s a-priori analytic (in fact
Armstrong’s metaphysics is significantly contingent) eliatic principle, developing
an information theoretic version which defeasibly defers to FOSIR. This is by
way of an argument that there is no information without the right kind of phys-
ical spatiotemporal structure, and that in fact all information must reduce to
very specific feature of such structure(s) (their configurations or arrangements.)
Quantitative communication and transmission theories generally deal with
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physical information generation, encoding, transmission, decoding, reception,
and processing. Quantitative algorithmic theories of information generally present
measures of information in terms of numbers of structural units or the length of
formal descriptions and/or atomic string objects. According to FOSIR, causally
induced configurations of spatiotemporal causal structure (CICS) is both a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of information. In this chapter
I moved from a general statement of this to a specific, defeasible, contingent
scientific-metaphysical statement of it, which I can now summarise thus:
IS1 (Informational Structuralism 1): Information is (reduces to
and is identical to) the causally induced configuration/arrangement
of any I-obtaining physical structure, the configuration or arrange-
ment of which has been caused or causally induced (via causal path-
ways) by some other causal spatiotemporal I structure(s), or to
structure(s) that reduce to such structure(s) (CICS information here-
after.)
IS2 (Informational Structuralism 2): I structure(s) reduce(s),
on a defeasible basis, to nonuniform heterogeneous regions of the
I-obtaining quantum field.
IS1 is essentially a statement of OSIR. IS2 is a statement of FOSIR, and
embodies the identity between I-obtaining physical structure and nonuniform
regions of the heterogeneous quantum field, defeasibly.
This is the limit of my development of FOSIR as a source-centric (I-obtaining
stochastic CICS system centric) scientific metaphysics of information, until fur-
ther work in the last chapters. In the next chapter I will outline a causal
indicative conception of the semantic content of information as I have charac-
terised it thus far, and in so doing I lay a foundation for (but not complete) a
solution to the symbol grounding problem.
Part III
Intrinsically Semantic
Information, and Further
FOSIR-CICS Source
Ontology Development
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Chapter 5
Information is Intrinsically
Semantic, but Alethically
Neutral
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I argue that, according to the CICS-(F)OSIR conception of in-
formation, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrin-
sically semantic. It’s intrinsically semantic on a reductionist and non-alethic
basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal path-
ways, often in conjunction with transduction and encoding. Similar arguments
have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation (see §3.3.1
p111 and §4.4 p158.) The upshot of using OSIR as a scientific metaphysics of
information with indicative semantic content is that there is no need for any
separate theory of semantic information (a claim familiar from Adriaans’ differ-
ent view that semantic content is already accounted for in classical information
theory and complexity theory Adriaans, 2010.) Thus in chapters one through
four I’ve presented the ontological basis for a theory of intrinsically semantic
information. I will argue it also constitutes an informational theory of truth
where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and
strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral
intrinsically semantic information.
The possibility of the naturalisation of information is the central metaphys-
ical issue in this thesis (Floridi, 2011c, 42-3.) Closely allied with the debate
about whether the metaphysics of information should be naturalised at all, and
if so, how, is the question of whether the metaphysics of any theory of semantic
information should be naturalised. I think that information as I have charac-
terised (CICS) it is intrinisically semantic on a causal and indicative basis, and
that therefore no additional separate semantic theory of information is neces-
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sary. The former is naturalised and thus so is the latter. This view is not
common.
Philosophers and mathematicians have offered several theories of semantic
information, mostly based upon a variety of mathematical constructs. The first
serious attempt at a semantic theory of information is arguably that of Rudolph
Carnap and mathematician Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952
1), according to which Shannon’s statisticalist conception of information consti-
tutes a description of the metaphysics of information (although it is less clear
what this actually means that might be expected). Carnap and Bar Hillel
produced a theory of the semantic information based upon a definition of the
information content of sentences that are state descriptions (descriptions of the
state of a Shannon source). The content reduces to a possibility space of state
descriptions: specifically those that do not obtain at the source. This approach
was adapted from Carnap’s logical probabilities (Carnap, 1945; Carnap, 1950)
and the principle of a space of possible information source states (source alpha-
bet) as presented in Claude Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication.
(Dretske, 1981) also adapted elements of Shannon’s theory to produce a theory
of semantic information in which semantic content reduces to the intentional
content of the information in a physical signal produced/caused by a physical
Shannon source construed in a certain technical statistical manner.
According to Floridi’s informational structural realism, which he labels ISR,
and his strongly semantic theory of information (§5.7 p200), data representation,
and data as representing structures, can be non-physical concrete or abstract
differences de re. OSIR-CICS does not allow either. According to (F)OSIR,
CICS - and therefore information - necessarily reduces to structural physical
nonuniformities that are non-binary and in re (refer to §6.2 p208, 44.) The
(F)OSIR conception of information is dataless, and according to OSIR data is
a structured representation of a selection of information from an I obtaining
source system.
Floridi has argued that such a physicalist in re conception of information
as that which I present here cannot explain the nature and semantic character
of information, and he has produced a theory of strongly semantic information
that is linked via his conception of data and cohering clusters of data, via a
correctness theory of truth, to his ISR. I oppose Floridi’s position by starting
with the following premise/hypothesis:
P1) CICS information is intrinsically semantic on a causal basis, and
no separate special theory of semantic information is necessary.
Dretske’s theory includes a conception of intentional information content of
a (physical) signal that is not dependent upon mind and language based repre-
sentations like sentences, messages or statements (Dretske, 1981, 75-7.) Floridi
has referred to this kind of conception under the head of naturalising informa-
tion and as an externalist naturalistic conception of information: externalism
about information (Floridi, 2004a, 54; Floridi, 2010b, 42.)
1See also Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1953;
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I’ll argue that I CICS information is intrinsically semantic in a number of
different ways on the basis of causally sustained indication similar to that which
is the basis of Dretske’s informational signal intentionality. It indicates some-
thing about the existence and, to varying degrees, about the configuration of
the upstream source(s) and causal pathways (also sources) that causally in-
duced it (Dretske, 1988a, 58; Dretske, 1981, 42-4.) However, my claim is that
this does not make CICS sources and information alethic, but only makes them
truthmakers:
P2) Intrinsically semantic (I CICS) information is not alethic: it has
no alethic value.
Information’s semantic content comes from the indication of causally up-
stream CICS-reducing sources. Floridi’s strongly semantic information “is not
a truth-bearer but already encapsulates truth as truthfulness” (Floridi, 2010c;
Floridi, 2011c, 106.) Dretske asserts that there is no such thing as false informa-
tion and what is normally referred to as “false information and misinformation
are not kinds of information - any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks
are real ducks”(Dretske, 1981, 45; Floridi, 2010a, 92.) Floridi’s view and that
of Dretske is that information has an alethic value because it is only ever true
and cannot be false (Floridi, 2005a, 25, 30.) However, I will argue that this
is a misconstrual of the relationship between information and truth, and that
this is demonstrated by the fact that according to the aforementioned assertion
information is always true, which outcome seems to be alethically redundant.
I suggest that what should have been claimed is that only information bear-
ing structures are real. My view is that information is not true in any truth-
functional or alethic sense. My argument is that information is not truth apt
and neither is it a truth-bearer. Nor does it encapsulate or embody truth. To
ascribe alethic value to information is to commit a category mistake.
Put otherwise, when compared to a correspondence theory of truth, this
theory says that it is not an item picked out in the world that is the truthmaker
for encoded information (including descriptions and statements.) Instead, the
CICS information of the sources contributing to the configuring signal plus the
signal as a CICS source constitute the truthmakers. According to most familiar
terms and concepts in philosophy P2 can be taken to be either just confused,
or else a contradiction, or both. However, the (F)OSIR-CICS conception of
information and P1 provides a way of avoiding any contradiction. I take this
to be hinted at by the intuition shared by Floridi and Dretske that there is no
such thing as false information.
Thus I will propose that I CICS information - reducing as it does to features
of structures existing according to physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural
realism - is a special kind of truthmaker. Truth reduces to I-CICS information,
and not vice versa. A consequence is that I endorse what Floridi has called
an informational truth theory: a theory according to which “an informational
approach can explain truth” (2010; 2011, 34.) Information is a non-alethic
truthmaker.
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To help establish P1 and P2 I will analyse certain concepts in both the
weakly and strongly semantic theories of information. Initially, however, I will
introduce some background to semantic theories of information - specifically
those of Devlin, Dretske, and Carnap and Bar-Hillel.
5.2 Logical Probabilities and Situation Theory
5.2.1 Devlin’s Abstract Infon
Situation theoretic semantic information theory carves the world up into states
of affairs or situations (Devlin, 1991, 20-7.) A situation is exactly what it
sounds like: a scenario or state of affairs involving different objects and inter-
actions between them. The situation is a part of the informational logic – the
logic based upon information – the development of which Devlin attempts as
his primary endeavour. Unusually, the nature and ontology of information was
a somewhat secondary and supporting concern in making information the basis
of Devlin’s new logic (Devlin, 1991, 4, 6, 10.) According to Devlin’s theory, con-
crete situations encapsulate and embody information: they are informational.
The situation where a reader is reading this sentence is one which is full of
information.
Devlin’s semantic theory of information models the situation using a col-
lection of abstract representational atoms or elements called infons. Infons are
an abstract semantic or meaningful constructs that represent parts of the sit-
uation (Ibid., 45-6, 46-7.) Floridi adopts the infon in his own later theory of
strongly semantic information, marrying it to his conception of data. Infons are
semantic both because they can correspond to elements of the concrete mate-
rial situation, and because they can be true or false depending on whether or
not the situation actually exists as described by the infon. As such, abstract
situations and abstract infons are part of the theory, and an infon can exist
without mapping to any real situation and yet is still regarded as informational
or information-bearing (Ibid., 11.)
An infon is an abstractum with no “form of physical existence”. Its syntac-
tic representation describes a set of individuals (objects), a predicate expressing
a relation between those individuals, a truth or falsity indicator that states
whether the relation holds between the objects, and parameters indicating a
time and location of the relation between the objects. An infon is made true
by a situation, but does not have to correspond to a concrete situation. Devlin
defines Infons as “semantic objects, not syntactic representations.” (23.) In-
fons as semantic physical symbol based representations have meaning in terms
of corresponding to real world states of affairs and entities: real or concrete
situations.
The real situation where I am typing this sentence in Glenbrook at 11:00
p.m. makes true the item of information or infon expressed as:
σ  @@ Typing,Bruce, ThePreviousSentence,Glenbrook,11  00p.m.,1 AA
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The relation or predicate is Typing, since Bruce (an object) was typing the
sentence (an object.) The objects in the situation captured by this particular
infon that are the things related by the relation (the relata): Bruce and the
previous sentence. The location and time parameters are Glenbrook and 11:00
p.m. respectively, and the 1 is a polarity which can have the value 0 or 1 corre-
sponding to true or false to indicate that the situation is either real or not real
respectively. This approach to information is quite different to Shannon’s, ex-
cept that the situation, like the process that produces information in Shannon’s
theory, is regarded as the origin or source of the information:
[D]ifferent [cognitive] agents are capable of extracting different
information from the same source (situation.) (Devlin, 1991, 14)
Infons, then, describe or represent information sources. Consider the infon:
σ  @@ Splashing,SpecificToddler,Bathwater,Bathroom,Bathtime,1 AA‘
This expression representing a semantic infon would be made true by the
situation (source) where an actual specific toddler is splashing water in a real
physical bathroom at bath time. The splashing toddler situation is a dynamic
causal process: a source of information. A situation is where the information
first exists and comes from. To write down an infon that is true, however, it
might seem that one need not have received information from the situation as
a source: the specific concrete situation simply has to be objectively real. An
infon – a semantic abstract entity or construct that represents - is made true
if the situation which it represents a part of is real. However, the infon is still
somehow comprised of information if the situation does not objectively obtain
(such that the polarity parameter would be 0 not 1.) Herein lies the problem.
There is clearly no way of establishing the truth of a situation in terms
of information for representation without information causally acquired from
the situation as a concrete causal structure via signal transmission (and some
complex encoding procedures using many ontologically differently implemented
effective source code alphabets.) One simply cannot encode into a physical rep-
resenting structure (involving physical symbols) the information that the toddler
really is or was splashing in the bath without some causal pathway from the
splashing-toddler situation to the encoding symbols/structure. A true descrip-
tion based on objective correspondence is perhaps tenable without such a causal
linkage or flow of information, but an encoded informational representation is
naturally/physically necessarily not possible.
Infons are the semantic mathematical abstracta used in Devlin’s theory to
represent parts of concrete and abstract situations. Although information is said
to originate in and be part of concrete situations, and infons are abstract se-
mantic structured representations of parts of such situations, infons as abstract
constructs themselves become informational and information bearing - what in-
formation itself is somehow comprised of on Devlin’s theory. Although Devlin
is a professed naturalistic realist about information who assumes “that there is
such a thing in the world as information”, this abstract infon-centric approach
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makes a coherent definition and conception of information elusive. This ‘infonic’
approach invites formalism driven ontological descent, because the infon, which,
in Devlin’s and Floridi’s characterisations, can be abstract (in a Platonic sense)
due to its designation as an atom of information taken to be an abstract com-
modity per Dretske’s liberal naturalised conception of information. The descent
occurs when the (Platonic) abstract infon, the representation of which can be
deployed as an apt representation of a concrete situation of some kind, is taken
in and of itself to be informational. Such an abstractum is not informational,
as it has no real transmission-apt structure. Especially according to the terms
of my characterisation or information as the causally induced configuration of a
structure which necessarily reduces to structures inhering intrinsically in re in
the quantum field (CICS+QFT), a representation of such and infon is a itself
pseudo-representation that picks out a pseudo-source (pseudo-situation.) The
abstract infon itself if a fiction, and not a real information source: it is not part
of the ontology of the world because it is not an information source. To assert
that it is informational - carries information content in its representing structure
- is an error. This is more than just the idea that the pseudo-representation of
the abstract infon deployed as a pseudo-representation of some upstream sources
is false as a truth bearer from a correspondence theoretic perspective. It’s the
assertion that there is no such thing as a real abstract infon information source:
it’s a virtual source. I introduced the concept of virtual sources at §2.3.1 p68
and develop it further below at §5.6 p199.
5.2.2 Carnap and Bar Hillel : Abstract Information Con-
tent
Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory of semantic information requires that semantic
information content is realised in abstract spaces by abstract entities: by the
abstract negations of abstract state descriptions or propositions. Information is
realised as a set or class of ‘something’:
We have committed ourselves to treat information as a set or class
of something. That set of something is E - the set of information
content elements of a sentence or state description. (Carnap and
Bar-Hillel, 1952).
Carnap and Bar-Hillel were attempting to address the semantic shortcomings
of theories developed from Shannon’s quantitative theory, which specifies no
semantic aspect of information. They define a formal language Lpin such that
there are n individuals a1, a2, . . . , an and pi primitive properties P1, P2, . . . , Ppi
that can apply to the individual. There are thus pin possible atomic statements
(also called atomic sentences or basic sentences) which look like the example
P1a1 (object a1 has property P1.) A disjunction of such atomic statements (a
molecular sentence) is called a content element:
A disjunction which, for each of the pin atomic statements, con-
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tains either this statement or its negation (but not both) as a com-
ponent, will be called a content-element.
The class of all such content-elements (molecular sentences) that are L-
implied (logically implied) by a given atomic statement i (or Piai) constitute
the information content of the atomic statement . This is denoted Conti:
A content-element is defined as the negation of a state-description, and the
content of i Conti - as the class of the content-elements L-implied by i.
Conti applies to factual state sentences and propositions – those based
upon empirical observation the truth of which is determined by material facts
- and to analytic sentences the truth of which is established purely logically.
Since a state description will be a conjunction of some atomic sentences (or else
what Bar-Hillel and Carnap call Q-sentences), the negation of a state description
will be a disjunction comprised of the negation of each atomic sentence in the
(molecular) state description. For example, if there is a system with three
individuals or objects (n   3) a, b and c defined to be humans, and two properties
pi   2 M designating male (with M or F for female) and Y (with Y or O
being old), then given state description:
1. Ma , Y a , Fb , Y b , Fc , Y cth is is i),
its negation will be
2. Ma , Y a , Fb , Y b , Fc , Y cth that is, i)
which is logically equivalent to
3. Fa -Oa -Mb -Ob -Mc -Oc
Hence 2. and 3. are both referred to as content elements by Bar-Hillel and
Carnap (see the previous two quotes.) Now, VZ is the class of all pin molecular
state descriptions i that can be formulated from a certain set of n individuals
and a certain set of pi properties. Ri is all of the state descriptions in the class
of pin state descriptions that L-imply i. Ri is called the range of the state
description i.
Alternatively formulated, i says that the universe is not in one of those states
which are described by the Z in VZ Ri, where VZ is the class of all Z. Just
as i is L-implied by every Z in Ri, so it L-implies the negation of every Z in
VZ Ri. We call these negations the content-elements E of i and their class
the content of i, in symbols Conti.
In our example, one of these would be 1. above which L-implies Ma ,
Y a , Fb , Y b. Thus 2. is a negation of a state description in the range of
Ma,Y a,Fb,Y b and is one of the abstract state descriptions in that set that
realises the information of Ma , Y a , Fb , Y b (and of any natural language
sentence that expresses this.) The theory is developed at length in An Outline
of a Semantic Theory of Information, which details many theorems and axioms.
What is important here, however, is that the information content Conti of a
state description or sentence i is realised by the negations all of the abstract
state descriptions which describe how the world is not if I states how the world
actually is. Thus information content is most certainly realised in abstract terms
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by abstract entities. Even if Carnap is not a Platonist about such entities, and
this position is perhaps tenuous at best (W.V.O Quine argued that he could not
avoid the charge because the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for the
existence of platonic mathematical entities commits the mathematical realist
Carnap to Platonism Alspector-Kelly, 2001, 93-94, 99-100; Quine, 1951; Quine,
1960, 275), then we still have information realised in an abstract space where
there is no physical structure and no kind of source.
Carnap and Bar-Hillel offer Conti as “an explicatum for the ordinary
concept ‘the information conveyed by the statement i’, taken in its semantic
sense.” It is said to be so because, at minimum, if atomic statement i L-
implies atomic statement j then Conti includes Contj. If Carnap’s denial
of Platonism holds, then the conception of abstract information here might
be taken to be information as abstracted from facts and expressed in factual
state descriptions. This would involve something more like Aristotelian in re
physical realism about information. In Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s semantic theory
the information content of an asserted factual sentence with observational or
empirical terms is realised when the sentence is asserted about an obtaining
state of affairs. Analytic sentences or state descriptions including mathematical
statements are taken to have null information content. The information content
of ‘2+2=4’ is null. A true factual sentence is required for non-null information
content. It thus very much seems that this confirms the intuition that semantic
information can only exist in real physical facts: real physical states of affairs
or structures. That there is no such thing as false information or information
existing apart from real facts and data – without concrete (but not necessarily
physical) information sources and data - is certainly asserted by philosophers like
Dretske and Floridi. This doesn’t negate the fact, however, that in its existing
form, Cont(i) ascribes the realisation of information to negations of abstract
state descriptions in the range of a given state description: an abstract set of
abstract descriptions of all the ways the world is not for specific individuals and
predicates.
Bar-Hillel and Carnap also develop measures of amounts of semantic infor-
mation based on E. This seems very much to assume that (semantic) information
exists in such a way as to be mass-quantifiable. It seems unintuitive at least to
describe something assumed not to be real (all of the state of the world that
do not obtain) in any world using a mass term, without the mass term being
any more than metaphorical, or else fictional-nominalist. I should not impose
my own style of materialist realism upon such measures, and yet it remains the
case that if the mass term is nominalist-fictionalist in nature, then according
to Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s theory the fiction is about something that does not
exist. Thus it seems that a fictionalist mass term is arguably also inappropriate
and invites the attribution of category error. To say one can apply a measure to
the number of utility belts that Batman does own seems plausible, but to apply
a measure to the number of utility belts he does not own seems implausible. I
cannot offer a better analysis here than to say I think it is arguably inconceiv-
able in the manner that round squares are inconceivable. That said, I do not
think that conceivability entails possibility in any case (contra David Chalmers
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and many other serious opponents Chalmers and Balog, 2009).
Bar-Hillel and Carnap offer two different implementations of a measure of
the amount of information in a state description: conti (note the small ‘c’)
and infi. The former delivers numeric values based upon logical probability
spaces, the latter is a similarly derived analogue to Shannon’s quantitative infor-
mation measure . The measure of semantic information in an analytically true
mathematical sentence is 0. On the other hand, the Conti (content, large ‘C’)
of an L-False mathematical statement is maximum since a logically false state
description L-implies all possible state descriptions. However, even Platonists
about information like Floridi and Dretske agree that there is no such thing as
false information. False information and misinformation: these are “not kinds of
information - any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks are kinds of ducks”
.
Natural information like that intrinsic to DNA, RNA and proteins is never
true or false: it is always just information. It can be affected by noise sources
(yet other causal structures) which may result in less complete or lower fidelity
imprints of the configuration of the sources which caused it. Noise, however,
does not make information false – just noisy.
Approaches like that of Devlin and Bar-Hillel and Carnap, and that of
Chalmers and Jackson, 2001 (345), rely on real abstract descriptions or rep-
resentations of various kinds. Such descriptions are inherently abstract. This
results in situations where the abstract descriptions that realise information
content are taken to exist before that which is described. This has the unde-
sirable result that the information of a physical structure or situation is not
only abstract and exists apart from any concrete state of affairs, but exists as
a description of the concrete structure prior to the existence of the structure
itself. Descriptions are about concrete structures, sources or situations. When
information is equated with abstract descriptions the information is taken to
exist apart from and before that which is described .
The problem with description based or description-centric theories of seman-
tic information is revealed in the use of the preposition ‘about’ with reference
to information associated with some entity or situation. Consider the sentences
“I want information about troop movements” or “This is the information about
that test subject”. What these statements respectively can be seen to mean
in terms of the structured situations in question is “I want a description in
natural (or formal, or mathematical, or scientific) language that captures and
encodes information from the troop movement situation” and “I want a descrip-
tion/theory in natural (or formal, or mathematical, or scientific) language that
encodes information from the test subject entity and/or the situation of the
experiment on the test subject”. In order to have information about specific
troop movements or about specific test subjects in the prepositional sense, it is
naturally necessary that information must be acquired from the situations and
entities in question. This acquisition may be very indirect, and may involve the
combination or synthesis of the information with that from other sources. Nev-
ertheless, information must come from the sources in question and its acquisition
must be effected through causal pathways.
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There seem to be two senses of information implicated here, one which is
ontological and pertains to the arrangement and structure of facts and objects
in the situations of interest, and one which is epistemic and based on descrip-
tions thereof. Observe that the descriptions in the above scenarios can only
be developed by encoding information that has been causally acquired from
the concrete structure of existing situations and entities. Acquisition of in-
formation existing in troop movements or a test subject is achieved by causal
observation and measurement in concrete situation or entities via channels that
necessarily must reduce to physical signal pathways and thus causal pathways
(Ladyman et al., 2007, 208, 210, 212-14.) Descriptions and theories are encoded
to re-represent the information in the CICS information of their own physical
structures. Structural and non-descriptive information exists in the concrete
situations and entities before the causal acquisition and encoding of informa-
tion produces any descriptions using certain rule-based codes involving symbols
and natural language lexicons. Information is not (identical to) descriptions.
Descriptions causally encode information causally acquired from physical struc-
tures and situations. Descriptions (and other kinds of representations) are not
prior to the information they encode, unless they have been encoded from a
very similarly structured situation and are thus apt encoders.
Information can not exist ontically prior to the structured distal source in
and from which it originated. Such structured distal information sources must
be physical and causal, otherwise no information can be acquired or transmit-
ted from them. A representing structure that was encoded (including construc-
tively) on the basis of similar sources in the past may be an apt structure to
use to encode representations of the new source, but such a prior apt represent-
ing structure is not the information in the new source itself: it is only apt to
represent it.
Correspondingly, given two concrete structured situations or sources SA and
SB which have the same structural configurations, the information in SA is not
in fact the same as the information in SB :
SA  SB  αi S
A
 
α
i S
B
Read as “that the structure of source A is isomorphic to the structure of
source B does not imply that the information of source A is identical to the
information of source B”. In fact, the stronger modal result applies:
 n  SA x SB,SA  SB , αi S
A
 
α
i S
B
Read as “it is not possible that if SA and SB are not identical (the same
source), and SA and SB are physically isomorphic, that the information of SA
is the same as that of SB”
Dretske argues that if information sources SA and SB generate identical
messages, the (semantic) information generated by (information source) SA is
not the same as the information generated by SB precisely because it was not
generated by SB , but by SA. The intentionality of the generated information
– which becomes the informational content of a signal in Dretske’s theory – is
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determined by the specific individual source which generated it. The information
generated by SB is of and from SB , it is not of and not from SA.
Descriptions referred to as ‘information about’ SA are naturally/physically
necessarily based on encoded information causally acquired from the structure
of SA. Roughly, if you and I both tell Sally “My pet rabbit died”, we are giving
Sally the same message (the signal might even be a duplicate) but not giving
her the same information. This applies even if your rabbit and my rabbit (two
physically separate rabbits) are identical physically in every respect, and died
in exactly the same way in the same place. It is relative to the structure of each
of our respective dead rabbit situations as sources. Thus Dretske rejects that
information is some kind of universal, and I agree.
If we both tell Sally that her one and only pet rabbit (a third distinct rabbit
source) died in exactly the same words, then we are each giving Sally a duplicate
of the same message, and we are also giving her the same (core) information.
However, this is because in the case where it is Sally’s rabbit that has died the
original source of information for both encoded messages (descriptions) is the
same causally upstream dead rabbit situation. (see §5.4.1 p190 below for more
about accidentally and incidentally co-varying structures/sources.)
5.3 Dretske’s Information Semantics
Scientific theories, explanations and descriptions all use information to encode
representations of the information at/of natural sources. Scientific representa-
tions are developed using instrument (and observation) captured emissions as
signals through causal pathways from such system-sources: i.e. via physical in-
formation channels (See also Ladyman et al., 2007, 208, 212.) Due to the dynam-
ics of necessary partial representation in effect complexes and causal pathways,
there will necessarily be only a partial isomorphism between the structures of
any scientific representation - which structures supervene upon the information
at the entities (sources) supporting the representation - and the spatiotemporal
configuration of the represented system-source. The physical and causal dynam-
ics and constraints underlying information loss (see section 1.v and (ii) above)
enforce what pragmatic pluralists refer to as the necessary partial character of all
scientific representations including all models and descriptions (Mitchell, 2009,
23, 31, 33.; Wimsatt, 2006, 684.) Scientific explanations require descriptions
(Among other things: models, diagrammatic representations, mathematical al-
gorithms etc.) Descriptions are produced by semantic sentential encoding of the
results of analyses of effect complexes from natural systems (raw data) acquired
through necessarily casual instrument and observation interactions.
According to Dretske physical signals used to transmit encoded physical sym-
bols produced by a source (caused by the consecutive successive physical states
of a source and transitions from one state to the next considered discretely)
have intentional information content. Dretske argues that the intentional infor-
mation content of an individual signal depends upon the satisfaction of three
requirements, two of which are expressley quantitative:
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1. The signal carries as much information about s as would be generated by
s’s being F (where s denotes a source and F denotes the current state and
structure of the source)
2. s is (in fact) F (In other words, the state of the source s is I F )
3. The quantity of information the signal carries about s is (or includes) the
quantity of information generated by s’s being F (and not, say, by s’s
being G)
Dretske’s probabilistic conception of information in a signal depends upon a
statistical measure of the quantity of information (which measure is also referred
to, somewhat confusingly, as the information.) The problem with 3. above is
that the quantity of information encoded into the signal tells one nothing about
which state obtained at the source:
It is not clear what it could mean to say that one quantity
(amount of information the signal carries) is (or includes) another
quantity (amount of information generated) when this is meant to
imply something more than numerical comparison. (Dretske, 1988a,
64.)
Aboutness has been lost as the probabilistic Shannonian conception only
makes measured quantities available. More importantly, the measure is one of
an amount of something, but the measure cannot sensibly be taken to be that
which it measures.
In trying to identify the semantic content of Shannon information, Dretske
goes on to isolate a single signal rather than an average of signals and messages
(sequences of symbols constituted by sequences of physical signals produced in
a medium by an encoder) over time as important (18.) He then defines the
information content of a particular individual signal as the likelihood that a
certain state obtains at the source based upon i) the message received at the
receiver and ii) a factor k which constitutes the receiver’s previously acquired
knowledge of the possibilities that can obtain at the source (Dretske, 1988a, 65,
80-82.)
The introduction of this k factor places stress upon the externalist nature of
the conception of information that Dretske starts with: the conception of the
nature of information is no longer I with this apparently epistemic ‘k’-factor
characterisation deployed (See Taylor, 1987, 100.) However, Dretske then offers
a simpler statement of the information content of a signal that is intentional
by way of being what I will call (using the terminology Dretske uses in his 19)
indicative:
The information content of a signal is being expressed in the
form “s is F” where the letter s is understood to be an indexical or
demonstrative element referring to some item at the source. What
the definition gives us is what philosophers might call the signal’s de
re information content. (66)
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This is in line with 2. (See above.) Dretske here introduces the concept
of (intentional) reference in relation to the signal caused by a source. F is a
specification of the nature, structure, and properties of s. I regard this latter
non-probabilistic aspect of Dretske’s conception of the information content of a
signal - with some adjustments involving the elimination of statistical constructs
and elements - as the right conception with which to proceed. However, there
are some distinctions to make and some more conceptual work to be done with
the ontology.
I suggest that where information is concerned correspondence, intentional-
ity (or intentional reference), and indication are all importantly different. In
bringing to bear the ontology of physicalist structural realism upon indication,
my conception of indication differs only slightly from Godfrey-Smith’s: “Indi-
cation is a relation between types of states of affairs; indication relates facts,
not things.” (Godfrey-Smith, 1992, 285.) I agree that the indication is between
states of affairs, in so far as these are sources and are CICS structures. However,
because physicalist structural realism provides the ontology of CICS informa-
tion, things are retained in the ontology as themselves structured sources or
states of affairs. With physicalist structural realism the relation in question
has to be constituted of physical causal pathway(s) - the indication relation is
causally sustained.
Put otherwise, usually intentionality is about one structure picking out an-
other structure in the world somehow on some basis (a relation of some kind is
implied) - with the means of the picking out being abstracted out. The inten-
tional content is just picked out or pointed to somehow. Godfrey-Smith points
out that Dretske seems to equate the somehow with the actual causal pathway(s)
for the intentional content of a representation (Godfrey-Smith, 1992, 285-6.)
Thus I am not the first to argue that indication and/or causation are the basis
of a naturalistic information-theoretic conception of semantic content (Dretske,
1988b; Dretske, 1995; Godfrey-Smith, 1992; See Stampe, 1986 for an application
specifically to representations. Kripke’s causal reference chains are an important
example.) However, I am not aware of any approach according to which the
indication is the necessary and sufficient condition for information of any kind
to be semantic, and this is characterised by all of the following together:
 Being physically causally sustained (via causal pathways from a physical
state of affairs or source.)
 Non-alethicity: having no alethic value, truth functionality, or bivalence
associated with it whatsoever.
 Non-mathematical/Non-computational: having no statistical or constructed
mathematical elements as necessary existential conditions.
 Anti-Platonist: having no reductive basis or existential dependence upon
any Platonic and/or transcendental abstracta.
i.e. That the indication is I-indication: it is mind, language, computation,
mathematics and theory independent in the sense that it necessarily does not
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existentially depend upon nor reduce to any of these ontologically. It exis-
tentially depends upon the causally-induced configuration of structures which
are either identical to or else reduce to heterogeneous bounded regions of the
quantum field, or upon structures which reduce to (or in some cases super-
vene upon 2.) Refer back to §1.3 p37 for the introduction of this important
‘short-hand’ abbreviation for The element of defeasible principles and theoris-
ing meta-metaphysically and methodologically applies even here, but in order to
overturn, say, the non-dependence on mathematics condition (as Max Tegmark,
or perhaps one of numerous pancomputationalists, seeks to do) would require
serious contingent verification and demonstration.
Importantly, there are multiple naturalisations that can be either associated
with the naturalisation of information and/or semantic information, identified
with either, or taken to be their basis. They include, but are not limited to
naturalisation of:
 Semantic content (Millikan, 2009; Fodor and Society, 1987)
 Representation(s) (Stampe, 1977; Godfrey-Smith, 1992; Stampe, 1986)
 Perceptual knowledge (Dretske, 1981; Dretske, 1988b)
 Beliefs or doxastic content (Dretske, 1988a)
 Structure
 Causation
 Concepts
Stampe was concerned with the naturalisation of representation on the basis
of causal indication (Stampe, 1986, 109-11). There are other ways in which to
naturalise representation commensurate with different degrees of liberal natu-
ralism with respect to what can participate in the ontology, and with respect to
different choices for the basis for a naturalistic conception of information. De-
vlin’s approach to naturalisation of information has a situation theoretic basis,
and calls into service the concept of the infon, which can be abstract. Devlin
also deploys Dretske’s concept of information as an abstract commodity, but he
still regards hi approach as naturalistic, and Dretske is overtly naturalistic since
his entire effort is based upon the naturalisation of information. Carnap and
Bar Hillel had an overtly naturalistic disposition in developing their theory of
semantic information. Dretske’s project was to develop a naturalistic epistemol-
ogy based upon a naturalisation of perceptual knowledge by way of something
standing as an information theoretic alternative to justified true belief, which
required naturalisation of information (using what was in fact an anticipation
of scientific metaphysics 3).
2The supervenience base must reduce in accordance with the defeasible identity theory.
That is - it must be either identical to or else reduce to configurations of structured, bounded,
heterogeneous regions of the quantum field
3There is very limited a priori conceptual analysis in Dretske, 1981
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According to my approach, naturalised representations (naturalised accord-
ing to causal indicative terms and causally induced configuration of structure)
are not identical with information, but are encodings of information.
In the next section I will develop the conception of causally sustained indi-
cation as the basis of the intrinsic semantic content of I-CICS information.
5.4 Semantic Intrinisic Indication
I’ve argued that states of affairs as sources must be causal CICS structures to be
informational. CICS Indication is something like Dretskian signal information
intentionality. However, a very specific thing - label it ι - does the job of sus-
taining and making real the picking out of the indicated structures and states
of affairs by the indicating structure(s.) ι is the set of physical spatiotemporal
causal dynamical structures that constitute the total causal pathways between
the causally upstream or precedent source structures and any causally down-
stream/impacted structure of interest.
Dretske allows that intentional information transmission (and informational
representation) can exist based upon a virtual channel where a destination and
source are correlated in terms of their structure. Causality is distinguished from
information transfer such that the latter can occur without the former (Dretske,
1981, 41.) I take ι1...n to be a set of n C 1 CICS pathways from the indicated
structure in the world to the indicating structure(s.) Moreover, I suggest that
the existence of ι1...n between CICS structures is a necessary condition for CICS
indication to obtain. If there are no such causal pathways then there is no real
indication, nor transmission of information (consistent with Dretske, 1981, 76-7,
1988, 55-6.)
I suggest the semantic content of information is constituted of and reduces
to causally sustained indication or indication along causal pathways - to ι1...n.
The minimum semantic content of any information source is the indication that
some concrete spatiotemporal causal state(s) of affairs (CICS states of affairs)-
causally upstream in the causal pathway(s) - exist(s.) Both the causal pathways
and original sources from which causal complexes or chains of cause and effect
emanate and originate are ι1...n indicated by, and are part of the semantic
content of, any given CICS informational structure. At minimum their existence
is I indicated. There does not have to be any informee with any perceptual,
cognitive, or epistemic access to either the sources or the causal pathways.
ι indication is not some transcendent entity, nor some kind of quantity,
nor reducible to a non-physical transcendent relational entity. Indication re-
duces to causal pathways (ιs), and these are I-CICS informational. The various
upstream contributing concrete sources/states of affairs (including the causal
pathways themselves) can be regarded as semantic-content (and information)
contributing information sources. An information source is defined according to
information science and communication theory as a stochastic physical process
or a dynamical system, and more basically as a CICS structure.
Dretske has closely associated and even equated signs with indicators. I
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propose that signification is not type-identical to indication, largely because
semiotic properties and other properties usually taken to be important to the
obtaining of a sign are not a necessary condition for an indicator. I suggest that
a sign is a sufficient condition for the obtaining of a structured rule-based or
regular signification of some kind. CICS indication is not signification, and is
not a sufficient condition for the existence of such a sign. However, indication
is a necessary condition for it to obtain according to the CICS-FOSIR theory I
am proffering. The existence of a sign is a sufficient condition for indication to
obtain.
Dretske’s conception of a natural sign is influenced by H.P. Grice’s concep-
tion of natural meaning. Natural meaning is the meaning that obtains when
the physical structure and accompanying properties of the physical symptoms
of measles indicate the existence of a measles virus, or when the structure and
properties of smoke means that there is a fire (Grice, 1957, 375-7.) Dretske
proposed that natural signs have meaning because they are indicators:
Natural signs are indicators, more or less reliable indicators, and
what they mean is what they indicate to be so. (1986, 18.)
The semantic content of Dretske’s natural signs - what they indicate to be
so - is the material states of affairs and/or facts that caused them to exist or to
be configured the way that they are, via ineliminable causal pathways.
Only indication is required as the reductive basis of all CICS informational
semantic content - not sign-based signification where a sign is any kind of pre-
configured, constructed, rule based, or even (physically) nomically regular struc-
ture. I suggest that there are different kinds of indication depending upon what
about the upstream causal sources is ι-indicated: existence or else past existence
(existential indication), and their configuration or arrangement (configurational
indication. See below.)
5.4.1 Accidental/Coincidental Covariance of Structure is
not Transmission
It is a necessary condition of the contingent FOSIR-CICS characterisation of I
information is that it can be physically transmitted, and that this is a sufficient
condition to adduce the I-obtaining of information. Covarying or correlated
structures SA and SB with no intermediate causal pathways may contain infor-
mation, but there is no information transmission occurring between them, and
thus one cannot be about νi or otherwise represent the other unless the two
are linked uni-directionally by other causal pathways: those introduced by an
observer of both sources, for example. i.e.   SA νi S
B , SB νi S
A, but
 SOνi S
B,SOνi S
A (common internal cognitive and perceptual structures
of the observer O will be configured by A and B observations.) Note that trans-
mission is not a necessary, but only a sufficient condition for the I obtaining
of information. However, accidental covariance is not information transmission,
and is not a sufficient condition for transmission.
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An accidental formation in the sand on the beach that closely resembles the
structure of one’s face encodes and carries no information in, from, of, or at
(ιi,
φ
i ,
ω
i , or 
α
i ) one’s face unless an observer of both the sand and the face
is introduced (For notation refer back to §1.3.1 p41.) Placing one’s face in a
plaster mould does involve a causal encoding of information (the configuration
of the plaster structure) from and of one’s face.
Communication systems can involve virtual channels based on a co-variance
between two structures, but such virtual channels always reduce to multiple
causal signal-realising pathways. For example, source A may send a duplicate
physical signal to receivers B and C so that the structure of the state of each
receiver is similarly causally updated and configured. There is thus a virtual
channel between B and C based on the structure of A and the signals it causes,
even if there is no uni-directional direct causal pathway for carrying signals
between B and C. Yet without the dual causal pathways from A to B and
A to C, there would be no structural co-variance of B and C (Dretske, 1981,
74.) Causal pathways and causally sustained co-variance are ineliminable in
information transmission.
There are no circumstances under which two accidentally co-varying sources
SDR1 and SDR2 (or a source and a destination/receiver structure) can involve
the transmission of I information. This is true even if both sources (or source
and destination) are being observed via causal signal pathways by one observer
S0 - or in other words if there are causal signal pathways from SDR1 and SDR2
(see Fig §5.1 p191.)
Figure 5.1: No CICS pathways, thus no signal pathways, thus no channel, there-
fore no transmission
In most cases the longer two sources are observed the less statistically likely
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it is that they will continue to accidentally covary. If there is some nomic
causal constraint that persists the covariance, then that means that there is a
high statistical likelihood of a common upstream source for the covarying and
apparently causally unconnected structures/stochastic process/systems (that is
- they are not really causally unconnected. see Fig §5.2 p192.)
Figure 5.2: If SDR1 is Platonic the problem is worse.
If there is an observer of both sources, then the observer (if an epistemic
agent) might get the impression that there is either a virtual or actual channel
between SDR1 and SDR2, but this is not made true by the reception of intrinsi-
cally semantic representing informational structures in the form of signals from
both sources (see Fig §5.3 p193.)
If on the other hand the intrinsically semantic CICS structures are being
transmitted in the other direction, then there is a possibility of actual covariance
and a virtual channel if the signals are co-ordinated at the S0,(see Fig §5.4 p194.)
5.4.2 Configurational ι-indication
The above presents a problem. It looks basic and uncontroversial that fruit flies
A and B still naturally I ι-indicate something about each other’s structures and
CICS configuration and thus about each others’ information. I will refer to this
as configurational ι-indication. Configurational indication can be symmetric
between the upstream causal source/structure and the downstream causally
configured source/structure if both exist together.
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Figure 5.3: The addition of a receiving observer still does not result in trans-
mission from SDR1 to SDR2
Godfrey-Smith observes that Dretske’s original (1981) conception of natu-
ralistic semantic indication is unidirectional, and as such it is like existential
ι-indication ( 285-88.) With configurational ι-indication, I suggest it does not
matter what direction the causal pathways have, or how multipart and complex
they are. Thus if A and B are carrots, and if C is a plaster cast of carrot A, C
should indicate something about B even if B as a structured source is not in any
of the causal pathways leading to C. This is because the common properties
between A and B are sustained by spatiotemporal causal pathways involved in
the evolution and distribution of carrot species genotypes. Thus both carrot A
and carrot B are connected to each other by spatiotemporal causal pathways
going back to the same ancestor carrot D, and both carry the same natural kind
of carrot DNA/genes because of that causal heritage, and their causally induced
structures reflect this (Various teleosemantic conceptions of information in the
philosophy of biology rely upon something like this, but for representations. See
Shea, 2007b.)
My argument is that CICS information is always intrinsically semantic by
indication. Since existential indication does not always exist between sources
indirectly linked by causal pathways (non-unidirectional in the case of fruit fly
siblings), perhaps existential indication cannot be the right kind of indication
to provide the semantic content of CICS information. Perhaps it should be
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Figure 5.4: If a common source updates both destinations with the same signal
then there is a virtual channel between the destinations
eliminated from consideration or even from the ontology. That is undesirable as
it is the most basic ontic component of indication. The other move is to identify
a different kind of ι1...n-indication as applying in the sibling fruit fly (common
causal ancestor) circumstance: the ι-indication of configuration (configurational
indication.)
Thus, according to the CICS approach, C does not indicate anything of B
or of the structure of B unless either:
i. There exist causal pathways between B and C such that the structure of B
causally induces some change in the configuration of the structure of C.
or else, both:
ii. A and B have common causal origin source D such that their structures
are mutually partially isomorphic due to D AND
iii. The kind of ι indication is not existential ι indication.
Causal existential and configurational ι-indication are I ontological simples.
Each is sufficient to make CICS information intrinsically semantic, but only
causal ι-indication is definable thus (S0 (partially) represents S1 by indication
IFF there is transmission between S1 and S0):
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S0 θ ∆
i
S1 ∆
i
S1 σ S0 (5.1)
Correspondingly (this is a short digression which makes good use of our
notation from §1.3.1 p44 for the purposes of clarity):
S0 θ ∆
i
S1  j∆
i
S1 σ S0 (5.2)
For ι1...n indication, the indicated structure, causal pathways, and indicating
structure all have to exist or else have I-existed. The indicating structure (at
the end of the causal pathways) at minimum must still exist. Below I will argue
that ι1...n indication can be symmetric between the components of ι that exist
simultaneously. If both upstream source structures, causal pathways, and down-
stream configured structures already exist (the sources and causal pathways may
no longer subsist after participating in the causal pathways) the direction of the
causal pathways does not matter for certain kinds of ι1...n indication.
Take two structured entities A and B that are similar in structure on some
basis. This could be by way of being of the same natural kind or of the same
artificial origins: A and B could both be carrots, or quarks, or red giant stars,
or pencils. If there is a third structure C whose microstructural configuration
is causally influenced, affected, or induced by A, then C indicates something
about/of (I prefer ‘of’) A - at minimum that A exists or did exist to participate
in the upstream causal pathway. I will call this minimal ι-indication of present
and/or past existence existential ι-indication.
By using some theory of universals and/or by identifying the importance of
common properties shared by A and B, many philosophers would claim that C
reveals something about B by way of indicating something about A. However,
there is now an apparent problem. If resemblence or category membership is
infdication, and all CICS information is intrinsically semantic on the basis of
ι1...n (causally sustained) indication, then it does not look like the information
(per CICS) is always intrinsically semantic.
This is because it seems to be just wrong that a common causal ancestor D
of A and B together with the causal pathways DιA and DιB delivers an I ι1...n
indication of existence from A to B or vice versa. In other words, in terms of
existential ι-indication, it does not look like A existentially indicates B or vice
versa. A and B do not each mutually I indicate that the other exists even in
the case where all of A, B, and D and their adjoining causal pathways I-exist.
The existence of B does not depend causally upon nor I-indicate the existence
of A and vice-versa, even though they both existentially depend causally upon
D. A and B both existentially indicate D, but not each other. D and the causal
pathway DιA are part of the indicative semantic content of A. Likewise for D,
DιB, and B.
A and B can existentially ι-indicate structures upstream in the causal path-
ways only. Fruit fly A existentially ι-indicates a parent fruit fly D, but it cannot
existentially ι indicate a sibling fruit fly B: the existence of one sibling fruit fly
cannot ι-indicate the existence of another sibling fruit fly with a common causal
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(parent) origin. A response is that perhaps they can existentially ι-indicate
each other by resemblance - or by covariance of their structures. After all, their
structures are quite complex at both a genetic level (LoA if you like) and at
the phenotype level, and the more complex and heterogeneously constituted in
terms of natural kinds - such as different biochemical and macro-organ struc-
tures, the less statistically likely it is that they co-vary closely or closely resemble
each other. In the next section I will attend to that response, and then proceed
with development of the principle of intrinsic indication.
5.4.3 Representation
According to Dretske, natural signification/indication is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the obtaining of mind and language independent natural
representations (Dretske, 1988a, 56.) Dretske’s Type I and II representations
are mind and language dependent and intentional, and non-natural in Grice’s
sense. Dretske reserves “the idea of representation for something that is closer
to...Grice’s non-natural meaning in which something can mean that P without
P ’s being the case.” (Ibid.) Dretske describes Type III systems as natural
representations on the basis that they have innate I natural indicator functions:
Natural systems of representation, systems of Type III...have
their own indicator functions, functions that derive from the way
the indicators are developed and used by the system of which they
are a part (Dretske, 1988a, 62.)
Critically, natural representation is different to conventional non-I represen-
tation because “in contrast to systems of Type II [for which the indicating func-
tion is externally determined by other systems including cognitive systems as
conventional] the functions indicating what these signs represent are...independent
of...extrinsic factors”(Dretske, 1988a, 62.)
Now according to Dretske a (Type III) system of natural signs can misrep-
resent (Dretske, 1988b, 68.) Moreover, natural signification/indication is only
one necessary condition for a system of natural signs to be a representation.
However, Godfrey-Smith notes that although Dretske has weaker and stronger
conceptions of indication, it seems that he always “thinks of indication as re-
quiring perfect correlation...there is no such thing as misindication” where the
correlation is a statistical one based upon nomic constraints and background
conditions (192, 289.) Natural lawlike regularities are also a necessary condi-
tion for natural indicating signs (and systems of signs) to be representations
(Dretske, 1988b, 57-8.)
According to Dretske, truth is a necessary condition for information to obtain
(Dretske, 1981, 45, 46, 81-2.) Importantly, the indication relation is the relation
that realises intentional information content of a signal (Dretske, 1988b, p58-9;
Dretske, 1981, 43-5, 76.) Thus natural indication cannot be misindication, and
so is effectively always true. It follows that there always exists information of
natural indication. Signs (and systems of signs) with an innate I function of
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naturally indicating are false natural representations to the extent that they fail
in their function to indicate depending upon lawlike regularities (1988, 68.)
I am claiming that in fact information does not require truth as Dretske
asserts (Dretske, 2008, 29-31), but vice-versa. Moreover, innate indicating func-
tion is not a component of, nor a necessary condition for, the I CICS conception
of natural representation.
I will denote I CICS representation ‘µ-representation’. The necessary and
sufficient condition for CICS µ-representation is a set µ1...n of n C 1 CICS
causally sustained partial structural (configurational) isomorphisms between
the features of the configuration of indicated structure(s) in the world and
the configuration of the indicating structure(s.) That set of partial struc-
tural isomorphisms determines what is picked out from the configuration of
the source/indicated structure(s) by the configuration of the indicating struc-
ture(s.) These mappings can be of any natural objective mind, language and
computation independent kind, as long as they reduce to or themselves map to
CICS causal pathways.
Therefore, according to the CICS account that I am presenting, the fact of
the presence of configurational ι-indication is only one of two necessary condi-
tions for natural I µ-representation - never a sufficient condition. The set of
partial structural isomorphisms and what they pick out is the other necessary
condition. It helps here to think mathematically. Both the (causally sustained)
isomorphisms and those aspects of the configuration of the indicated source
structure they pick out can be identified, labelled, and enumerated: they are
each a real set of concrete entities. They answer the question “What is picked
out from the configuration of the source structure by the configuration of the
indicating structure and how?”. Configurational ι-indication is just the fact
of the existence of the isomorphisms. It answers in the positive to the ques-
tion “Is configuration picked out from the source/indicated structure by the
indicating structure?”. µ-representation is thus the content of configurational
ι-indication. They are not the same thing. Therefore natural (biological or
otherwise) representing and/or signifying (Sarkar, 2005) structures construed
as alethic cannot equate to, nor be a necessary condition for, causally sustained
ι1...n configurational CICS indication.
Lawlike regularities are not one of the necessary conditions for either config-
urational ι-indication or µ-representation, even if they play a causal part in the
governing of the causal pathways and partial structural isomorphisms. I’ve no
space to expand here, but lawlike regularities result in a richer kind of natural
representation than µ-representation. Neither are indicating functions a nec-
essary condition for I µ-representation. It is Dretske’s (functionalist) natural
representations and CICS µ-representations both that are alethic in different
ways. The information of configurational ι-indication is not alethic: it just
exists as a set of partial structural isomorphisms.
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5.5 Non-Alethic Intrinsically Semantic Informa-
tion
According to the CICS conception and characterisation of semantic information
it does not make sense to speak of information as either true or false. What
does make sense is to speak of the presence or absence, or, more specifically,
the existence or non-existence, of information. I am proposing that conceptions
of alethicity and truth functionality do not apply to (CICS) information itself:
only to CICS-informational natural I µ-representations.
Thus indication is not a sufficient condition for alethic value for informa-
tion. Indication in representations reduces to the intrinsic indication - CICS
information (existential and configurational.) Dennis Stampe has pointed out
that there are certain requirements for naturalistic conceptions of representation
(largely in the context of internal representations and propositions) and that “
a causal theorist must provide the required reconstruction of the notion of a
truth condition” (Stampe, 1986, 127.) According to the approach that I am
articulating existential and configurational ι-indication are necessary but not
sufficient conditions for µ-representation. µ-representations both indicate and
represent, but clearly it does not follow that ι-indication and µ-representation
are the same thing.
Existential ι-indication involves indication that a causally upstream struc-
ture exists only : it is the indication of a material fact or of the obtaining of
a material state of affairs. It indicates nothing of the nature or arrangement
of the causally upstream structure or source, except that it exists and is spa-
tiotemporal and causal. Configurational ι-indication is the fact of the existence
of a causally induced and sustained partial structural isomorphisms between
the configurations of the indicating and indicated structures. It is also distinct
from existential ι-indication because directionality of the causal pathways can
be mixed, rather than unidirectional between indicating and indicated structure.
CICS µ-representation is what of the configuration of the source structure(s) is
in fact indicated - it is the partial structural isomorphisms and the information
of the source structure(s) as induced in the indicating structure and what it
picks out in the source.
The semantic content of CICS information is just the causally-sustained I
indication of the upstream causal information sources: minimally what is I indi-
cated is the existence of those sources. Consider the simple example of a coconut
striking a mud bank. The presence of the indentation I indicates (minimally)
the existence of the coconut and the event of its impact. Events are also spa-
tiotemporal structures with causally induced configurations and thus they are
information sources. The configuration of the causally induced structure - the
indentation - is also an I CICS-informational representation of the configura-
tion of the causally impacting or causally upstream spatiotemporal structure(s)
(the coconut and the impact event.) Complexes of effects constituting signals
and emissions (in/from machine communication systems and celestial X-Ray
sources etc.) induce configuration of downstream structures like signals and
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energy emissions differently. Nevertheless, such causal inducement of the con-
figuration of structures via causal pathways always produces causally sustained
I indication and I representation.
Only the induced CICS µ-representation - the structural isomorphism(s)
between coconut and indentation or between source and signal - has alethic
value. The degree of isomorphism between the configuration of the coconut
(and the coconut impact event, and so on) and that of the indentation is the
degree of correctness of the representation (For a discussion of formal physical
isomorphisms see Szudzik, 2010, 502-5.)
5.6 Pseudo-sources and Virtual Sources
CICS information sources implied to exist by fictional statements (statements
about fictional entities) and putative (non-I) conventional representations of
other kinds (pictures of unicorns) do not exist and therefore no real information
exists in them. Representations of fictional sources are pseudo-informational:
they imply the existence of real information at a real singular I source where
in (material) fact there exists no such source. They are thus also pseudo-
representations. Yet they are themselves physical spatiotemporal structures,
and causally induced ones at that, and are thus information sources in their
own right. They are embodied in CICS structures. It does not follow from
this that either statements about or descriptions of fictions, or other putative
representations of fictions, are not semantic on the basis of ι-indication.
I’ll designate such implied but non-existent sources pseudo-sources. Semantic
CICS information does not reduce to statements, syntax, language, representa-
tions, or messages (including mathematical statements or other constructs.) An
informational representation of a Pegasus is both false and meaningless with re-
spect to the implied pseudo-source. However, it has ι-indication based semantic
content due to other causal sources: real horses, real wings, other informational
representations of horses and wings and representations of fictional pegasii in
the form of fictional descriptions and depictions (plus whatever other upstream
contributing sources can be identified.) In other words, a whole set of upstream
causally contributing CICS sources are indicated by the CICS (Pegasus) rep-
resentation, but no actual singular I CICS source that is not a constructed
fictional representation is in the set. In the CICS schema, I call such a set of
upstream causally contributing sources that causally induce the configuration
of a representation of a pseudo-source a virtual source. The configuration of a
token of Quine’s sentence “pink round square cupola on Berkeley College” is
causally induced by a virtual source. The configuration of the structure of an
image of a unicorn is induced by a virtual source. Pseudo-sources are not real,
virtual sources exist.
Floridi agrees with Dretske’s assertion that false information (misinforma-
tion) is not information but pseudo-information (Floridi, 2010b; 2011, 104.) It
follows that pseudo-information is real - just not real(ly) information (Floridi,
2004a, p11-12; 2011, 104, 149.) According to the I-CICS conception, pseudo-
200 Chapter 5. Information is Intrinsically Semantic, but Alethically Neutral
information does not even exist: it is not in the ontology.
I am arguing that the specific information of one or more spatiotemporal
causal structure-cum-entities (CICS structures) as sources are the semantic con-
tent for any structure(s) the configuration of which they have causally induced.
The causally-induced configurations of those downstream structures (themselves
sources and parts of sources) have ineliminable minimal semantic content by way
of indicating something about the causally upstream structures (minimally, that
those structures exist.) CICS information is a special kind of truthmaker, but
not a truthbearer.
According to most semantic theories of information, information is somehow
dependent upon and reduces to truth or truthbearers of some kind. In the
section §5.7 p200 I will discuss the kind of truthbearers that Floridi and Bar
Hillel and Carnap take to be involved. In the next section, I want to look more
closely at virtual sources and pseudo-information.
5.7 Weakly, Strongly, and Intrinsically Seman-
tic Information
Floridi’s theory is intended to redress some of the problems with that of Carnap
and Bar-Hillel, which Floridi labels The Theory of Weakly Semantic Informa-
tion or TWSI. According to Floridi’s alternative theory of strongly semantic
information, semantic information is factual if it is comprised of data that is
truthful according to the veridicality thesis. The veridicality thesis establishes
truthfulness on the basis of Floridi’s Tarski-inspired and Kantian correctness
theory of truth, which I do not have room to discuss. The veridicality thesis
states that semantic information must be comprised of information items (σs)
comprised of data (δs) where the data must be well-formed according to some
syntax, be meaningful, and be truthful Floridi, 2011b, 84, 104.)
Weakly semantic information is realised by and reduces to sets of statements
or - more precisely - formal state descriptions. They are the sets of possible for-
mal state descriptions that describe possible states of affairs that do not obtain
given a state description that describes a state of affairs that does obtain. The
information in a sentence s is the set of all state-descriptions inconsistent with
the state description that corresponds to s. In the case of data-centric strongly
semantic information, the information content of state description regarded as
an infon (σ) (a kind of information-atom) is the set of state-descriptions incon-
sistent with σ.
In the case of weakly semantic information truth (truth values in Floridi,
2011c) supervenes upon information (semantic information in Floridi, 2011b.)
Floridi asserts that truth, veridicality, and truthfulness are synonyms in the case
of strongly semantic information because they all mean “providing true contents
about the modelled system” (2011, 105.) According to Floridi’s conception,
content must be data (δ.) Weakly semantic information, however, “is not meant
as implying truth...a false sentence which happens to say much is therefore
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highly informative” (Carnap and Bar-Hillel, 1952, 229; Floridi, 2011b, 109.)
According to Floridi this is a problem. It arises because Carnap and Bar-
Hillel classify as real information what Floridi - largely following Dretske - calls
pseudo-information. Floridi’s response is to require that semantic information
both have alethic value and be true only (Floridi, 2011b, 117.)
According to the I-CICS conception, alethic value is not required to dis-
tinguish information from pseudo-information. There is no real information
associated with the range of the negation of a state description. This is because
according to the CICS conception:
1. State descriptions do not constitute information because information does
not reduce to any kind of syntactic description or statement whether con-
structed, formal, or transcendent (abstract): CICS information is I and
non-Platonistic/non-transcendental.
2. State descriptions as formal syntactic structures (spatiotemporal syntactic
rule-governed structures produced by mathematicians acting as or fulfill-
ing the functional role of complex physical encoders) although informa-
tional, are only alethic as representations of other information (existing at
causally upstream sources.)
The positive state description σ is a true (bivalently or else by degree - it
does not matter) informational representation. Its structure has been causally
induced by I-existing CICS sources. The negative formally expressed (consti-
tuted of physical spatiotemporal structures) state descriptions in the range of
the negation of σ are just false informational representations when physically
tokened. Thus, according to the CICS conception of intrinsically semantic in-
formation, neither the range of the negation of the state description nor the
state description itself can constitute semantic information. Semantic informa-
tion does not existentially depend upon state descriptions, only upon states of
affairs (situations) or information sources where situations are spatiotemporal
structures (Devlin, 1991, 69.)
Floridi refers to Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s theory as weakly semantic because
“there is no reference to the actual alethic values of the infons in question, which
are supposed to qualify as instances of information independently of whether
they are true or false” (Floridi, 2005a, 8.) This is what he calls alethic neutrality
(AN): information (with the necessary condition that it is comprised of well-
formed and meaningful data) existing independently of truth (Floridi, 2011b,
92.)
Alethically neutral weakly semantic pseudo-informational infons (σs) can be
meaningful without being true, but their lack of truth - via the veridicality
thesis and a lack of truthfulness of their constituent data - renders them non-
informational (2011, 81, 98-103.)
Such pseudo-information is “no information at all...only meaningful and well
formed data, namely, mere semantic content” (104.) It is not clear how data are
meaningful, since this cannot be on a truth-functional basis using the veridical-
ity thesis. The veridicality thesis delivers the truthfulness of data - not their
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meaningfulness. It does then seem that strongly semantic information requires
no truth for data to be semantic, but requires truth for information comprised of
data to be semantic. It does seem that items of strongly semantic information
would already be semantic by virtue of being comprised of meaningful data,
without any need for veridicality. Moreover the semantic content of information
seems to be overdetermined - or dually determined, and that perhaps even a
circularity threatens. Data is already meaningful, but information comprised
of information items comprised in turn of data are meaningful because they
encapsulate.
Floridi identifies σs with state descriptions in Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory
(2005, 8.) However, it is not clear what the data δ that Floridi elsewhere takes
to comprise items of information (σs) correspond to. It seems that they could
correspond also to state descriptions - those in the range of the negation of the
positive state description that Bar-Hillel and Carnap stipulate constitute its se-
mantic information content. This would fit with the Kantian transcendentalist
conception of information that Floridi espouses if the state descriptions of the
possible non-obtaining states of affairs are transcendent. In this case however
it is arguable that the data are only transcendant descriptions of possibilia.
My ontic charge is that such cannot constitute a basis for any real informa-
tion. Moreover it is not clear how such possibilia are also relata of any kind -
transcendental or otherwise.
In any case, Floridi rejects the idea that semantic information can be false
as Bar-Hillel and Carnap assert. He requires that information is necessarily true
only by correctness of data included/encapsulated within the infon(s) compris-
ing the information.
According to the I-CICS account, Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory of semantic
information is really a theory of semantic syntactic formal non-I representations
of information. Such representations are syntactic symbol-sequence structures,
and are thus informational when expressed physically and syntactically. Like
any other informational structures, such syntactic expressions have a causally-
induced configuration. In the constructive case - where state descriptions are
only formal a-posteriori synthetic constructs (conventional encodings of infor-
mation) - this involves complex mind-dependent syntax.
It does not seem that Bar-Hillel and Carnap could admit of real state descrip-
tions as transcendent and a-priori, given Carnap’s formalism and physicalism.
This seems especially true where there are only possibilia to be described. In ei-
ther case - both constructed tokened and transcendent a-priori state descriptions
- they are not comprised of the information that they represent. According to
the I-CICS conception representations are CICS structures. Thus they are se-
mantic because they are comprised of source-indicating structure: the indicated
sources can be actual or else virtual (comprised of actual sources.) The existence
of a representation is not a necessary condition for ι-indication to obtain and
thus not a necessary condition for CICS structures to be semantic. Thus the
state descriptions of Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s theory are not semantic informa-
tion content. They are syntactic language-dependent CICS representations of
information and pseudo-information. Representations are alethic. Information
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isn’t.
Truthful data comprising Floridi’s strongly semantic information can some-
how exist transcendentally in non-extended noetic and Platonic spaces. Thus
the range of the negation of a true state description on Carnap’s formal terms is
prospectively comprised of relational differences and data (δ) in non-extended
spaces that can or could constitute real information. According to the I-CICS
theory of semantic information, however, information does not reduce to atomic
data of any kind, but to the configuration of I-CICS structures. There is simply
no actual information indicated by the range of the negation of a state descrip-
tion if it is not physically tokened. When physically tokened or expressed, the
total structure is a representing CICS structure the same way as the positive
description token is. Real information can not reduce to a set of possible states
(of the universe/world or of a source) that could obtain, nor to the objective or
subjective reduction in uncertainty associated with the obtaining of the actual
state of affairs or state of the source (or of the universe or state of affairs taken
as a source.)
It might follow from the existence of a certain CICS structure that it does not
exist as some other possible structure, but this is not what constitutes informa-
tion according to the I-CICS conception of intrinsically semantic information.
Biting the physicalist and non-transcendental bullet for information - sets of
possible structures or possibility spaces somehow comprised of the same are not
informational. Even if they are considered somehow to be I, they cannot be
CICS. Probabilities might be CICS (frequency data or physical propensities of
some kind) but probabilities are not possibilities. At a stretch, we could regard
possibilities as physical frequentist event sets to make them CICS, but this is
very radical. Such sets of events would be CICS information sources in their
own right, and it would be their collective virtual source configurations that
constituted the information. It is not clear how possibilities as we normally
consider them would fit with this picture.
Floridi’s conception is Platonist or transcendental since Platonic and non-
extended entities can comprise data and are therefore informational. With the
requirement that the data to which semantic information reduces must be both
true and syntactically meaningful in place, Floridi’s semantic information must
be or becomes a kind of truthbearer. Semantic information itself has alethic
value: it is always necessarily true.
The common feature of different representationalist conceptions of informa-
tion including both strongly and weakly semantic information is that informa-
tion exists as or reduces to message structures and constructed syntax of some
kind used to produce them. According to the I-CICS conception of informa-
tion, such structures are only representations of information, or else pseudo-
informational representations if they do not represent any I-CICS information
sources.
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5.8 Conclusion
I have provided a conception of intrinsically semantic causally induced informa-
tion that explains how the semantic content of concrete sources (actual infor-
mation) and pseudo-sources (virtual information) obtains, but the most salient
outcome that I hope I have demonstrated is that even fictions that are in some
cases thought to be Platonic must reduce to physical information sources at
some level - or else they will naturally necessarily not involve any information
at all.
Recapping, according to the I-CICS conception:
1. Information is intrinsically semantic because of causally sustained indica-
tion, and
2. Information is not alethic, and
3. Information is not comprised of, nor does it reduce to or supervene upon
data or any relational entities - especially transcendent relational entities.
4. Pseudo-information is not only not real information, but does not really
exist: there is no pseudo-information in the ontology because information
either exists or it does not.
5. Informational representations can be pseudo-informational, not because
pseudo-information exists, but because they imply the existence of I CICS
sources of information where no such sources exist: they ι-indicate virtual
sources and represent pseudo-sources.
I’ve argued that we should dispense with the idea that information has
alethic value, and also no special separate additional theory and conception
of semantic information is necessary or desirable. In a very real sense, informa-
tion is the alethic value of any representation that encodes it. According to the
conception and theory of intrinsically semantic ι-indicative I-CICS information,
all CICS structures are semantic by indication along causal pathways alone -
that is by virtue of the existence of causal pathways from I-CICS information
sources.
I have argued that the way to deal with the problem of informational but false
state descriptions is not to require information to have alethic value, but instead
to recognise that information is not and does not reduce to the kind of thing that
has alethic value. According to the I CICS conception to think of information as
true or false is a category mistake. Instead of asking whether information is true
or false, the correct question is whether or not there is or I exists information.
According to this approach, information is a special truthmaker. Information
does not reduce to mathematical or other mind, language, and representation
dependent constructs like statements, nor to any kind of abstracta such as state
descriptions of possible ways the universe either is or is not.
Information is not a syntactic truthbearer that could even be false (or true
in the sense of being veridical or corresponding to something) in the first place.
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The problem of informative false state descriptions is instead a problem about
representations only because semantic information is not what Bar-Hillel and
Carnap said it was. Shannon’s conception of a possibility space of possible
states of a source constitutes a measure of information - not information itself
- which according to Shannon’s theory requires an actual physical source and
source states.
Bar Hillel and Carnap’s and Floridi’s conceptions are inadequate as theo-
ries of semantic information. They are instead theories of strongly and weakly
semantic representation. The informational ontologies of weakly and strongly
semantic information are different enough to suggest that almost any alternative
is permissable. I have suggested the physicalist I-CICS theory of information is
simultaneously a theory of intrinsically semantic information.
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Chapter 6
The QFT-Structure
Identity Thesis
6.1 Introduction
This chapter brings my work with QFT based field ontology and source ontology
closer to work done by other philosophers of information in the context of what
are sometimes called informational structural realisms. My revision of NOSR
will be further developed here. I present further development of, and argument
for, the scientific metaphysical identity thesis of CICS structure and selected
structure inhering in re in the quantum field/vacuum, where I take the quantum
field to be I-obtaining according to the definition at §1.3 p37.
I will then evaluate the ontology that this delivers with reference to the
NOSR of both Ladyman and Ross, which I will argue is inherently information-
theoretic by dint of its deference to I-obtaining stochasticity as well as Ladyman
and Ross’s own earlier references to information channels as necessary to scien-
tific realism, and to the NOSR of other ontic structural realists (Michael Esfeld
and Vincent Lam, Simon Saunders) and philosophers of information (Luciano
Floridi.)
I will further develop the idea of eliminativism about relations as ontologi-
cally prior to structure, and thus turn most OSR ‘on its head’ by different means
to that deployed by Ladyman and Ross and Steven French. I’ll regard not only
properties and relata, but also relations, as features of structure - not its basis
(see especially section §6.6 p242.) My view is that this is the best candidate for
explaining the nature of the structure which ontic structural realism is realist
about on a scientific metaphysical and contingent basis. Thus, this is further
support for the identity argument (H2) and the source ontology argument.
The overall argument that goes with the identity thesis is that information
exists in the ontology of the world intrinsic to CICS and is not just an artifact
of theory and modelling. To achieve this I use induction and deploy and further
develop the indispensability argument according to which reference to informa-
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tion (or else to I-existing features that involve transmission, encoding, or gen-
eration) is in many scientific theories as indispensable as references to structure
or patterns. Daniel Dennett is not a reductionist about what he has called real
patterns (Dennett, 1991. See my discussion below at §6.3.2 p221), but one way
of summarising my argument and proposed metaphysics is that such patterns
necessarily realise information and are ubiquitously referenced and represented
in scientific theories because they are ubiquitious in the I-ontology about which
the scientific realist is realist.
I will proceed by first (§6.2 p208 and §6.3 p213 ) discussing Luciano Floridi’s
influential and important conception of infon-reducing data having an existen-
tial basis in de re nonuniformities, and compare this to my own FOSIR-CICS
approach for the ontic basis of information.
6.2 Nonuniformity and Heterogeneous Fields
In this chapter, reference to the quantum field is reference to what physicists
call the universal quantum field. The scientific metaphysics of information I
propose requires that information existentially depends upon the existence of,
and ineliminably reduces to, the causally induced configuration of I-obtaining
physical structures. The structures in question are construed according to a very
specific physicalist and reductionist NOSR (where the R is about I-obtaining
structures) motivated by scientific realist scientific metaphysics such that they
either are or else ineliminably existentially depend upon and reduce to non-
uniform/irregular physical structures, which in turn reduce to (or - defeasibly -
are identical to) heterogeneously constituted classical fields and bounded regions
of the quantum field (Cao, 2003b, 63; French, 2014; Cao, 2003c, 4, 16, 18) - in
the physical sciences. The nonuniformity in question is nonuniformity in an I-
obtaining physical structure or a structure that reduces to I-obtaining physical
structures that reduce to heterogeneously constituted fields.
Informational structural realisms have been proposed before, but not specifi-
cally as field ontologies, although there have been efforts to reconcile NOSR with
QFT (Cao, 2010, 204.) I am also not original in identifying non-uniformities as
the reductive basis of both structure and information. Floridi does this with his
ontologically neutral data/non-uniformities (Floridi, 2004a; Floridi, 2011c.)
Floridi’s metaphysics of information is not physicalist, but is reductive.
Floridi reduces semantic information to data, which he defines as nonunifor-
mities constituting difference relations at minimum. Floridi’s diaphoric non-
uniformities de re - or data de re - are one of three diaphoric non-uniformity
based data:
I. de re : I abstract, constructed, and natural (but not physical), as with non-
uniform fields. Includes what I refer to as physical in re non-uniformities
(Floridi, 2011c, 83-4; Floridi, 2009b, 15-17.)
II. de signo : I natural and constructed contrasting states.
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III. de dicto : I natural and constructed contrasting symbols.
(II) reduces to (I) according to Shannon’s theory and the definition of sources
as stochastic processes, and as dynamical systems according to more recent
mathematical communications theory. This conceptual and ontological reduc-
tion of (II) to (I) is also compatible with a four dimensionalist view of the
universe, which is compatible with contemporary quantum mechanics and cos-
mology in physics due to Minkowski’s spacetime model, which is also deployed
broadly in QFT - both in its Lagrangian and algebraic manifestations (Swanson,
2017, 204, 215.) This maps to the idea that information in I natural sources in
science is encoded into other I obtaining structures. Complex encoding (which
includes, among other things, neurologically reducing physical information pro-
cessing sources) delivers constructed CICS reducing representations.
(III) is important to the symbol grounding problem ( Taddeo and Floridi,
2007), but in the natural case also reduces to (I) as in the case of natural syntax.
Floridi explains the concept of non-linguistic syntax as that involving libraries
of symbols, pictographs, and such (Floridi, 2011c.) The idea of natural syntax
follows easily from this and from Shannon’s theory, according to which contin-
uous, analogue, stochastic information sources involve alphabets of such things
as waveforms (Shannon, 1998; Gallager, 2008, 16, 71-2, 85; Orlitsky and San-
thanam, 2003; Hayashi, 2017, 599.) My approach applies ontological reduction
to both de signo and de dicto uniformities, reducing them to complexes of in
re non-uniformities. According to the physicalist CICS approach that I am
proposing, there is no such thing as a non-physical, non-causal, transmission
and encoding incapable information bearing or informational non-uniformities
de re. All differences de re reduce to non-uniformities in re, but not vice versa.
It is important to understand that a non-uniformity or structural feature is not
the same type of thing as a difference, although it may incoporate a difference.
Floridi discusses differences de re and non-uniformities de re as if they are iden-
tical concepts (Floridi, 2008a, 234-6, 247.) Yet, differences do not have to be
part of the same structure. There is a basic logical and categorical difference
between a frog and a quark, but we would not readily think of this as a struc-
tural nonuniformity. I think that this confusion/conflation of difference with
non-uniformity partly arises from discretising (including digital/binary) data
centric metaphysics. Floridi eschews digital ontology, but in a sense retains it
in the binary of non-uniformities de re that become more like differences de
re. Floridi analyses non-uniformities as binary differences de re since he asserts
a-priori that “in its simplest form, a datum can be reduced to just a lack of
uniformity, that is, a binary difference, like the presence and the absence of a
black dot, or a change of state, from there being no black dot at all to there
being one.” (Ibid., 236.)
Floridi is aware of the metaphysical quandry he faces in reconciling differ-
ences de re with differences in re (concrete):
if a datum is a difference, then a datum is an abstract thing, as a
difference is an abstract, rather than a concrete thing. But this raises
210 Chapter 6. The QFT-Structure Identity Thesis
a severe problem, if data are supposed to be the basic objects in our
structural realism (assuming that this is supposed to be structural
realism as a possible position in philosophy of science). For the
structural objects need to be concrete things in the world . . . you
cannot make concrete things out of abstract things, so informational
objects do not seem to be viable candidates for the objects in an
ontological structural realism fit for the philosophy of science. (Ibid.,
247)
I think Floridi fails to overcome the problem identified in his last sentence
above, as judged by scientific metaphysics and information theory. His response
is to attempt to accommodate both kinds of difference under a transcendental
schema. Note that his metaphysics is not scientific, since he classifies science
and philosophy in the same category w.r.t empirical coherence and quality:
. . . [I]t is true that no concrete things can come out of purely ab-
stract things, at least not without presupposing some metaphysical
superpower that science (and its philosophy) had better leave alone,
if they can. However, no reason has been offered to justify the view
that data, understood as differentiae de re, may not be as concrete
as one’s definition of “concrete” may allow. . . Now, the correct po-
sition is somewhere in between: as far as the argument in favour of
ISR is concerned, data are neither purely epistemic (abstract) enti-
ties. . . nor ontic (concrete) differentiae de re inseparably coupled to
some epistemic component, as suggested by objection (6.8). They
are (or need to be treated as) ontic (concrete) differences that are
then epistemically exploitable as resources, by agents like us, for
their cognitive processes. (Ibid.)
Among other things, remarkable here is that there is a strong subjectivist
justification - requirement in fact - for the characterisation of data. At the
same time, there is an anti-platonist view, in keeping with the transcendentalist
framework.
[T]he data/differences in question can be concrete because we do
not have to assume something as radical and problematic as Leib-
niz’s . . . monads: Eddington’s package hypothesis (cVr-relata + c7r-
relations) is sufficient to support OSR. Second, it should therefore be
clear that the interpretation of structural objects as informational
objects is not meant to replace an ontology of concrete things with
one of virtual entities. . . OOP provides us with an interesting exam-
ple of how we may conceptualise structural objects and make sense of
their ontology. . . talking of concrete differentiae de re, and conceptu-
alising them as data structures and hence as informational objects,
we are defending a version of structural realism that supports at
least an irreducible, fundamental dualism, if not a Leibnizian plu-
ralism, as the correct description of the ultimate nature of reality.
(Ibid.)
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Here Floridi avoids what French would likely identify as mathematical col-
lapse, yet calls object oriented computer programming (OOP) into metaphysi-
cal service and thus delivers the same outcome via a theory of software systems
modelling. Abstraction in software engineering may be the relevant kind of
abstracting-out or abstracting-away-from kind of abstraction, but in software
systems modelling this applies to anything (abstracting away from the details
of the fictional beings in the code for a fantasy role playing game, for example.)
In OOP, it is frequently the case that engineers abstract away from - other non-
concrete abstract objects or structures (It should be noted also that in software
development and engineering, and object in code and a data structure are two
categorically different things.)
In trying to avoid a reductive ur-concept for information, Floridi largely
delivers one in a transcendental framework. I suggest that differences de re are
not the same thing as non-uniformities de re (the set of all of the the former is
not identical to the set of all of the latter), and even if they were, the “cohering
cluster of data” that Floridi builds from them using a-priori conceptual analysis
does not get us to a coherent metaphysics of information. For that we need a
scientific contingent metaphysics. I suggest that instead of coherent cluster of de
re difference data, what is required is a set of signal (causal pathway) connected
CICS information sources that can itself be regarded as an information source. I
agree with Floridi’s assertion that as an a-priori analytic formal construct “ the
relation of difference is binary and symmetric” (Ibid., 236.) Floridi’s conception
of non-uniformities is binary and reduces to de re differences, and I think that
the basis for the formulation is clearly both a-priori and confused. I recommend
that, instead, informational non-uniformities always reduce to in re non-binary
features of physical structures which reduce not to relations, but to fields. I
develop this biting of the bullet identity thesis between structure and fields
fully in chapters three and four.
According to the CICS based conception, and the adapted NOSR - which
I am calling ontic structural informational realism or OSIR - that I’ll attempt
to derive from or base upon contemporary physics, (II) and (III) both reduce
to in re non binary non-uniformities, and the only real information is that
which reduces to physical non-uniformities in re which constitute minimal in-
formation sources, which also incidentally allows us to deal with dynamical non-
uniformities. When considering what it could mean to say that (III) reduces
to (I), one easy route is to consider that some natural structures are elements
of naturally occurring lexicons of syntax: the sequences of DNA and RNA for
example. Such symbols and syntax I exist. This is not very controversial except
for the challenge from subjectivism about information.
6.2.1 The Symbol Grounding Problem
What of constructed symbols: Charles Sanders Peirce’s symbolic signifiers? How
can they be reducible to natural non-uniformities in re? Put brutely: it’s not
elegant. However, elegance is not a prerequisite for truth or correctness. Such
in re reduction involves brains, brain based physical information processing,
212 Chapter 6. The QFT-Structure Identity Thesis
cognitive transmission by linguistic encoding 1, and other symbol/message (in
the classical non-semantic Shannon sense) transmission mediums all reducing
to I-obtaining physical structures and information (with the shortcut physi-
calist reference that physical structure is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the I-obtaining of information.) Pragmatism is certainly a component of
scientific method, and it demands a lot of abstracting-out/away of information
(a lot of wilful information hiding.) If we want to know about the entire in-
formation of the system, however, we have to undo this, and especially if we
want to know about the nature of structure and information themselves. The
requisite necessary and sufficient condition for the obtaining of any kind of sym-
bol is signal/emission based transmissability or transmission, where signals and
emissions are physical causal pathways recognised contingently by science as
manipulable, realisable, and/or measurable. Any complaint that this condition
for the obtaining of informational symbols is either arbitrary, not contingent,
or unnecessarily restrictive, must be accompanied by a demonstrable way of
realising information transmission in the absence of a physical channel and sig-
nal/emission, or information generation in the absence of a stochastic ergodic
or non ergodic causal and physical source.
Symbol grounding then arguably presents a problem only if one does not
admit of the possibility of a reductionist and causal explanation for semantic
content: one that involves semantic content reducing to causal indication of
upstream causal CICS sources where cognitive symbol recognition operates by
the same mechanisms but with physical information processing introspection of
neurological sources to sustain mental representation, for example. This very
reductionist approach to semantic information does allow for a supervenience re-
lationship between structures at a higher (Floridian computer-science inspired)
level of abstraction and those at lower LoA. The reason for this relaxation of
reductionist premises is epistemic access: the causal inducement relations may
simply be practically (but not in-principle, except in the case of some kind of
naturally necessary impediment) inaccessible. I propose an encoding mecha-
nism that does not have to be troubled by any issues related to a philosophy of
mind per French’s re-iteration of Rosen’s concerns about how representations
are realised:
Thus, one way of grounding it is to appeal to some process of ab-
straction, so that we begin with concrete entities and obtain, some-
how, via this process, abstract entities by (of course) ‘abstracting
away’ certain features of the concrete. However, the nature of this
process is either unclear, or involves problematic features, having
to do with the particular philosophy of mind assumed in talk of
‘obtaining’ abstract entities (Rosen 2001) (French, 2014, 198.)
I contend that there are not really any seriously problematic features of this
process in-principle. What is trivially problematic - ergo French’s appeal to
1I am not referring here to the literal scientific conception of (natural) transducer-based
encoding except as a low level neurological partial basis for natural language use
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‘some process’ - is epistemic access to the minutiae of the mechanisms, in, for
example, the case of the neurological underpinnings of internal representations
and the encoding thereof (a CICS-source conception of cognitive information
sources is effectively tantamount to a representational theory of mind), and of
the many neurological mechanisms also involved in rendering external in-theory
representations based upon them (not least of which are whatever mechanisms
turn out to be the underpinnings of natural language processing.) This really re-
duces to a (very large) complex of encoding (at various levels of abstraction) and
transducing (at a very low level) processes (including associated stored rules.)
Such can be regarded according to the very same abstractive and interpolative
basis of interest. In this manner a scientist and their methodology and instru-
ments can be regarded as a representation-encoding black box. The encoding
processes at higher levels of abstraction and across levels of abstraction (since in
the case of natural systems especially, levels are themselves imposed arbitrarily
or else related to natural function and properties) might involve posits, trial
and error, confirmation, instrument and theory calibration, and interpolation
- at minimum. Critically, and according to the thesis and metaphysics I am
presenting, the complex of processes depends upon Constructive processes are
included in this. Just because constructive invention is used in determining the
appropriate structure/features in the I-structure to isolate and abstract out,
it does not follow that this does not constitute an abstracting of information
out from the total structure of the natural phenomena or systems. I will have
to leave further development of this idea a promissory note for the most part
due to space, but I will add that regarding cognitive processing of information
as being processing of physical information helps with a very large part of the
puzzle.
6.3 Reduction to I-Regions of The Universal Quan-
tum Field
Luciano Floridi, in his stated aspiringly non-reductive approach to the nature
of information, is interested in applying the principle of levels of abstraction
that is familiar from computer science to demonstrate that not all information
is reducible. I say aspiringly, since in the process of formulating both a theory
of semantic information and an informational structural realism, he neverthe-
less proposes a thoroughgoing informational ontology according to which it is
information that is at the ontic basis not only of the scientific image but of
material reality (Floridi, 2005b.) This latter very much seems to be a case of
ontic reduction.
Other reductive and non-reductive physicalists have spoken of explanatory
levels and emergent properties, and of levels of reality (Dennett, 1991; Mitchell,
2009; Wimsatt, 2000.) Non-reductive physicalists like Chalmers often endorse
supervenience and emergence. Like Ladyman and Ross I will broadly reject
the idea of ontological levels, levels of reality, or levels of physical explanation
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as I-existing in the material world and as something that is instead isolated
epistemically by the encoding abstracted-out information into representations.
According to Ladyman and Ross, such levels are only apparently represented.
They are in fact imposed epistemically and as formal constructive artefacts,
but do not really I-obtain in the physical world (Ladyman et al., 2007, 56-57.)
According to my approach they can be thought of as epistemically imposed
selections of features (encoded) from the entire structure of a system (refer to
the no abstract wireframe principle §3.3 p101 and §2.3 p62)
I agree with the rejection of ‘levels physicalism’ also for both I-obtaining
structure and I-obtaining information. Unlike Ladyman and Ross, Chalmers,
and Floridi I do not reject physical reductionism, since I think that causal conti-
nuity, informational closure, and primacy of physics constraint (PPC) together
with no miracles argument entail I-reducibility of all informational natural sys-
tems, even if the accessible information is partial and the rest of the information
is practically epistemically inaccessible. There is no in principle nor any con-
tingent reason why reduction of sources defined as bounded continuous and
discontinuous regions of multidimensional fields to other sources of the same
kind can’t be a reduction of scale (micro-reduction) and may be a reduction to
other physical natural kinds in some circumstances. This follows from and/or
fits with the classical and more contemporary physico-mathematical definitions
of sources as stochastic physical processes, and more recently as physical dy-
namical systems modeled as mathematical dynamical systems(Gray, 2011a, 1,
5-6, 10-11; Gallager, 2008, 5-7; Shannon, 1998, 5.)
6.3.1 The Contingent Defeasibility of Theoretical Physics
With respect to the defeasibility of physics, still in keeping with the primacy
of physics constraint (PPC), the Quantum field may contingently turn out to
actually reduce to some other natural kind (Weinberg, 1995a, 499; Cao, 2010,
210-15; Swanson, 2017, 2, 4, 6; Esfeld and Lam, 2009; Esfeld and Lam, 2008;
Esfeld, 2013; Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 135; Fraser, 2004b; Teller, 1995.) De-
feasibly, for my purposes, however, it is structure and therefore bounded regions
of fields (reducing to the quantum field) all the way down (or down as far as
physics currently goes), or to be more accurate to the ontological and conceptual
domains, all the way in or out (for some initial insights, see the conclusion of
Arageorgis, 2013.) I suggest this is the best available approach to cater for the
strangeness of both quantum superposition states and quantum non-local effects
or entanglement. It does not involve ignoring the best quantum science in the
shape of the experimental proof of the Bell inequalities in 1971 and 1984 (As-
pect et al., 1981; Bell, 1966; Clauser and Shimony, 1978; Esfeld, 2015; Hensen
et al., 2015.)
I am not postulating - without any consensus support from physicists - that
fields somehow stand in as the missing intermediary or causally mediating hid-
den variable structures that Einstein insisted must exist to account for and ex-
plain entanglement (Esfeld and Lam, 2009; Esfeld, 2013; Esfeld, 1999; Ladyman
and Ross, 2013, 135; Arageorgis, 2013, 212-213; Bub, 2005, 543-6.) Especially in
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the light of the above cited Bell theorem experimental proofs and accompanying
no signalling theorem.
The Bell inequalities and experiments for non-locality not only do not neces-
sarily, nor in-principle, undermine PCC. This is because, whatever the nature of
the causal pathway that is involved can be assumed, without concrete positive
ontological evidence to the contrary, to obey PCC. In other words, the falsity of
PCC doesn’t necessarily follow from the fact that the specific cause of non-local
effects in entanglement is not currently catalogued, nor even detectable. Such
has not been a reason to conclude that there exist non-physical substances or
existents that can sustain a causal pathway. One reason that this is appar-
ent is that entanglement evidently involves, and obeys, constant natural nomic
constraints. To conclude that PCC is false requires clear repeatable positive ex-
perimental evidence of interacting entities (hidden variables, for example) that
are demonstrably not operating per PCC and ICP (ineliminability of causal
pathways §1.3 p37). In any case, using the definition of I-existence as stated
(§1.3 p38) as a set of necessary conditions for the way in which information
would have to exist in order to satisfy scientific realism is not at odds with a
contingent scientific metaphysics.
I am saying that the best current physics demonstrates that two quantum
systems of like types (photons, gluons, muons, quarks, or electrons, and so
on for the entire standard model) will be qualitatively the same no matter
where in the known cosmos (where nomic physical constraints are known -
contingently and defeasibly - to persist as universal) they exist. My approach
can tolerate contingent discoveries that undo this, since I include defeasibility
as an element of scientific metaphysics precisely because it is an element of
science and especially theories in physics. Moreover, currently (according to
our best physics) two (or any number of) entangled particles can be regarded as
one information source, and so can regions of the fields at which they are each
quantised be taken together as one information source (Bynum, 2014, 131-35.)
The discovery of the Higgs Boson in 2012 presented physicists with a problem:
it obeyed the standard model, and thus must itself be explained by further
underlying physics. String theory considered at best a possible close defeasible
alternative pending contingent confirmation - since there is no experimental
physical evidence whatsoever for its truth to date.
The locus classicus example that bears out this defeasible theorising and
ontological disposition of physics, and its predictive power by way of encoded
representing structures, is Wolfgang Pauli’s postulation of the existence of the
neutrino (relabeled as such from Pauli’s original and now ambiguous ‘neutron’
by Enrico Fermi) to account for the excess/missing energy and corresponding
failure of his equation about energy exchange in a photon-electron interaction
to balance (Cowan et al., 1956; Guerra et al., 2014; Reines and Cowan Jr, 1953.)
Pauli found that - according to the physico-mathematical equation, electrons
were carrying off less mass than expected in β decay in the electron photon
interaction according to physics’ central tenet of the conservation of energy,
leading him to postulate that another particle must to account for the rest of
the mass-energy in what he called a “desperate remedy” (Guerra et al., 2014,
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1351):
¯v  e  p  e  n (6.1)
(Kim et al., 2013)
After initial experiments in 1953, Frederick Reines and Clyde Cowan Reiner
experimentally demonstrated the existence of neutrinos as the mathematics and
physical principles together had predicted in 1956 (Kruse, 2011; Cowan et al.,
1956.) By 1958, Maurice Goldhaber, Lee Grodzins, and Andrew Sunyar at
Brookhaven National Laboratory determined that the neutrinos have specific
physical properties such as lefthanded helicity or anti-clockwise spin in the di-
rection of their motion. The physical phenomena predicted by mathematical
modeling of physical principles revealed turned out to be real extended physical
phenomena/entities. No such conclusion or outcome is thought to be available
for the mathematical entities employed in the theory.
Another example is the recent experimental confirmation of Einsteins theory
of general relativity by means that Einstein himself never expected to be pos-
sible, declaring that “their magnitude [frame dragging effects of large spinning
celestial masses on gravity] is so small that confirmation of them by laboratory
experiments is not to be thought of” (Einstein, 1950.) I think that information
in empirical theory formalisms is realised as representations that also reduce to
CICS, but that their semantic content comes from the encoding of intrinsically
semantic (on a causal indicative basis) information at multiple levels of abstrac-
tion. Stephen Hawking’s theory of the informational properties of a black hole
and event horizon provides good support. There is doubt about the correct-
ness of the theory, but the terms of the theory are not in question with respect
to their referring to material entities and I-obtaining structure(s) and other
elements including information in information sources.
I think that this remains true for several interpretations of the nature of
information, and especially wherever the accompanying metaphysics is physi-
calist: arguably a working assumption of most science. Varying commitments
to reductionism might constitute a degree of freedom between physicalist the-
ories and/or scientists (Mitchell, 2009, 21-23.) However, I will be arguing that
in important ways information is and reduces to specifically physical structures,
and that the best applied sciences of information bear this out through their
conceptions and definitions of channels, noise, and signal transmission. This
argument is in line with my aspiration to scientific metaphysics, and so I should
demonstrate some support from science and the philosophy and methodologies
of science.
I suggest that the contingent existential basis of these structures is that they
I-obtain as and reduce to defeasibly as nonuniform, heterogeneous, bounded
(and interacting) fields (§7.1 p249.)
In other words, I am not leapfrogging or contradicting contemporary physics
and asserting that a causal structure mediates the non-local effects of entangle-
ment. I am only asserting that any physicist can take either one or both of the
entangled particles in an entangled system and treat them as an information
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source. They can be treated as apparently physically connected bounded re-
gions of a nonuniform multidimensional physical quantum field. (Smilga, 2017;
Lancaster and Blundell, 2014)
6.3.2 QFT and Scientific Realism
There are at least two basic problems with physics and Quantum Field The-
ory from the perspective of physicalism and scientific realism. One is that
there are serious debates about the ontological status of the various quantum
fields supporting standard model particle realisation. The other is that physico-
mathematical operators are common in quantum physics, and they are often
either identified or conflated with the entities that they are being used to model
and/or track. This lends itself heavily to both instrumentalist interpretations,
and to formalism driven ontological descent.
When physicists say gravity and electromagnetism are fields, they mean
physical I-obtaining fields. The mathematical apparatus that represents them
are also called fields, and they have mathematical properties. We must keep
in mind, however, that physics is replete with physico-mathematical operators
- like the operators of quantum mechanics. Field theories (plural) are taken
to describe every point in spacetime permeated by a given physical field type:
gravity, magnetic, electromagnetic, and so on:
Every particle and every wave in the Universe is simply an ex-
citation of a quantum field that is defined over all space and time.
That remarkable assertion is at the heart of quantum field theory
. . . Quantum fields are defined over space and time and so we need
a proper description of spacetime, and so we will need to use Ein-
stein’s special theory of relativity which asserts that the speed c of
light is the same in every inertial frame . . . even matter itself is an
excitation of a quantum field and quantum fields become the fun-
damental objects which describe reality. (Lancaster and Blundell,
2014, 1-2 0.1-0.2)
Since spacetime is taken to be everywhere in special relativity, so is a (or
the) quantum field. Moreover, gravity permeates all of spacetime, and to the
gravity field is likewise co-extensive with spacetime in terms of its distribution.
However, with respect to the quantum field as a basis for the existence of the
structure of physicalist ontic structural realism - and more specifically FOSIR -
there are a number of potential problems:
Pancomputationalism, Simulation Theory, and Digital Ontologies As
has been mentioned at §3.4.4 p131 and §4 p137 (see further discussion at
§7.4.2 p265), many serious and respected physicists and philosophers of
physics take some version of pancomputationalism or digital ontology, or
in some cases some version of mathematical ontology that is not statis-
ticalist (like the physical-world-as-math ontology of Max Tegmark). The
views are often interpreted as anti-physicalist, or at least non-physicalist.
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Instrumentalism about QFT As I will discuss below, eminent philosophers
of physics with instrumentalist and constructivist dispositions take it to
be the case that quantum fields are constructs in theories used to calculate
measurement outcome statistics only (See the comments of Michael Esfeld
from private correspondence below).
Concrete and Abstract Algebras There are many interpretations and vari-
ations of different versions of algebras in QFT. They are taken to avail
themselves of different ontological interpretations, or sometimes to make
no ontological (let alone physical) interpretation available. (Kuhlmann,
2015, 5.1)
QFT Interpretation There are impediments to physical interpretation of the
mathematics of quantum field theory.
So there are serious doubts about whether QFT can provide a basis for
any kind of ontology, but at the very same time, it is little doubted by most
quantum field theorists and physicists that quantum fields I-exist and that the
mathematical models of how particles and quantum systems emerge in them
frequently refer to actual physical excitations in fields. Some instrumentalist
philosophers of physics, however, are not convinced by a scientific metaphysical
approach of the kind I am endorsing and deploying:
To my mind, one has to be absolutely clear about what one task
the structures to be that are admitted as ontologically fundamental.
That is the argument for working with concrete physical relations,
such as distances. As regards QFT, a discussion of ontology makes
only sense if one makes clear which formalism one uses to solve the
measurement problem, i.e. what the dynamics is supposed to be
and how it accounts for measurement outcomes. The fields used
in QFT are operator valued fields, that is, instruments to calculate
measurement outcome statistics. You cannot build an ontology on
that. (Professor Michael Esfeld, Private Correspondence, December
02, 2017.)
At this point I make the following observations. I will do this in point form
not to be overly formal, but to make my premises and suppositions as clear as
possible:
1. I am not of an instrumentalist disposition, and neither is the CICS-FOSIR
conception of information intrumentalist or constructivist (nor is it subjec-
tivist, platonist, nominalist, or mathematicalist) and nor are fellow scientific
metaphysical endorsers Ladyman and Ross, French, and Humphries: scien-
tific metaphysics does not encompass instrumentalism.
2. Ladyman and Ross’ ontological assertion “the world is the totality of nonre-
dundant statistics” does in fact accommodate Esfeld’s above comment about
the limits of QFT for making and ontology. However, it does not have to be
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governed by it: according to Ladyman and Ross’ conception of a world of
nonredundant statistics, the statistics are:
i. Physical (Ladyman and Ross have not abandoned physicalist ontic struc-
tural realism)
ii. What I have called I-obtaining: the statistics inhering in the physical
stochasticity is theory, model, language, computation and mind indepen-
dent.
3. I take it that what Esfeld is committed to is in fact ultimately what French
has termed mathematical collapse, and comes under the head also of what I
have called formalism driven ontic descent.
4. In the context of a scientific metaphysics, there is strong support for my
physicalist I-ontic disposition about fields: that they are not just statisti-
cal constructs or formalisms based upon measures, but that they I-obtain
physically as much as Michael Faraday took magnetic fields responsible for
magnetic forces or attraction and repulsion to be physical and I-existent.
This is because in the context of the history of field theories - at least since
Michael Faraday’s discovery and exploration of magnetic fields - physicists
have considered fields to:
a. Have physical effects (Kuhlmann, 2010b)
b. Sustain physical entities (including particles and waves) (Lancaster and
Blundell, 2014; Kuhlmann, 2010a; Smilga, 2017, 18, 3.1)
c. Not just be mathematical or constructs
d. Be I-existing entities in the world with I-obtaining physical structure,
and not just to be constructs in theories and models in theories that do
instrumentalist explanatory work.
e. Be capable of participating in causal interactions where the underling con-
ception and/or theory of causality and causation is physicalist (including
mechanistic and process-orientated theories)
To me, the immediately apparent issue with considering the quantum field
to be the basis of a physicalist ontic structural realist ontology is not - as instru-
mentalist Esfeld would have it - that it’s not suited to the purpose of furnishing
an ontology by instrumentalist lights. I take this to be begging the question
in favour of theory and model instrumentalism. I will avoid engaging with de-
bates about scientific realism at this point due to scope limits, except to say
that elsewhere I have argued that, commensurate with scientific metaphysical
premises, something like a statistical re-expression of Ian Hacking’s corrobora-
tion argument - which essentially argues that if Putnam’s no miracles argument
is to be taken seriously then according to inference to the best explanation an
I-existing external physical reality is the best explanation for empirical data in
science - is more successful than generally believed. More basically, the scien-
tific metaphysical mandate requires that we give significant credence to scientific
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authority and the primacy of physics constraint (PPC). It is clear that this ap-
proach favours the scientific realist ontological disposition of most physics and
physicists.
This can be supported by reference to the way in which the various mathe-
matics of the field theories of the stand model particles and their properties are
adduced using various manipulations of different mathematical representations
of fields, but it can be more straightforwardly revealed in terms of the way in
which quantum field theorists do, and expect to, ratify their models:
The discovery of a Standard Model (SM)-like Higgs boson [1, 2] is
a milestone in particle physics. Direct study of this boson will shed
light on the mysteries surrounding the origin of the Higgs boson
and the electroweak (EW) scale. Additionally, it will potentially
provide insight into some of the many long standing experimental
observations that remain unexplained (see, e.g., [3]) by the SM. In
attempting to answer questions raised by the EW sector and these
presently unexplained observations, a variety of new physics models
have been proposed, with little clue which - if any - Nature actually
picks . . . In this paper, we make use of the Standard Model effective
field theory (SM EFT) as a bridge to connect models of new physics
with experimental observables. (Henning et al., 2016)
In response to the assertion that some physicists take such things as pancom-
putationalism, digital ontology (“it from bit”), and simulation arguments seri-
ously, I proffer that pancomputationalism is still naturalist and physcalist (it’s
physical natural phenomena that are themselves taken to be the computational
elements), digital ontology is largely instrumentalist up-front (front loaded with
instrumentalist premises about yes-no queries in theories), and in the case of the
simulation theory there is a fair charge of a looming regress (What’s running
the simulator - another simulation? Is it simulations all the way down? Are the
simulators not physical and physico-causal? If not, then given the bite of Rolph
Landauer’s claims about necessary physical representation of data in all real
cases of digital and quantum computation: why eschew a physicalist basis for
simulation and for the simulator?) The point is that asserting instrumentalism
about QFT as a premise for doubting it as a basis for physical ontology is too
quick, and largely circular, and it arguably fails the curbing premises of contin-
gent scientific metaphysics, which are themselves contingent in the context of
PPC.
Recall also that I have emphasised the defeasibility of scientific theories as
an important and ineliminable element of a scientific metaphysical outlook. De-
feasibility does not imply, nor does it entail, instrumentalism, any more than
revisability of scientific theories entails the correctness of the extreme conse-
quences of pessimistic meta-induction. Defeasibility of this kind saves me from
commitment to immutable stipulations about ontology, but does not commit
me to pessimistic meta-inductive inferences. I don’t have to follow Esfeld into
instrumentalism, as scientific metaphysics that emphasises the defeasibility of
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theories, methods, and modelling, avails me of a pessimism about theory fal-
libility with greater epistemic humility that does not require me to delete the
I-ontology to accommodate the fact of partial representation and partial accu-
racy.
It certainly doesn’t necessarily follow from the standing fact that there are
many different mathematical and algebraic approaches to modelling in QFT that
instrumentalism about QFT is true. I suspect that the truth is more closely
approximated by Hacking’s corroboration argument - the view that the reason
for the efficacy of different theory-models is that they’re all different views of
some I-existing external referent to which science has access via noisy channels
(along the lines described Ladyman et al., 2007.)
Reductionism
Reductionism causes some difficulties in philosophy and the philosophy of sci-
ence, which is a result in significant part of the varieties of reductionism avail-
able. Sandra D. Mitchell minimises its role in comparison to the importance of
emergence in complexity studies, but points out that it is impossible to remove
explanatory and ontological reductionism from scientific practice and theorising
(Mitchell, 2009.) Ladyman and Ross reject neo-scholastic reductionist overtures
about microbangings, but retain Nagelian reduction (Ladyman et al., 2007, 196-
7; 2.) Moreover, they do not reject Saunders’ view that structure may reduce
recursively and ontologically, so it is fair to adduce that they have not rejected
reductionism about I-obtaining ontic structure.
According to Daniel Dennett’s real patterns approach, which is designed to
handle the relationship between patterns in (data, theory, explanation, and on-
tology) between physics and the special sciences (and between different special
sciences), patterns in chemistry and biology can reduce - on information theo-
retic terms - to the information of the structure of underlying physical systems
(Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 110.):
Mere patterns—stable but nonredundant relationships in data—are
distinguished from ‘real’ patterns by appeal to mathematical infor-
mation theory. A pattern is redundant, and not an ultimately sound
object of scientific generalization or naturalized ontology, if it is gen-
erated by a pattern of greater computational power (lower logical
depth.) Then to be is to be a real pattern. Ladyman & Ross pro-
vide reconstructions of important concepts in philosophy of science
such as causation and laws in terms of recurrent types of structural
relations among real patterns. Most important claims that have been
thought to be laws in the history of modern science describe such
structural relations in mathematical terms that survive episodes of
theory change in approximate form. Individual objects as used by
2For an overview of Nagel’s intertheoretic reduction see this defense - Dizadji-Bahmani
et al., 2010
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people for coordinating reference to a universe organized from spe-
cific parochial perspectives are real patterns of relatively high logical
depth and thus do not feature in scientific generalizations. Further-
more, the important real patterns in science are not reducible to
facts about the intrinsic properties or natures of individual objects.
Ladyman & Ross defend a metaphysics that does not take individual
things to be fundamental. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013)
Ladyman and Ross argue (effectively, I think) that Dennett’s position in fact
commits him to both a metaphysical thesis and to instrumentalism:
However, in a now-classic paper ‘Real Patterns’ (RP; Dennett
1991a), he emerged from this [metaphysical] neutrality to frame his
view of mind in the context of . . . a distinctive metaphysical thesis.
According to RP, the utility of the intentional stance is a special case
of the utility of scale-relative perspectives in general in science, and
expresses a fact about the way in which reality is organized—that is
to say, a metaphysical fact. (Ibid., 199-200)
However, in addition to being committed to Saunders’ style of turtles [struc-
tures] all the way down reduction, it looks like being committed to scale relativ-
ity in the way that they are commits Ladyman and Ross to an instrumentalism
of their own:
Scale relativity of ontology is the more daring hypothesis that
claims about what (really, mind-independently) exists should be rel-
ativized to (real, mind-independent) scales at which nature is mea-
surable. (Ibid., 200)
Why call this instrumentalist too? Because it’s the claim that what is essen-
tially explanatory scale relativity is intrinsic to nature, but there is no reason
to assume that structure in nature respects explanatory boundaries for its or-
ganisation, and so it looks like this reasonable take on scale relativity is an
epistemic and theoretic imposition, tending toward formalism driven ontologi-
cal descent. Nature presumably doesn’t know or care about (various universalist
idealisms and the anthropic cosmological principle notwithstanding) the differ-
ence between a structure deep in dynamical protein folding and one embedded
in quark emergence by way of field excitation. That the new solutions required
for the protein folding problem combine quantum physics and DNA science tend
to bear this out. I accept scale relativity in the sense that I do in fact accept
as part of a natural structural heirarchy that can be picked out arbitrarily from
natural structures - but arbitrarily, and in arbitrarily many different ways. All
such selections involve the identification of a CICS configuration which is a
source.
What is going on is that epistemically tractable science requires the ab-
stracting out (from both measured data and representations thereof) of a lot of
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low level structural I-obtaining information. It also requires a lot of interpola-
tion by hypothetico-deductive posits to be confirmed as representative of real
I-structure. I do not deny scale relativity. A scientific metaphysics must avoid
scale invariant assertions - on contingent grounds (Humphreys, 2013, 55-6, 68.)
However, if ontic I-reduction is a fact for a system, then patterns detectable
at smaller scales can only be undetectable at larger scales due to noise and/or
limitations in data acquisition (measurement), and can only be undetectable at
smaller scales due to difficulties with isolating and associating all of the under-
lying microsystems and their microstructures due to limited resolution or else
capacity of measurement apparatus.
Chemists and biologists don’t practically attempt to reduce all organisms
and molecular systems to underlying physics(Berenstain and Ladyman, 2012,
161.) Moreover, as with most special sciences - statistical and mathemati-
cal/computational patterns do most of the work. However, it doesn’t logically
follow that such don’t so I-reduce. In the context of a scientific metaphysics,
it is non-trivially relevant to debates about reductionism that the most recent
advances in molecular bioscience - especially in research into protein folding and
protein synthesis - have come to require quantum biology, which is a paradigm
of (albeit statistically represented) physical physics-based reduction for the pur-
poses of analysis, data gathering, and explanation.
Dennett’s conception of real patterns as patterns in data requires a concep-
tion of data as something like what Landauer took them to be: representations.
Dennett’s patterns, however, can incorporate fictions, and this suggests (re-
quires, in fact) addition of (semantic) information (representations bearing en-
coded information) from cognitive sources. According to Landauer, information-
as-data representations must be physical, giving rise to a conception of data that
is similar to Aristotelian in re or immanent realism about mathematical struc-
tures. The specific nature of the appeal to mathematical information theory
in Dennett’s real patterns is unclear for this reason, and for at least two other
reasons. Firstly, there are several mathematical theories of information, and
they are not unified.
Secondly, Shannon’s quantitative theory of information offers a number of
conceptions of information in statistical terms and with reference to what are
arguably two kinds of entropy, and as Von Neumann indicated to Shannon -
there is definitional difficulty with entropy (Cole, 1993; Tribus, 1963; See §2.4
p72) - and it is not clear which part of Shannon’s theory would be appealed to
as the basis of data. Ladyman and Ross (and Collier) seek to handle this by
way of deferring to Collier’s distinction between thermodynamic depth based
upon entropy in evolution of natural systems for identifying salient (effectively
real) elements of the ontology in bioscience, but deferring to logical depth for
identifying structures that are real qua Dennett’s real patterns classification:
However, Shannon and Weaver provide only a theory of the ca-
pacities of channels for transmitting information in which the quan-
titative measure is relativized to initial uncertainty in the receiver
about the source. To obtain an objective measure of informational
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content in the abstract (that is, non-thermodynamic) sense, one
must appeal to facts about algorithmic compressibility as studied
by computer science. The important measure for our purposes will
be logical depth. This is a property of structural models of real pat-
terns. It is a normalized quantitative index of the execution time
required to generate the model of the real pattern in question ‘by
a near incompressible universal computer program, that is, one not
itself computable as the output of a significantly more concise pro-
gram’ (Bennett 1990, 142).
Shannon does not speak of patterns (the word does not appear in his 1948
paper) but of such things as sequences of symbols and ensembles of continuous
functions treated as messages and modelled using Markov analysis. Patterns or
this kind - sequences of symbols - are certainly salient to algorithmic computa-
tional approaches to, and conceptions of, information. The CICS characterisa-
tion accommodates both.
There are a host of problems for real-pattern orientated OSR and ISR. They
apply to the view of Ladyman and Ross as well as to that of Dennett and of
Floridi. I suggest that until there is a clear conception of the nature of informa-
tion and data, then there is little point talking about either Floridi’s levels of
abstraction or Bennett and Collier’s logical depth except as in significant senses
- arbitrary - rather than somehow ontologically prior. Ladyman and Ross think
that scale relativity of ontology is intrinsic to the natural world, which is why
real patterns seem to be hierarchical. As I have said above, I suspect that this
is largely an (instrumentalist) epistemic and artefactual theory-driven imposi-
tion. I take it that real patterns do exist in nature because structure is CICS
structure or structures that reduce to CICS or in some cases supervene upon
it and that they can be graded and classified depending upon whether they
can be described by patterns that are more computationally powerful (require
less detailed work with reductively basic elements and variable for greater pre-
dictive power.) Any real-pattern-cum-CICS-structure hierarchy is arbitrarily
selectable, and a different selection will yield overlapping but differently hier-
archically arranged patterns. The kind of reduction that I am talking about
when I say that structures may reduce to CICS structures includes that se-
cured through encoding and decoding (either or both of natural and artefactual
versions.)
I think that Ladyman and Ross’s approach requires a much more rigorous
definition of ‘logical depth’ than is on offer in OSR metaphysics to date (Lady-
man et al., 2007, 218). The nature of data is just as problematic, as it is charac-
terised differently and situated differently in the various ontological heirarchies
offered by Dennett, Floridi, and Ladyman and Ross. Its nature is any one or
more of relational, abstract, concrete, non-extended, I, non- I-and perspectival,
depending on the version of OSR (Floridi, 2011c, 81-4; Dennett, 1991; Ladyman
and Ross, 2013.) Data does not always seem to be the same thing. Sometimes
it is physical and I-exists in nature, sometimes constructed, sometimes only
the product of measurements, and sometimes a representation of one or more
6.4 How Does FOSIR Relate and Compare to (Other) Informational Structural Realisms 225
of these things (Landauer, 1991; Floridi, 2005b; Ladyman et al., 2007.) Thus
my own view, which involves in re structure as selectable and encodable for
representation based upon explanatory purpose and or other motivations, is
close to Dennett’s conception of real patterns as established by perspective pur-
suant to explanatory power as determined by computational power in terms of
predictive-power to processing cost ratio.
Put in simple terms - what I have said in this part of this section is that lev-
els of abstraction and scale relative scales are arguably innate and to be found
in nature and natural systems in re, but that the arrangement and heirarchy
taken to be somehow prior and intrinsic by Ladyman and Ross is imposed instru-
mentally, and per Dennett’s argument could be imposed in innumerable other
different ways because without the explanatory and epistemic requirements it’s
completely arbitrary. I think that it also follows from this that there are at least
two kinds of reduction still prevalent in Dennett’s schema - computational and
infromational - and if my characterisation of the nature of information is correct,
then the latter gives a stronger reductionism than either Ladyman and Ross or
Dennett might be comfortable with. I intend to acknowledge these problems,
but put them aside and focus on identifying and justifying an alternative ba-
sis for a physicalist reductionist NOSR: nonuniform natural-kind-heterogeneous
physical fields (identical to or reducing to the configurations of quantum fields
in both excitation and ground states). I suggest that the physicalist conception
of NOSR is retained for structures that can be considered informational or in-
formation bearing: only physical causal structures - or structures that reduce
to such - are informational. First of all, however, there has to be a reliable
conception of the nature of structures as physical - or at least as not Platonic
or abstract in a transcendent way.
6.4 How Does FOSIR Relate and Compare to
(Other) Informational Structural Realisms
Donald Gillies has put forward a similar position to Ontic structural informa-
tional realism called Aristotelian informational realism in that it is explicitly
anti-platonist (Gillies, 2010, 8 and Floridi, 2010c, 253-281 (Reply to Gillies).)
However, Gillies argues for partial-constructivist reductive physicalist realism
about both numbers and information, and has a mathematicalist conception of
information such that it reduces to mathematics and symbols. Information is
realised in the physical world, but is partly constructed by humans and partly
exists in nature (Gillies, 2010, 8, 17.) I argue that although humans encode in-
formation into representations, human construction is not a necessary condition
for the obtaining of information, including semantic information. I’m arguing
that it’s contingently apparent that the sufficient condition for the existence of
information is the existence of physical spatiotemporal causal structure(s), in-
cluding those not constructed by humans. I’ve also rejected subjectivism about
information.
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Gillies thinks that “mathematical realism might even be a special case of
informational realism” (Gillies, 2010, 8. For similar views, see Tegmark, 2008,
Bub, 2005, Bynum, 2014, Floridi, 2009a.) I favour informationism about math-
ematical entities based upon I-physical realism about information. It is realised
by - and encoded using - spatiotemporal structures, and can be thus encoded
into the physical structures of descriptions and mathematical constructs. In-
formation itself is neither reducible to mathematical constructs (although there
are certain ways in which it may be statistical if statistics and probabilities
have I-obtaining aspects), though measures of information might be. Nor is
it a universal (Barbour, 2015, 3,4,6-8.) Ontic structural informational realism
has little else apart from anti-platonism in common with Gillies Aristotelian In-
formational realism. The other common feature is the idea that mathematical
and ontic structure reduce to the same thing. However, in Gillies’ case this is
an example of mathematical collapse for the ontology of information, which is
what mathematicalist conceptions of information amount to. Gillies does not
attempt to put information in the foundation of the ontology like Floridi and
Tegmark.
Floridi seeks a kind of constructivist (he labels it contructionist) middle
ground or alternative to accomodate objectivist and subjectivist intuitions. He’s
proposed a conception of informational structural realism that is intended to be
compatible with non-eliminative ontic structural realism and epistemic struc-
tural realism. However, it does not have the physicalist commitments of the
I-Ontic structural informational realism that I am proposing (Floridi, 2008a.) I
will reject that informational ontology on the basis that it inexplicably and un-
justifiably/arbitrarily places data based upon relational entities (non-extended
relational entities) at the reductive base of the ontology (and this is not just for
semantic information.)
Floridi’s uses of the concepts of layers of abstraction that is important in
computer science for systems modelling, computer architecture, simulation, and
software modelling and design to help arbitrate the relationship between I-
structure and models (Floridi, 2011c.) However, he does this without any com-
mitment to the physicality of the I-world or its structure. Ladyman and Ross
stop short at physical statisticalism and irreducible stochasticity as the bot-
tom of I-structure. French stops at modal content. Tegmark and Gillies stop
at mathematical structure as the I-structure (so the computation independent
component of the my definition of I-may not apply.) Floridi stops at transcen-
dental non-commitment to scientific realism about I-structure. I stop at what
science currently says (with significant experimental support) is the universal
heterogeneous nonuniform quantum field, defeasibly.
Floridi combines features of ontic and epistemic structural realism to produce
what he calls informational structural realism, which he argues is compatible
with both. A primary motivation for this is that Floridi, inspired by Dretske, has
a naturalistic yet unavoidably subjectivist conception of semantic information
(Floridi, 2008a, Floridi, 2011c.) Semantic information is defined as reducing to
units of information that in turn are comprised of and reduce to (there is not
really a better way of describing the relationship) well formed meaningful and
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truthful data. The data are truthful on the basis of a veridicality thesis according
to which truthfulness is grounded in a defined purpose in a specific context at a
level of abstraction that is not I-since “LoAs are always teleological and queries
are formulated (results are offered) for a purpose, even if the purpose might be
implicit” (Floridi, 2011c, 147, 155; Floridi, 2008c, 230.) They are well-formed
according to some syntax. I think that Floridi’s semantic conception pushes back
on his ontological conception of information, forcing him into a kind of Peircian
transcendentalist idealism (which is by no means a philosophically paucit view.)
Floridi is also interested in producing an informational epistemology and a
logic of information as its foundation (Floridi, 2011c, 226, 344-5.) That logic
is inspired by modal logics and is based on the replacement of doxastic and
epistemic modal concepts (believing that and knowing that) with a modal in-
formational conception of being informed that some state(s) of affairs obtain(s.)
According to Floridi’s theory, the nature of being informed involves prior knowl-
edge of the state of a source and treatment of information as an abstract com-
modity that is true and somehow has truth as a necessary condition because
it is required as the basis for knowledge. These premises are familiar from the
work of Dretske (Dretske, 1981, 46-7, 65.)
I have removed the ontological and existential dependence of structure upon
relations, regarding such as the first move towards formalism driven ontological
descent. Floridi asserts that abstract relations are the reductive basis for the
data that comprise the information units of semantic information (infons) are
relational entities which are somehow identical to metaphysical non-uniformities
(Floridi, 2011c, 85-7.) I have suggested that non-uniformities are not binary,
and are not the basis of structure, but features of it.
Floridi’s informational structural realism is not intended to directly unify
ontic structural realism and mathematical structuralism. It is intended to rec-
oncile ESR with OSR. Floridi does not claim, as does Gillies, that mathematical
structure might be a special case of informational structure. However, he does
say that data as nonuniformities embodying relations (of differences de re at
minimum - Floridi, 2011c, 356) exist in all kinds of spaces. Mathematical spaces
are included in this. There is no ontological existential dependency of physical
data upon abstract data directly implied, but Floridi asserts that the bottom
of the ontology of the entire world is informational in the very real sense that
everything reduces to information:
As far as we can tell, the ultimate nature of reality is informa-
tional, that is, it makes sense to adopt LoAs [levels of abstraction]
that commit our theories to a view of reality as mind-independent
and constituted by structural objects that are neither substantial
nor material (they might well be, but we have no need to suppose
them to be so) but informational” (Floridi, 2011c, 361.)
Floridi’s ISR is non-eliminative about objects and emphasises the role of
relations between objects posited at various modelling levels of abstraction as
the existential basis of informational structure (Floridi, 2011c, 348-50.) This
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accommodates scale variance, yet it is a reflection of the difficulty of the debate
about ontic structure in OSR as expressed by French that Floridi’s data are
concrete and yet purely relational:
So, ontologically, data (as still unqualified concrete points of lack
of uniformity) are purely relational entities. Of course, from a struc-
tural perspective they remain unknowable in themselves. (Floridi,
2011c, 356.)
Apparently it must be the way in which the data as relations are concrete
that is unqualified. Floridi is attempting to reconcile ESR and OSR to some
extent, but at this point I believe that Cao (Cao, 2003b, 57-60) and French’s
(French, 2006) view of I-structure is better supported by science. Floridi does
not seem to be able to find a place in the ontic menu for concrete purely relational
structure, and it is not clear what such would be in the case of the structure of
physical phenomena and systems. His conception of how structure and relations
are interdependent is arguably not clear or is ambiguous since, in addition to
his assertion of the truth of ontic neutrality, his claim is that “cohering clusters
of data as relational entities (differences de re) are the elementary relata we are
looking for in our modified version of OSR . . . the structuralism in question here
is based on relational entities (understood structurally) that are particular, not
abstract and universal...” (Floridi, 2011c, 356.) If they are particular in the
Armstrongian concrete or even immanent realist sense, then it is hard to see
what makes them such, and how. I take it that Floridi is referring to some kind
of Kantian particular: or monad-like existent. I have designed Ontic structural
informational realism to dispense with such ontic glue and constructed abstract
retinue as inflationary and anti-POP. I don’t think that the admission of such
Kantian particulars is excusable on the basis of epistemic access problems, since
it’s an informational structural realism with ontic realist commitments that is
being presented.
So it is not clear whether Floridi’s ISR unifies mathematical/formal and
I-ontic structure, if only because it is not clear what his commitment to the
concrete status of data means with respect to OSR. It does not look like ISR
solves outstanding problems about the nature and content of structure. More
importantly, it is not clear how mathematical relations and non-mathematical
relations can both be concrete. Moreover, if mathematical relations as binary
difference de re data are the basis for information, then it is not clear why such
data can’t be part of a computational process (Floridi, 2009a.) Yet Floridi is a-
priori opposed to digital ontology. More significantly, if abstract mathematical
relations are the basis for information just as concrete non-abstract relations
as data are, it looks like the conflation of ontic and mathematical structure is
unavoidable(Ladyman, 2014, S.E.P.5.)
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6.5 Defeasible Field Ontic Structural Informa-
tional Realism: FOSIR
I defer to scientific metaphysical premises and identify the (irregular/nonuniform
heterogeneous) quantum field as the basis of - in fact as identical to - the
ontic structure of the I-world as the subject of scientific study according to
Ontic structural informational realism. Ontic structural informational realism
is/becomes FOSIR - Field Ontic Structural Informational Realism. Ladyman
and Ross also place field theory - including its scientific realist commitments -
at the bottom of the scientific metaphysical heirarchy, which does seem to not
only imply, but require, both theory and ontology reduction:
Ontology in this second sense––which is equivalent to naturalized
metaphysics according to Ladyman and Ross (2007)–– necessarily
involves one in reflections on quantum theory, because no other cur-
rently mature part of science is reasonably intended to restrict all
possible measurement values in the universe at all scales (pp 132)
. . . Lagrangians for different interactions is a major methodologi-
cal pillar of QFT and its astonishingly accurate predictive success
. . . Taken more or less at face value, our best fundamental physics
tells us that there are no little things. Consider again QFT, in which
particles are excitation modes of fields, that themselves are assign-
ments of operator-valued measures to regions of space-time. Particle
number is frame dependent, and every generation of particles turns
out to be a collection of effective degrees of freedom that approximate
the structure of the underlying deeper field theory . . . (Ladyman and
Ross, 2013, 137.)
Ladyman and Ross retain entities like space time points as explanatory ab-
stracta which reduce to relations:
When it comes to space-time physics we have learned that the
identity and individuality of space-time points is grounded in the
metrical relations between them and not the other way around. The
situation in other sciences is often similar. Biological individuality is
relative to selection in the sense that to determine what biological in-
dividuals there are in some domain it is necessary to see what counts
as an individual for the purposes of Price’s equation (Ladyman and
Ross, 2013, 138)
At first this sounds like a mathematisation: something like a mathematical
structure - or Floridi’s abstract data - as the basis of the I-ontology. However,
instead it’s a claim that relations are primitive, and prior to objects. The claim
about determining biological individuality is interesting in the context of my
own approach: some I-structure is picked out from total I-structure on the
basis of representing structured mathematical constructs in the formal model.
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According to my approach, I-relations are intrinsic to the I-structure of
the phenomena being investigated. If the relations exist as abstract or direct
representations in the formal theory, then they might be thought to be the
basis of the structure in the theory. But relations in a theory are not identical
to relations in the I-ontology: they are an encoded representation of the CICS
information in the modeled phenomenon. You can delete the relation from
the formal representation and yet that which it represents may still exist in
the I-structure - which may have been modelled as a stochastic process or
Shannon source. At the same time, the relations that were represented in the
I-structure are not the basis of the I-structure: they are picked out from it
based on formalisms designed for abstracting out structural information that is
explanatory. It is the I-continuous structure that the relations and their picked
out relata (features of the structure) are part of that is prior.
If according to QFT particles are excitation modes of fields, and fields de-
feasibly are I-structure, and if particles are regarded (as Ladyman and Ross
would regard them) as relata - then it is evident that the field is contingently
ontologically prior. A response to this is that it is jumping the gun to equate
the quantum field even defeasibly with I-structure. However, my response is
that French and Ladyman and Ross’s scientific metaphysical aspiration leaves
that as the only live option (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 47; Cao, 1997.) If
it turns out that I-structure is not the quantum field at bottom, then relations
will still be abstracted out of whatever the I-structure is contingently found
to be objectively identical to. Defeasibly and contingently the content of ontic
structure is classical fields and other phenomena to reducing quantum fields.
Relata are features picked out of them because of explanatory and functional
relevance (related to their properties), as are relations.
Ladyman and Ross emphasise the relevance of Dennett’s conception of real
patterns as one foil to thoroughgoing reductionism. Dennett’s approach reveals
part of the motivation for regarding that all of the non-redundant statistics
as the totality of reality in conjunction with their commitment to irreducible
stochasticity:
The interest of the account is that it describes an order which is
there whenever actions are done with intentions . . . . But how could
the order be there, so visible amidst the noise, if it were not the
direct outline of a concrete orderly process in the background? Well,
it could be there thanks to the statistical effect of very many concrete
minutiae producing, as if by a hidden hand, an approximation of the
“ideal” order. (Dennett, 1991, 43),
QFT and therefore the quantum field and classical fields that reduce to it
are not, however, just a formalism or set of abstracta, as is indicated in part by
the predictive power of QFT:
A structural realist view, at odds with both standard realism
and standard instrumentalism, about the ontology of QFT seems
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completely naturalistically appropriate, and does not amount to re-
garding QFT as a bare formalism. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 135.)
I regard I-existing fields as being the basis of all structure - by way of being
identical to it - including abstracted mind and theory dependent encoding of
mathematical structures derived from C n I-sources. There are just nonuniform
(irregular) compositionally heterogeneous (defeasibly of different natural kinds)
fields that are structure, and relations are a feature that can be picked out - or
more specifically encoded - from them. What is a structure in the I-world? Just
a nonuniform physical field or a complex of heterogeneous fields, with arbitrary
boundaries (which boundaries may even be fuzzy or indeterminate.)
Ladyman and Ross defend their probabilist irreducible stochasticity based
ontology as being the best expression of scientific metaphysics, but this does not
seem to properly reconcile with their commitment to the I-obtaining of fields.
Their fair charge is that denying stochastic irreducibility tut de suite is analytic,
a-priori and dogmatic (Ibid., 140):
Deutsch’s dogmatic refusal to allow for the possibility of irre-
ducible stochasticity is similarly conservative. We are by no means
the first philosophers to argue that refusal to allow irreducible stochas-
ticity in the fundamental laws of nature is a domesticating move
based ultimately on residual analysis of some general metaphysical
notions, especially causation. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 144.)
However, denying reducibility - or at least that statistical expressions are an
effective encoding of information from nature on the basis of nomic regularities
and experimental confirmation (see Long, 2014, Rickles, 2008b, and Ladyman
and Ross, 2013) would also seem to be equally dogmatic, especially given that
defeasibility should apply to both methodology as well as to ontology. There is
a question about the kind of reducibility that is at issue here, however.
I have elsewhere referred to the problems associated with open questions
about the nature of probabilities and how formal statistics is taken to refer
to or encode information from the I-world. A brute yet correct way of stat-
ing this approach to I-ontology overall is that Dennett’s real patterns are all
ultimately defeasibly existentially dependent upon and reduce to I-obtaining
physical fields. Using supervenience as an explanatory device (see Hu¨ttemann
and Papineau, 2005, 34; Pettit, 2009; Kim, 2005): defeasibly - if there were no
quantum field there would be no real patterns of any kind - abstract or statistical
or otherwise.
It’s interesting that Ladyman and Ross allow that structures are comprised
of structures. It is difficult to see how to characterise this except in terms of
reductionism - especially given a scientific realism about I-structure (Ladyman
et al., 2007.) They acknowledge the reductionist status of QFT, reject domes-
tication of science by a-priori analytic edicts, and yet seem to all but prohibit
reductionism on a similar basis:
Quantum entanglement in particular and quantum physics in
general, especially quantum field theory, show that there is no sense
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at all in which atoms or sub-atomic particles resemble little macro-
scopic things reduced drastically in size. In undomesticated physics,
particles don’t resemble any kind of entity that people had ever
imagined prior to the twentieth century.1 3 This is a decisive consid-
eration in favour of anti-reductionism: there is no convincing reason
to believe that the micro-scale mechanistic structure that the re-
ductionist treats as explanatory bedrock exists.(Ross et al., 2013,
143.)
Statistics seems to be as good a tool as any for domesticating science, if one
makes it the arbitrary endpoint of investigation and metaphysics. In informa-
tion theoretic terms what this seems to threaten is that there is no intrinsic
semantic content to I-information - only statistical magnitudes and patterns.
As French, Chakravartty, Psillos, and Cao have pointed out - albeit with various
ontic commitments - the apparent absense of ontic content - the nature of the
structured thing beyond it being structured - is an unsatisfying outcome for
ontic structural realism (see §3.3 p90.)
Ladyman and Ross offer an argument from non-reductive practices in sci-
ence, but this fact does not prove that I-reduction to concrete microsystems
does not obtain in nature, and it seems to devalue the many reductive successes
of science. Moreover, there is a straw man here with respect to the rejection
of any grounding. The reductionist does not have to believe in a fixed ontic
bottom or foundation: only that one set of physical structures and dynamics
reduces to and is comprised of other structures and dynamics.
The prevalence, power (in terms of its ability to determine and/or adduce
data where it is otherwise unavailable) and effectiveness - dominance in fact -
of (specifically frequentist and non-subjectivist) statistical analyses in contem-
porary science is a fair basis for a stochastic structuralism:
The importance of Peirce’s interest in psychophysics was, as
Hacking explains, that it encouraged him to reconceive of prop-
erties of frequencies not as second-order properties of judgments,
which people strive to bring into correspondence with fixed under-
lying constants, but as basic properties of the external world that
constitute its structure. Remarkably, Peirce recognized in this idea
the basis for a new conception of scientific method, the method that
now overwhelmingly dominates the everyday life of the scientific
community across almost all disciplines, of exploiting the system-
atic patterns of variation in large data sets generated by known
processes to minimize estimation error–– that is, to tell noise apart
from structure. Where randomization with respect to a dependent
variable in a model of such data can be experimentally imposed
or instrumented, regression can even be used to discover causal re-
lationships (Angrist et al., 1 996; Angrist and Pischke, 2009)––on
the Peircean understanding of causation indicated above. Such es-
timation is core activity in every science that relies on modeling
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quantitative data––including, in particular, quantum physics . . . the
Peircean hypothesis we invoke to explain. . . the efficacy of statistical
theory is the simplest one to which a realist should have recourse:
the world is stochastically structured. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013,
145.)
However, Ladyman and Ross want to claim a very strong stochastic irre-
ducibility in nature, which they take to extend to a thorough anti-reductionist
outcome (in keeping with their arguments from scientific practice):
It follows from the truth of general anti-reductionism that, how-
ever completely the generalizations of fundamental physics constrain
all measurements taken at all scales of real patternhood, one cannot
hope to explain all or most real patterns by showing that they are
determined by these generalizations. Were this not true, we would
indeed expect that many putative ‘higher level’ patterns would be
reduced away––eliminated––and thus turn out to be ontologically
redundant. Most of these non-redundant non-reducible patterns are
also irreducibly statistical, in the sense that they are generated by
stochastic processes. (Ladyman and Ross, 2013, 146.)
Reductionism - both theory reduction, conceptual reduction, explanatory
reduction, and ontological reduction - is used frequently enough in successful
science to make the claim of correctness of general (read as thoroughgoing)
anti-reductionism a non-sequitur. It is probably not the case that ‘higher level’
patterns are ontologically redundant if they reduce, especially according to an
ontic structural realist scientific realism. They may still be enlisted to provide
defeasible adequate explanations or involve variables and parameters that are
casually efficacious and explanatory. Moreover, ontic structural realism is by
definition realist about structure, none of which is regarded as ontologically
redundant even if it is reducible. This can all remain true even if natural I-
structures are stochastic. Moreover, it looks like QFT supports the view that we
should allow possible infinitely reducible field structures (Ladyman and Ross,
2013, 135.)
As Ladyman and Ross have noted, physics underdetermines metaphysics in
the sense that there is not enough agreement even among scientific realists about
what exactly is mind and language independently real and what is - say - a sta-
tistical representation thereof. There are further open questions from quantum
mechanics and quantum field theory regarding which model is more correct (La-
dyman and Ross, 2013, French, 2014.) However, if there is a characterisation of
mind and language independent structure to be had in scientific metaphysics,
then I think that eliminativism and nominalism about information in physics
should therefore be off the table, and thus eliminativism about information in
the hard and soft sciences in general.
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6.6 Content of Structure
Ladyman and French are aware that Cao (understandably given their apparently
ambiguous stance regarding the nature of relations for mathematical structures
versus material structures) charges that they are Platonists about the structure
of their OSR ontology, and correct the impression:
Cao understands us as advocating ‘the dissolution of physical en-
tities into mathematical structures’. But, first of all, by ‘dissolution’
we mean metaphysical reconceptualisation. And secondly, as we
tried to emphasise, to describe something using mathematics does
not imply that it itself is mathematical – the structures are what
they are and we describe them in mathematico-physical terms. Let
us put it as clearly as we can: we are not mathematical Platonists
with regard to structures. (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 75.)
Nor, as I went to pains to articulate at §1.4.1 p49, am I. I am claiming, in
the face of non-reductionist physicalism of most NOSR, that the dissolution in
question (formalism driven ontic descent where maths becomes all that is acces-
sible, or else French’s mathematical collapse, where it becomes the actual basis
of the ontology 3) maps to a reduction and complex encoding process involv-
ing ineliminable information channels realised as signal pathways which have
continuous causal pathways as a necessary condition. Mathematical structures
reduce to the same kind of informational structures as everything else that is
informational. In this thesis I am claiming that the only real structures in the
ontology are or reduce to I-obtaining physical spatiotemporal structures that
reduce to quantum field regions (See IS1 at §4.6 p171.) This is a much stronger
physicalist content claim - in terms of ontic commitment - than that made by
Ladyman and Ross and French.
The contingent OSR I want to deploy involves a still stronger or more rad-
ical claim: structures do not reduce to either formal relations, nor some kind
of I-obtaining mathematical (Platonistic) relations, and are not existentially
dependent upon or grounded in/by them (See §3.3 p101.) One motivation for
this move is that in this thesis information is realised at bottom by the con-
figuration of spatiotemporal causal structures (bounded nonuniform regions of
heterogeneous fields.)
I provided contingent and scientific metaphysical support for the quantum
field as structure for Ontic structural informational realism in greater detail at
§3.3 p90. At this point an introduction of the versatility and universal applica-
tion of QFT in physics is salient:
What is Quantum Field Theory Good For? The answer is: al-
most everything. As I have stressed above, for any relativistic system
it is a necessity. But it is also a very useful tool in non-relativistic
3Thus the two are different
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systems with many particles. Quantum field theory has had a ma-
jor impact in condensed matter, high energy physics, cosmology,
quantum gravity and pure mathematics. It is literally the language
in which the laws of Nature are written. (Tong, 2007, 4; See also
Lancaster and Blundell, 2014, 1-2)
QFT involves formal representation, to be sure. However, its premise is
scientific realism (Mathur, 2009b, 7-8.) If we regard the spacetime manifold M
as I-obtaining, then it is the quantum field that we should regard - defeasibly - as
its content and its reductive ontological basis. My brute abstracta-eliminating
identity thesis is that nonuniform heterogeneous quantum field is identical to
Ontic structural informational realism structure. My intention is to defeasibly
pick ontic I-structure straight out of the menu of contingent (defeasible) ontic
furniture discovered by physics - the nonuniform heterogeneous quantum field.
French and Ladyman’s NOSR retains scientific realism about object-relata
but regards them as all but irrelevant for scientific modelling and explanation
compared to relations and thus structure. Ladyman and Ross have introduced
the idea that if the structure in ontic structural realism does I-obtain, then it is
derived from statistics that exist in the I-ontology as the content of the struc-
ture. They defer to Daniel Dennett’s real patterns, more than to relations, as
the basis for intrinsically statistical I-structure, about which they are scientific
realists (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 42, 47; French, 2014; Ross et al., 2013.)
The hallmark of Dennett’s real patterns is that they are allegedly objectively
not reducible, and Ladyman and Ross follow suit with irreducible stochasticity
of natural structures. French has since moved to an innatist modalist ontic
structural realism (French, 2014, 231; Refer to §2.3 p62)
Meanwhile, Ladyman and Ross develop a statistical NOSR according to
which “ the world is the totality of non-redundant statistics, not of things”
where the statistics arise from Dennettian patterns because “ Most of these non-
redundant non-reducible patterns are also irreducibly statistical, in the sense
that they are generated by stochastic processes” (French, 2014, Ladyman et al.,
2007, Ladyman and Ross, 2013.) Michael Esfeld has suggested a middle ground
based upon quantum mechanics and particularly the challenges presented by
entanglement for scientific realism (Esfeld and Lam, 2008.) Esfeld deals with
the problems of intrinsic properties by emphasising that in entanglement there
are no properties of the individual entagled systems available - only properties
of the whole entangled system (Esfeld and Lam, 2008.) He leverages a strong
non-supervenience principle developed by Carol Cleland to retain relata but
make the intrinsic properties of relata (entanglement related quantum systems
in Esfeld’s case) irrelevant to the obtaining of relations, but without requiring
the elimination of relata from the I-ontology (Esfeld and Lam, 2008, 612-13.)
French’s more recent version of NOSR regards that mathematical collapse
of any kind is unacceptable, and he reintroduces causality as the differentiator
between mathematical structure and what I have called I-structure. Causality
is also a mainstay of the NOSR and the philosophy of information that I develop
here.
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I reject that structure is the limit of what we can be scientific realists about.
I agree with French that mathematisation of the I-world is not an ontic scientific
realist approach, but instead constitutes a specious conflation of patterns and
relations in a formal model with that which is being modelled. There are indi-
cators from the physico-mathematical tools of physics that this is true. Proofs
of the renormalisation theorems in QFT involve cancellation of most terms that
initially arise in them, going from ontologically inflationary to minimalist, which
tends to confirm that it may well be the case that formal mathematical models
encoded to represent physical reality are inherently ontologically inflationary
(Zeidler and Service, 2009, XII, 131.)
I do not propose that I-ontic structure is somehow indicative of natural con-
tent, but that it does in fact defeasibly reduce to specific parts of that content in
the sense that it is identical to it. I bite the bullet on the question of what it is
that is causal and ‘latched on to’ by science, by saying that it simply defeasibly
is whatever science suggests. I suggest that science suggests that structure is
an I-obtaining element of the I-ontology by virtue of being (defeasibly) identi-
cal to bounded configurations of nonuniform heterogeneously constituted fields
(classical reducing to quantum.)
If I-structure is somehow accessible - then that structure simply is the I-
obtaining ontic content of the natural phenomena/systems under investigation
and being represented. It’s the opposite, ontologically speaking, of formalism
driven ontological descent: the I-ontology supplants what were considered to
be abstracta. According to Ontic structural informational realism I-structure
is only abstract in the sense that it is abstracted from the total I-contents of
the natural phenomena as a causally induced (multiple transduction reducible
4) encoded selection of the total structure.
French attacks Max Tegmark’s mathematical universe hypothesis as an ex-
ample of mathematical collapse since according to MUH the mappings between
mathematical structures in physics and symmetries mean that the underly-
ing structure is identical to the mathematical structure as mathematical only
(French, 2014, 195.) I am adopting an almost opposite ontological shift (but
not quite): structures thought of as only abstract are in fact abstracted from, or
abstracted away from, or abstracted/selected/picked out from the I-structure
using a complex encoding process as discussed at §6.2.1 p212 above in relation
to the black box encoder solution to the symbol grounding problem.
Deferring this representation-encoding problem and returning to the reversal
of formalism driven ontological descent - the answer to the question “what is
the structure that is latched onto in the I-world when the representation is
encoded?” (even if this involves posits and constructive invention) is literally
4By ‘multiply transduction reducible’ I literally mean that all processes of extracting infor-
mation from one set of I-sources and representing it in other structures requires - at bottom
- conversion from one kind of energy to another. This includes all neurologically based in-
trinsically semantic physical processing of physically reducing information in the brain and
all instrument based extraction of physical data from I-obtaining natural sources (this stands
under instrumentalism also at minimum in the sense that the conversion of information in the
instrument to the instrument user reduces to energy transduction as a significant ineliminable
element - although energy conversion is not the whole of encoding.)
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that it is a selection of the actual content or natural substance of the material
world. The I-structure just is part of the content. So I favour something close to,
but not identical with, what Steven French has called in re structural realism:
Two forms of structuralism can then be introduced: ‘ante rem’
structuralism which takes structures to be abstract,freestanding en-
tities which exist independently of the systems (which ‘exemplify’
them); and ‘in re’ structuralism, which denies that structures are
free-standing - rather, systems are ontologically prior to structures
and talk of ‘the’ structure is understood either as talk about any sys-
tem structured in a certain way or talk about all systems structured
that way (French, 2006, 175.)
According to Ontic structural informational realism, it’s the immanent struc-
ture of the particular source - the region of the QFT field/vacuum (refer to §3.2.1
p85 for definitions) - that is not just the basis of the structure, but identical
to it. The structure is not an Armstrong style of type - a universal. Although
there is no in-principle reason why such a universal could not be invoked, it is
not a necessary condition for the existence of the structure.
My claim is not that such things as energy, matter, plasma, entanglement,
phenomena, dynamical systems, microsystem are just structure where structure
is some abstract ontic additional furniture. The claim is bipartite and comprised
of a weak and strong assertion, that the aforementioned assorted (scientific
realist alleged) existents defeasibly I-obtain, and:
a. (Weak Claim:) Are intrinsically and ineliminably physically structured/structural.
b. (Strong Claim:) Have an intrinsic I-structure that may well be inseparable
(apart from abstracting away from) from their causal and intrinsic properties.
What is abstracted away (hidden or excluded) 5 from the I-obtaining phe-
nomena when their structures are encoded into representing structures is the
natural kind heterogeneity, while what is retained is the nonuniformity. What
proportion of the interactive causal propensities of a microsystem come from
its configuration or spatiotemporal arrangement, what proportion from natu-
ral kind properties, and if properties reduce to information, what proportion
of natural kind properties and interactive propensities reduce to configuration
of structure only? I will stick with a contingent analysis that ascribes inter-
active causal propensities to both nonuniformity and heterogeneity of natural
kind content, and I do not seek to attempt to characterise the latter in terms
of the former. The work is defeasibly done by type identifying I-structure with
features -or continuous subparts - of fields themselves.
In a sense then there is a inverse parallel/analog to what happens with
digital, quantum, and analogue computers alike. Such computers have phys-
ical (in every sense of the term ‘physical’ that matters) microarchitectures
5As opposed to abstracted out from or selected from or picked out from (or isolated from)
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that are designed to physically represent (implement, in fact) logical relations
and operations. The situation here is converse and sometimes naturally oc-
curring (but sometimes cognitively dependent): physically represented logico-
mathematical rule-based structures are constructed to represent I-obtaining (or
at least instrument-sustained and obtaining) structures. In Chapter §5 p175
I argued that the structures in both situations are intrinsically semantic (§5.4
p189.)
The I-substructure that gets encoded into the formal theory as a represen-
tation of some kind is selected and abstracted from the I-system(s)/source(s)
either arbitrarily based upon the best detection, and/or based on the purpose
of the representation. French notes that picking the correct structure seems
arbitrary:
Thus the structures of natural systems are, ‘if anything’, in re.
But then what is it that privileges a particular structure as the
structure of that system? (French, 2006, 176.)
French notes that Psillos complains that choosing the right structure as
being determined by what saves the phenomena or gets some nomic constraint
based relations right leads the OSR theorist to “take the in re option, and has to
accept some non-structural element” like objects and (allegedly non-structurally
reducible) properties. French’s response is that:
[T]he ontic structural realist . . . should not accept that the sys-
tem, composed of objects and relations, is ontically prior to the
structure. Indeed, the central claim of OSR is that it is the structure
that is both (ultimately) ontically prior and also concrete. (French,
2006, 176.)
I declare a pox on both structuralist houses: structure is not prior to phe-
nomena and physical systems because it just is and reduces to the quantum
field, but nor are objects and relations ontologically prior: they too reduce to
the quantum field (defeasibly.) The ready complaint is that the quantum field
itself is ontologically mysterious. However, my response is that introducing an
even more mysterious abstract ontic glue or substratum and trying to make
that the basis of material ontology is worse - as at the very least then one
has two mysterious pieces of ontic furniture and the need to explain how they
are related. Not to mention that the quantum field is at least in-principle and
to a significant extent contingently accessible to measurement and verification
(Bub, 2005, 542-3.) Making the basis of the ontology a mathematical formal-
ism in accordance with what I have termed ontological descent presents those
two problems and additionally a serious question of a-prioricity: models that
pre-exist complex systems being modelled are statistically unlikely to be com-
mon (and that assertion is based upon classical information source and channel
theory.) There is just the physical structure of the natural information sources.
When a formal theory represents part of the I-structure, then what is rep-
resented is thus a selected part of the defeasible bottom of the ontology. The
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rest is whatever it is intrinsic to and may in fact contribute to the causal and
intrinsic properties of the system/phenomena as a physical source set. Thus
according to Ontic structural informational realism properties probably reduce
to I-obtaining CICS information.
Whither Causal Efficacy?
The discussion above at §6.3.1 p214 presents an argument that causal path-
ways do not have to be continuous qua contiguity, especially with reference to
the implications of Bell’s inequalities and the accompanying experiments (see
further discussion at §7.3 p252). However, that does not address the issue of
the nature of causation itself. Chakravarty charges that structure alone can-
not provide enough ontic basis for explaining change and properties in natural
systems/phenomena (Chakravartty, 2004.) (Psillos, 2001) has suggested that
NOSR does not have the means to explain the causal efficacy of objects in sys-
tems. Ladyman has retained objects in the ontology for similar reasons - as
necessary to the explanation of casual properties and sustaining of properties.
However, I agree with French, who defends scientific realist structuralism as
able to answer all of these alleged explanatory shortfalls:
Indeed, she can respond to Chakravartty’s concerns by insisting
that the explanatory buck stops at a point down the chain before we
reach objects. That is, she can insist that this active principle lies
with the relations and properties themselves, and it is these which
carry the clout. (French, 2006, 180-1; For a more recent position see
French, 2014, 210.)
Ontic structural informational realism places causal efficacy directly in the
I-structure as a structure that is intrinsic to the nature/substance/content of
the natural system/phenomena. Carving the ontology between structure and
substance is only necessary for formal modelling where mathematical abstracta
are demonstrably useful for manipulating Dennettian real patterns (that I sug-
gest do reduce despite their original characterisation: refer to the arguments
in and at the end of §6.3.2 p221) Carving the I-ontology between structure
and substance is unnecessary and redundant except as part of the process of
abstracting part of the structure away (isolating or picking out) from the en-
tire structure of the system pursuant to isolating the causal explanation for the
behaviour and properties of the system, and for the purposes of informing (by
CICS based encoding) the formal representing structures. (These latter also
all necessarily - naturally necessarily - reduce to CICS.) You can’t have a 40
kilometre ball of Uranium 352 without an explosion, and you cannot have a
representation without causally-induced (causal signals and emissions in causal
signal pathways) physical structures to sustain it and upon which it existentially
depends somewhere.
Ontic structural informational realism accounts for Psillos’ concerns about
causality on a similar basis to that which is suggested by French also:
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However, OSR does not advocate the analysis of all macroscopic
causal processes in a structuralist fashion . . . [T]he OSR account
piggybacks on the physicalist’s reduction of such processes
in terms of ultimately quantum processes and then insists
that the latter have to be understood in structuralist terms.
Imagine, for example, two particles of the same charge approach-
ing one another and being mutually repelled. The OSR would
take the currently accepted theoretical description of that process
whether in terms of field-theoretic interactions or the ex-
change of force particles or whatever and would simply insist that
rather than thinking of this description in terms of causally interact-
ing physical objects, we give an appropriately structural description
involving causal relationships. (French, 2006, 181.) (My highlight-
ing.)
According to Ontic structural informational realism I-structure (defeasibly)
reduces to exactly what is suggested here - fields embodying field interactions.
Causality and therefore causal inducement of configuration reduce to the trans-
mission of structure-altering energy through fields, where the fields are non-
uniform in structure and heterogeneous in natural kind composition (There is
a precedent for this in at least Fair, 1979.)
There are no microbangings: more like continuous micro-conveyance or
micro-transmission by proximity, overlap, and adjoinment, except in the case
of quantum entanglement and nonlocal effects or action at a distance, where
all I can do is posit that the quantum field may contingently turn out to sup-
port strange signal transmission mechanisms which are still causal due to their
nomic nature (According to Stephen Hawking, this may even allow signal trans-
mission across event horizons in black holes (Hawking, 2014; See also Clifton,
2002, 151-3.) The structure that I-intrinsically inheres in natural systems thus
is not imposed Platonically upon the existing system(s) total structure(s.) In
accordance with the ancient conflict between the Platonic and Aristotelian meta-
physics - the I-structure is abstracted out (picked out) from the total natural
system structure (or has the total natural system structure abstracted away
from it.)
French recounts the usual kind of discussion about causal powers and their
relationship with causal properties:
This raises further issues, to do with the relationship between
properties and their causal powers or capacities, whether different
properties can have or bestow the same power, whether the same
property can bestow different powers on its instances, and so forth.
Even metaphysicians admit that the connection between properties
and their powers is not fully understood. One option is to insist that
a causal power is a further property over and above the property that
has or bestows it, but that introduces obvious complications and the
possibility of regress; if this option is rejected, however, it is not clear
6.6 Content of Structure 241
what the relationship is. I don’t think the structuralist should have
to sort these issues out and there certainly appears to be nothing
here that could not be appropriate (French, 2006, 184.)
Why talk about causal powers at all? They are not necessary any more
than objects, and only breach POP . It’s arguably due to another example of
baroque definitional and descriptive formal theory and representation language
and descriptive terms imposing themselves upon the I-ontology unnecessarily.
Just because we feel the need to describe something in an abstractive and really
largely metaphorically laden manner by talking about causal powers does not
mean that there are actual casual powers I-obtaining in the natural system or
phenomena. The system or phenomena just has a certain structure constituted a
certain way and will interact with other structures on a certain basis empirically
and contingently (and perhaps defeasibly even at the level of the I-structure.)
I develop this fully below at §3.3.1 p111.
According to the approach of Ontic structural informational realism (which
is non-eliminative about objects and properties since these are just labels for
features of or subsets of structures) one can and should dispense with talk of
powers just as one dispenses with talk of bundles. Without bruising contingency
or inflating ontology, I will say that a feature is a possibly specifically functional
(though possibly not) nonuniform remarkable causal CICS substructure. Re-
markable simply means that the pattern or configuration of the substructure
would stand out to a god-eye observer as significantly different to the rest of
the structure, or is mathematically anomalous - would give markedly different
mathematical representations - to the rest of the source in which it is embed-
ded. A structure is casually efficacious in a certain way contingently because
of its field content and the embedded context in terms of other sources that
are proximate and present. Natural kind tokens (physical structured sources)
have mutually recognised propensities w.r.t to each other that have been discov-
ered contingently by empirical means and that are ascribable to physical nomic
constraints or natural laws. That’s all that’s required. Whatever natural kind
field reducing structure SA naturally necessarily does empirically and contin-
gently when it interacts with or even overlaps with natural kind field-reducing
structure SB is what natural kind structures like SA can be expected to do -
with significant statistical confidence - in similar settings. Further explanation
requires picking out further microstructural features that seem to be intimately
involved in the casual interaction.
A formal representing structure for modelling and explanation can be re-
tained and reused - or even a-priori devised - as an apt fit for such structures
in such systems. However, when the explanation is sought for the behaviour
of the system, that it has such and such a mathematical structure is a faux
explanation - or at least only an abstractive one: such a formal representing
structure only represents part of the real physical I-explanation from causal
pathways and nomic constraints. It can stand as an interim explanation that’s
epistemically efficacious in the same way as saying system A behaves like system
B because they both have structure C or have structure that maps to a repre-
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senting pattern P or model M . This explanation by comparison is not a full
causal explanation of the causal properties of the system: that explanation will
have to include the I-structure and its intrinsic relation to the substance of the
rest of the structure of the system and how the properties and causal influences
of the system are associated with the identified abstracted-away structure.
Eliminating Relations
Where I radically depart from French and almost all other OSR structural re-
alists (with the possible exception of Ladyman and Ross in their more recent
statistically orientated work) is that I dispense with relations also as primitive.
I consider them,including property based relations, instead to be like spacetime
points. Relations based upon physical properties - such as relative mass and rel-
ative velocity - may very well pick out or correspond to I-obtaining differentiae,
but these can be described by reference to data or structure. There is no need
to additionally reify any abstract entity called a relation, nor to assume that
relative mass or relative velocities of two systems are the basis of their structure.
Relative mass and relative velocity could be described as emergent from the en-
tire system, for example. They might thus be real, but it is a leap to say they
are the foundation of the quantum-field reducing system. After all, with a sci-
entific defeasible contingent metaphysics the question arises: what non-formal
relation I-exists between nonlocal entangled systems apart from a nomic em-
pirically established regularity/prediction? Information theory demands that a
signal has passed between the entangled quantum systems, but none has been
found, and then there is the more pressing problem of apparent instantaneous
transmission. Relations were already problematic:
What we are faced with is a choice between particular relations
or kinds of relations having, as features, causal aspects particular to
those relations or kinds and some form of underlying causal activity
which imbues the relevant relations with causal power. (French,
2006, 184.)
This choice is only necessary if relations are required as a foundation of
structure in OSR. I am asserting that scientific contingency not only allows -
but suggests - that relations are simply not required as a basis of structure, even
if they are intrinsic to it. A justifiable description is that they are emergent in
the structure (quantum field according to FOSIR) like everything else. The way
I approach this is that there are infinite ways in which all features of a structure
can be related. I am avoiding referring to points in a structure because these
are generally conceived of mathematically, and because I think that structures
are comprised of structural features - which are themselves subsystems and thus
CICS sub-sources - and features are extended concrete parts of I-contingently
defeasibly reducing structures. Features still don’t have to be objects either,
since they can be arbitrarily bounded and inhere in structures, and they can
be picked out by identifying relations. Relations are themselves a feature that
can be picked out from I-structure using formal representations or picked out
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or abstracted out from it on the basis of identifying first other features of the
structures. I think that one can have I-structure without existential dependency
upon relations even apart from an Ontic structural informational realism where
I-structure is identical (defeasibly) to the quantum field, but I am deploying
this identity theory anyway, and so the most I have to concede is that relations
may be intrinsic to I-structure. I can concede this is ineliminably the case
without conceding that they must be the ontological basis upon which structure
existentially depends.
I suggest that the impression of the primacy of relations (Floridi, 2011c, 356)
comes from the same origin as mathematical ontic descent and mathematical
collapse (French, 2014, 193): we can speak of and describe relations in formal
theories when referring to I-systems, but it doesn’t follow that I-structure of
I-dynamical systems and their associated stochastic processes would fall apart
without them. It seems like - since relations appear to be able to stand apart
from the I-structure - then structure cannot exist without the relations. I
think it true that I-material relations are ineliminably intrinsic to I-structure,
but it does not follow that the latter existentially depends upon the former as
ontologically primary. Mutually perhaps, but I reject this also. I take relations
to be like points: mathematical projections into the space of the structure based
on the selection of features. It is possible that I-structure (based on fields for
example) might reduce infinitely. However, if it doesn’t and there is not really
infinite structure(s) in an I-system, then there are still infinite relations. Apply
the triangular argument for demonstrating and infinity of points on a line to
see this (Galileo’s paradox.) Given two features of a structure (an irregularity
and a sub-structure) one can pick a point on one structure and map infinite
lines to a line or curve of the other feature/sub-structure. Each one of these
is a relation. However, given a structure, there was no necessary existential a-
prioricity of relations. There may be a-prioricity of relations from the I-structure
in the formal theory such that the structure of the representations in the theory
depend upon the specification of the relations. I think that is frequently true.
However, allowing that progression and existential dependence hierarchy to be
inferred/descended back into the I-structure is simply a mistake.
Approaches that deny that either relata or relations (mathematical or oth-
erwise existing) are the ontic basis of structure have been regarded - directly or
by implication - as all but nonsensical by some theorists (Ladyman and Ross,
2013, 138; Floridi, 2011c; Chakravartty, 2004, 152-3; Cao, 2003b, 58.) However,
the nature of structure is a curiously vexing issue in ESR and OSR:
Poincare 6 is quiet on the subject of what structures are, and
Worrall inherits this ambiguity . . . What does it mean to say that
mathematical equations are indicative of structure? It is insuffi-
cient for a realist simply to point to the equations of theories and
claim that they in some sense describe reality, for constructive em-
piricists, instrumentalists, logical positivists and idealists agree with
6Poincare provided early inspiration for ESR based upon elimination of objects
Chakravartty, 2004, 154
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this much. (Chakravartty, 2004, 154)
More trouble arises, as I have already mentioned, with the conflation of the
nature of mathematically established relations in the formal theory and its con-
structs and the nature of relations in the I-ontology. I suggest that the tendency
to impose the relations of the formalism onto the I-obtaining structures being
represented in the formal theory on a scientific realist or at least instrumen-
talist basis (which I have termed formalism driven ontological descent) seems
correct partly because relations are simply features of the pre-existing contin-
uous non-uniform structure(s) that already I-exist. According to CICS based
Ontic structural informational realism (ontic structural informational realism)
- relations in the theory are either 1. select information encoded from the I-
ontology by various means or 2. representing structures that are encoded from
the first kind of structures and other sources on a secondary basis and that
participate in computation and modelling as artefacts of the model only
6.7 Ergodic Stochasticity Entails I-Structure
Assuming structure in the I-world is somehow ontically mathematical is un-
satisfying and confused. Trying to abstract structure out from the I-natural
phenomena is misguided if it involves the assumption that symbolic and/or
Platonic mathematics is the ontic basis of the structure of the natural phenom-
ena, and/or if Platonic mathematical structures are somehow identical with or
of the same type as token structures in the I-system (Cao, 2003b, 63).
French and Ladyman have rebutted Cao’s ascription of their approach as
mathematical Platonism about I-structure, rejecting his assertion of an identity
thesis. Cao understands ontic descent as operating in the opposite direction:
the I-structure is ascended into the mathematical formalism such that it is
identical to it rather than additional to it. I suggest that what is ‘left over’ is
nothing other than more/further natural I-obtaining nonuniform heterogeneous
field structure that has not been captured by the instrument and computation
based theory and model encoding process. The interpretation of a mathematical
structure can be abstract in the sense that one can demonstrate the turning of
the handle of the mathematical machinery and use it to produce patterns that
may be apt for representing features of the world or otherwise features of more
mathematical patterns.
Cao’s assertions are upheld by what Ladyman and Ross later enlist to ad-
duce that the world is the totality of nonredundant statistics: stochasticity.
Combined with classical information theory, the supporting argument runs as
follows. If the mathematical representation and formal model is statistical -
which is increasingly the case in the sciences - then a complex ergodic stochas-
tic system will adopt certain states - and certain patterns of states - over time
based upon nomic constraints. These constraints cannot come from within the
formal model. They can only be captured by it. Physically nomically con-
strained frequentist data of stochastic source state I-natural processes are the
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best explanation for the source of formal statistical distributions. There is sim-
ply nothing in any Platonic mathematics that can drive these: no structure,
causality, or dynamics. The I-external physical structured system is entailed to
a greater degree by a statistical model the more complex the ergodicity becomes
(the greater the variety of finite sequences of source/system states can represent
the overall system behaviour in a predictive mode.)
In empirical theories, however, there have to be what Cao calls ‘inputs’ (Cao,
2003b, 57-59.) Additionally, French discusses the problem of how the I-content
of some system or phenomenon is related to its structure, concluding that:
[W]e might insist, crudely, that physical structure is concrete in
that it can be related—via partial isomorphisms in the partial struc-
tures framework, say—to the (physical) ‘phenomena’. This is how
‘physical content’ enters our theories and allows them to be (at least
partially) interpreted . . . But of course, this content must itself be un-
derstood as fundamentally non-mathematical. One way of securing
this would be to argue that there are mind-independent modal re-
lations between phenomena (both possible and actual), where these
relations are not supervenient on the properties of unobservable ob-
jects and the external relations between them; rather this structure
is ontologically basic . . . This in itself renders structural realism dis-
tinct not only from standard realism but also from constructive em-
piricism. However, this option is not open if one is an eliminativist
about phenomena, in so far as the phenomena has to do with, or is
composed of, ‘everyday’ objects, such as tables, for example. From
such a perspective, there is nothing to such objects that cannot be
cashed out in structural terms, and so there is nothing intrinsically
concrete about the phenomena and our problem returns. (French,
2014, 198-99)
I think this is evidently only a problem if phenomena are objects, but I
allow them (dynamical systems, natural systems, stochastic processes) to be
information sources per the classical theory of information. according to Ontic
structural informational realism information sources are or reduce to heteroge-
neous nonuniform bounded regions of the quantum field. There is no mathe-
matical collapse, but the I-ontology itself eliminates the need for certain kinds
of abstracta.
An initial objection will arise from the mandate of the NOSR project:
By way of consequence, however, if we give up Worrall’s distinc-
tion between structure and nature, the argument for a metaphysics
of relations can as such not say anything in defence of scientific re-
alism against the challenge posed by the ‘argument from pessimistic
induction’ (Esfeld and Lam, 2008, 613)
I sidestep this outcome by denying the primacy of relations, and by deferring
defeasibility in NOSR as recommended by the kind of scientific metaphysics.
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This preserves the ability of NOSR to avoid worries about such things as
phlogiston, caloric and the ether (see the discussion about the quantum field
and spacetime manifold M below at 3.2) being part of theories that have been
superseded, whilst some of the mathematics derived on the basis of earlier wrong
assumptions remains correct when applied to new referents. This is simply more
indication that structure is the intrinsic relevant part of whatever I-exists that
is being modelled. According to this view, a radical change in the content or
nature of the underlying phenomena or microsystems - perhaps based upon the
evolution of those microsystems - would change the structure as well (Ladyman
and Ross, 2013, 144; Hacking, 1990.)
French and Ladyman initially assert non-committal ambivalence to the con-
tent of I-ontic structure, which they later revise to various different commit-
ments including I-statistics (presumably meaning probabilities and stochasticity
in nature) and inherent modal natures:
Of course, what the structure is, remains an open question: a
Kantian will have one answer, a phenomenologist another. Neither
will appeal to a structural realist who wants to save a sense of objec-
tivity involving significant mind-independence, unless their accounts
can be appropriately detached in the manner we have indicated...
(French and Ladyman, 2003b, 45)
However, I want to embrace a different but related identity thesis to that be-
tween mathematical and ontic physical structure that Cao attributes to French
and Ladyman: the I-structure is a selection of the total region of the quantum
field comprising a given system/source. The content is given defeasibly and
contingently by QFT. It does not seem to be the case that one can say a field
is only structure.
Real information, then, is - or else reduces to - the causally induced configu-
ration of I-structures: classical fields and the quantum field. It may supervene
upon such in terms of limited causal and epistemic access to the underlying
I-fields, but I do not see the point of introducing any non-epistemically based
supervenience principle. I do not deny that there are reasons to regard abstract
structures and certain abstract relations as real, but I do deny that such abstract
structures and relations realise real information unless they are specifically an
encoded abstraction from real physical structures.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I moved to situate my previous work in relation to the work of
other philosophers of information and especially informational structural real-
ists. I have further supported (§6.3 p213) my argument that instead of regard-
ing that the content of the structure of Ontic structural informational realism
is unknowable in principle, it is defeasibly identical to nonuniform regions of
the quantum field and vacuum. This effective identity thesis about ontic struc-
ture provides a foil to both French’s mathematical collapse and to the problem
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of distinguishing where formal representation ends and I ontology begins. It
avails me of a way in which to defeasibly ground the realisation of information
as causally induced configuration of structure in the ontology identified by QFT.
I then introduced the idea of a general conception of fields qua QFT as a
basis for an ontic structural informational realism, and linked this with existing
conceptions of structure per variants of NOSR.
I discussed Floridi’s ISR, and especially its ontological reductive basis: bi-
nary nonuniformities regarded as data, and cohering clusters of data. I rejected
Floridi’s analysis on the basis that it is a-priorist, not rooted properly in scien-
tific metaphysics, and conflates concepts of difference de re and nonuniformity
de re, resulting in an a-priori binary discretisation of ontology that approximates
the kind of digital ontology that Floridi has rejected. I have argued that in-
stead of clusters of cohering data, the bottom of an information NOSR ontology
should be taken to be sets of causally linked CICS sources.
I have rejected Ladyman and Ross’s allegedly contingent tenet that the uni-
verse is the totality of nonredundant statistics on the basis with interpretational
problems with the conception of statistics, and I have ascribed to it the status
- or at least convergence upon the status - of what French calls mathemati-
cal collapse for similar reasons. I’ve also challenged their idea of irreducible
stochasticity on the basis that it seems to be at odds with their allowances for
Saunders’ turtles (structure) all the way down reduction of I-structure per de-
feasible scientific metaphysics, and on the basis that a declaration of irreducible
stochasticity seems at odds with uncertainty about exactly how it is that nat-
ural phenomena are innately statistical (this is brought out by the fact that
French, for example, has a different analysis based on modal premises.) I’ve
rejected French’s modalist interpretation of the statistical mechanics associated
with QM, and his idea that the possible representations that are implied by the
sets of possible representations in models in QFT and QM for such things as
particle modeling should be regarded as real. I have ascribed to this thesis of
French’s my conception of formalism driven ontological descent.
The idea is to move towards the fully developed ontic structural realism I
need for a metaphysics of information as constrained by scientific metaphysics.
I’ll argue that the most appropriate OSR is most contingently coherent from an
information theoretic perspective - is non-eliminative physicalist, causal struc-
tural realism (causal because the structure is causal.) It differs in various ways
from the kind of reductionist physicalism that Ladyman and French, and Ross,
endorse. However, there are also many similarities. Like French and Ladyman,
I am averse to constructive conceptions of structure as the I-obtaining structure
of the universe (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 73.)
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Chapter 7
An Informational
Statement of Physicalism
7.1 Introduction
My main objective is to argue for the I existence of something that constitutes
the basis of what most scientists refer to as information, whilst avoiding pla-
tonism, nominalism, and formalism-driven ontological descent. In this chapter I
further consolidate the identity thesis in the context of a discussion about phys-
icalist ontic structural realism. I then move to use the FOSIR source ontology
thus far developed to develop a statement of physicalism. This is reasonably
ambitious, and my objective is to rely upon the work done in the thesis so far
and avoid circularity.
I start by establishing the concept of informational and physical ontological
closure at §7.3 p252. The idea is to establish by thought experiment the premise
and hypothesis that physical structure and information are inseparable, which
should follow from the field ontology structure, to ontic structure, identity thesis.
The next step is to deal with issues about causal continuity, and to provide
a brief argument for dealing with causal continuity in the important case of
apparent instantaneous signalling over large distances due to spooky action at
a distance. I have mentioned this severally in the previous chapters, especially
at the first few paragraphs of §2.4 p72, and so in this chapter my treatment will
be brief. Since this is the last chapter, I include some anticipated problems and
challenges to various arguments presented herein, but I address issues mostly at
the metametaphysical and metaphilosophical level, rather than continuing closer
engagement with field ontology and the FOSIR source ontology foundations in
QFT and the indispensability of (I-obtaining) information argument.
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7.2 Situating Physical Structure Vs Formal Struc-
ture
I’ve no space for the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists, and I
have chosen the NOSR alternative (with adjustments) anyway (Cao, 2003b; Cao,
1997; Cao, 2003c; Cao, 2010, 204.) To gain some context, French and Ladyman
do not think that the real structures of mathematics are the same thing as the
real structures of the physical world regarded as the ultimate object of study of
physicists:
Cao persists in lumbering us with two seemingly contradictory
identifications that we thought we had rejected . . . The first con-
cerns the identification between physical structures and mathemat-
ical ones, which Cao then takes to imply that the ontic structural
realist must be a Platonist. (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 75.)
I suggest that Cao’s alleged misinterpretation (which in fact does point to
something like what French later refers to under the rubric of mathematical
collapse) points to the right view for the metaphysics of information: a more
traditional physicalist and scientific realist view (Cao, 2010, 202-6.) Neither
French nor Ladyman and Ross commit to thoroughgoing physicalism in this
way, presumably due to metaphysical and definitional difficulties. However, as
discussed in the previous chapter, they each resort to a non-reductive phys-
icalism, but neither allows physical structure to belong in the I ontology in
anything but either statistical (Ladyman and Ross) or modal (French) terms.
Thus, unlike Cao, who bites the bullet due to induction from the efficacy of
physics posits (at minimum), they both end up committing to what seem to be
two different versions of what I have called formalism driven ontological descent
(§3.2.2 p87.)
French and Ladyman’s unifying formulation of OSR distinguishes mathemat-
ical structure from physical structure, albeit with scare quotes on ‘physical’:
Now, we did say that the distinction between the mathematical
and the physical may become blurred, particularly if the mark of the
latter has to do with ‘substance’ or individual objects or the like.
Nevertheless, blurring does not imply identity. The mathematical
can be trivially distinguished from the physical in that there is more
of it; there is more mathematics than we know what to (physically)
do with, which is what Redhead expressed with his notion of ‘surplus
structure’. What makes a structure ‘physical’? Well, crudely, that it
can be related – via partial isomorphisms in our framework – to the
(physical) ‘phenomena’. This is how ‘physical content’ enters. Less
trivially, the mathematical can be distinguished from the physical
in that the latter is also causal (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 75.)
This assertion is multiply supported - including by the mass cancellation of
terms in renormalisation in QFT (Zeidler and Service, 2009, XII, 131.) Accord-
ing to French and Ladyman there is no such thing as an intrinsically physical
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structure - only structures that are somehow abstract but pick out parts of
and/or are related to the physical system by something like a partial bijective
isomorphism. It’s not an isomorphism (invertible bijective mapping) between
mathematical topological spaces, but a somehow a mapping between a struc-
ture in a mathematical space and the physical (see French, 2014, 195.) The
‘somehow’ seems to be that features or objects of some kind stand as relata in
the phenomena which are mappable to structures in the formal representation.
I analyse this somehow in terms of physically and causally reducing encoding
of partial structure in the I-obtaining system as a source using other struc-
tures as destinations (See also Ladyman et al., 2007, 208 and Rickles, 2008b.)
The surplus (formal) structure is presumably not physical, which is the reason
that French and Ladyman give for Cao’s call for an explanation. However, Cao
seems to be concerned with what looks like French’s conception of mathematical
collapse for all of the structure.
Redhead and French and Ladyman leave space for platonism about informa-
tional (in explanatory terms) entities, but also other possibilities like immanent
realism or fictionalism. Ontic structural informational realism is an immanent
(or in re) realist solution according to which all real information (and pseudo-
information is not information per §2.3.1 p68 and §5.6 p199) is realised non-
platonically somehow. The ‘somehow’ in Ontic structural informational realism
is that information reduces to the causally induced configuration of physical
structures or structures that reduce to (or in some non-platonic cases, super-
vene upon) such structures. The approach allows that the surplus mathematical
structures are (only) constructed artificial symbols (discretised atomic lexical
and diagrammatic structures with rule based semantic content designated by
cognition, reference, and epistemic content) or representational artefacts (di-
agrams, graphs) which encode, or facilitate the encoding of, heterogeneously
constituted partial representations of information in or (abstracted) from natu-
ral phenomena and systems. There is no need to move from such structures and
their semantic information content, which still cannot obtain apart from CICS
and are semantic on the terms defined in chapter 5 (instrinsically via causal
pathways including those involving complex heterogeneous structures such as
causally induced neural correlates of mental content 1) to the reification of pla-
tonic information. To do so is an ontological and logical non sequitur.
Ladyman and Ross later deny that physicalism is entailed by fundamental
physics, which they take to be a mathematical enterprise and to ontologically
privilege mathematical and non-physical structure:
To anticipate, fundamental physics for us denotes a set of math-
ematically specified structures without self-individuating objects,
where any measurement taken anywhere in the universe is in part
measurement of these structures. The elements of fundamental physics
are not basic proper parts of all, or indeed of any, objects...The
1and recall that I regard the information processed in cognitive requires to be itself physical:
only physical or physically reducing information is real/exists
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primacy of fundamental physics as we intend it does not suggest
ontological physicalism. (Ladyman et al., 2007, 44-5.)
Although physicalist, the NOSR of Ladyman and Ross is at best indirectly
or tentatively physicalist, which is borne out by their later reduction of the
ontology of science to stochasticity. The first sentence seems to assert univer-
sal continuity of structure, which would fit with the idea of structure reducing
to the quantum field. However, Ladyman and Ross are not proposing such (I
will.) Their idea is that I-obtaining structure is isolated or identified in a phe-
nomena by constructed formalisms, but that additionally statistics also exists
in re in the I-obtaining structure of the world. This brings my position very
close to theirs, but there are still important differences. I agree with this con-
ception of I-structures in the phenomena being picked out by formalisms, but
like French 2 I regard that the content of the picked out structure is literally
part of whatever material stuff the (structured) phenomena is constituted of
(or else its dynamical and causal behaviour.) We may not be able to say any-
thing conclusive about what the intrinsic material substance of the structure is
according to my adopted interpretation of scientific metaphysics, which allows
that both the nature of structure and what it may or may not inhere in can
be contingently re-conceptualised and re-understood on the basis of the defea-
sible nature of contingent science and scientific theory. However, I think that
scientific metaphysics, and especially this element of defeasible science - allows
us to refer to the quantum field, and bounded regions thereof, as the substance
of the structure about which ontic structural realism is realist. This is what
I am calling the defeasible scientific metaphysical identity thesis about ontic
structure: it’s literally identical to selections of the structure of the quantum
field and regions of it.
7.3 A New Informational Statement of Physi-
calism
I have already foreshadowed this in earlier chapters (see §1.4 p47.) An alterna-
tive statement of FRank Jackson’s above formulation of physicalism will help
to allay any suspicion of circularity or begging the ontic question: that I am
assuming the physicalism of information to reinforce token physicalism.
7.3.1 Causal Continuity
My approach to causation in scientific metaphysical terms is an approximate
adaptation of what has come to be called the ‘spray-stuff’ argument of Ian
Hacking, an introduction to which conception (in conjunction with a description
of my in-principle commitment to its basic premises) can be found at §3.4.3 p126.
2French, 2014
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Important in physicalism about information is what I will call causal con-
tinuity. Causal continuity means that there can be no informational (infor-
mation transmitting or carrying) covariance of structures (signals or emissions
in science) and no causal inducement of a change in the configuration of one
structure by another in the absence of continuous CICS (causal inducement of
configuration of structure) causal pathways existing in CICS causal structures.
Importantly, causal continuity does not require spatial continuity due to the
obvious examples provided by non-local effects and in accordance with the Bell
theorems, confirmed by later experiments (John Clauser and Stuart Freedman
(1972) and Alain Aspect et al. (1981). See my discussion at §2.4 p72.) The re-
cent re-validation of Bell’s theorems suggest there is non-local causality with no
intermediate field or other material structure: according to the best and most
reliable scientific theory physicists have there is either an apparent or actual
‘immediate’ (possibly actually spontaneous) causal inducement of the configu-
ration of one quantum system by another at a distance (Aspect et al., 1981;
Freedman and Clauser, 1972 Cao, 2003c.)
This leaves potentially open the question of the specific nature of causal-
ity, but requires a continuous structure that can support non-contiguous causal
transmission as a necessary condition. This non-contiguous continuity is easily
characterised. If a signal passes between two points or locations in a structure,
then there can be no causal (rather than spatiotemporal) ‘gap’. This is not
a-priori conceptual analysis or stipulation. It is a characterisation of the only
known basis for signal transmission/emission through a physical channel, with
allowances made for quantum entangelment. Ontic structural informational re-
alism can tolerate counterfactual analyses of causation, but requires that they
either accommodate or reduce to physical causation on a contingent metaphys-
ical basis in accordance with our criteria for scientific metaphysics (Ney, 2009,
737-8, 740-1; Esfeld, 2010, 1598; Dowe, 2004.)
Say that it is proposed that there is a supernatural agent or structured
supernatural entity. It is not clear how any kind of agent could have no I-
obtaining structure at all, and I will posit that this is in fact impossible. Suppose
our supernatural entity can interact with the CICS world to induce changes in
the configuration of its dynamic and static CICS. Say the induced changes in
the configuration of the material structure covaried with and were partially
isomorphic with the configuration of some (dynamical) sub-structure internal
to the agent, and thus constituted a signal or even a message.
Contingently, then, and setting aside cognition and sentience as irrelevant,
that part of the putatively supernatural (and presumably non-material or at
least spooky-stuff comprised) agent/structure that does the causal inducing
must be causally inducing changes in CICS. That connected inducing/interacting
part of the supernatural agent/structure has to be a CICS structure, or else
it could not do so per the principal of causal closure (PCC) and primacy of
physics constraint (PPC) both. However, then any other part of the supernat-
ural agent/structure (also an information source if it is causally induces) that
interacts with its causally inducing CICS part would have to be CICS also, by
causal closure and casual continuity. I suggest principal of causal closure (PCC)
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and ontological principal of natural closure (PNC) both apply here, and that
there is no version of naturalism that allows us to venture outside of their pro-
scriptions without becoming not-naturalism. This in keeping with contingent
scientific metaphysics: not only is it in principle impossible for physical structure
to causally interact with not-physical structure, but - in accordance with our
scientific metaphysics premises - such an interaction has never been scientifically-
verifiably (publicly and experimentally) detected that we know of. The no mir-
acles argument with vast inductive support puts a non-physical causal outcome
at bay even for spooky action at a distance in QM. In response to the idea
that some causality is non-physical according to - say - counterfactual causal
analyses.
There are numerous interpretations of both counterfactual and physical
causation (For counterfactual interpretations see Woodward, 2003; Broadbent,
2007; For opposing physicalist conceptions see Salmon, 1994; Kutach, 2013; Ney,
2009; See especially Ladyman et al., 2007, 258-62; 264-5; 275-6.) Counterfactual
approaches tend to include, but are not limited to, at least these features:
1. Omissions and preventers as causes of outcomes, which coheres with the
idea of causation being defined by difference making (rather than, say,
physical causal pathways)
2. Causation in cause and effect involving compound or multiple possible
causal pathways that all factor into the causal relationship in a cause-
effect interaction.
3. Causation in cause and effect involving compound or multiple possible
difference makers (including omissions and preventers), more than one of
which can be taken to be a factor cause-effect interaction.
Counterfactual approaches come under the broad heading of difference mak-
ing characterisations and theories of causality, and these are contrasted with
the set of mechanistic theories of causality:
Mechanistic theories of causality are normally contrasted with
difference-making theories of causality. This heading includes prob-
abilistic, counterfactual, regularity, agency and some dispositional
theories of causality. According to a difference-making account, two
events are causally connected if and only if a change to one makes
a difference (of an appropriate sort) to the other. . . . [This category
distinction] can be flouted: e.g. one might give a mechanistic ac-
count which is essentially difference-making because the mechanisms
in question are given a counterfactual analysis, or one might give a
difference-making account which is at root mechanistic if the differ-
ences in question have mechanisms as truth-makers. (Williamson,
2011, 422.)
The CICS approach is closest to “causal foundationalism: the view that facts
about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical
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causation” (Ney, 2009). Difference making interpretations of causation include
such things as omission and blocking or prevention: omitting to take action
constitutes a cause, for example (likewise - preventing some action constitues a
cause of the outcome.) However, a number of theorists have argued that such
approaches are confused (Dowe, 2004). My scientific metaphysical approach -
with its inclusion of the defeasible nature of science and scientific contingency as
centrally important - accommodates the approach of Braddon-Mitchell, 1993,
who argues that a-priori difference making and other accounts of causation do
not undo the in-principle existence of some microstructural process or interac-
tion to be discovered my science contingently, and also coheres with the view of
Chakravartty, 2005 that causal accounts that involve conceiving of causation “in
terms of mere, regular or probabilistic conjunction are unsatisfactory, and that
causal phenomena are correctly associated with some form of de re necessity”
(Chakravartty, 2005, Abstract.)
Historically, scepticism about the nature and existence of causality has strong
supporters - including David Hume and Bertrand Russell. However, the scien-
tific metaphysics that I espouse coheres with the argument of Chakravartty’s
process theory of causality:
that if such objections seem compelling, it is only because every-
day expressions concerning causal phenomena are misleading with
respect to certain metaphysical details. These expressions generally
make reference to the relations of events or states of affairs, but ig-
nore or obscure the role played by causal properties. I argue that
on a proposed alternative, an analysis in terms of causal processes,
more refined descriptions of causal phenomena escape the charge of
incoherence. (Ibid.)
Process theories usually fall under the head of mechanistic theories of causal-
ity (Salmon, 1994; Glennan, 2010), and the CICS-FOSIR approach also accom-
modates significant aspects of that approach. CICS doesn’t require properties,
per se, but the causal inducement of configuration of structure could fairly be re-
garded as a process - especially by the standards of physics where finite amounts
of time are arguably necessarily required for such inducements (with a possi-
ble exception being available along the lines of the possibility of Planck-scale
ontological fundamentally discrete nature.) In formal classical Shannonian in-
formation theory and in contemporary information theory, sources are of course
stochastic physical processes. So the kinds of causation required by CICS is
very much that which can induce a configuration or pattern in the dynamical
structure of a source. Given that signals and channels themselves can be treated
as sources, this tends to impute a process aspect to causation in classical mathe-
matical communication theory in general. In fact, I’ve been arguing that causal
stochastic processes are ineliminable necessary conditions for the obtaining of
information, as well as for its transmission. With these reminders in place, one
can see the relevance of the process theory of causation presented by Wesley
Salmon as reported by Williamson:
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The idea behind the process theory is that A causes B if and
only if there is a physical process of the appropriate sort that links
A and B. There are two views as to which kind of physical process is
appropriate for underpinning causal relations. One view has it that
the process should be one capable of transmitting a mark from A
to B (Reichenbach 1956, section 23; Salmon 1980a, section 2). Ac-
cording to the other view, a causal process transmits (Salmon 1997,
section 2) or possesses (Dowe 2000b, section V.1) a conserved phys-
ical quantity, such as energy-mass (Fair 1979), linear momentum,
angular momentum or charge, from A to B Williamson, 2011, 423;
See also Salmon, 1994; )
Physical causal arguments and counterfactual causal analyses are either
about different things, in which case some of the counterfactual analyses are
not relevant to the nature or information as necessarily transmittable, or else
they are very different analyses of the same thing, which is contingently to be
explained reductively (Ney, 2009). Where cand if ounterfactual causal analyses
undo the principal of causal closure (PCC) and ontological principal of natural
closure (PNC), or require the elimination of physical causal structure somehow,
I reject them. Incidentally, the thought experiment I’m here describing (su-
pernatural/spooky causal pathways) with its CICS ontological-status ‘domino
effect’ constitutes also an alternative statement of ontological principal of nat-
ural closure (PNC) (the only principal of natural closure (PNC) I am calling
upon.)
Returning to our thought experiment, Spooky-stuff Supernatural causal
agency or inducement that changes the configuration of CICS in the physical
closed universe is therefore a straight paradox. The inducing agent/structure
can only be CICS, and therefore a material and thus natural agent. This re-
quires that principal of causal closure (PCC) is the necessary and sufficient
condition for what is natural, which reconciles with the materialism of physics.
All information reduces to CICS construed according to FOSIR (defeasibly) in
the causally closed universe according to a scientific metaphysics.
Continuous causal pathways are best defined as follows. If there is a causally
inducing structure A and a casually induced configuration of a structure C then
there must be either 1. direct immediate or non-mediated causal inducement of
C by A, or else 2. indirect causal inducement of C by A through n intermediate
causal CICS pathways which are themselves CICS, between which there is im-
mediate or non-mediated causal contact. Non-mediated causal contact means
that there is direct causal contact between the two structures with no interme-
diary structures or causal pathway elements. It is physicalist non-eliminative
structural realism with the QFT-OSR identity thesis that is providing the ontol-
ogy. In the FOSIR ontology structure (realised at bottom as physical fields) is
ubiquitous. Thus non-mediated direct causal contact between structures must
happen at the smallest possible physical scale: say (contingently) Planck dis-
tance.
As I have just indicated with reference to the Bell theorems, there is an
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exception in the context of quantum entangled states or what Einstein called
“spooky action at a distance” (nonlocal effects) in quantum mechanics. With
entanglement measuring one of a pair of spatially separated quantum systems
(particles) affects the state of the other system with no apparent intermediate
causal structures or pathways (hidden local variables.) However, it remains
that with entangled quantum states of particles and quantum systems exhibiting
action at a distance, the altering of the state of one system reliably always results
in the inducement of a predictable change in the configuration of the state of the
other system. Moreover, in accordance with the informational eliatic principle
Whatever kind of specific causality is involved, physics takes it to obey causal
closure. Thus action at a distance for entangled quantum systems does not con-
travene causal continuity under causal closure (principal of causal closure (PCC)
via primacy of physics constraint (PPC).) Instead, there is just no requirement
in terms of shortest possible distances (non-contiguous.) Whether the casual-
ity involves intermediary CICS (hidden local variable interpretation) or not, it
is still physical. Specific types of physical cause - causally altering the config-
uration of the state of one of the systems - results in physical effects in the
configuration of the state of the other system on a regular and predictable basis
(even in the context of density functions.)
7.3.2 Informational Ontological Closure
Causal interaction with the CICS informational universe is a sufficient condition
for the upstream casually-inducing interactor to be itself I CICS and therefore
physical and natural. This is defeasible and comes by way of induction from
scientific findings in physics. The interactor is also a CICS information source.
CICS physicality is like an ontic domino effect: all the dominoes have to be I
CICS (which means physicalist ontic structural realist) and obey causal con-
tinuity under causal closure. Anything in the informational causal chain of
structures is contingently or naturally necessarily physical. Contingently and
according to our best applied scientific and applied mathematical theories of in-
formation in mathematical communication theory and algorithmic complexity
theory (and computability theory) CICS are a necessary and sufficient condition
for the embodiment, encoding, processing, and transmission of real information
(and of data on most characterisations thereof, with the notable exception of
Floridi’s ontological neutrality posit.) Causal pathways are a necessary and
sufficient condition for information transmission. (Dretske, 1981, 26-8.))
A consequence of the CICS conception of information is that information
processing and transmission is causally closed: informational structure-entities
(sources) have the necessary condition that they obey causal closure, and thus
so does information.
Say any kind of apparatus that was constituted of existing physical natural
kinds (matter, energy etc.) could detect some new ontic stuff. This would
mean that there would have to be a physical causal interaction based upon
causal pathways that are also I CICS existing between the contingent new stuff
structure and the known physical stuff of the apparatus: one that could carry
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information or sustain real information transmission. Both would have to be
CICS: extended and causal. This is the compliment to the supernatural agent
thought experiment aboveI will refer to this as informational continuity: the
causal pathways necessary to induce representations of information of the new
stuff into the structure of the measuring device would have to be continuous
under the principle of causal closure. This includes quantum entanglement, since
Ontic structural informational realism, and later FOSIR, require only causal
continuity, not I-contiguity.
If there is no possibility of such spatiotemporal causal inducement of the
configuration of the measurement apparatus by the new spooky stuff source Ss,
then the new stuff is not physical, nor causal, and no information could ever be
transmitted from it, nor encoded from Ss, nor, I suggest, would any information
about Ss be available. Accordingly, all of the following would hold:
 § 
θ
i S
s (that - semantic information encoded from the source indicating some-
thing of its configuration, nature, status, state, or dynamics/behaviour)
 § 
ι
i S
s (in - within source structural boundary, including in mathematical
representation)
 § 
ω
i S
s (of - within the source including its boundary)
 § 
α
i S
s (at - at the source and its immediately causally connected sources per
causal continuity)
 § 
ρ
i S
s (artefactual representation)
 § 
ν
i S
s (natural representation)
 § 
φ
i S
s (from - any structure encoded from the source into other sources via
the inducement of configuration/pattern)
 § 
θ
i S
s (that - indication by signal transmission)
All of the following also hold because there’s no transmission and no emission
possible in principle from the spooky stuff source to any real informational non-
spooky source:
 Ss σi S
j
 Ss ηi S
j)
There is no partial representation available either:
∆
i

φ
i S
s
  0 (refer to §1.3.1 p45 and §1.3.1 p44)
It follows from the above in epistemic terms that Ss DNE (does not ex-
ist). These operators are intended to be physico-logical cum quantitative op-
erators. The same argument and operator can be applied to platonic entities
in the same way. The physico-logical operator component mimics that pro-
posed by Paul Humphreys for dealing with emergence (Bedau and Humphreys,
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2008.) The addition of the dual duty as quantitative is motivated by the need to
overcome the qualitative-quantitative gap in information measures in classical
theory. This operator is both quantitative and logical: the quantity of infor-
mation transmitted to any other source is 0, and there is correspondingly no
transmission from SS possible (2nd order modal logic.)
There can be no causal discontinuity with any informational processes in-
cluding transmission and encoding. This also means that it is not circular to
say that only real structures can be informational, and only CICS are real struc-
tures. The determiner and necessary condition for physicality is neither spraying
(Hacking, 1983) or microbangings, it is informational causal closure reducing to
transmissability (See also the development of IS1 later at §4.6 p171.)
The point is that if the kind of causal pathways that are required for all
material measurements of matter and energy and other known physical natu-
ral kind types can be set up between known physical stuff and any new stuff,
then the new stuff is CICS-informational and could not be discovered physically
otherwise. In principle it could necessarily could never be discovered from a in-
formationally causally closed universe. Causal closure is informational closure,
and informational continuity is the necessary condition to get any signal from
or representation of the information in a real source.
There is another way of stating the physicalist necessary and sufficient con-
ditions of information realisation:
 IP1 (Informational Physicality): A physical duplicate of the world sim-
pliciter is a complete informational duplicate of the world.
IP1 is an adaptation of Frank Jackson’s statement of physicalism - that
a physical duplicate of the world is a duplicate simpliciter. It is a duplicate
of everything that exists without exception or omission which says that if one
duplicates all of the physical structure of the world, then one will have duplicated
all of the information associated with and realised in the world (Jackson, 1998,
9, 18-30; See also French and Ladyman, 2003b, 75.)
The above development is evidently Armstrongian - relating to the eliatic
principle in informational terms. However, my overall scientific metaphysics is
not Armstrongian, because I have rejected his variety of nominalism. Thus the
question arises about its correctness in ontological terms. It doesn’t seem right
to deny a source has existence on a logical necessary and natural necessary basis
when such a spooky source may well exist - like another Lewisian modal realist
possible world - but be in principle perpetually causally inaccessible to us: to the
actual world of veridical sources. There are standard responses to this, includ-
ing that which compares the case to that of an entity our source structure that
is part of the physical world according to causal closure (i.e. - it’s not a spooky
source). The idea is that this kind of as yet undetected source is necessarily in
principle not informationally inaccessible. However, the informational pathway
picture that I have deployed entails that the source in question - the non-spooky
source outside of our light cone or otherwise undetectable - is naturally neces-
sarily connected to every other source realised in the quantum field by multiple
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channels. In other words - there are channels which meet the boundary of our
light cone and go beyond it. That means that there are causal signal pathways
connected to it from both myself and the reader right now. We may never be
able to propagate a broadcast signal to them within any imaginable reasonable
time frame (the message might not be received before our solar system is long
gone - for instance). However, if we somehow acquire enough energy or power to
do so (enough to penetrate any noise and overcome signal loss) then the signal
- or part of it - would necessarily reach the out of light cone source provided
it still existed and was not moving away faster than the signal speed (We also
have to consider the CICS-FOSIR.)
It follows from the above that everything that exists realises information and
therefore reduces to physical structures or supervenes (reductively) upon phys-
ical structures (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 42-50.) As an adjunct outcome:
anything that is not informational in this way is not real (see also §4.4 p158.)
My positive I CICS physical realist and physicalist thesis about the ontic na-
ture of information culminating in IP1 is supported by a negative anti-Platonist
thesis (§1.4.1 p49 and §1.4 p47 ) about what information could not be.
7.4 Some Anticipated Responses/Problems (to
elements of the metametaphysics of FOSIR-
CICS source ontology)
7.4.1 Eliminativism and Pluralism
Research into protein folding involves numerous explanatory challenges includ-
ing 1. how proteins come to be efficiently folded into a natured state so that
they are functional (Biro, 2013; Wolynes, 2008; Gershenson and Gierasch, 2011;
Horwich, 2011; Dill and MacCallum, 2012; Weikl and Dill, 2007) and 2. the
related but prospectively harder problem of how protein folding mechanisms
evolved or developed in the first place (Wolf and Koonin, 2007; Bernhardt and
Tate, 2010.) The first is the kind of process that Sahotra Sarkar has described
as being a prime candidate for a information theoretic and semiotic description
which recognises conformational and dynamical information as I-obtaining in
the structure of the system (Sarkar, 2006.)
Yet the general and well known survey of the protein folding problem by Dill
et. al. mentions the term ‘information’ only once in 27 pages, albeit with fairly
significant information theoretic and ontological import:
The search for folding mechanisms has driven major advances in
experimental protein science. These include fast laser temperature
jump methods. . . ; mutational methods that give quantities called
θ-values . . . [now also used for ion-channel kinetics and other rate
processes (42)] or ψ- values (204), which can identify those residues
most important for folding speed; hydrogen exchange methods that
give monomer-level information about folding events (Dill et al.,
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2008b, 294-5.) (the term ‘encoding’ is also mentioned only once at
291.)
The role for the reference to information here has nothing obvious to do,
however, with I-obtaining structure in protein folding microsystems. It appears
to be only referring to epistemic-explanatory benefits associated with the ex-
perimental and analytic methods described. This impression comes primarily,
I suggest, from the ‘about’ term, and from a somewhat epistemic/subjectivist
interpretation of the nature of information (probably with some reference to the
classical theory.) I will refer to this usage henceforth as corresponding to the
lexical representation or ‘about’ dynamical information logic operator (νi - see
§1.3.1 p44) to be read as ‘information about σ’ where σ is a source structure.
Suffice to say, it does not look (from the above passage) like Dill et al., 2008b
have much use for realism about information or associated concepts in the fairly
hard science of protein folding, and so my indispensability argument appears to
have hit a snag in this case.
Correspondingly, one view that causes problems for the realist argument is
ontological eliminativism about information in the philosophy of biology. Some
philosophers of science and biology have argued that in biology and especially
the molecular biosciences, the term ‘information’ (and closely associated terms
like ‘coding’, and ‘code’) can be regarded only as either simply a convenient
term of art, a useful metaphor to refer to various different physical constructs
and dynamics (Griffiths, 2001; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013, 143-5.) Eliminativism
is related to pluralism in so far as the latter, drawing on a nominalist conclusion
from theory level pluralism about information, denies that information exists as
any central natural kind, basic existent, or primitive particular based structure
(or perhaps structural type.)
How to save my fairly important indispensability of information argument
from this apparent dispensability of informational terms and information in a
field where transmission of configuration of structures by various dynamical
mechanisms is certainly ineliminable in an I-ontic sense? Returning to Dill
et al., 2008b, it is undeniable that the job of the DNA, tRNA, ribosomes, chap-
erone molecules, and/or chaperonin is to structurally guide the folding of the
polypeptide chain into its natured state: to induce the appropriate configuration
of its structure. This requires causal inducement of structures from alphabets
of structures drawn from the configuration of various sources: the mRNA, and
before that the DNA, as well as the functional structures of the ribosome and its
rRNA and the structures of the chaperonin themselves. These various structures
are modular and uncontroversially form natural modular sequences of symbols,
and their structures causally induce downstream configuration in other struc-
tures. Their configurations can be measured as entropy and as complexity, and
in a sequential sense as Markov sequences: the measures that can be devised
are multifarious and can involve statistics and various mathematical constructs.
A support for a less severe pluralism about biological information is that
several senses of the term ‘information’ are used by molecular bioscientists and
philosophers of biology to characterise the nature of biological information, and
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several more have been proposed as unifying and/or central. They include:
a. The classical sequence and/as encoding sense familiar from the fundamentals
of genetics, (Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Godfrey-Smith, 2007)
b. The Peircian semiotic or signification and signalling approach proposed in
part by Godfrey-Smith and related to work by David Lewis (Godfrey-Smith,
2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2011; Lewis, 2013.)
c. What Carl Bergstrom and Martin Rosvall have called the transmission sense
of information as applied to the informational characterisation of genotype
to phenotype transmission in DNA transcription and translation and protein
synthesis (Bergstrom and Rosvall, 2011),
d. The conformational conception of information associated with the stoichio-
metric and chiral properties of biomolecules (molecular angles and their de-
grees of freedom, for example) in processes such as protein synthesis and
folding (Sarkar, 2006; Sankararamakrishnan and Weinstein, 2000.)
e. A combined semiotic conception that includes sequence specificity, confor-
mation, and dynamical elements - also proposed by Sarkar.
f. The teleosemantic conception of information in biology derived from philos-
ophy of mind (Millikan, 2009, Millikan, 2001.)
g. Nicholas Shea’s infotel semantics which requires/includes “correlational in-
formation” and “starts from the idea that genetic transmission is a way for
organisms to send signals to their offspring, and seeks to define the semantic
content of those signals.” (Shea, 2007a; Griffiths and Stotz, 2013, 165-7.)
h. The functional-cum-infotel semantic conception of genetic information re-
cently proposed by Griffiths and Stotz (Griffiths and Stotz, 2013.)
i. The pragmatic Bayesian subjectivist approach of Ariel Caticha (Caticha,
2014)
If eliminativism about information is either true (correspondence semantics
true) or correct (correctness of some formal theory), then realism, let alone
physicalism, about information, can’t get started. To begin with, however, it is
at least not clear that the propensity for scientists and philosophers to use the
term ‘information’ plurally and polysemously - even using an apparent corre-
spondence theory of truth - entails that anti-realism about information is true.
The term ‘structure’ gets used comprehensively in scientific theories in a pol-
ysemous manner, but it does not seem coherent to claim that structure is not
real on this basis, nor that when scientists describe physical structure that they
consider this to be ambiguous, nor that they consider structure to be a fiction
(with allowances for the difference between mathematical structure and physical
structure.) The tenor(s) of ‘information’ as a metaphor are usually Shannonian
theoretical terms like ‘information’, ‘encoding’, ‘transmission’, ‘channel’, ‘noise’
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and ‘decoding’ (The term ‘code’ does not appear in Shannon’s Mathematical
Theory of Communication, although source and channel coding are certainly fa-
miliar from contemporary mathematical communication theory - Dretske, 1981,
115-116; Gallager, 2008, 7, 64, 249-50; Orlitsky et al., 2004, 1469; Shannon,
1998, 1, 2, 5.) Otherwise they are regularly terms inspired by complexity, com-
putability, or sequence orientated conceptions like those of Crick and Watson
(the sequences being very much physical structures and representations thereof)
and hybridisations with Kolmogorov complexity and its derivatives (Wolf and
Koonin, 2007; Galas et al., 2010.)
The active scientific use of more than one of a.-i. presents a problem for a
non-pluralist and reductionist realist view (Sarkar, 1998; Godfrey-Smith, 2007;
Godfrey-Smith, 2001.) It often doesn’t look like molecular bioscientists and
philosophers of biology are saying that there is a singular reductive conception of
information, and philosophers of biology have been known to assert anti-realist
positions, and nominalist-like positions. The reductionist physicalist realist
about information (me) has arguably only three options - give up realism about
information, or identify what in the ontology constitutes the basis of informa-
tion in all theories on a non-trivial basis, and/or identify when scientific theories
are not really referring to information at all but simply being terminologically
imprecise or lax. The correct question is not “What justifies the claim that a
scientist who is a subjectivist/pluralist/probabilist/computationalist about in-
formation is not just legitimately talking about a different kind of information?”,
but “Is there something - common to other conceptions of information - that
the scientist is referring to in the ontology, or something in the ontology that is
ineliminable as the existential basis for what the scientist is referring to?” and,
importantly (to avoid redundancy and vacuity) “Is that thing more than just
structure?” According to a scientific metaphysics, information may be being
referred to using various other terms.
The question is whether it follows from the existence of plural conceptions
of information in the molecular biosciences that there is no common reductive
ontic foundation of various references to information. This can be seen to be a
parallel to the question of realism about structure - and especially the relation-
ship between structure and content - in the ontic structural realist debate. I
am suggesting that it is an extension of that debate since I am offering an ontic
structural informational realism as a basis for the metaphysics of information.
It does not follow from there being a. through i. in molecular bioscience and
philosophy that anti-realism about physical information is true, nor that nom-
inalism or pluralism about an ontic primitive ground of biological information
itself - rather than measures thereof - are true.
I take a primary non-negotiable identifier and sufficient condition for the
presence of information to be signal transmission including natural and/or
artificial transduction/quantisation reducing to causally induced and inciden-
tally/naturally representing structures (they represent in the same way as a
footprint in the sand represents the foot that made it, and in fact by extension
all feet due the causal genetic pathways that connect all feet to one genetic ances-
tor.) I think that transducer based natural and artificial encoding/encodability
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with nomic constraints (and certainly with natural alphabets of structures or
possible configurations) are also a sufficient condition.
I can offer some preliminary idea of what the more specific distinguishing
features of information-indispensable theories might be. I suggest that they
tend to be theories that either:
I. Have some kind of apparently I-obtaining information as their central ob-
ject of study and especially where
I.1. Such theories deal with experimental results and repeatable experi-
ment and derived data: i.e. are not based upon simulations, fore-
casts (as in applied computer science for the soft sciences or special
sciences), or undetected postulates (as sometimes arise in particle
physics for example.)
I.2. The information in question is assumed to occur naturally and not
be an artefact of the theory or experiment in instrumentalist or prag-
matic terms. i.e. The science is done with the express intention that
some kind of natural environmental information is supposed to be its
object.
II. Involve modeling and/or identifying some kind of environmental informa-
tion transmission involving signals and/or emissions, and/or signal (and
therefore symbol/message) encoding/decoding, and/or processing, and/or
generation/production where these processes and dynamics are considered
to be physical and causal in some important sense. (Godfrey-Smith, 2014)
Such cases very much seem to involve an assumption of the existence of
information as an I commodity. In many cases it seems that the commodity in
question is not in fact regarded as abstract (see the examples from Demirel et.
al, Gattenby et. al, Dill et al., and Singleton et. al in the previous section), as
Dretske described (Dretske, 1981; Devlin, 1991.) These kinds of theories should
be distinguished from theories that seem to use references to information only
in an illustrative or non-critical manner. These ideas constitute the beginnings
of a positive scientific metaphysical argument for the I existence of information.
In contrast to biology, physics seems to be less ambiguous about information
as an indispensable component of empirical theories and as physical at bottom.
Still, physicists tend to apply classical information theory and derivatives thereof
with surprising variability in theory construction and in the interpretation of
information theoretic terms. Moreover, there have been efforts to use algorith-
mic conceptions of information and complexity and to unify these with classical
probabilistic formulations (Vitanyi and Li, 2009; Gru¨nwald and Vita´nyi, 2003,
and especially Chaitin, 1975, 329-31.) Then there are cases where there looms
the formal-physical duality that French refers to under the rubric of the col-
lapse of represented structures into representing structures prevails (French,
2014, 133-4, 192-3), and other cases where there is a clear mathematisation
of the ontology on Everettian or other terms (Tegmark, 2008; Deutsch, 1998;
Everett, 2012.)
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7.4.2 Triviality and Token Physicalism
I have already extensively alluded to this objection, and dealth with it by pre-
senting alternative realisms about information including various ontic structural,
Platonic, Kantian transcendental, and statistical realist versions. In this sec-
tion I will say more about the pancomputational and computationalist realisms
about information as data and the ‘it from bit’ ontological view.
The ontology about which I am realist places physical structure at bottom as
the existential reductive basis of information as well as everything else. To use
a very truncated thought experiment to clarify my overall intention: if we are
all in a giant advanced computer simulation as Nick Bostrom has hypothesised
(Bostrom, 2003; Bostrom, 2009), then the simulation and the information pro-
cessing in it reduces to physical structure. Redundancy and overdetermination
aside - any alteration to the physical structures including the causal pathways
necessarily results in a change in configuration of structure and of the infor-
mation of the structure, and therefore results in changes in the simulation in
qualitative informational terms.
So one of my core claims is that no real information exists where there is no
I-obtaining physical structure, and this is because without physical structure
there is no causally induced configuration of physical structure - which reduces
ontologically to nonuniform physical I physical fields which must all reduce
defeasibly to regions of the fluctuating quantum field - which is the proposed
reductive basis of all real information. This is not only not a vacuous restatement
of token physicalism. Neither is it just uninteresting since many information
theorists and even mathematical physicists have proposed that the universe is
in fact information at bottom, with no Landauer-style ontological commitment
to physical structure as a necessary condition for the obtaining of information or
it’s representation, while scientific anti-realists insist that the ontological nature
of the referents of scientific theories and their models is in-principle inaccessible
(Floridi, 2008a, 241-2; Floridi, 2011c, 361. See also Tegmark, 2008, Bostrom,
2003; Van Fraassen, 2001; Van Fraassen, 1991; Van Fraassen, 2008)
The original computational metaphysics is arguably due to computing pio-
neer Konrad Zuse who proposed in the 1950s that the universe might be running
on, or as, an enormous computer (Floridi, 2009a, 152-3.) Restatement of this
came from physicists Edward Fredkin and John Wheeler’s ‘it from bit’ thesis.
Pancomputationalism is characterised by additional posits present in the
theories of Zuse, computer scientist Edward Fredkin and to some extent by
that of mathematician Stephen Wolfram (Bynum, 2014, 125-6.) One of these
is identified in the final sentence of the above quoted passage. Fredkin’s the-
ory requires that nature be regarded as necessarily discrete at a fundamental
level digital and that there be no ultimately continuous processes in nature. In
this, Fredkin embraces Einstein’s assertion of the discrete nature of quantum
phenomena and objects:
One can give good reasons why reality cannot at all be repre-
sented by a continuous field. From the quantum phenomena it ap-
pears to follow with certainty that a finite system of finite energy
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can be completely described by a finite set of numbers (quantum
numbers.) This does not seem to be in accordance with a contin-
uum theory, and must lead to attempts to find a purely algebraic
theory for the description of reality. But nobody knows how to find
the basis for such a description. (Einstein, 1950)
However, Fredkin maintains that the solution is not to be found with algebra
but with information theory, and that according to his finite nature hypothesis
the universe is not only computational by virtue of being fundamentally digital
but effectively also itself a computational process (Fredkin, 1992, 116-17. See
also Zenil, 2013, 3-5; Vedral, 2010; Brooks, 2012a; Brooks, 2012b; Beavers and
Harrison, 2012, 349-51; Chaitin, 2012, 280-1; Hutter, 2012, 408-12)
It seems to be an article of faith among many philosophers of information
that the information in a given spatiotemporal volume must be finite. The
primary contingent reason for this is probably the Bekenstein bound on the
amount of information required to describe any physical system occupying fi-
nite space and with finite energy, and the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy which
demonstrates that the bound is saturated (it’s limit reached) for three dimen-
sional black holes (Bekenstein, 2004; Mu¨ller et al., 2012.) However, it is note-
worthy in the context of both the difficulties involved with and the defeasibility
of scientific metaphysics the formulation and scope of the Bekenstein Bound
is debated, and that according to contemporary information theory (specifi-
cally mathematical communication theory) information sources can have both
unknown and infinite possibility spaces or alphabets, which latter translates to
infinite information according to most information-theoretically derived concep-
tions 3 (Gallager, 2008, 16, 71-2, 85; Orlitsky and Santhanam, 2003; Hayashi,
2017, 599.) Moreover, Shannon’s classical formulation of information measures
for continuous sources (continuous physical stochastic processes) is achieved by
imposing the discrete source solution upon them for mathematical tractability
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949.) The upshot is that Shannon’s classical charac-
terisation and model of continuous sources is inherently a partial representing
mechanism (For further discussion including reference to Einstein’s discretising
conception of the universe and Planck length, see §4 p137, 101.)
Adriaans and Van Bentham refer to approaches like Fredkin’s under the
broad heading of “metaphysical computationalism”, and the Zuse and Fredkin
varieties are only one of a number of proposed models (Adriaans and Benthem,
2008, 12.) Computational metaphysics has been variously endorsed and devel-
oped by philosophers, and there is an entire new field of scientific endeavour
which regards nature as computational but which does not necessarily involve
regarding nature itself as a simulation or as fundamentally informational in on-
tological terms. This does not require Wheeler’s “It From Bit” ontology, but
does allow it (See Dodig Crnkovic and Giovagnoli, 2013.) My approach allows
for the coherence of the idea of nature as computational and informational, but
involves rejecting Wheeler’s ontological stance as arising from an illegitimate
3It certainly should for a view like that of philosopher David Chalmers, according to whose
controversial characterisation possibility spaces are the information. (Chalmers, 1996)
7.4 Some Anticipated Responses/Problems (to elements of the metametaphysics of FOSIR-CICS
source ontology) 267
extrapolation from facts based upon an apparent bias towards a form of instru-
mentalism or a kind of Van Fraassen style constructive empiricism. According
to Wheeler, nature is informational because the way in which we investigate
nature using instruments involving testing binary possibilities or - in Wheeler’s
terms - asking binary questions.
My view of Wheeler’s computational metaphysics applies also to the informa-
tional metaphysics/ontology of Luciano Floridi (Floridi, 2008a, Floridi, 2011c),
which I also reject as premature and not supported by science as a scientific
metaphysics, despite the role of statistics and computation in the sciences. If
it was clear that reductionism was completely undone as a going concern in
science it would not follow that the universe is informational at bottom It is far
from clear that such is the case, and I think information theory can be shown
to bear out the opposite.
I am minimising the I ontology by asserting that representing structure
in models and theories picks out just partial structure and therefore partial
information in and of a system (French, 2014, 102-3.) The debate about real
versus mathematical/formal structure brings out an important point: there are
theorists and philosophers who think that some real structures are non-reducible
non-physical Platonic abstracta. As with the CICS formulation - or with any
formulation that regards that information is somehow realised by structures - in
the cases where structure is taken to be Platonic or transcendent non-physical,
Platonic abstract, and irreducible supervenient and prospectively non-physical
structures are informational. The upshot is that according to those approaches
information is not physical, although as I have argued previously (§1.4 p47),
it is not only not clear what it is, but how it can have the property of being
informational or of informing anything - or any mind for that matter.
In accordance with these observations about pancomputationalism and pla-
tonism about information, physicalist reductionist realism about both structure
and information is not token physicalism. The idea is that real information
reduces to physical causal CICSs as an existential necessary condition.
7.4.3 Reductionism
A defence of either physicalism or reductionism is very large scope work. I am
limited to an indirect approach to retaining reductive physicalism by identifying
its indispensability. Regarding indispensability of physicalism, Ladyman and
Ross defer to the primacy of physics constraint (PPC) (Ross et al., 2013, 37.)
I think it is fairly uncontroversial that physics largely takes physicalism to be
true.
It is apparent that the reason for the epistemic privileging of physics is not
just about scope, but about the reduction of explananda to ontic explanans.
Now, it might be true that a field biologist studying the epigenetic features of
a mammal species is no more interested in, and needs to use no more refer-
ences to (none at all), quantum systems that are the material microstructural
basis of their samples than does a carpenter. A molecular bioscientist trying
to understand chaperonin operations in protein folding and the stoichiometric
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limitations associated with the same, on the other hand, may well have cause
to investigate the degree to which quantum effects are a basis for and impinge
upon protein folding dynamics and the transfer of information from one point
in the chain of protein synthesis to another (See §3.3.1 p111p 110-11 .) Cor-
respondingly, while not being thoroughgoing reductionists, Ladyman and Ross
are not anti-reductionist. They present a set of naturalistic principles for theory
unification and scientific metaphysics that cater for the importance of certain
kinds of physical or ontological reduction (what they call ‘core-sense reduction’):
[W]hile we are not type reductionists...the realization argument
tells against that doctrine, we are also not proponents of the sorts
of non-reductive physicalism (involving token identity and/or lo-
cal supervenience) paradigmatically associated with the rejection of
type reductionism...Core Sense Reductions are also sometimes called
‘ontological reductions’ . . . (CR) All nomic special- and honorary-
scientific facts, and all positive non-nomic special-and honorary-
scientific facts, have an explanation that appeals only to (i) physical
facts and (ii) necessary (i.e. non-contingent) truths. (Melnyk 2003,
83.) (Ladyman et al., 2007, 51.)
This kind of reductionism caters for the kind of NOSR that identifies rela-
tions as ontologically fundamental. It does so by allowing the ontological status
of relations to be based in significant part upon necessary and logical truths.
This is one way to sure up the portability of one kind of relation between physics
and mathematics, which is arguably of critical importance given the obvious in-
terdependency of the two. This portability of the nature of relations is a central
feature of the NOSR of Ladyman and Ross, but per criticisms that will be dis-
cussed in the following section: this is one point at which it could be argued that
the a-priori manages to becomes part of the ontology of relation based NOSR.
However I will retain this kind of non-type reductionism at minimum (although
not with relations as the ontic base), and do not see any point in not adhering
to this statement of it. It seems well suited to accompany an NOSR according
to which structure reduces to heterogeneous fields rather than relations (§6.6
p242.) A contingent scientific and thus defeasible metaphysics must make ref-
erence to physics. In fact physics - and particularly QFT - will very directly
provide the basis for the kind of adaptations that I will make to physicalist
NOSR.
7.5 Conclusion
Most significantly in this chapter, I presented a new informational statement
of physicalism, which is intended to strengthen the best existing conception of
physicalism. My interest in this is obviously that it helps support the scientific
metaphysical FOSIR-CICS source ontology that I have presented in the thesis.
To this end I revised David Armstrong’s a-priori analytic (in fact Armstrong’s
7.5 Conclusion 269
metaphysics is significantly contingent) eliatic principle, developing an infor-
mation theoretic version which defeasibly defers to FOSIR. This is by way of
an argument that there is no information without the right kind of physical
spatiotemporal structure, and that in fact all information must reduce to very
specific feature of such structure(s) (their configurations or arrangements.) I
then adapted Frank Jackson’s statement of physicalism in such a way that the
circularity complaint against Jackson’s version is nullified.
I went on to anticipate three key challenges and problems for the view and
its foundational concepts, including challenges from pluralism and eliminativism
about information, and charges of token physicalism. Platonism, mathematical
ontic descent, and probabilism (statisticalism) were addressed in earlier chap-
ters.
I’m certainly not trying to argue for realism about information as some kind
of new element or natural kind. It is obviously not a parallel case to realism
about a new type of particle suggested to exist on the basis of the theoretical
work of particle physicists. It is, however, analogous (more than analogous) to
the idea of realism about I-obtaining structure. If information is or reduces
to I CICS, and if CICS reduces to and is identical to nonuniform fields, then
this reconciles with the idea that there can be no information transmission
without signal transmission through I-obtaining mediums, and the idea that
real information is intrinsically representational and thus semantic and must be
causally interactive in such a way that it can be thus transmitted.
So leave aside for the moment the question of whether ontic structural re-
alism or any structural realism is a correct scientific metaphysics. Regardless,
if information exists as a certain set of effects and outcomes associated with
and realised by CICS structures, and if structure is I real - then information is
arguably I real. The causally induced configuration of real I (field reducing)
structures is something real. Given the ubiquity of configurations of spacetime
and fields that are important in physics and in metaphysical observations moti-
vated by physics, information is also ubiquitous. It is and reduces to the causally
induced configuration of structure which - according to my radically minimalist
view - just is non-uniform I fields. These same fields are the basis of structured
causal pathways required for the transmission of a signal.
270 Chapter 7. An Informational Statement of Physicalism
Part IV
Conclusion
271

7.6 Conclusion 273
7.6 Conclusion
My overall objective has been the naturalisation of information on physicalist
and unusually reductive terms, but with deference to a scientific metaphysi-
cal outlook that incorporates defeasibility of contingent metaphysical posits in
keeping with the primacy of physics constraint. In name, the ontology sup-
port the naturalisation of information is FOSIR-CICS source ontology: the field
ontic structural informational realist, causally induced configuration of struc-
ture(s) (as) source(s) ontology. According to Steven French - we should read
our ontologies off our best scientific theories and can chose a-priori metaphysical
posits and representations if they are apt to the task of furnishing contingent
metaphysics. I agree with the first part of the conditional, with the additional
requirement that those structures thus regarded to be real should be informa-
tional and capable of sustaining transmission. I think that the second part of
the conditional statement probably involves a-priori metaphysical posits and
representations that are really significantly contingent My position is that it is
better to rely upon what science adduces is already probably in the ontology:
sources (stochastic processes) reducing (or in the real patterns sense - practically
supervening upon) bounded regions (including distributed regions) of dynamical
heterogeneous quantum fields and their ephemeral configurations.
According to James Ladyman, Don Ross, and Harold Kincaid, the world
is the totality of nonredundant physical I-existing (my notation - introduced
at 1.3) statistics, where those statistics are realised by stochasticity in re to/of
natural stochastic processes. Julian Barbour and I agree that the world is com-
prised of configured information sources, but we differ significantly about how
they have semantic content. Barbour’s approach regards natural information
as alethic and a truthbearer in accordance with earlier work by Fred Dretske,
H. P. Grice, and Stampe, 1977. I regard this as a conflation of the concepts of
a representation with that of information, and I have argued that representa-
tions, whilst also realised as CICS structures or structures that reduce to or else
supervene upon them.
However, deferring to the defeasibility of scientific theories and explanations
where these are the encoded representations of the I-universe in theory-models
and their various physical min-dependent lexical, computational, and diagram-
matic implementations: this does double metametaphilosophical duty. It allows
me to make identity statements (H2 4) that are not a-priori fixed claims but
contingent and revisable, and it thus helps me to avoid committing to the kind of
formalism driven ontological assertions from theory that tends to impose them
in an inappropriate way on the I-ontology.
It’s not been my project nor my intention to attempt to subsume all statistical-
quantitative and semantic theories, notions and conceptions of information un-
der some all-encompassing unifying theory. Certainly not at all levels of ab-
straction or explanatory levels. The reductive physicalist conception of infor-
mation and information realisation that I presented is not some overarching
theoretical abstracta or all-encompassing theoretical concept or construct that
unifies all theories of information at the level of their mathematical constructs
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and measures (Floridi, 2004a, Location 957.) My project has been to develop
a scientific realist metaphysics of information itself. In Chapters 1 and 2 I
established a metametaphysical and meta-philosophical basis and context for
my project: contingent, defeasible scientific metaphysics. I then adapted the
physicalist non-eliminative ontic-structural realism of the kind formulated and
favoured by James Ladyman, Don Ross and Steven French to produce OSIR:
ontic structural informational realism. I deferred to such NOSR as a correct
and scientifically coherent conception and definition of the kind of structure the
causally induced configuration of which I claim information reduces to: CICS.
According to this conception of NOSR, all structure is physical or reduces to
physical structure (French and Ladyman, 2003b, 17; Floridi, 2008a.)
I distinguished OSIR from ISR - Floridi’s informationist NOSR adaptation
- by demonstrating that OSIR is physicalist, non-transcendentalist, and reduc-
tionist, and by interpreting Floridi’s idea of a nonuniformity in a non-binary
way. I then added a defeasible scientific metaphysical ground for OSIR in QFT
by asserting a brute identity of the structure of OSIR and structures that re-
duce to nonuniform heterogeneous regions of the quantum field. I also made the
fairly radical adaptation to NOSR: I removed relations as the basis for struc-
ture(s), regarding them instead only as features of the structure. An important
feature of FOSIR is that no abstracta of any kind exist in the ontology to me-
diate the relation between I physical structure and formal structures. FOSIR
is anti-Platonist - as a scientific metaphysics. I used IBE/induction, defeasibil-
ity, and especially an indispensability argument in conjunction with a scientific
metaphysics.
The indispensability of information argument for realism about I-information
is not language-centric but contingent-concept centric (concepts adduced by sci-
entists from applied information theory and in scientific research), and I have
emphasised the salience of information concepts of various kinds (transmission,
codes, encoding, and processing) deployed in theories in physics and molecular
biology - especially where such involved a specifically physical structural onto-
logical commitment. As initially discussed at (Intro. §1 p16), it’s similar to
the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for realism about mathematical
entities (and also to the enhanced IA that takes explanatory power to be impor-
tant) but, in transitive combination with the inter-supporting but independent
argument from inference to the best explanation for CICS and F/OSIR, it de-
livers an in re physical realism about information. I consequently bit the bullet
(defeasibly in accordance with scientific metaphysical premises) on a brute iden-
tity between the quantum field and vacuum of QFT and the structure of NOSR
(OSIR) resulting in a field ontology called field ontic structural informational
realism: FOSIR (Chapter 3 and 6.)
I’ve agreed with Floridi’s assertion that no unifying conception or construc-
tive definition - no ‘ur-concept’ of information - is likely to be possible at the
level of mathematical models and representing formalisms (including unifying
formal measures) in different theories either practically or in principle. FOSIR
with CICS underdetermines all such models and measures, but is intended to
identify a necessary condition for all of them to be of or about information.
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In fact it requires the omission of statistical constructs from the definition and
conception of information and information realisation, with the possible excep-
tion of probabilities considered as physical and stochasticity considered as an
ineliminable property of dynamical systems or stochastic processes.
FOSIR with CICS does identify an objective, contingent, necessary ontic
reductive basis for information and the realisation of information (IS1 and IS2.)
It can be identified as the reductive basis of information in all of the above-
mentioned conceptions of information. Identifying the kind of structure that’s
ineliminable and present in the ontology of all quantitative and algorithmic con-
ceptions of information is necessary to determine the nature of the ontological
basis (or ground, if one insists) of information.
I argued that information encoding representing structures don’t encode all
of the content of the phenomena/dynamical process(es)/microsystem(s) under
investigation, and agreed with French and Van Fraasen there’s a partial isomor-
phism between formal representing structures and the I-obtaining structure. In
FOSIR, however, the latter is encoded variously from the former. Thus the
answer to the question of what the I structure actually reduces to, is that it
is - defeasibly - classical fields reducing to nonuniform heterogeneous regions
of the quantum field. Until science comes up with and experimentally verifies
or confirms something better. In Chapter’s 2 and 3 I rejected mathematising
ontologies like that of Tegmark, and modal interpretations of physicalist or sci-
entific metaphysical NOSR such as those of French and Esfeld. I rejected also
the objective statistical conception of L&R according to which the ground of
the ontology is irreducible stochasticity and thus statistics (the relationship or
identity between which I also questioned.) I bit the bullet about real structure
as being identical to and/or reducible to nonuniform heterogeneous regions of
the universal quantum field - defeasibly. In chapter 3 I went on to assert that I-
obtaining stochastic sources are the basis of the ontology - not their stochasticity
nor somehow statistics.
OSIR and FOSIR avoid the positing of abstract analytic constructs and var-
ious metaphysical ‘glues’ and intermediates abstracta like trope bundles and
property bundles (or the Kantian reification of structure that Cao mentions
above), and such things as infons They also deflect mathematisation of the I
world, and what I have termed formalism driven ontic collapse. The outcome
is that informational or information-bearing structure does not depend upon
relations, or mathematical relations or constructs. I suggested that the former
are features that can be picked out of I-obtaining structure by way of an encod-
ing process involving mathematics, computation, minds, and instruments. The
latter are abstract representations of complexes of heterogeneous I-obtaining
and nonI-obtaining structures which themselves reduces to complexes of CICS
structures coupled with or governed by nomic constraints (and in some cases
constructed rules - which also CICS-reduce.)
Important non-a-priori metaphysical results include the informational re-
statement of physicalism, which is comprised of the following.
A general metaphysical scientific contingent permitted statement of the ontic
basis of information:
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IS1 (Informational Structuralism 1) : Information is (reduces to
and is identical to) the causally induced configuration/arrangement
of any spatiotemporal structure, the configuration or arrangement
of which has been caused or causally induced by some other causal
spatiotemporal structure(s.) (CICS information hereafter.)
IS2 (Informational Structuralism 2) : I structure(s) reduce(s),
on a defeasible basis, to nonuniform heterogeneous regions of the
I-obtaining quantum field.
and an informational statement of the necessary condition for structure to
be real:
SIE (Structural-Informational Eleatic Principal): Structures are
to be counted as real if and only if they realise (CICS) information.
This was then further developed to produce:
EI (eleatic Information Principal or no Pseudo-information prin-
ciple): Information is to be counted as real if and only if it is re-
alised by causally active physical spatiotemporal structures (config-
ured bounded heterogeneous regions of the quantum field) in accor-
dance with FOSIR.
and finally:
1. ¦xIx (Premise: All existing structures realise (and can and do carry)
information)
2. ¦xIx   Px (Scientifically supported Hypothesis: Hyp): Only physical
structures can realise and carry information)
3. ¦xPx(1,2 MP: Only physical structures and structures that reduce to
physical structures are real.)
I combined the informationist version of NOSR that I developed with these
findings and with formalisms in classical and scientific information theory and
its applications to deliver the following as a basis for the I-obtaining ontology:
OSIR.1: The world (the set of real things/stuff) is the set of all
stochastic, dynamical (reducing to the ephemeral energetic excita-
tions in the combined quantum field and vacuum) CICS information
sources.
In Chapter 5 I argued that FOSIR-CICS information is intrinsically seman-
tic but non-alethic. It’s a truthmaker, not a truthbearer. I noted that several
philosophers have answered the apparent need for a theory of semantic informa-
tion by offering various theories of semantic information. According to Carnap
and Bar-Hillel’s offering the semantic information content of a sentence as given
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by the range of the negation of the formal state description that gives the con-
tent of the sentence. Luciano Floridi used the situation theoretic logic of Keith
Devlin in combination with an adaptation of the general definition of informa-
tion to deliver a data centric and atomistic conception of semantic information.
Floridi’s strongly semantic information is comprised of information atoms or
items of information called infons that are in turn comprised of data that must
be well formed according to some syntax, be truthful according to a veridicality
thesis, and be meaningful. Fred Dretske presents a theory in which semantic
information content reduces to intentionality of a signal towards the source that
produced it, plus a k-factor constituting what a reciever knows about a source. I
carried through arguments that these conceptions are either wrong ontologically,
or else they can be shown to reduce to CICS-FOSIR.
The argument makes reference to Carnap and Bar-Hillel’s conception of se-
mantic information, and to the later revisionary theory of Floridi (Floridi, 2004a;
Floridi, 2005a; Floridi, 2011b) The argument runs that only if one has some in-
formation does one have truth, and that there is no such thing as false informa-
tion - only what looks like real information encoded into messages that are not
causally linked with any real mind, language and representation independent
information source or sources. This I refer to as pseudo-information, follow-
ing the terminology of Floridi (Floridi, 2005a) and the conception of Dretske
(Dretske, 1981.) Dretske asserts that “false information and misinformation are
not kinds of information - any more than decoy ducks and rubber ducks are real
ducks” (Dretske, 1981, 45.) However, I go still further than both Dretske and
Floridi, since each theorist considers that information has an alethic value: it
is always true. I remove the concept of truth from information altogether, and
take information - per FOSIR and CICS - to be a special kind of truth-maker -
not a truth-bearer I argue that a representation of information from or at some
source - a representation realised using other information - is a true represen-
tation if there is a causally induced structural isomorphism between the source
structure (S) and the structure of (constituting, encapsulating, or embodying)
the representation ρiS.
There are scientific information-theoretic criteria for the identification of nat-
ural I-obtaining dynamical systems as information sources. The I CICS in re
physical realist about information has a scientifically coherent, contingent, and
defeasible story, based upon the combination of inference to the best explanation
with indispensability arguments (§1 p16), about how all real structures realise
information, and only physical structures are demonstrably information bear-
ing (§4.4 p162.) More importantly - the story is based upon the fact that when
mathematical collapse and formalism driven ontological descent are avoided in
formulating metaphysics from particle physics and cosmology: physical trans-
mission, signals, natural encoding, and generation of sequences of emissions or
signals with variously effective structures all (contingently) seem to I exist in
the systems in question just as much as structure does. In fact the presence of
the kind of I-existing structure that is proposed in physics is a sufficient con-
dition for the I existence of signals, emissions, information transmission, and
natural encoding by transduction and inducement of configuration. Reduction
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of signal transmission to continuous transmission of fluctuations in regions of
the quantum field is defeasibly a perfectly eligible contingent option for the I
basis for information transmission. Quantitative statistical measures of informa-
tion reduce to measures of stochastic patterns that emerge in such systems due
to nomic constraints in the I-existing systems that are the subject of scientific
study in physics and biology (and other hard and special sciences.)
So the outcome of approaching the metaphysics of information according to
OSIR plus QFT is an informational universe - but information is only at bottom
by dint of being an intrinsic feature of nonuniform regions of heterogeneous
fields (defeasibly.) I assume that when scientists talk about mind, theory, and
language independent structures of physical systems they are talking generally
about something that is very real in the ontology, but quite ubiquitous and with
different physical contexts. The structure of a physical system is an ineliminable
part of the physical system and its ontology. I’ve argued that such structure is
itself physical and that it should not be inflated with metaphysical quasi-logical
concreta-cum-abstracta (they are in fact ontologically ambiguous, rather than
defeasible) like tropes and bundles - or even relations - but directly explained
and described as reducing to fields. Fields are specific natural kind entities in
the I physical ontology of the world regarded on scientific realist terms and are
contingent in empirical scientific theories. Relations, objects, and information
all reduce to structure, but information is something more: it is the causally
induced configuration of structures that thus exist and thus reduce, or else
reduces to such. Such must really exist in the I ontology, otherwise signal
transmission would be - contingently - impossible.
I’ve to establish a reductionist ontology on scientific metaphysical premises
with regard to the existence of information, but for that to be defeasible in
terms of the reductive base. If fields stop being the best physical explanation
for, and ontological furniture of, quantum structure - supplanted by strings or
some modal reality - then the nature of information at bottom will have been
revised, but its status as the causally induced configuration of structure retained
(unless the latter is unworkable in the light of a change to the former.)
I have not discussed the philosophy of religion at all, but belief in the ex-
istence of supernatural entities tells us one thing very salient about the nature
of information. Even if a supernatural entity is a fiction (in the cases where
they are such) the belief and associated concepts reduce to structures that are
physically causally induced. Someone has to think up and write down a fiction
at some point, and although I have classified such as pseudo-informational and
constituted by virtual sources: neurological physical processing of physical infor-
mation is required to sustain such fictions (this is quite familiar from traditional
identity theoretic and epiphenomenal explanations of mind.) I have provided a
conception of intrinsically semantic causally induced information that explains
how the semantic content of such pseudo-sources obtains, but the most salient
outcome that I hope I have demonstrated is that even fictions that are in some
cases thought to be Platonic must reduce to physical information sources at
some level - or else they will simply not involve any information at all.
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